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Abstract
The Theages poses a number of problems for the interpreter of Plato 
and the Platonic dialogue. Traditionally, the most controversial one con­
cerns the authenticity of the work: is Plato its author, and what criteria may 
be considered valid and important for settling the debate over authorship? 
But there are numerous other questions of at least equal significance. 
What is the purpose for which this dialogue was written, and what is its 
meaning? Is it merely a patchwork, as is commonly assumed, or does it 
display a structural unity? How does the Socrates of this work compare 
with the same character in other Socratic compositions, and what literary 
qualities can be attributed to the author's portrayal of the dialogue's other 
personae? How are we to evaluate the lengthy section in IheTheages on 
Socrates' "divine sign"? When was this dialogue written? What is its 
relation to the other works in the Platonic Corpus, to Socratic literature 
generally, and to philosophical interests at the time of its composition?
The introduction and some of the appendices to this thesis attempt 
to offer answers to these questions, both through a comprehensive review 
and assessment of the critical literature on the Theages, and through the 
use of new evidence, argumentation, and interpretation. At the same time, 
a basis for the analyses offered here (and for future examinations of the 
Theages) is provided in this study by a detailed line-by-line commentary on 
the text. The text on which this commentary depends has been established 
from a fresh collation of all known manuscripts, early printed editions, and 
ancient testimonia, containing all or part of the Theages. This thesis 
represents the first attempt, in any language, to undertake the above 
programme of work on a definitive scale.
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lI. Structure and Purpose
a. Introduction
Over the past two centuries the Theages (Thg.) has been discussed 
and criticized in a number of articles, in general as well as specialized 
studies of Plato, in a single monograph, and in numerous critical editions of 
the dialogue. But in recent years it has excited only scattered serious com­
ment. Hence a casual observer might be led to infer that little more now 
needs to be said about Thg.-, and, indeed, an examination of most of the 
modern literature would probably drive one to the conclusion that some 
measure of scholarly orthodoxy as regards this dialogue has been 
achieved. Nevertheless, it is accurate to say that the most basic work on 
Thg. has not yet been attempted. For in making the question of the authen­
ticity of the dialogue almost the exclusive focus of their endeavours, schol­
ars have been led largely to ignore what is, or should be, of primary import­
ance, namely the detailed interpretation of the work from beginning to end, 
with a view to elucidating and determining, as far as possible, its meaning. 
We can hardly expect to be able to pronounce on the authenticity of Thg. 
until we have made an effort to know what its author’s intentions are, and 
what the purpose of the dialogue is. In examining Thg. (or, for that matter, 
any work of disputed authorship), there are issues which deserve to be 
given priority over the problem of authenticity.1
1On this methodology, see O. Gigon in Gnomon 27 (1955) 14-20 (a review of M. Soreth, 
Derplatonische Dialog Hippias maior [Munchen, 1953]); and for an appraisal and modifica­
tion of Gigon's statements, see Muller, Die Kurzdialoge 10-11 n.3.
An extended study of Thg. demands such an approach. Therefore, 
while the commentary which is included in this study is intended to provide 
much of the information on which an evaluation of the dialogue might be 
based, and certain introductory chapters seek to answer more specific 
questions about characterization, authenticity, date of composition, etc., it 
seems best to try to establish at the outset how the author set about 
composing this dialogue, and by what principles he was guided. Accord­
ingly, the following sections will focus on problems of structure, unity, and 
meaning in Thg. But in order to clarify the arguments that will be offered in 
these pages, it will be helpful, in anticipation of the detailed exegesis which 
follows, to sketch in a preliminary fashion what conclusions I have evoked 
from the evidence at our disposal.
Thg. divides naturally into two unequal sections, 121a1-128c8 and 
128d1-131a10; about this, at least, scholars seem to be in general agree­
ment. As to whether these two sections actually cohere logically and them­
atically there is less unanimity, and this problem, central to the whole issue 
of the purpose of the dialogue, will be fully treated below.2 The second of 
the above-mentioned sections, the rather lengthy description of the activ­
ities of Socrates’ divine sign, is one of two structural features of which a 
reader, familiar with the Platonic Corpus, is most likely to take particular 
note. The other feature is the presence in Thg. of so many apparent Plato­
nic borrowings, a few of which are almost verbatim extracts; in fact, some 
scholars have felt that there is justification in calling Thg. a cento. Not 
surprisingly, it is these two aspects of the dialogue that previous schol­
2For a detailed division of Thg. into various sections, see comm, ad 121a1-8, 121 b1 -122 
b1, 122b2-e1, 122e1-123b3, 123b3-e17, 124a1-e10, 124e11-125b4, 125b5-e7, 125e8- 
127d1, 127d2-128c8, 128d1-130e10, 128d1-129d8, 129e1-130e4, 130e5-131a10 (I 
have divided the dialogue up differently for the discussions in this chapter). For other div­
isions of the dialogue, see Pavlu 15-8; Souilhe 129-30; Kruger 9-11.
arship has concentrated its efforts upon, to the virtual exclusion of all else. 
Yet, taken by themselves, they tell us virtually nothing about the structure of 
Thg., and are of even less assistance as guides to the purpose of this 
work.3
In order to determine the purpose and meaning of Thg., its structure 
must be carefully examined and an attempt made to understand the way in 
which the two main portions of the dialogue relate to one another. For 
there has always been a tendency and temptation to claim that Thg. is 
somehow "about" Socrates' divine sign. Assertion is usually substituted for 
argument when the problem of subject matter is considered, and the belief 
that Socrates' divine sign, tel quel, is in some vague sense the crux of the 
whole matter has been expressed in its most extreme form in the thesis of 
H. Muller (469ff., 473-4), who held that Thg. is really the work of two hands, 
one of which completed what Plato had left unfinished at his death. 
Scholars who have approached Thg. in an analytic manner such as this 
maintain explicitly that the purpose of the dialogue is to relate stories about 
the divine sign; implicitly, they assume that Thg. possesses no unity, and 
that there is no means of connecting the earlier part with the later.4 It is no
3This is not to deny the importance in the interpretation of Thg. of parallels and topoifrom 
Platonic and Socratic literature generally, many of which will in fact be cited below as pro­
viding valuable clues to the meaning of the dialogue. The point is that, unless we are 
prepared to relate these potential borrowings to the context in which they occur, and 
attempt to discover the author’s reason(s) for the use of a particular Platonic passage or 
topos, the mere listing of such passages as evidence of the author's "copying" (a common 
practice) is of no substantive value for deciding authenticity, and is sure to be counter­
productive in our attempt to determine his meaning. Stefanini (1.28) comes close to 
recognizing this defect in methodology, though he tends to underestimate the degree to 
which other dialogues besides Ap. may help to clarify the meaning of Thg. F. Cairns 
{Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry [Edinburgh, 1972] 98-124) makes some 
pertinent remarks about the employment of topoi in ancient literature; his comments mostly 
concern poetry, but they may be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the use of topoi in prose as 
well.
4For some judgements on the theme and purpose of Thg. which reflect this approach, see 
(int.al.) Ast, Leben 495-6; Stallbaum 220; Steinhart 435; Wagner 3; Knebel 9; Taylor, PMV\fi 
532; Kruger 11.
wonder therefore that critics have, for the most part, been either baffled by 
its purpose, or appalled by its inconsequentially.5 Even those who have 
from time to time defended its authenticity have made little attempt to 
appreciate the work as a unity.6 One must, however, avoid the inclination 
to be purely destructive, for some suggestive lines of approach have been 
brought forward. But it ought to be said that the scholars who have con­
tributed to our understanding of Thg. have not subjected their assessments 
to any detailed investigation, nor have they recognized the full implications 
of their theories.
Thg. is not "about" Socrates’ divine sign in any strict sense. The 
lengthier first section of the dialogue introduces, and dispenses with, the 
possibility that the sophists will satisfy Theages’ desire to become crowds. 
This is achieved more through heavy-handed irony than carefully- 
reasoned dialectic. Here the process of question and answer is used to 
call into serious question the ethical content of the sophists' teaching. 
Next, the claims of the politicians of Athens to possess and teach crocjna 
are considered, but are swiftly rejected as well. Finally, one alternative is 
presented to replace the pseudo-ao<|)ia that other educators might offer, 
and this is Socratic association (cwoucria). Socrates redefines The­
ages' desire for ao<|na. as a desire to become cos peXTicrTOS, and pro­
ceeds to show, first, how some people who have associated with him have 
been affected by the occurrence of his divine sign, and second, how
5So, e.g., Hermann, Geschichte und System 427; Steinhart 435-9; Lamb 344.
6See Knebel (n.4 above); Grote 436ff.; Friedlander (148) makes a number of telling points, 
but again largely fails to relate the earlier pages of the dialogue to the section on the divine 
sign. Socher's discussion is little more than an attempt to refute a number of arguments 
against authenticity raised by Schleiermacher, Ast, and Stallbaum. For a list of upholders of 
authenticity see Intr. ch. IV, a.
others, through the agency of the divine sign, have actually improved by 
association with him.
If the dialogue is analyzed in this fashion, the section on the divine 
sign functions primarily for the sake of contrasting Socratic owoucria. with 
that of other individuals, notably sophists and Athenian ttoXitlkol. To 
the extent that Socrates emerges as the person with whom both Theages 
and Demodocus believe Theages will achieve what he desires, this 
dialogue may be considered apologetic: it is the sophists, not Socrates, 
who are likely to corrupt a young man like Theages, and from the outset of 
the dialogue care is taken to distinguish Socrates from the sophists; nor is 
there any efficacy in association with the ttoXitikoi. This message is 
emphasized the more strongly by the presentation of Socrates as the 
epamKos avrjp, who is concerned for the welfare of his young associate, 
in contrast with the sophists, whose main distinguishing feature is their de­
mand for money. Moreover, Socrates' ability to "help," "improve," or "make 
better" those who associate with him marks him out as the one genuine 
ttoXitikos, as that term is understood elsewhere in the Corpus. Thus he 
emerges as the individual best-suited to help Theages achieve his goal of 
becoming a ttoXltlkos, though of a far different kind from that which the 
young man envisaged at the outset.
b. Structure
i. Prologue: 121a1-122b1
Demodocus and his son Theages have come to Athens from their 
home in the coastal deme of Anagyrous (127e3), with the express purpose 
of finding an educator for Theages. This young man wishes to be en­
trusted to a sophist who, he believes, will make him crowds (121d4-6).
The introductory portion of the dialogue essentially belongs to Demodocus, 
whose extensive opening monologue conveys his trepidation about his 
son's desire, and elicits Socrates' advice on this problem.
A very limited range of observations tends to surface repeatedly in 
reference to the first page or so of Thg. By far most frequently, the dramatic 
setting of Thg. is said to be much like that of La., in so far as Demodocus 
shows the same concern and hesitation about his son's prospective 
welfare as Lysimachus does at the opening of the latter work (178a1- 
180a5), and, like Lysimachus, does so in a rather long-winded manner.7 It 
may or may not be the case that our author had La. in mind at this point; but 
the issue is not in itself of primary importance. For it appears as though we 
are dealing here with a topos in which a father asks Socrates for guidance 
on the education of his son. A similar situation arises in Euthd. where, at 
the end of the work (306d2ff.), Socrates offers words of encouragement 
and advice to Crito, who is at a loss as to how he might urge his son 
Critobulus to the pursuit of philosophy (compare also Socrates' direct 
questioning of Hippocrates at the beginning of Prt. [310a8-314c2] con­
cerning the latter’s education). The same theme was evidently taken up by 
Aeschines Socraticus in the fragmentary Aspasia (cf. fr. 17 [Dittmar]: Socra­
tes offers Callias advice about the training of his sons),8 and seems to 
have been adapted somewhat in his Miltiades.9 The best-known example
7See, e.g., Hermann, Geschichte und System 430; Bruns 345; Pavlu 25; Brunnecke 99­
102; Friedlander 147-8; Kruger 27-8; Souilh6 137; Robin 1642. G. Billings (The Art of 
Transition in Plato [Diss. Chicago, 1920] 16) calls the introduction of Thg. "purely conven­
tional," though it is never clear precisely what this label is intended to mean.
8See B. Ehlers, Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros (Munchen, 1966) 
35ff.
9Cf. frr. 37-8 (Dittmar) and POxy. 2889, 2890: Socrates, Euripides, and Hagnon deliberate 
(apparently; see S.R. Slings, ZAE16 [1975] 301-8) over the identity of the person who best 
deserves the epithet of the wisest man in Greece, and who would therefore be the right 
educator for Miltiades.
7of this, however, is the dramatic point of departure of Aristophanes' Nu.'. 
Strepsiades wishes to learn from Socrates how his son may gain from 
education in the phrontisterion.™
This evidence points to the strong possibility that the dramatic 
setting of Thg. is formulaic.10 1 It seems unnecessary therefore to pursue 
any further the similarity of this part of the dialogue with the corresponding 
section of La., as the similarities seem to be generic rather than specific, 
and the parallels which can be cited are mostly superficial.12 But there are 
other features in the opening part of Thg., which, though overlooked for the 
most part by critics, will prove much more important for a critical under­
standing of the rest of the work.
It is necessary, first of all, to consider the arrival of Demodocus and 
his son in Athens after a journey of some distance, for the purpose of en­
listing someone to educate Theages (first established in 121d2). This dra­
matic mise en scene creates a stereotypical situation: the country dweller, 
armed with his peculiar set of assumptions, confronts the very different 
attitudes which characterize those who inhabit the city. This contrast, or 
conflict, between country and city, is an opposition which in Greek literature 
finds its most poignant expressions in comedy (again, Ar. Nu. suggests
10Cf. also the situation in Aristophanes' first play AaiTctXeis (frr.198-244 Kock).
11 And perhaps remained so, cf. Lucian's adoption of this dramatic setting in Somn. (init.).
12This is especially true of the respective characterizations of Demodocus and Lysimachus, 
see Intr. ch. Ill, c. The numerous parallels that Brunnecke (99-102) draws between La. and 
Thg. can hardly be taken as proving the dependence which he believes to be so manifest; 
so, e.g., the use of €TTL(j.e\rief]vaL Thg. I21d4 and La. 179a5 (see also comm, ad 122 
b6-8, 131a4-6).
8itself).13 Although this opposition may be exploited in a given instance for 
a number of purposes, one that is prominent is an author’s desire to con­
trast the traditional values of the countryside and its inhabitants, with the 
new and revolutionary ideas that tend to take hold and have a corrupting 
effect in the city, especially with regard to upbringing and education. Here 
Demodocus represents the rural way of life, and his rusticity is presented 
most forcefully (but not only, see lntr. ch. Ill, c) through his early simile of 
plant-rearing and child-rearing (121 b1 -c5): when pressed into describing 
the gravity of his situation, Demodocus immediately falls back upon an 
analogy with the toil of a farmer; he cannot help but view the world in this 
way.14 His attitude towards the sophists, moreover, reflects a generally 
traditional and reactionary disposition: all he knows, apparently, is that a 
sophist is a professional who claims to be able to make a student crowds, 
but is not to be trusted too readily (see lntr. ch. Ill, c); the thought that his 
son wishes to be trained by them causes fear in him (121c5, c7); and a 
tinge of contempt may be noted in his voice when he refers to them (see 
comm. ac/122b5-6). But the portrayal of Demodocus is not unsympathetic, 
for in giving priority to the well-being of his son over any financial 
considerations (121 d6-122a1), he is ranging his values in a way that 
elsewhere in the Corpus evokes the admiration of Socrates, who voices 
alarm that a father should care for money and how his sons will be as rich
13Forthis stock theme see V. Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophanes2- (Oxford, 1951) 82­
9; R.L. Hunter, The New Comedy of Greece and Rome (Cambridge, 1985) 109-13; Dover, 
GPM112-4; and on Plato’s relationship to comedy and comic expression, see W.C. Greene, 
HSCP3'\ (1920) 62-123; E. Hoffmann, Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung 2 (1947) 
472ff. Others, not surprisingly, have compared the dramatic setting of Thg. with that of Nu., 
e.g. Kruger 27; Carugno 8 n.1; C.W. Muller 135; Pangle 149-50, 152 (who, in being driven 
by the comparison to assert [152] that "Plato presents in the Theages his most direct dram­
atic reply to the Clouds," introduces a thesis with which I cannot agree; Did Plato ever feel 
compelled even to "reply" to Aristophanes? See further DeVries, Mnem. 4.26 [1973] 1-8).
14See lntr. ch. Ill, c. The husbandman's bemoaning of the hardship of his way of life is a 
commonplace; see Ehrenberg, op. cit. 88-9.
as possible, yet neglect at the same time the education of these sons (see 
comm, ad 121d6-122a1; Intr. ch. Ill, c). Opposite Demodocus, and under­
lining the implicit tension in the dramatic circumstances of the dialogue the 
more clearly, are the "new" educators, the sophists, to whom Theages 
wishes to be handed over (121d5, 122a6).
It is clear that, whatever may be the connection of the opening of 
Thg. with other Platonic literature, it is not merely one of slavish imitation of 
any particular dialogue, not simply an attempt to do what Plato (if different 
from our author) had done more effectively elsewhere. The originality of 
our author at this point lies precisely in his looking outside of Socratic 
literature to a commonplace of Athenian social values, most recognizable 
to us through a topos of comic literature. And by the use of this device he is 
able to establish at once an antipathy towards the sophists and new 
education in general, of the kind that is raised explicitly by individual 
characters in other dialogues,15 quite apart from the many notes of implicit 
disparagement that we encounter.
Between the traditional way of life of Demodocus and that repre­
sented by the sophists, the future of Theages hangs in the balance. At this 
stage in the dialogue any information about what Theages himself has to 
say is restricted to Demodocus' reports. Above all, we are told, Theages 
desires to become crowds (121 d1, where gjs makes crowds yev~
eaOaL look like the quotation of an incantation by Theages). This aspir­
ation must have been typical of many young men in Athens in the fifth and 
fourth centuries, and in many circumstances may be expected to have 
contained a political dimension (see comm, ad 121 d1); indeed, as we shall 
see, Socrates does assume that the political dimension is part of Theages'
15Cf. e.g. Prt. 314d2ff. (cf. also 316d3ff., 318d7ff.), Men. 91 c1ff.
10
desire for ao<|na. But Demodocus' exceedingly vague use of crowds in 
121 d1 (the first appearance of the word in the dialogue) betrays the fact 
that neither he nor Theages, whose words he is reporting, have a firm 
grasp of what the attaining of ao<|uct might, in the present circumstances, 
possibly entail. Demodocus does not attempt to qualify his initial use of 
crowds, and Theages is undoubtedly no more certain of what the desire to 
become crowds involves (though his conception is clarified further on in 
the dialogue). Significantly, Theages himself has never met a sophist, but 
has based his comments on the reports of friends who have made a trip to 
Athens before him (121d1ff.). Demodocus perceives that there are 
dangers involved in Theages’ desire to become crowds, but he is little 
more specific about these dangers than he is about his notion of what it 
actually means for his son to become "wise" or "clever." It seems reason­
able to suppose that his trepidation about Theages' becoming crowds has 
been conditioned by an innate, though unelaborated, suspicion of cro<j)- 
icjTai. As Demodocus sees it, Theages runs the risk of being corrupted 
by continuous association with a sophist who has not passed his own 
scrutiny (122a3-5); and that is virtually all we are told.16 His characteriz­
ation of Theages' desire for cro^ta as otjk ccyevvqs, a<()0cXcpa Se (121 
c7-8) does not take us much further (see comm, ad loc.), although it does 
draw our attention to the inherent ambiguity of the terms crowds and 
ao<j)toc.
16Apart from reflecting a general distrust of what he does not fully understand, Demodocus' 
words could well be taken simultaneously as the expression of a father who feels ambiva­
lence upon watching his son about to enter into a conventional epacFTfjs-epajpevos1 
relationship: ambivalence, because of gratification, on the one hand, over the benefit his 
son may receive, and because of fear, on the other, that his son may be corrupted (see 
Dover, GH 81-91). Such a mundane process of thought would indicate (and this in any 
event must be the author's intention) that Demodocus has not extricated himself from 
conventional ways of thinking.
11
Hence Theages' desire to become crowds is thematic to the dia­
logue, at a dramatic level, because it furnishes Demodocus with the reason 
why he must ask for Socrates' advice. But at the same time it provides a 
motive for Socrates' questioning of Theages, since it is evident at once that 
Socrates will need clarification about the meaning of Theages' unqualified 
desire for cro4>£a. The issue of ao<t>ia. is given a prominence which would 
seem to indicate that it is central to the dialogue as a whole.
What position, then, does Socrates assume within the rural-urban 
opposition sketched above, on the one hand, and Theages' vague desire 
to become "wise," on the other? Clearly he stands, at first, as somewhat of 
a mediator. It is likely that Demodocus has come with his son to Athens 
with the prior intention of asking for Socrates' help (see comm. ac/121a1 
eSedjjLT)v), and Socrates is greeted enthusiastically at this chance meet­
ing, first upon Demodocus' catching sight of him (121 a1 ff.), and later, at the 
end of Demodocus' monologue (I22a6-b1), as the one person who can 
relieve a distressed father of his fears.17 It is possible the sophists may 
corrupt young men, but Socrates, who sacrificed his life to such a charge 
(and Demodocus' words in 122a4-5 inevitably call to mind the very similar 
accusations brought against Socrates in his indictment, see comm, ad 
122a4, and sec. c below), is evidently seen by Demodocus as the person 
who can best help his son avoid such corruption. Moreover, that his advice 
is solicited so eagerly by Demodocus is a hint that Socrates holds an hon­
oured place, for not only is advice "a sacred thing," according to the pro­
verb that Socrates quotes, but Demodocus himself describes Socrates’ 
chance appearance in terms that suggest the arrival of a god (see comm.
17For Demodocus' relief at being able to consult with Socrates, see comm, ad 122a7 
(Trapec|)dpr|S), 122a9-b1,127b3 (eppctiov).
ad 122a7). He is therefore intended to be viewed as quite distinct from the 
class of educators about whom Demodocus feels so much hesitation and 
doubt
But, despite this medial position which he occupies, Socrates is 
himself engaged in a separate conflict of sorts from the very outset of Thg. 
This conflict, sketched merely in outline at first, but gaining in clarity as the 
dialogue progresses, involves the opposition of TraiSict and CTro'uSfj, 
and is familiar from many Platonic contexts.18 Here it embraces Socrates 
on one side, and Demodocus and (later) Theages on the other. The author 
wastes little time in conveying Demodocus’ attitude of seriousness. His 
first halting words - the first words of the dialogue - communicate the sin­
cerity of his trepidation, and his anxieties are further articulated in the 
course of the monologue which follows shortly after.19 Socrates' cast of 
mind is first represented by his response, which I have characterized as 
ironic (see Intr. ch. Ill, a), to Demodocus' opening words; in his tone and 
general disposition, Socrates in this dialogue is the very antithesis of 
Demodocus and Theages. The Trai8id“O‘Trou8T) theme will be devel­
oped in greater detail below.
If this opening section of Thg. may be characterized in any particular 
way, it should be said that it is dominated by signs of Demodocus' con­
fusion and suspicion, as one might expect if the first page or so is inter­
preted, as I have done here, as a confrontation of the traditional with the 
novel. Theages wishes to become crowds, and this is seen to be possibly 
good or possibly bad; the ambiguity of the word, and Demodocus' ambi­
valence towards this desire, is emphasized. Theages wants his father to
180n TrctiSbct and o'TrouS'q in Plato, see Guthrie, HGPIV. 56-66 (with reff. on 59 n.2).
19See comm. ac/121a1, a2-3, and Intr. ch. Ill, c.
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entrust him to one of the sophists, who are to Demodocus an unknown 
quantity. Demodocus' difficulty is such that he needs advice from Socra­
tes. But he indicates that he is clear on one matter: Socrates is not to be 
confused with these sophists, and if anyone will corrupt, it is they, not he. 
The dialogue will return to this important topic. But for now, it will be seen 
that Demodocus' opening monologue anticipates many of the develop­
ments in the dialogue as a whole.
//. Socrates and Demodocus: 122b2-e1
Having listened to Demodocus' anxieties about his son's future, 
about sophists, and about crocjua, and having had the request made of 
him to advise about Theages' education, Socrates proceeds to behave in a 
characteristic manner. First, he calls attention, quite emphatically,20 to 
something to which he will return periodically through the rest of the dia­
logue, namely the fundamental importance of education and the care that 
one should take over it. Next, he underlines the need for him and Demo­
docus to reach agreement on their proposed subject of discussion. This 
latter point seems reasonable enough to Demodocus, but Socrates has 
another suggestion to make: they must first determine exactly what it is that 
Theages desires (122d2-4).
The dialogue would appear to falter slightly at this stage, in so far as 
Socrates so promptly casts aside the agreement he has just made with 
Demodocus concerning their commitment to begin discussion from agreed 
premises, in favour of making the same commitment with Theages. In fact, 
Socrates' adjustment is perfectly understandable. In dramatic terms, it 
allows the author to introduce Theages into the dialogue, and this is done
2°Cf. 122b2 ’AXAa pei> Srj and Kat.. .ye (see comm, ad loc.).
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by means of typically Socratic ttociSloc.21 Much more importantly, how­
ever, the adjustment indicates where Socrates' priority lies in terms of the 
deliberation about education which he has placed in such high esteem just 
a moment ago, for it is clearly his concern above all to consult directly with 
the young man himself whose future is at stake; consultation only with his 
father will simply not do. Socrates establishes at once that his main pre­
occupation on the question of education is with Theages; there is nothing 
impersonal about education in the form in which he considers that it ought 
to be pursued. Demodocus had originally approached Socrates with a 
request for a private discussion (121 a1f.), but the dialogue evolves into 
something quite different.
The introduction of Theages will effectively remove Demodocus from 
the course of discussion for the time being, and allow for a transition in the 
movement of the work. But Socrates first requires one more piece of in­
formation from Theages' father, i.e., the name of his son. Some objections 
among commentators have been provoked by the way in which Socrates 
puts his request for information here (122d6). There is, however, no 
reason to trouble over these lines, since their tone is highly Socratic, both 
in the interest in male beauty that they reflect, and in the sportive flavour of 
the words (more TToeiSia; see comm. ad122d6, d9, e1). We may also note 
that elsewhere in the Platonic Corpus Socrates, as here, seems to employ 
etymology for its own sake, and that this sometimes involves a proper 
name (see comm. ac/122e1 lepoiTpeTTes).22
21 For the characteristically Socratic "one small change," see comm ad 122c8.
22Some critics are inclined to find important thematic significance in Theages' name (e.g. 
Friedlander 147; Pangle 153), but, whatever may be the value of this hermeneutical tech­
nique, the precise meaning of the name is in fact uncertain (see comm, ad 122e1).
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The interplay in this brief section between Socrates and Demodocus 
serves a couple of functions. First, it allows the author to present Socrates 
at once in a guise that the reader will recognize from other Platonic litera­
ture. Second, and somewhat more importantly, it enables Socrates to 
modify and delineate the perspective from which Theages’ desire to be­
come crowds is to be examined, for Socrates here emphasizes the value 
of direct contact with the young man, while the importance of Demodocus’ 
apprehension of the present situation is, at least for the time being, limited.
iii. Socrates,Theages, and cro(f>tot (pt. 1): 122e 1 - 124e 10
Socrates' first address to Theages (122e1-3), prefigured by his 
request for the young man's name, serves to sum up ostensibly the two 
main issues of the dialogue: Theages wishes to become crowds, and to 
be entrusted to a person who will make him so. Socrates is reiterating 
points that were touched upon by Demodocus in his monologue (e1-2 
eTrieu(jL€Li?.. .crowds yevecrOoti ~ 121 d1, e3 octtis ac ao<)>dv ttol” 
rjcrci ~ 121d5-6). But Socrates, just as he had earlier sought to turn the 
conversation away from Demodocus towards Theages, now carefully 
seeks assent and confirmation from the young man on both the main 
issues. Theages' acknowledgement of Socrates' question (122e4) thus 
confirms all the information already provided by Demodocus.
122e5ff. seem to be little more than a further display of Socratic play, 
as Socrates forces Theages essentially to admit that, since the cro<j>oi are 
CTTLO‘Tfj|jLovcs, and since Theages himself has learned the €TrtcyT'rt(jLCXL 
of letters, music, etc., he too must be eTriaTrjjjLtov, i.e., crowds. Certainly 
there is a teasing irony in Socrates' words, and structurally we may think of 
other dialogues in which the earliest discussion is conducted on an appar­
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ently trivial level (see comm, ad 122e1-123b3). But this very brief ques­
tioning of Theages is a necessary elaboration of Theages' avowed desire 
to become crowds. Any reader would have recognized that this desire, 
simpliciterjs intolerably vague and uninformative. Indeed, to determine 
more accurately what ao<j>ia Theages desires is the task that Socrates 
quite naturally sets for himself in the next several pages; and 122e5ff. are 
the first stage in the process of elucidation. But the way in which they fulfil 
this role has, it seems, gone unnoticed.
Socrates plays here upon the assumption that, having learned to 
become proficient in the curriculum of the typical Athenian "primary" educa­
tion (122e10-11 ypctpipLOGTOC.. .aywviotv), one may possess all the €tti- 
CTTrj|JT) that one will ever need; for he frames the question which follows 
Theages' acknowledgement that he has been schooled in this curriculum 
in the form "Do you think [sc. having learned the above skills] that you still 
(ctl) lack..." (123a1-2). The process of argument has more than passing 
significance, since the traditional attitude was that this kind of conventional 
education surely was all that might be required to make a person crowds, 
and, for that reason, ready to handle the affairs of the state. Doubtless we 
may believe that a man like Demodocus thinks this is all his son requires, 
and had not previously countenanced the idea that Theages might wish to 
gain further education, above and beyond that which has been provided to 
him. That Socrates is playing upon these traditional assumptions through 
his initial interrogation of Theages is all but confirmed by his reference 
(122e9-10) to the class oi kclXoi Kaya0OL, which denotes the very 
people who are likely to consider the education Socrates is mentioning as 
the exclusive property of their sons, and as practically sufficient for all their 
needs. Theages' dismissal of Socrates' suggestion is significant for its im-
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plicit denial of an outlook which his father would undoubtedly espouse. 
Again, it becomes evident that Theages stands at a crucial point: he lacks 
aocjnct, and recognizes this lack, but where will he obtain it from, and of 
what will it consist?
Here some aspects of another dialogue must be considered for the 
light that they shed on the passage presently under discussion. Very early 
in Ale. I, Socrates infers that Alcibiades intends to advise the Athenians in 
assembly within a short time (106c4ff.). Socrates rightly assumes that 
Alcibiades' previous training has followed exclusively the conventional 
Athenian series of subjects, ypappctTa kocl KieoipiCciv Kai TraXaiciv 
(106e6). Yet in spite of (or, indeed, because of) this limited background, 
Alcibiades has been confident up to now about his ability to become a 
statesman; and it is only through cXeyxos that Socrates forces Alcibiades 
to recognize his ignorance, and to realize that no advantages of class, 
education, or upbringing are sufficient to ensure the kind of knowledge to 
which he lays claim (118b4ff.). Alcibiades is taught the need to "know 
himself" (129a2-10).
As in Ale. I, Socrates' allusion to Theages' education occurs early in 
Thg., and, consequently, scholars have assumed our author's depen­
dence on Ale. I. In isolation, the presence of virtually identical lists of 
school subjects proves nothing, as the curriculum thereby denoted was a 
standard one and the same catalogue of subjects occurs frequently in 
Plato and other authors.23 But the mention of the curriculum early in both 
dialogues does invite a comparison of the function which the reference to it 
performs in each case. For whereas Alcibiades reckoned that his back­
23See comm, ad 122e10 for other parallels, as well as for the commentators who have con­
nected Thg. and Ale. / on the basis of this passage.
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ground was sufficient to prepare him for a political life, and acknowledged 
no further requisite skills, Theages at least admits that a certain ciuarnpri 
or ao<j)LCC is lacking in him, and realizes that what he has thus far accom­
plished simply will not suffice. One might say that Theages has the advan­
tage of recognizing his own ignorance, and is therefore not a replica of the 
Alcibiades of Ale. /, as is sometimes believed (see Intr. ch. Ill, b). In view of 
this, if the author of Thg. has drawn upon Ale. I at this point, he has not 
done so in meek imitation. If anything, comparison between the two dia­
logues on this particular issue mainly serves to distinguish from one 
another the attitudes that the two young men have about themselves in 
their respective dialogues.
This distinction between personalities will go some way to explain 
an important structural characteristic of Thg. The argument in the sections 
of this dialogue which I have classified as iil-v (122e1-127a7) is unlike that 
of numerous other Platonic dialogues, including the doubtfully Platonic Ale. 
/,24 in as much as Socrates here makes no effort to convince Theages of 
his own ignorance. Section vdoes end, it is true, in a very modified kind of 
ccTTOpia (see sec. b, vbelow). But there is no reason for Socrates here to 
convict Theages of apccOia, as he does, for example, with Euthyphro, 
Meno, and Alcibiades, in fulfilment of his "mission" (cf. Ap. 22e6-23c1). 
Theages is a somewhat different sort of interlocutor for Socrates, because 
he does not exhibit the same pretensions that others do. Considerable 
hope might be held out for him: knowing that he is not crowds, he is 
instead at the critical stage of considering how he will attain to this level. 
This, then, is the problem that Socrates must consider along with Theages, 
rather than trouble himself over the preliminary confuting of his respondent.
240n the authenticity of this dialogue, see Intr. ch. V, g.
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Theages’ early admission of ignorance also accounts for another 
difference from early, Socratic dialogues. Unlike other dialogues, in which 
Socrates encounters a person who claims to possess a certain skill or 
virtue, and then asks him (without positive result) to define that skill or 
virtue (e.g. La., Lys., Euthphr., Men.), Socrates is here relieved of any need 
to frame his discussion explicitly in the "what is x?" form so common 
elsewhere.25 True, in 123a4, in response to Theages’ admission that he 
does lack some eTrierTrj|jr|, Socrates asks Tis ecrTiy at)rq;; but that is 
as close as he ever comes to putting his words in a form that remotely calls 
to mind questions which elsewhere explicitly seek a definition. Rather, his 
question here has greater immediacy, for it means, in effect, "what is the 
eTCiaTqpT|/cro(|Ha you desire" (although the question turns out not to be 
as simple as Theages, or the reader, may have originally imagined; see 
sec. b, iii-v). The dialogue is rather more thematic than aporetic.
Theages’ answer to Socrates’ Tis eaTiv ocutt); question in 123a4 
nevertheless adds a new dimension to the dialogue. As we saw a moment 
ago, Theages in this work does not suffer from the delusion displayed by 
some of Socrates’ other interlocutors, of claiming expertise in a certain 
ethical or intellectual body of knowledge. He is, however, under a different 
kind of mistaken impression. He claims to know precisely what he desires, 
to have told his father about this often, and, for all of that, to have been 
denied any access to a teacher (123a5-8).26 At this point Socrates’ pre­
sent task is clarified: Theages believes that his desire to become crowds is 
a straightforward one, easily fulfilled by none other than a sophist, but
25Although it should be added that the question "what is x?" is far from the only kind with 
which Socrates is concerned in the early dialogues (see Robinson, PED2 49), and the 
absence of it in Thg. is therefore in itself no indication of spuriousness.
26For misunderstandings of this passage, see comm. ad123a5-8.
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nonetheless frustrated by his father.27 Yet, as the conversation unfolds, 
Socrates proves that the matter cannot be as Theages thinks.
The interrogation of Theages which now follows requires comment 
on certain points. To begin with, we must look at the question and answer 
sequence between Socrates and Theages, which commences immediate­
ly from the use of analogies with various crafts. Craft-analogy is, of course, 
one of the features most typical of Socratic elenchus, and for that reason its 
application here is, in itself, unremarkable. But the use to which the craft- 
analogies are actually put is nevertheless peculiar. From the outset, the 
kinds of craft to which Socrates compares the ao<f>ioc that Theages desires 
are carefully restricted; for the erosion, Socrates names are such as to 
denote exclusively skills to which the concept of "command" or "supervise" 
might be applied. First the narrower verb Kupepvav is used (123b4, c2), 
but this yields shortly after to the more general fipyeiv (123d9, d13, e1, 
e8, e12, 124a6, 8, b2). This application of craft-analogy is peculiar be­
cause it confines the ao<j)LOC which Theages desires to one specific sphere 
of activities, while suppressing mention of any other possible kinds of 
cro<$>£a. This is curious, since croc^ia possessed a very wide field of re­
ference beyond the one set forth here: besides the capacity "to rule/ 
command/ supervise," it could indicate, for example, simply a practical or 
prudential sagacity, or the knowledge and ability to perform some epyov 
or produce some artifact.28 Socrates, in other words, is scarcely surveying 
the full range of meanings for this elusive term. This is enough to encour­
age the supposition that there is more to the present argument than might
27Socrates emphasizes the adversarial disposition of Theages towards his father on this 
point by his use of metaphors and language of litigation (see comm. ac/123b1, b1-2, b2).
28See also comm. ad121d1.
initially be imagined, and it is therefore necessary to look in greater detail 
at 123b3ff.
Socrates' first analogy, in his attempt to elicit the name of the <ro<|>ia 
Theages desires, is constructed with reference to the ao4>£a by which one 
commands or steers ships (toc ttXoloc KUpcpvcnorv 123b3-4 = Ktipep— 
Kr|TiKrj b7); his second with reference to the cro^icc by which one steers 
chariots (toc appccTOC KUpepwarv 123c2 = t]Vloxikt) c4). One reason 
(among many) that several scholars have adduced for athetizing Thg. is 
the persistence of the verb KUpepvccv in these two analogies; they object 
that in the second analogy the use of the verb is "un-Platonic," or poetic, or 
both.29 I shall not defend the text against the strictly linguistic argument 
that this raises, as this has been done at length in the commentary (ad 
123c2). However, it must be emphasized that the difficulties which have 
been expressed about phraseology completely misapprehend the point of 
Socrates' present argument, and result merely from a failure to examine 
closely what he is trying to accomplish here. What is significant is that 
Socrates' first two analogies both involve the use of the verb KUpepvctv, 
even though this produces a somewhat metaphorical construction in the 
second instance. Now the words KUpepvav, KUpepvTiTrjs, and KUpep™ 
vriTiKrj hold a special place in the field of Socratic and Platonic ana­
logies. Where they occur, it is very often in connection with discussions 
about the political craft, as in metaphors of the "ship of state," or where a
21
29Brunnecke's comment (103) is rather typical: "Id porro monere licet, quomodo imitator ab 
exemplo e navigatione sumpto transitum muniverit ad novum idque ex arte equos moder- 
andi petitum. Fit verbis inusitatis appaTa Kupepvav et iis quidem maioris momenti ad 
Academicorum (illius aetatis) docendi rationem inlustrandam. Tantum enim abest, ut magi- 
ster statim novis notionibus afferendis discipuli animum perturbet, ut verbis paene ridiculo 
modo conectendis ab uno ad alterum exemplum paulatim transitum munire conetur, veter- 
ibus notionibus quoad fieri potest retentis." I cannot share Briinnecke's confidence that 
Socrates' method of argument is evidence for the dialogue’s date of composition.
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ruler is likened to the state's "helmsman." The most famous example of this 
is in the parable of the ship of state in R. 488a7-489a2, but there are 
numerous others.30 Hence the most logical explanation for the twin use of 
KU(3epvav in Thg., and for the prominence given to the verb, is, I think, that 
the political metaphor underlies the language in use here.31 Socrates, it 
would seem, is tacitly attempting to narrow down the collet which Thea­
ges desires to the concept of ttoXitlkt), by introducing, exclusively at this 
stage, the notion of helmsmanship. Such an interpretation of these lines 
makes Socrates' examination of Theages coercive from the outset, in that 
Socrates is excluding all other forms of acxjna. from Theages' purview. 
But Socrates is reasoning ad hominerrr. he has met other young men in 
Theages' position, and quite naturally assumes that what he is really 
seeking is the skill required to make him a success in public life; thus he 
understandably feels no need to waste time eliminating all other possi­
bilities.
Socrates' subsequent request for the name of the crocjnot which 
Theages has in mind (123c6-10) shows a typical Socratic demand for 
precise specification, without unnecessary circumlocution, of the subject at 
hand. The answer he wants from Theages is clearly ttoXltikt], or even 
(on the basis of his previous examples) T) tcov avepciJTrujv KUpcpVT)— 
tikt) (cf. Clit. 408b3). However, Socrates is frustrated in this, as Theages 
can manage nothing better than the answer "crocjua" (123d1 -2). So far, 
the process of investigation has been of a kind exceedingly familar from 
Socratic dialectic: two cases are introduced, leading to a coordinate pro­
30See comm. ad123c2; also R. Bambrough, "Plato’s Political Analogies" in Plato: A Collec­
tion of Critical Essays II, ed. G. Vlastos (Notre Dame, 1978) 192-6.
31Pangle (153-5) seems to be thinking roughly along these lines, but his over-interpreta­
tion leads, it seems to me, to a curious distortion of Socrates' choice of analogies.
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position.32 But, as Theages remains confused even at this elementary 
level, Socrates proceeds to a still simpler and lengthier series of examples. 
He does away with any metaphorical obfuscation by withdrawing the term 
KUpepycty and replacing it with the wider ocpxeiv instead, and shows that 
there are many kinds of cro<|>ict that involve the principle of apyeiv (here 
he recurs, for his first two cases, to the previous examples of Kupepi/ri" 
tikt) and tivlox^kt], though chiastically arranged [T|Piox^ta 123d3, 
Kupepd11]). Since it is a specific kind of cro<|>ia, that they are 
concentrating upon, Socrates seeks to distinguish the various cro<|>iocl 
according to that which each cro^ia aims to control.33 Theages has no 
difficulty in naming ot avepcoTrot as the subject matter of the cro^ioc he 
desires (123e2), but that is still too wide for Socrates. Soon, however, 
Theages gratefully endorses Socrates’ suggestion that what he means in 
fact is that he desires the co^loc by which he might rule all the people in 
the city (124b5-9) 34 Still, Socrates is not finished with this line of thought. 
Through five separate parallel examples, Socrates demonstrates that "to 
rule everyone in the city" was exactly what various tyrants did, and, again 
eliciting a precise name from Theages, forces him to acknowledge, re­
luctantly, that the cro<jna he desires is TUpavviKT), and that he is thus 
destined to become a TUpotwos.
It is perhaps understandable (though symptomatic of the neglect 
with which this dialogue is treated) that commentators generally view all 
this as little more than absurd play on Socrates' part. Certainly Socrates'
32See Robinson, PEE? 33-5.
33This involves Socrates in the use of some fairly strained analogies, on which see comm. 
acM24a5-8.
34For the argument that 123d3-124b3 contains considerable extracts from examples given 
in Ale. I, see comm. acf123d1-2.
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reduction of Theages’ desire for ao<|na to a desire for TupavviKfj is 
ironic, and may be taken as another sign of the TrcuSict by which he is 
characterized in this dialogue. But this will hardly do as a full explanation 
of Socrates’ aims, and it would be well to look to the earlier mention of the 
sophists for a clue (see sec. b, i). Socrates had accepted Demodocus’ 
report that Theages wishes to apply to a sophist, and he structures his 
interrogation of Theages on this assumption. The development of the 
argument whereby TToXiTiKrj, first interpreted discreetly as metaphorical 
KupepVT|TiKfj, becomes a function of otpxeiv, and is in turn distorted into 
TUpavviKrj, is a manifestation of dialectical TraiStd which can be par­
alleled from other contexts: Socrates accepts unqualifiedly the words of an 
interlocutor, and presses the consequences of these words to the logical 
limit (see n.48). But in this instance Socrates’ TrociSict is particularly 
pointed if it is taken at the same time as an earnest parody of the sophistic 
basis of morality. Sophistic relativity advocated, or could be seen to advo­
cate, that terms such as cro<jna and TroXiTLKfj were content-neutral; the 
conventional significance of the term could be transvalued according to the 
user's beliefs and set of assumptions. Thus here the equation of ttoAl” 
TiKvj (implicitly put forward) with TUpavviKT) represents a cynical dis­
tortion which comes vividly to life in some of Plato’s most impassioned 
writing, and in characters who are either themselves sophists, or reveal 
sophistic influence, and who actually believe that TUpavvLKTi (i.e., 
apx^iv simpliciter) is the only form of ttoXltlkt) worthy of the name. So, 
for instance, Callicles, who is not a sophist, but bases his view of the good 
life on the notion that the man who is just (jruaci will achieve dpeTrj 
through the removal of all restrictions on his freedom, envisages Tupav-
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vis or 8waaT€ia as a fitting goal (Grg. 491 e5-492c8);35 Thrasymachus, 
who is a sophist, holds that justice is the interest of the stronger, and that 
the stronger will inevitably and appropriately want to exercise absolute in­
justice, which he calls TUpamg (R 343b1-344c8); and Polus exalts the 
life of the tyrant as an ideal at which most Athenians would aim (Grg. 470 
c9-471d2). To the end, Plato recognized the existence of, and spoke 
against, such persons who were unencumbered by the bonds of vopos in 
their belief that absolute domination was a perfectly right and natural state 
of political affairs (Lg. 889e3-890a9, a passage which utilizes basic soph­
istic principles). For all these individuals there is no question of what sort 
of rule Tro\LTLKrj ought to imply 36 and Socrates in Thg. ironically takes 
over the same assumptions that they do. But in our dialogue there is no 
explicit argument pro or contra this evaluation of ttoXitvkt). Socrates is 
only concerned to present the consequences of sophistic morality as stark­
ly as he can, and in order to do so he performs, one might say, in loco 
sophistae,37 taking advantage of the inherent ambiguities in the term 
ao<()LCc, and in the concept allied to it in this dialogue, itoXltlkt).
Thus does Socrates hit upon the sort of corruption which Demodo­
cus fears will be perpetrated on Theages by certain educators about whom 
he knows little. The demonstration is the more forceful for the uncompro­
mising direction in which it is compelled to go. And like other interlocutors 
in Platonic dialogues, the bewildered Theages can do nothing but acqui­
esce in Socrates’ conclusions: he admits, to his own dismay, that Tupav-
35As Dodds remarks (Gorgias 15), "Gorgias' teaching is the seed of which the Calliclean way 
of life is the poisonous fruit"; see also Maier, Sokrates 233-5, 246-8.
36Thuc. 3.82.8 is good evidence for the transvaluation of conventional political terminology 
in the fifth-century; see further Vers6nyi, Socratic Humanism 53-9.
37Another instance in which Socrates seems to argue (ironically) in the manner of a sophist 
in the presence of an un-sophistic interlocutor is Lys.-, see Guthrie, HGPIV. 146.
26
viKrj is, indeed, what is meant by ocpx^LP t(3v ev TroXei (124a1, 
a3-4).
One more feature of this section, already alluded to, must be ex­
amined in greater detail. As mentioned above, no illustration is required to 
show that Plato's Socrates is powerfully inclined to the use of craft-ana­
logy; it is among the most recognizable and "typical" traits of this Socrates. 
So we should not be surprised to find evidence of the same characteristic 
in this dialogue. But the extensive use of craft-analogy here demands 
further investigation as to its aim and particular method: is it included mere­
ly to impart a Socratic flavour to the dialogue as a whole, as is commonly 
believed,38 or is the employment of craft-analogy subservient to some 
larger purpose of the author's?
Previous discussion in the dialogue has shown that the cro<t>ia 
Theages desires is actually apxciv tcov ev tq ttoXei (in effect, ttoXi- 
TiKrj). By comparing this ao<|na to such things as jjboucriKrj, KU(3ep“ 
vriTLKr), tcktovikt), etc., Socrates is tacitly assuming, for the moment at 
least, that what Theages desires possesses (ideally at any rate) the status 
of TexvaL like these; this he emphasizes by his interchanging of the words 
Tex171! ancJ in 124a5 and b8: Theages' desire for crocjna. is a
desire for a Texvrl- Now the assumption that an ideal ttoXltlkt) is a craft 
or science, parallel in certain respects with others like medicine, music, or 
mathematics, is a famiiiar and fundamental Platonic doctrine, unquestion­
ably Socratic in origin.39 But if the kind of ttoXltlkt) Theages is after (and 
which he designates as crocjua) is a craft in the true sense of the word, it is 
necessary that someone, in order to prove definitively its status as a
38So, e.g., Schleiermacher 173; Shorey, WPS 661; Kruger 15.
39lt is the basis of his criticisms of democracy; for testimony outside of Plato, cf. X. Mem. 4. 
2.3-7; 1.2.9.
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Tex121!’ be ab,e t0 show what the rational basis of this T€Xvrl is» °r ’’give 
an account" of it, as Socrates would have it. Alternatively, ttoXitikt) can 
be shown to be a Texvrl if one is ab,e t0 demonstrate that it is teachable; 
and the simplest way to do this is by indicating that it is, in fact, taught. This 
much at least is familiar from a number of Plato’s dialogues; and, since the 
connection between TroXiTiKrj and certain 'reyyax is also being made in 
Thg., we expect Socrates to draw some inferences about the validity of the 
parallel within the specific context of Theages' desire for ao<|>ia. Is this 
expectation realized?
I believe that it is, though not in an altogether straightforward 
manner. When Socrates sets out to learn more accurately what cro<Jncxit 
is that Theages desires, he asks Theages for its name (123c9ff.). It seems 
a simple request, but the appearance of a long series of questions in­
volving Texvoci after Theages failed to supply an appropriate name in­
dicates that Socrates is setting out to establish something more funda­
mentally significant than simply the name of the o*o<j)ia in question. Of the 
two methods cited in the previous paragraph for determining whether or 
not the cro<tna Theages desires is really a Tcxvq, Socrates reserves the 
second (consideration of its teachability, or, at least, of whether it is or is not 
taught) for later, when he will briefly examine whether the cro^ia that ot 
ttoXitikoi impart is a T€Xvt1 (see sec- 6, v)- Here, however, he is con­
cerned with the kind of ao<f>Loc that the sophists are likely to pass on to 
Theages, and it is, I think, rather through the first method that he tackles the 
problem at this point. When Socrates requests the name that Aegisthus, 
Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias all have in common, he first 
gives a demonstration of what he expects from Theages by asking for the 
name that Bakis, Sibyl, and Amphilytus share, to which question Theages
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readily offers the answer "xpriapcnSoi?' (124d10). A number of scholars 
have objected that the appearance of the class xpT|<T|jiq)8oL in an analogy 
at this point is irrelevant (see comm, ad 124d10), but the significance of its 
presence here seems to me to be this: If there are any individuals in Athens 
whose occupation does not depend upon some Texvri» ’-e-» does not 
issue from a communicable set of rules, the xP^o'P^Sol are these; and 
when Plato wishes to underscore his conviction that politics, as practised in 
Athens, have nothing to do with 'veyyr\, the comparison he draws is 
between ttoXltlkol and xp'HO'piySoi (cf. Men. 99ct-5).40 Although our 
author does not in so many words announce the same deduction in Thg., 
nevertheless, by drawing tijpocpvol and xp^owSoi into close proxim­
ity, he leaves it to the reader (and to Theages) to draw the inference that 
ttoXitikt), evaluated as TUpavviKrj, is on equal footing with XP^OW” 
8ia, which is itself not a Tex12^- Once this connection is perceived, it 
becomes clear that Socrates intends that any claim to be a real Tex12'1! 
ought to be denied to the kind of cro<|>£a that Theages believes he will 
receive from the sophists.41
Essentially, then, Socrates’ reasoning has two stages. The first may 
be roughly represented by the following schema.
i. The ao<pia Theages desires = ttoXitikti 
This ao<p(a = rex^r)
Therefore ttoXitikt) = rcx^r)
Socrates, as we have seen, does not argue these steps. But since the final 
proposition to which the first two lead represents a standard Socratic and
40Forthe xPWP^Soi working 0€lqc poipot, not Tex^Xb cf- also Ap. 22b8-c3, Ion 
534b7-d1.
41A Platonic attitude; cf. Grg. 465b1ff., where Socrates classifies cro^LCJTLKfj and pr|- 
TopiKT) as spurious forms of ttoXitikt).
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Platonic ideal, we can understand why he implicitly assumes these steps, 
and we should look upon them as rather uncontroversial. This first stage is 
the base from which Socrates operates, and represents the assumptions 
which he sets out to test under the present circumstances. The second 
stage, however, as an examination of the first, gains its effect wholly from 
irony and parody. It consists, I think, of the following steps.
ii. The cro <p (a Theages desires (i. e. no A i t i Krj) = rvp awiKrj 
But rupawiKrj, like xprjapqjBia, not a 
Therefore this aorpia not a rox^p
Socrates' argument here is, as we have seen, insidious rather than logical: 
he allows Theages no choice but to accept that the qo^loc he seeks is 
tantamount to tyranny, then parallels tyranny with soothsaying, though 
without drawing attention to the important respect in which the two may be 
considered similar. Any effect that is gained here comes through assoc­
iation and juxtaposition. But then, this is meant to be mockery of a sophistic 
conception of cro<{)ia, Theages is never intended to be an adversary in the 
face of whom intellectual rigour is demanded, and logical consistency has 
a subordinate role where irony and parody are the main objectives. The 
assumptions which Socrates sets out to examine (i) are presented as a 
serious matter; his means of examining them (ii) are not, and reflect his 
attitude towards the subject of investigation.
Suffice to say that the presence in this dialogue of craft-analogy is 
not gratuitous or decorative. It is, on the contrary, an integral part of 
Socrates' examination of the essence of sophistic crocjna.; indeed, Socra­
tes is not yet finished with the sophists and his application to them of craft- 
analogy (see sec. b, v).
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iv. Interlude: 124e11-125b4
As in earlier parts of the dialogue, we again encounter a prominent 
measure of Socratic TraiSict. This feature of the interlude is illustrated by 
the remarks in the commentary ad 124e11-125a8 (pass.), and so need not 
be elaborated here. Otherwise, there are several features of interest in this 
section which bear directly on the structure of Thg. itself.
Demodocus’ response to Socrates in 125b1-2 affirms that he and 
Socrates must, as Socrates had suggested (125a6-8), decide to what per­
son they ought to send Theages to make him a ao<j)ds TUpavvos. Can 
Demodocus have missed Socrates' manifest irony? Although this question 
has been answered in the affirmative (see comm, ad 124e11-125b4), I 
doubt that this can be right; for we would then have to accept that Demo­
docus supports the idea that Theages become a tyrant. Whatever other 
criticisms scholars may make of our author, I should be disinclined to con­
vict him of this kind of insensitivity; and, in any event, the heavily emphatic 
language Demodocus employs seems to indicate that he is himself ironic 
in his response (see comm, ad 125b1-2). I would prefer to interpret Demo­
docus' acceptance of Socrates' suggestion as evidence that he under­
stands one goal, at least, to which Socrates is leading up, namely the refu­
tation of Theages' censure of his father for not providing the education he 
demanded. It makes better sense if Demodocus is seen to be a party to 
Socrates' intentions in his examination of Theages, though of course he 
need not understand everything that Socrates is contriving. But his later 
uninhibited acceptance of Socrates (127b2-d1, 131a8-9) is at any rate 
some incidental confirmation of his cognizance of Socrates' superficially
ironic tone. On this analysis Socrates’ eventual criticism of Theages for his 
behaviour towards his father (126d9-e127a3) is here foreshadowed.
However this may be, Socrates at once dismisses his original offer 
to deliberate with Demodocus over the question of who will become Thea­
ges' educator. It is Socrates’ wish to postpone this, at least until Theages 
has been adequately examined (125b3). We cannot but be reminded here 
of an earlier part of the dialogue, where Socrates cautioned that he and 
Demodocus had first to determine if they were talking about the same 
thing, but then apparently changed his designs and asserted that it was 
first necessary to carry out this process with Theages (122c8ff., see sec. b, 
ii). As before, Socrates is here giving priority to the young man himself 
whose future is at stake; it is another affirmation of the need for direct 
contact with a person in Theages' circumstances.
At the same time, our argument that it is Theages' desired cro^ioc 
qua Texvq that Socrates has been interested in up to this point, and that 
the technical (i.e. rational) aspect of this crcxjna is in reality the centrepiece 
of Socrates' examination of Theages, receives support in this interlude, for 
here Socrates reverts quite subtly to his earlier interest in how this cro^ioc 
may compare with other Texvai. Socrates calls this issue to mind when 
he takes ironic aim at Demodocus for begrudging Theages an education, 
even though he knew where he could have sent him to make him a 
Sqjjiioupydv.. .Tqs aortas rjs cinQ'upei (125a4). The terminology 
here patently alludes to the earlier craft-analogies (Socrates could just as 
easily have said simply auTOV cro^dv av GTroiqcrcts instead of using 
the phrase in 125a4), since Theages could become a Sqpioupyos 
aortas only if he were to practice some tcx^T, ’n other words, if the 
cro<j)La in question were a tcxvt). Socrates would seem to be accepting
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that what Theages has claimed to be searching after, and what the 
sophists will provide, is in fact a Tex171?’ and that Demodocus could have 
made Theages a "craftsman'' of it had he sent him to a sophist, as his son 
demanded. But Socrates' ironic tone throughout this interlude is against 
such an interpretation. And to call Theages a Sripnoupyos aortas, 
even hypothetically, should hardly be considered complimentary, either for 
Theages or for those who might profess to render him thus; it is hard to 
imagine what else a "manufacturer of the wisdom which [Theages] desires" 
could be but a sophist, especially as the word 8r)pnoupyds, within the 
context of a discussion of crafts, suggests professionalism. Socrates there­
fore appears to be hinting that, had Demodocus acquiesced in granting 
Theages' wish by entrusting him to a sophist, a sophist is what Theages 
himself would have become. Socrates makes a similar point in Prt. (311 
a8-312a7), when he induces the young Hippocrates to admit (very re­
luctantly) that, as education by a doctor or sculptor makes one a doctor or 
sculptor, so education by a sophist is bound to turn a student into a sophist.
On purely structural terms, this interlude functions as a transitional 
hinge. Section /// leading up to it had ostensibly sought to clarify the nature 
of the aocjnct to which Theages aspired. Socrates brought that investig­
ation to a satisfactory conclusion, or at any rate to the conclusion to which 
he deliberately drove Theages: the aocjnct which the young man wishes, 
or is destined, to acquire from the sophists is tijpotvmKrj. Now he must 
examine the second part of Theages' demand, namely, with what person 
should Theages associate in order to become a "wise tyrant" (125a7-8 8ict 
tqv tlvos awouaiav aocj)ds av yevoiTo Tupawos).
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v. Socrates, Theages, and cro<f)(a (pt. 2): 125b5-127a7
This section is rather variegated in form. It begins with an appeal to
a verse from "Euripides," which fails to elicit an answer from Theages as to 
the person who will best instruct him in tu pawnor Socrates proceeds to 
allude to a poem of Anacreon, again attempting to prompt a response from 
Theages concerning the appropriate object for the wisdom he is pursuing. 
In annoyance Theages clarifies the nature of his desire for crocjna. Socra­
tes returns to craft-analogy to elucidate his argument, but this only results 
in a suggestion from Theages that cro<|>ia may not be teachable. He then 
reproaches Theages because the latter does not know, after all, who will 
make him crowds. Finally, Socrates offers to entrust Theages to one of ol 
kocXoi KccyotGoi, by association with whom he will gain a high reputation 
in the eyes of the Athenian people. Each of these parts has its own rele­
vance to the structure and analysis of the dialogue, and will have to be 
considered separately, as well as in relation to other parts.
Socrates’ citing of the Euripidean verse42 cro 001 Tijpawoi top 
oo0ujv cuv'ouo'LQC five times in succession in 125b7-d4 should be con­
sidered co-extensive with the earlier play upon sophistic thought and val­
ues singled out above; for the criticism and evaluation of poetry, pursued 
largely with the intention of investigating the moral questions that the poets 
raised, was part of the sophistic armoury.43 That Socrates looks to poetry
42For the tradition in antiquity which attributed the verse to Sophocles, see comm, ad 
125b5.
43Cf. Prt. 338e6-347a5 (esp. 339a1-3 [Protagoras] ecFTiv 8e touto [i.e. avSpi ttcci- 
Setocs (jteyicrTov pepos 338e7] toc tjtto tcbv ttoit|T(3v \eydpevot olov t’ eTvoti 
OTivtevcii a Te opedrs TreiToiTiTaL kccl a pd, kccl eiTLo-TOCcreccL SieXeTv Te kocl 
epcoTcnpevov \6you Souvocl); also Hp. mi. 363a6ff.
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for guidance in his investigation at this stage is in itself further demon­
stration of TraiSia 44 but once more a serious purpose may be detected 
behind this play. For one thing, in Socrates' mouth the verse sounds 
highly incongruous: Socrates' estimate of tyrants is everywhere low,45 and 
there must be implicit criticism here of the sort of ao<f>ia which can be 
associated with a Tupavvos, unless cro<j)oi be understood in the most 
debased sense. From a Socratic point of view, the first two words of the 
verse rank as a rather gross oxymoron. As well, by substituting success­
ively yewpycu, paycipoi, and TrctXaicrTai for TUpavvoi in adapta­
tions of the verse, Socrates returns to craft-analogy, in an attempt to clarify 
the sort of answer he requires for the question "Tyrants are wise by 
association with those wise at what?". If we keep in mind our earlier 
consideration of craft-analogy in sec. b, iii, and Socrates' attempts to place 
the cro<|>£a Theages is pursuing alongside other Texv0CL> Socrates' pro­
cess of thought is transparent: for each of yccnpyoi, pdycipOL, and 
'FTCcXaiaToti, the respective craft is learned through association with 
someone who already possesses the skill in question. So tyrants are wise 
by association with those wise at TupccvviKoc, the pattern would demand. 
But whether out of obtuseness, or (preferably I think; see comm, ad 125d7; 
Intr. ch. Ill, b) simply because he is by now too annoyed to do otherwise, 
Theages offers no answer to Socrates' final quotation of the verse in its 
original form in 125d4. All the same, Socrates has now made his point 
(ironically again): the kind of cjo^loc about which he and Theages have 
been speaking for some time is not like other crafts, or rather, is not a 
Tex^'H at aH- What remains implicit is that, if the cro<|ua. which the
44For the ironic effect imparted by the ascription of the verse to Euripides, see comm, ad 
125b5.
45Cf., e.g., Grg. 466c9-480a4, R. 576b11 -580c4, Phdr. 248c5-e3.
sophists profess to teach is such as this, its value must be held seriously in 
doubt.
The interpretation of Socrates’ use of the Anacreontic poem men­
tioned in 125d1 Off. and of its role in the dialogue, depends on the infer­
ences we can draw concerning its original meaning, based on the limited 
amount of information with which its context provides us. It is inconceiv­
able to me that the mention of TUpavviKct (which must have been present 
in Anacreon's poem, since the word obviously prompts Socrates’ allusion 
to the poem in the first place) can have referred to anything but erotic prow­
ess on the part of the unknown Kallikrite of the poem. Since a detailed in­
vestigation into this problem is set out in Appendix 2, I offer this assess­
ment here without further argument. If this evaluation of the original tenor 
of the passage from Anacreon's poem is right, Socrates' allusion to it be­
comes important for an interpretation of the dialogue. Superficially, it ex­
tends his overtly ironic treatment of Theages: the apparent incongruity of 
Socrates' shift from political TUpavviKf) to erotic TUpavviKrj proves 
Theages' subsequent charge that Socrates is making fun of him (125e4 
Trcn£eis) to be particularly well-motived. There is however a good deal 
more to the allusion. When Socrates asks Theages if he wishes to associ­
ate (125d13 avvovaias eTTiOupeis) with a man who "practises the 
same craft" (opoTCX^os 125e1) as Kallikrite, he is clearly keeping our 
attention fixed upon the use of craft-analogy which has bulked fairly heavily 
in his discussion so far (and the word TUpavviKCt furnishes precisely the 
answer that Socrates was seeking earlier in his quotations from "Euripi­
des"). But to Theages the notion that, if one practised what Kallikrite did 
(i.e. epcoTiKCt), he could on that account be called (and so
crowds) is ludicrous, and he responds to the suggestion in what he feels is
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an appropriate manner. Thus, by association, rather than through any 
detailed argument (not unlike the juxtaposition of tyrants and seers earlier 
on, see sec. b, iii), Socrates brings into further ridicule the notion that the 
ao<|>ia which Theages is after is a tcxvT> or, indeed, is worthwhile at all. 
Socrates' attitude is apparently dismissive.
This level of meaning is undoubtedly intended to be amply clear to 
Theages, and to the author’s contemporary reader as well, who would 
have known the Anacreon poem, as Theages does (cf. 125d12). But the 
allusion contains another level of meaning, which will become fully evident 
later, and only in retrospect. Like Theages, commentators tend to see 
nothing but irony (of an unspecified kind) in Socrates' suggestion that 
Theages would desire to associate with a man who is skilled in the same 
craft as Kallikrite. It is more probable, however, that these words also point 
forward to later developments in the dialogue. By the end of the section 
presently under discussion Theages will apply to Socrates to become his 
companion; and not long after that, Socrates himself will claim to be com­
pletely unknowledgeable, except in the matter of Ta epcoTiicd, in which 
field his skill surpasses that of all others. In view of this, it would appear 
that in 125d13-e3 the author is foreshadowing Theages' eventual desire to 
associate with Socrates, the consummate master in Ta eptOTiKa. Socra­
tes' irony is at once richer than might at first be realized.
So far, we have observed that, while the tone of the poetic allusion 
is at one level unquestionably playful, it also anticipates a later stage when 
Theages will apply to Socrates to be his companion; as such, Socrates 
does emerge as the very person who is oijlotgx^os with Kallikrite, i.e., 
who also €TriC7TaTai rupavviKa of an erotic kind. How Socrates' erotic 
expertise could be called TUpavvvKa is an important matter which will be
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examined later (sec. c). Now, however, Theages’ anger at the attitude 
which he feels that Socrates has displayed towards him prompts a restate­
ment of the nature of his desire for <70<|na, expressed in the form of a 
rejection of any aspirations to become a tyrant, or even a god (125e8- 
126a4).
This passage has, for several reasons, attracted a certain amount of 
attention. Those discussions which are only concerned with the possible 
bearing that the passage has on the dialogue's date of composition may 
be disregarded here (see Intr. ch. V, c, d). Instead, I shall restrict my 
comments to an examination of the putative dependence of these lines on 
a passage in Ale. I (an issue which is, admittedly, not wholly unrelated to 
the problem of the dialogue’s date, see Intr. ch. V, g). A number of scholars 
have expressed the view that, when our author depicted Theages’ re­
jection of tyranny and divinity in 125e8-126a4, he had Ala 1105a7-c6 in 
mind.46 |n the latter passage Socrates represents Alcibiades, who is 
destined within a few days to speak for the first time before the Athenian 
Sfjpos (a7-b1), as inflamed by the prospect of becoming master of all Eur­
ope (b2-8). But, the dialogue continues, it is unlikely Alcibiades would be 
satisfied with this, as his eyes would inevitably turn toward the subjugation 
of Asia as well, in emulation of Cyrus and Xerxes (c1-6).46 7
46See Pavlu 26-7; Heidel 55 n.8; BrOnnecke 104; Souilhd 139; Robin 1643; Turolla 311.
47This is not the occasion to examine fully the possibility that the author of Thg. also had 
before him Ala II 141a5-b8, in which place Alcibiades again affirms that one could count 
himself blessed if he were made a tyrant (see Brunnecke 104; Heidel 55 n.8; Turolla 311). 
The evidence is far too slim to allow any confidence that it is a source for Thg.; and since the 
date of Ala II may well be in the first half of the third century (see, e.g., Taylor, 528-9),
while that of Thg., whatever its authorship, is unlikely to be after 330 (see Intr. ch. V, g), the 
chances of such derivation seem slight indeed, unless the accepted dates for Ala II are 
radically altered. For my own part, I see no advantage in deriving Thg. from Ala II, quite apart 
from the problem of priority. If anything, the opposite hypothesis may be true: Alcibiades’ 
confirmation of the happiness of the tyrant (14lb7-8 ’Eyu) pev oTpai, (5 IcoKpotTes, 
Kav aXXov ovtlvoOv, etTrep ToiauTa crnppairi ccuTqj) may depend on Thg. 
126a2.
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It should be noted, first of all, that a good deal of the tone and 
meaning of Theages’ statement in 125e8-126a4 can be accounted for 
simply by reference to the evidence of commonplace utterances elsewhere 
in Greek literature (see lntr. ch. V, c). Verbal parallels, therefore, cannot by 
themselves prove the dependence on Ale. / that some scholars have postu­
lated. However that may be, it is hard to resist the temptation to accept Ala 
las the earlier work, and to interpret our passage in Thg. in the light of if it. 
For if it is the case that the author of Thg. had Ala I in mind here, the par­
allelism which scholars point out is not evidence simply of thoughtless 
imitation. On the contrary, it is much more probable that our author, by 
representing Theages as rejecting tyranny and divinity, wished to contrast 
the young man with Alcibiades in Ale. I, and to offer an evaluation of his 
character. Simply put, juxtaposition of the two passages demonstrates that 
Theages is no Alcibiades. Earlier, I drew attention to another corre­
spondence between these two dialogues (122e8-123a3; see sec. b, iii), 
where the author of Thg. seems to be urging that there is an important 
difference between the character and aspirations of Theages, on the one 
hand, and those of Alcibiades, on the other: Theages, we saw, was pre­
pared, unlike Alcibiades, to admit that he lacked some €Tn,aTT)p.r|. It will 
be argued later (see sec. c) that these two parallels, taken together, have 
significance for the meaning of our dialogue.
As in other Platonic works, Socrates’ deliberate misunderstanding of 
his interlocutor has forced that person to clarify himself.48 And as vague 
answers are at other times discarded and replaced by more precise ones 
during the process of elenchus, though a conclusive position is not 
achieved (this process could be illustrated by a glance at the arguments of
48Cf., e.g., Men. 70a1-72d1, Hp. mi. 364b1-365d4, Ft. 338c1ff.
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almost any early dialogue), so here (and earlier in 123b3-124b9, up to the 
beginning of Socrates’ deliberate distortion) progressively more satisfac­
tory answers are evoked.49 Theages’ subsequent elaboration of his desire 
to rule (126a7-8) is of some interest, since the kind of ruler he professedly 
wishes to become (constitutional, ruling by consent) accords with what is 
likely to have been an ideal of the historic Socrates.50 This aspiration 
underlines all the more strongly the difference between Theages and a 
person like the Alcibiades of Ale. /; and again, Theages shows signs of 
promise to be found in by no means al, of Socrates' associates.
Theages’ acknowledgement that he wishes to rule like Themis- 
tocles, Cimon, and Pericles (126a9-10) performs the further function of 
shifting the emphasis away from the previous issue of what effect the 
sophists might have on him, to the question now of whether or not the 
Athenian ttoXltlkol can satisfy his desire for cro^ia. Socrates returns 
once again to craft-analogy (126a12-c9), and the questions he puts for­
ward are framed in a predictable enough form. If one wanted to become 
crowds at either horsemanship or javelin-throwing, one would go to some­
one skilled in these Texvai- If a person wanted to become wise in toc 
ttoXltlko. (126c3), would he go to anyone but ol ttoXltlkol? What is 
at stake once more is the question of whether ttoXltlkt), as it is common­
ly understood, can be regarded as a T€xvrl, and if those reputed to 
possess it are Tex^LK0^ as horsemen and javelin-throwers indisputably 
are. The answer to this question is the more final for the fact that it is 
supplied by Theages himself, and there are several points of note in the 
manner in which he responds.
49Cf. Men. 82b9-85b7; see Robinson, PEC? 72-84; Versenyi, Socratic Humanism 117-24; 
Irwin, PMTGQ-71.
50See comm, ad loc.-, Gulley 170-5.
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The most striking is that Theages has recourse here to a topos 
which Socrates not infrequently looks to in support of his thesis that apeTq 
or cro<i)ia is not teachable, namely, that those who might be thought to 
possess it in greatest abundance do not even pass it on to the individuals 
who would be most expected to receive it from them, i.e., their own sons 
(see comm. ac/126d1-7). Here Socrates' craft-analogies lead to the same 
conclusion as earlier: cro<$>La, i.e. ttoXltlktt as Theages knows it, and as 
ot ttoXltlkol practise it, is not a it were, someone who could
give a rational account of it, and could therefore teach it, would present 
himself; but that has not happened. The argument on its own cannot be 
considered conclusive, but Theages is satisfied by its premises (126d3-4). 
Moreover, he cites the topos with full knowledge that it belongs to Socrates 
himself (126d1 ),51 and this acts as a convenient device to indicate that 
Theages is at one with Socrates on an important point, just as Theages' 
reformulation of his desire to rule in 126a7-8 had done.
This admission by Theages that it is futile to look to ot ttoXitlkol 
in order to help him accomplish what he is seeking, coupled with the 
earlier rejection of the kind of ttoXltlkt) that is best characterized as 
TUpccwLKfj, carries the interrogation back to its original point of departure 
by a "ring form" of sorts. The conversation between Socrates and Theages 
had essentially begun with Theages' indignant claim that his father was 
witholding the instruction he desired (123a5-8). Socrates' expression of 
(ironic) shock in 126d9-e7 and 127a1-a3, and indeed the irony of the 
whole conversation with Theages, as much as indicate that, formally at
51 Theages has heard this report from others (<j>ctcn). One thinks first of the companions of 
121d1ff. as the probable subject of the verb, but they have aroused Theages’ excitement 
because of their reports about sophists (see comm, ad 126d1). It is therefore tempting to 
suppose that we have here an allusion to the regularity with which pronouncements of this 
kind occur in the context of Socratic literature in general (see comm, ad 126d1).
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least, it was his intention all along to refute Theages' presumption of 
knowing what the implications of his desire were, and who could make him 
crowds. Demodocus himself seems to have perceived that this is the 
direction in which the dialogue was moving (see sec. b, iv). And, while the 
object of this examination has not been to establish a definition for any 
term, and differences from the structure of other Socratic investigations, 
especially definition dialogues, may therefore naturally be detected, there 
are nevertheless also some similarities which prove instructive.
One of these is an interlocutor's realization that he and Socrates are 
no further along than when they originally set out upon their investigation, 
and have even returned to their starting point. This circularity is often 
signalled in other dialogues by a verb containing the prefix Trepi~ accom­
panied sometimes by a personification of the \dyos.52 In Thg. there is no 
such concise signpost, but Socrates' virtual restating and rebuking, in 126 
d9-e7, of Theages' original position serves much the same purpose. This 
development in a Platonic dialogue is usually attended by the interlocutor's 
sense of ouTopia, which, ideally at least, also produces a recognition of 
his own ignorance (so, e.g., Tht. 210b11-d4). A very similar conclusion is 
reached, I think, at this point in Thg., for Theages himself can do nothing 
but admit (126e8) that his father has acted rightly in holding him back 
(Theages* condition is now like that of his father, who aTropei otl qol 
XP^crriTOCL Kai ottoi Trcp/rroi 127a2-3). That the author does not repre­
sent Theages as dwelling despondently on this is not surprising, since, as 
we saw, Theages already is at an advantage (unlike other respondents in 
Plato's dialogues) in recognizing his own shortcomings (see sec. b, iii).
52Cf. Chrm. 174b11 (TrepieXKeis ktjkXcij), Euthphr. 15b10 (KiJKXtp TrepuovTa), b11 
(TrepieXetov), Euthd. 291b8 (TrepiKctpi|/aPTes), Grg. 517c6 (Trepi<|>ep6p.evoi,),7M 
200c3 (iTepiTp€XeLl?)-
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Moreover, as often happens in similar situations, Socrates shares in his 
interlocutor’s inability to offer the correct solution to the problem at hand 
(this becomes especially clear in coming pages). It is also typical of num­
erous instances of eXeyx°s in Plato that a state of perplexity is reached 
through the use of analogy with crafts: virtue x, assumed to be a T€.yyr\ at 
the outset, turns out, under present circumstances, to be unlike other 
Texvai; though here the implication of Socrates' examination of Theages 
is that the co^loc he is pursuing is inferior to other Tex^ai» whereas in 
other dialogues ethical virtues often resist classification as T€X1?aL be­
cause they are different in kind from conventional crafts, being of a higher 
order (and anthropocentric).53
vi. Socrates, sophists, and politicians: 127a8-128c6
If there had been any doubt that Theages was not destined to fulfill
his ambition by associating with either the sophists or some successful 
public figure of Athens, this apprehension is dispelled by Socrates' heavily 
ironic words in 127a3-7. They are a formulation of the most commonplace 
conceptions of utility: Socrates is prepared to entrust Theages to any 
among ol kocXoi Kocyoc0ol toc ttoXltlkcc (127a3) the young man 
wishes; he and his father will not have to spend money for what he re­
ceives, yet from this association Theages will gain a high reputation among 
ol ttoWoi otvSptnTTOi (127a5-6). Theages is confronted with a choice. 
Although Socrates' words sound vulgar and are ironic (his commendation
53Cf. e.g. Euthd. 288d5-292e7; see further n.81 below. Thesleff's schematic delineation 
of Platonic dialogues led him (168) to call Thg. "climactic," i.e. as displaying no central cul­
mination or peripeteia (an absence shared, according to Thesleff, only by Cri., Ale. II, Clit., 
and Min.). Whatever may be the merits of a classification such as this, I do not think it wholly 
valid for the present dialogue, for at this point we do indeed encounter a reversal: other 
possible educators are discarded, Theages' confidence is ruptured, and a new start is made 
as attention turns to Socrates. The structure is not simply linear.
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of the judgement of ot itoXXol could not be otherwise, see comm, ad 
127a6), nevertheless Theages, having now been shown that any system­
atic qo4>loc is unattainable, may yet accept the notion that popular approv­
al by the majority of Athenians is, realistically, the only measure of cro<|>ia. 
that matters. But Theages, who, as we have seen, is not like all other 
young men, commits himself otherwise; it is Socrates he now wants to 
associate with, and this proposal meets with the vehement approval of 
Demodocus (127b2-c2, c5-d1, see comm, ad locc. pass.).
Socrates' reaction to this turn of events is elaborated in 127d2- 
128b7, and is characteristic of the homonymous figure of other Platonic 
dialogues. First, he marks Demodocus’ anxiety and serious demeanor 
(eaTrouSccKevoci 127d2, cnTOu8d£oi d4); next, he recommends the qual­
ifications of others (Demodocus and other politicians of Athens, the soph­
ists) as potential educators for Theages (127e1-128b1); finally, he dis­
claims any ability of his own to satisfy Theages' desire, since he knows 
virtually nothing except tcc epcoTiKa, at which however he is the greatest 
expert who has ever lived (128b1-7). Theages is unsatisfied with these 
declarations, interprets them as TrcciSid once again (n.b. Trai£cnv TTpos 
qp&s 128ct), and cites the positive experience of other young men in his 
situation, who became "better" by association with Socrates (128b8-c5). 
He is convinced that Socrates himself was responsible for their improve­
ment.
When Theages rejects Socrates' proposal in 127a2ff. to put him in 
the care of oi kocXoi KdyctQoi, only to turn to Socrates himself for his 
personal attention, there is no reason to suppose that he is abandoning his 
initial desire to acquire cro<|na; rather, he now apparently feels that Socra­
tes is the one who can help him achieve this goal. Thus when Socrates
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addresses Demodocus and Theages in 127d2ff., it is as a person thought 
to represent an alternative to other prospective educators. It is also im­
portant to recognize that both Theages and Demodocus see Socrates as a 
desirable alternative: this agreement represents the concurrence of two 
widely differing outlooks, and produces as close to an expression of con­
sensus as the author can achieve within the strict confines of the dialogue 
form. Socrates, consequently, is to be distinguished utterly from other 
people, especially other educators, and he is, moreover, a person about 
whose value there is no dispute. As well, the structure of Socrates' 
address in 127d2-128b7, in which the two types of people with whom he 
was concerned earlier (the sophists and oi ttoXltlkol) are first 
assessed, before he expresses incapacity on his own part, all but proves 
that it is the author's desire now to force a comparison between Socrates 
and these individuals, and to effect thereby a transition in the dialogue.
But, once we recognize that Theages and Demodocus wish to press 
the possibility that Socrates is crowds, an inevitable difficulty arises, for it is 
precisely the Cairn to cro<|noc that Socrates most vigorously rejects in Ap. 
and other works where he upholds his profession of ignorance (see comm. 
ad 128b1-2). It is therefore difficult to see how Socrates could contend with 
sophists and politicians for the kind of oo<t>ia that Theages desires; nor do 
we anticipate that he would in any event claim to be able to compete with 
them, or would want to, since "success in public life," as implied by the type 
of acxjnot which Theages and ambitious young men like him were seek­
ing, was certainly not what Socrates hoped any companions would gain 
from him. One does not expect Socrates to assert that he can defeat the 
sophists or oi ttoXltlkol at their own game; nor does he make this 
claim. After the appearance of the word oo<j)oi in an ironic parting shot at
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the sophists (128a2),54 cro^icc and crowds vanish from sight for the rest of 
the dialogue. The reason is obvious: if the remainder of the dialogue is 
going to concentrate on the characteristic qualities of Socrates, it would be 
pointless for the author to talk of ao<()£a. Socrates' profession of ignor­
ance in 128b1-2 is therefore, as far as this is concerned, coherent.
Yet his claim is unusual here, for Socrates circumscribes the limits of 
his ignorance by proceeding to assert a special expertise in one body of 
knowledge, namely toc epaoTiKcc. This amounts to a modification of his 
regular profession of ignorance, and has been the source of much con­
fusion and oversimplification among scholars, who object to the apparent 
inconsequentiality of the statement about Ta epojTiKa, and frequently cite 
it as a defect of composition for which Plato could not be responsible (see 
comm, ad 128b2-4). In order to clarify the meaning of this passage, it will 
be necessary to look in detail at Socrates' profession of a knowledge of toc 
epamKa in Thg., along with the context in which this expression occurs.
The first thing one tends to notice about Socrates' claim in 128b2-4 
to know only one small p.oc0Tipa, namely toc epcuTiKcc, is the apparent 
lack of motivation for the statement. As mentioned, this is usually evalu­
ated as a sign of faulty composition: it is judged to be an unsuccessful 
attempt by the author to depict Socrates in Platonic terms, i.e., as erotically 
preoccupied. Yet this abrupt introduction could just as well be taken as the
54The sophists are so cto^ol that they persuade the wealthiest and highest-born young 
men to shun the company of their own fellow citizens in favour of association with the 
sophists, to whom they gratefully pay high fees. This is mentioned in a passage (127e7- 
128a7) which is so similar to another in Ap. (19e2-20a2) that it is impossible not to assume 
collusion of some kind (a similarity recognized by all writers on Thg., e.g., Stallbaum 223; 
Schleiermacher 351; H. Muller 464; Heidel 53; Pavlu 28-9). Notwithstanding this patent 
correspondence, it is important to note that the word cro^oi is absent from the passage in 
Ap., and it is probably legitimate to infer therefore that our author is including it here in order 
to deride the value and meaning which "most people" would ascribe to the word. Socrates' 
disposition is the same as that which he displays in Ap. 21 b9, d8, where he speaks of those 
"who have the reputation for being cfo<()ol."
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author’s method of attracting the reader’s attention to something which he 
considers important within the context of the dialogue; and, indeed, other 
features point to the same inference. One of these is Socrates' device for 
introducing the subject of tcc epeoTixa; according to Socrates, he knows 
virtually nothing, except for one small body of knowledge (TrXrjv ye apt,— 
KpoC tivos (jLcc0T|iJiccTog 128b4). Thisis just the sort of phraseology that 
Socrates frequently uses when he is about to introduce something of 
crucial importance into a conversation (see comm, ad loc.). Another 
feature is Socrates' contention that a surpassing knowledge of tcc epco- 
tlkcc is something to which he lays claim very frequently (del 128b3). 
Since this statement flatly contradicts the evidence of all surviving Socratic 
literature, in which the positive claim to have knowledge in tcc epcoTird is 
very rare (see comm, ad 128b2-4, b3), one is tempted to search for ways of 
explaining it away, and several possible means of accounting for the 
inconsistency may be suggested (see comm. ac/128b3). But it seems to 
me that the author has Socrates lay emphasis (cf. 8t)TTou 128b3) on the 
frequency of the assertion about Td epumKa because he wishes, above 
all, to underline the importance of the statement itself in this particular 
context. Finally, we have already seen that Socrates anticipates his claim 
here to be the epcoTiKos dvrjp par excellence when in 125d13-e3 he 
refers to Theages' prospective companion as one who will be knowledge­
able in (erotic) rupavviKd (see sec. b, v). The prediction that this is the 
sort of person Theages will seek out, offered apparently without serious 
intent at that point, is now realized in the person of Socrates. And the ful­
filment of this prediction (whether or not Theages actually recognizes the 
connection is immaterial) further underlines the importance of Socrates' 
expertise in Ta cpcoTLxd, since it would be pointless for the author to
prefigure a statement in this way unless that statement were one of some 
relevance to the dialogue as a whole.
Hence we can see that the author has gone to considerable trouble 
both to draw attention to Socrates' professed skill in tcc epcoTiKa, and to 
emphasize its significance. It will not do, therefore, simply to deny 
coherence to the dialogue at the point at which reference to tcc epcoTiKa 
is made; but it is nevertheless incumbent on the reader to determine what 
the relevance of the reference is.
To begin with, we have already seen that 127d2-128b7 are in­
tended to bring Socrates into explicit comparison with the sophists and ol 
TToXiTiKOi. But these lines also underscore the idea that Socrates’ 
assets are qualitatively different from those of the former classes of indivi­
duals: they possess croct)£a (of a certain kind), while he is skilled in tcc 
optDTiKCt; and the two, as we shall see, are mutually exclusive. Thus the 
solution to the problem of why Socrates mentions tcc epcoTiKa. would 
seem to be simply this: if others are to benefit from association with Socra­
tes, it will be through tcc cpcoTiKcc, just as the sophists and politicians 
would claim to help others through their coulee. That this is the meaning 
the author wishes to convey is also indicated by certain details which 
accrue around his reference to toc epcoTiKa.
First of all, Socrates calls tcc epomKcc a pccOripa in 128b4 and b5. 
Since in the same sentence he speaks of what the sophists offer also as 
paefjpaTa (b2; the reference is ironic, see comm. ad128b1), it is clear 
that he is placing himself and his particular offering on common ground 
with the sophists and their skills, and is inviting a comparison to be drawn. 
Furthermore, the application of the term pa0rjpa to Ta epamKa appears 
to be an implicit announcement that Socrates is now entering the
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"competition" over Theages, for pdQrjpa is a word which has strong con­
notations with regard to learning and education;* 55 thus Socrates is here 
setting up tcc eptOTiKa as a rival to the piaerjiJiaTa of others. This is fur­
ther implied by eTncrTdp.cv'os in 128b4, the influence of which is carried 
over from cjs. . . ouSev (b3) to the phrase TTXT5 v... cpcoTiKcBi/ (b4). 
Since any object of eTUQTapai has a claim to be considered a Tex^,56 
the importance of Socrates’ knowledge of Ta epumKa would clearly 
seem to consist in the fact that it alone allows him to be presented as a 
viable alternative to other individuals and to the skills which they claim to 
possess.
Doubtless Socrates speaks of Ta epamKa in this way in order to 
confront, in closely parallel terms, his own special capacity with that of 
others, and for this reason utilizes the same vocabulary in each case. 
Nevertheless, this account of Ta epcoTiKa and of the language which 
Socrates applies to it gives the strong impression that he is arguing in 
favour of Ta epumKa as a Tex^P, a subject of learning and teaching. 
Now, if tcc cpcuTiKa is the one way in which Socrates can be of any 
advantage to another, and this capacity is represented in rationalistic 
terms, to my mind this can only mean that our author is here thinking of 
Platonic philosophic epees, of rational desire as it is depicted in Smp. 
201d1-212c3: Diotima taught Socrates tcc epCDTiKCC (201 d5) - Socrates 
possesses no knowledge (eTricrTacrOai 177d7-8) except in this field - 
and this Ta epcoTiKa emerges as the name for an individual’s gradual 
progress through dialectic to transcendent beauty. As Socrates only
55lt can also be used as a synonym of tcx^T when the emphasis happens to be on educa­
tion, cf. Prt. 318e1,319a4; see also J. Lyons, Structural Semantics (Oxford, 1963) 187 n.1.
55See Lyons, op. cit. 159-70,176-88.
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alludes to this concept at this point in Thg., the question is left open as to 
whether the notion of rational epcos will be developed in later pages, and 
we shall return to this question.
The application to Socrates of the adjective SeLvds in the sentence 
that follows (b5-6) also serves to draw Socrates face to face with other 
individuals. The most obvious reason for the use of the adjective in 
relation to Socrates is, naturally, that some word other than crowds must 
be found, since it would be absurd for Socrates now to claim to be crowds 
with respect to ra epcoTLKct (toxjto. . .to (jLa0T|(jLa b5) after he has al­
ready reserved the quality of crocjna exclusively for others (see above). 
Socrates is strictly consistent in this dialogue in his abnegation of aoc^La. 
At the same time, however, the choice of Seivos ought to carry one’s mind 
back to Socrates’ earlier consideration of ot ttoXitlkol, in which context 
alone he applied the word SeLvds (126a10, b1, b4, c5). The politicians 
were said to be 8olvol tcc ttoXltlkoc; Socrates now holds that he is 
SeLvds tcc epCDTLKCt. The effect of this parallelism is, again, to show not 
only wherein Socrates' special capacity lies (this is reinforced by b5-6 
TTCCp’ OVTLVOW. . . TCW TTpOYC'y O VOTCO V avepOJTTCDl/ KCCL T(DV VUV, 
see comm, ad loc.), but also to force a comparison of this capacity with the 
alleged qualities of others.
The structure of 127d2-128b7 then is this: Socrates recommends ol 
ttoXltlkol and the sophists over himself as prospective companions of 
Theages, implying that he will be useless in promoting the skills at which 
they are so adept. This is meant to be taken seriously, in so far as Socra­
tes would never have claimed any knowledge in these skills. But he does 
indicate through irony his low opinion of this kind of ability. Socrates' 
assertion that he knows nothing but Ta epcumKct appears to be a denial
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that he can do anything for Theages or anyone else (and this is how Thea­
ges understands it in 128b7-c5), but in a number of ways Socrates indi­
cates that this is not only his one special quality (and Tex12^), but also the 
one respect in which he can vie with the sophists and ot ttoXitikoi.
On this reading, what we now expect is that Socrates will demon­
strate how tcc cpcuTLKCC has a beneficial effect on his companions. The 
author is prevented (for reasons already mentioned above) from repre­
senting this effect as an ability to make others ctcx^ol by association with 
Socrates. The passage 127d2-128b6 again offers a clue as to what we 
will find in its place. In 127d5 Socrates, instead of referring to Demodocus' 
anxiety about his son’s becoming crowds, substitutes the phrase cis j3eX— 
tlqtos. This phrase frequently denotes a moral ideal for Socrates, and is 
not simply a neutral expression (see comm. ac/127d5). Two lines later, 
Socrates states that Theages’ and Demodocus’ goal is for Theages to 
become a ttoX£tt|S ayaQos (127d7). Both of these phrases avoid the 
connotations that crowds and crochet have acquired up to now, and they 
at least represent a goal which Socrates (though he does not say as much) 
might be thought to be able to help Theages achieve. Even when Theages 
a little later on refers to the effect of Socrates' presence on others, the 
author avoids having him say that those individuals in Socrates’ company 
became cro<|>oi; instead, they are said to have become TravTcov (3eX~ 
tlods (128c4; Theages calls Socrates himself KaXos KCoyaGos [127a8] 
rather than crowds)- In this way our author prepares us for the imminent 
consideration of Socrates as the most suitable companion for Theages. 
Thus if Theages' aim is to become cos (3£Xtlcjtos, or (SeXTicov, rather 
than crowds, Socrates may be the one Theages has been looking for all 
along.
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vii. Socrates and the divine sign: 128c6-fin.
If my analysis of the previous section is accurate, we should now 
await Socrates' elaboration of the way in which toc dpcoTiKa plays a 
decisive role in his improvement of others. And if it can be shown that this 
is what we are presented with, not only can critics' objections to the alleged 
impropriety of the earlier mention of tcc dpcoTiKa. be silenced, but, more 
importantly, the same critics' bewilderment over the function of the final 
section of the dialogue (see above sec. a, and nn.4-6) will be answered.57
We might hope to gain some assistance in interpretation by observ­
ing our author's method of transition to the divine sign section (128d1 ff.). 
This transition is effected by Socrates’ correction of Theages' misappre­
hension that it is Socrates himself who determines (128c7 eccv crii (3otj Att| ) 
if others are to become "better" by his company: as Socrates proceeds to 
elaborate at great length, it is rather to Scttpoviov that is responsible for 
this (128 c6ff.). This transaction bears a certain resemblance to a passage 
at the end of Ale. I which it would be worth examining. In 135c12-3 of this 
dialogue Socrates asks Alcibiades if he knows how he will escape his 
present servile condition; Alcibiades eventually responds (135d3) with 
’Eocv pouXxi <2 SojKpocTOs. When Socrates tells Alcibiades that he is 
mistaken, and Alcibiades asks ’AXXct ttcos XP^ Xoyoiv; (d5), Socrates 
retorts <zOtl cay Gods €©0X13 (d6). Since Socrates at different points in 
this dialogue has made reference to his divine sign, sometimes under the 
name of 6 Gods (see Intr. ch. II, c), it would appear that, here as well, 
Socrates is referring to the agency of the sign by playing upon a common
57As the details of this section are dealt with in a chapter of its own (ch. II below), I shall 
concentrate only on those aspects of it which relate directly to the meaning of Thg.
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formulaic phrase. Thus in both Thg. and Ale. I the importance of Socrates' 
sign is emphasized by Socrates' assertion that it, rather than he, decides if 
someone is to benefit by association with him; and several scholars have 
therefore suggested that this is another place at which our author has 
made direct use of Ale. /.58
This is, I believe, another instance in which critics have merely 
looked at a similarity in language, without scrutinizing the full implications 
which the parallel, if a conscious imitation, might possess with regard to the 
Thg. passage. To begin with the question of imitation, it may be true, of 
course, that the passage in Ale. / was a source for our author. In all fair­
ness, however, the evidence could equally be taken to indicate the priority 
of Thg. over Ale. /.59 Then again, both passages reflect a fact about the 
historic Socrates, namely that he denied any ability to teach, and was 
therefore not himself responsible for a companion's intellectual progress; 
so we cannot ignore the possibility that the two dialogues are independent 
of each other at this point. Be that as it may, we ought, I think, to concen­
trate instead on the way in which this parallel provides evidence that both 
dialogues share a similar point of view about the importance of Socrates’ 
divine sign in his associations with others. But the similarity is not a vague 
one. Suffice to say at this point in our discussion that in both Thg. and Ale. I 
there is a close conceptual link between Socrates' divine sign and Socratic 
epcos (see lntr. ch. II, b, c). Thus when Socrates in Ale. / claims that Alci­
biades will improve his own condition, not if Socrates is willing, but eo 
0eds e0e\^, this is a concession to the prominence of the unexplainable
^8See, e.g., Heidel 55 n.8; Pavlu 19-20; Vouveris 118. Kruger (14-5) criticizes Pavlu’s 
assessment, but is answered by Pavlu in the latter's review of Kruger's dissertation (see 
PhilWoch 22 [1939] 593-5)
59See Kruger 15.
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in Socrates’ beneficial relationship with Alcibiades. We have already seen 
that to 8cxl(j.ovlov is prominent in Socrates' mind at this point, but that 
this irrational force also has a great deal to do with love is made clear in 
Socrates’ next words in 135e1-3. In Thg. as well, Socrates, by denying the 
importance of his own volition in the improvement of his companions, is 
simultaneously affirming his lack of a rational or ’’technical" ability, and is 
thinking instead of the effects of toc epomKcc, though at this point the 
connection between to SocipovLov and tcc epcoTiKcc is not as clear as it 
will become (see Intr. ch. II, b). It appears, then, that the transitional 
passage under review is intended to bind Socrates’ earlier statement 
about his knowledge only in toc epCDTiKOC with the section on his divine 
sign, which reveals the role that the unaccountable plays in an associate’s 
success or failure.
But this use of the formulaic ectv Oeds PotjX'q now clearly creates a 
difficulty of interpretation: whereas the arguments in the preceding para­
graph concerning the place of tcc epcoTiKcc suggest that this concept 
plays a purely irrational role in Socrates’ contacts with others, Socrates’ 
earlier profession of knowledge only in toc epcoTiKcc brought to mind quite 
strongly the Platonic doctrine of a rational epcos (see sec. vi). Yet this 
contradiction and confusion can be explained if attention is paid to another, 
non-Platonic, member of the Alcibiades-dialogue genre, the Alcibiades of 
Aeschines Socraticus. After much philological work on the fragments of 
Aeschines’ Ale., the general character, and many of the details, of this work 
seem fairly clear.60 Rather than give a summary of this dialogue, however,
I shall concentrate on three fragments, numbered consecutively 11a-c by
60See Dittmar 97-159; Gaiser 71-95; R.A. Applegate, The Alcibiades of Aeschines of 
Sphettus (Diss. Princeton, 1949); K. Doring, Hermes 112 (1984) 17-22.
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Dittmar (Krauss 3-4). Brunnecke (63) was the first to draw attention to 
these fragments in connection with Thg.’, but Gaiser (98f.) went much fur­
ther (independently) in pointing out various parallels which he considered 
to provide definite evidence that our author drew upon Aeschines’ dia­
logue.61 Whether Gaiser was correct in this assumption is not the main 
point at issue here, although the question of Aeschines' Ala as a source for 
Thg. will be discussed.62 But it will be best first to examine at length some 
features of this dialogue, and then consider how they may shed light on the 
contradictory element in Socrates' treatment of tcc cpamKa. Here are the 
fragments in question, with emphasis on those words and phrases which 
will be pertinent to the ensuing discussion (Socrates is the speaker),
a) "’Ey co 8’ ci pcv tlpl tcvvt) gqpBT' SwaaOai lo^cXqgaL Travv 
av TroXXqv epauTOV pcopLav KaTcyivcoaKOV vuv 8c Qciq poipp 
cppqv poi toljto 8c8daeai ctt’ ’AXKLpLaSqv Kai ovScv yc tolj- 
tcov agiov eaupaaaL."
b) 'TIoXXol yap Kai tojv KapvovTcov uyicis yiyvovTai ol pev 
avepcnTTLi/q tcvvt]. ol 8c Oclq, poipp. octol pcv oCv dvepco- 
ttlv^ tcx^T). wo iaTpcSv ecpaTrcvdpcvoL, oaoL Sc ecia poipa 
CTTLevpLa avTOUs aycL cttl to ovqaov KaL totc CTTcOupriaav 
cpccraL, ottotc auTOLs epcXXc ctuvolctclv, KaL totc KwqyeT- 
qaaL, ottotc auvoiacLV cpcXXc TrovfjcraL."
c) "Tyco 8c 8lq top cpcoTa ov CTuyvavov epfiv ’AXklPlccSov 
ovScp SLa^opov t(3v BaKx&v cttcttovOclv. KaL yap at BaKyaL 
ciTCLSav cvecoL ycvcnvTaL, oOcv oi aXXoL ck t(3v ^pcaTtov
61 See also Muller, Die Kurzdialoge 233 n.1; Guthrie, HGP III. 401 and n.1.
62AIthough it should be added at once that any borrowing from Aeschines Socraticus does 
not by itself render Thg. spurious; B. Effe has argued persuasively (Hermes 99 [1971] 198­
208) that Chrm. is, in part, a reaction to Aeschines’ Ale.
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ouSc UScop SwavTotL Tj8pciiccy0aL, eKeivai jjlcXl kocl ya\a ocpij- 
OVTOCL. KOCL 8f) KOCL gyti) OTjSeV |JL(X0T)[JLQC €TTLCJTdcp6VQ<? O 8l8d£0C<? 
ocvQpcnTrop (jp(|)€XT)q'ccL[jL ccK 0{jlcjd<? <j|jLir|v Ewcdv ocv CKCLVcn 8loc to
CpQCV |3€\TLC0 Trouper oil."
We must look at fr. 11c for a moment. There can hardly be any 
question, as we compare its final sentence with T/?g. 128b1-7 (esp. b3 
eyco.. .b4 epcoTLKrijv), that we are dealing with more than general simi­
larities in thought. The language itself is strikingly close to what we find in 
Thg., and strongly suggests collusion of some kind; note in particular 
Socrates' claim to ignorance in both, the respective occurrences of cttl— 
cr tcc pcvos and pa0r(pa (up to this point the author of Thg. had spoken 
only of taL)’ and the coincidental expressions about love. The con­
nection of thought in Aeschines' Ale. is, as we shall see, much more readily 
explicable than that of Thg., but this is as it should be, since Socrates is 
rendering a narrative account in the Ala, whereas Thg. is in dramatic form. 
Partly because of the correspondences cited here, and partly because of 
other evidence which will be adduced below, I shall assume that the 
respective passages in the two dialogues are related (see further below, 
and sec. c). Moreover, since the Ala fragments are relatively transparent 
as to their meaning, they should be able to help us elucidate the meaning 
and role of the last few pages of Thg., as well as the apparent change in 
the character of tcc epcoTLKot as it is described by Socrates.
Socrates introduces his divine sign into the dialogue with the words 
ccjtl yap tl 06lqc poLpa iTapeTropepov cpoL ck TraLSos ap£ape~ 
vov SaLpdi/LOV (128d2-3). He will proceed to sketch in detail the way in 
which the divine sign is the decisive influence in his associations with 
others, most importantly in his educational contacts (129e1-130e4). That
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the sign is said to have attended him Oeig p-OLpqc since childhood (a point 
not mentioned in the parallel passage in Ap., see Intr. ch. II, b) may be 
explained by reference to the three instances of that phrase in the Ale. 
fragments above. In these fragments Qelq: pLOtpQC assumes a specific 
function: in fr. 11b63 the words characterize one means by which any per­
son might be aided, or might aid another (cf. cttl to ov-perov); here it is 
closely associated with desire or will ( €Ttl0li|jlloc), and is at the same time 
strongly contrasted with what may be performed Texvi]. In fr. 11a the 
same Qeipc jjLOippc~T€X1/''Q opposition is upheld, but here it is applied to 
the way in which Socrates thought he could exercise a beneficial influence 
((o4>e\T]aai) on Alcibiades in particular; the careful opposition to Texvi3 
shows, of course, that this influence had no rational basis. Now, the most 
obvious point of contact between Thg. and Aeschines’ Ale. is that Socrates 
speaks in each of his ability to "improve" another person. But whereas 
Socrates in Ale. maintains that this ability was conveyed to him merely 
OeiQ: jjLOLpQC, in Thg. the same ability emanates from an intermediary 
agent, to Saipidviov, which is itself allotted to Socrates iq. poipg. In 
both instances, however, the result is virtually same: those who come into 
contact with Socrates are able to improve through non-rational means (i.e., 
not tox^XI)- The use of the term co^eXciv (cn^eXta) in both works (Thg. 
129e4, e6, 130a2; Ale. fr. 11a, c) in the sense "to improve" or "make better" 
(see comm. ac/126d6), as applied to Socrates, further underscores the
63l have presented the fragments in the order in which they appear in Dittmar’s edition. For 
my own part, however, I should prefer that 11b precede 11a. With this arrangement, Socra­
tes’ narrative proceeds by use of analogy: first (11b), instances within human experience are 
presented, in which the influence of either avepcoTrivr) Texvri or eeia poipa may be 
the critical factor; then (11a), Socrates applies the same dichotomy to his own situation vis a 
vis Alcibiades, by affirming that he was able to help Alcibiades ©e£pc poipQt, not Text'll- 
The inductive argument is much more what we would expect of Socrates (cf. the similar use 
of craft-analogy in Aeschines’ Miltiades, as discussed by S. Slings, ZPE16 [1975] 304-5).
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similarity in the function of 0eia poipa in either dialogue (cf. also fr. 11c 
PcXticd Troufjom ~ Thg. 127d5 ottojs (Lg peXTiaTOS OQTai, 128c4-5 
iTdcvrav peXTious <|)oclvovtccl kt\.).
It is in this context that Socrates' previous claim in Thg. to know 
nothing but Ta epcoTiKa gains direct relevance. If we look once more at 
fr. 11c of Aeschines’ Ala, the connection of thought is this: Because of his 
love for Alcibiades, Socrates experienced the same thing that Bacchants 
do, who perform wonders when they are evOcoi, in circumstances when 
other people are ineffectual.64 Socrates, too, became evOeos because of 
the workings of 0€ia poipa, and thought himself capable, in this inspired 
condition, of helping Alcibiades. Although he knew (CTTicrTapevos) 
nothing by which he could benefit (aj<t>c\rjcrai|r av) Alcibiades, neverthe­
less he thought that by being with him (£uvd)v.. . OKeivq)) he could make 
him better through love (8ia to epav; so eTTi0upia worked hand in 
hand with 0eia poipa to produce a beneficial effect in fr. 11b).65 The 
Socrates of Thg. also professes to know nothing, as we have already seen. 
But whereas in Aeschines he holds that despite knowing nothing, he still 
believed he could make Alcibiades better 8ia to epav, and the role of 
Ta cpcuTiKa is thereby made unambiguous, the Socrates of Thg., through 
a Platonic device (see above on b4 TrXrjv ye kt\.), fastens on to this 
same profession of ignorance a strictly Platonic assertion about his exper­
tise in toc epcoTiKa. Aeschines, in other words, states explicitly what is 
only implicit in Thg. (and what is clear enough in Smp.), that toc optDTiKa 
is the source of Socrates' ability to help others. For in Thg. this ability, and 
its connection with tol epcDTiKa, is made manifest largely through the
64Cf. Ion 533e5-534c4; Phdr. 245a1-8.
65For eTneupict as the generic term under which epcos is subsumed, cf. Phdr. 237d3-4.
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story about Aristides, who maintained (according to Socrates) that he 
improved (eTTiSiSovccL) in direct proportion to his physical proximity to 
Socrates, so that he made his best progress when he actually grasped 
Socrates and fixed his eyes on him (130d3-e4).
Hence in certain important respects the triad ”ignorance-epo)s-0eioc 
poipcc” follows a similar pattern in both Thg. and Alc.QQ In Aeschines’ Ale. 
Socrates possesses no (jlcc0T|}j.oc, i.e., is not tcx^^kos; in Thg. he 
possesses no jjloc©tiijloc but one. What distinguishes him in each, however, 
is cptns/Toc epomKcc, with which his relationship is very close. In Aesch­
ines, epcos further defines the means by which Socrates can help Alcibi­
ades 0eiqc poipQC. In Thg., toc epomKcc typifies Socrates’ relationships 
with others, particularly as depicted in the Aristides story in 129e1-130e4, 
though his conscientious and persistent diverting of the conversation to 
Theages himself (122c7ff., 125b3; see sec. a, ii; iv), which demonstrates 
his insistence on personal contact in an educational context, should also 
be recalled. In this dialogue, moreover, 0eiqc poipQC proves to be an 
important concept, because Socrates, for his ability to help another person, 
is totally reliant upon to SccipLoviop which has always attended him 
0clqc poLpQC (see further Intr. ch.ll, b, for the connection of these two 
concepts).
It should be evident, however, that there is an important difference 
between the introduction of toc epomKcc in Thg. and in Aeschines’ Ale. 
For in Aeschines there is never any question that the love of Socrates is ir­
rational; but in Thg., as we have seen, we are initially confronted with the 
prospect of rational desire of a Platonic kind (Socrates’ one pcc0qpcc), only 
to be shown subsequently that toc epomKcc is in fact responsible for the
66Gaiser (98) saw this complex as the fundamental link between Aeschines’ Ale. and Thg.
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irrational component in Socratic association. And this has given the 
appearance of an inconsistency in Thg. It seems now that the best way to 
explain this inconsistency is by postulating the influence of two kinds of 
Socratic eptos on our author: in the first place, the Platonic, philosophic 
variety, closely connected with learning and teaching; in the second place, 
an Aeschinean concept of Socratic eptns, which is seen purely in terms of 
an irrational impulse. The author’s desire to graft these together has con­
sequently resulted in the marriage of essentially incompatible principles.
We can see then that the difficulty in evaluating Socrates' assertion 
about a knowledge in tcc epcoTiKa stems largely from two sources. The 
first of these is the one that has so troubled commentators, namely the 
casual way in which the assertion is introduced, and its lack of a formal 
connection with the section of Thg. that deals with the divine sign. But the 
apparent lack of clarity in Thg. is not tantamount to faulty composition, for 
not only is Socrates' declaration about tcc epcoTiKa introduced in a 
Platonic (or Socratic) manner, but, as well, Socrates' earlier surprise at 
Theages' and Demodocus' notion that he could help anyone at all (cf. 
127d5-e1, and comm. ac/127b1) can hardly be contradicted now by a 
sudden volte-face, in which he expresses confidence that he could in fact 
assist Theages. Rather, it is left primarily, and more discreetly, to the 
section on the divine sign to show how Ta epamicd actually figures in 
Socrates' associations, and how he can be beneficial to others. Because 
Aeschines leaves no real doubt about the function he assigns to eptos, he 
helps to elucidate our author's intentions; and so, too, does the parallel 
from Ale. I which was pointed out a little earlier. At the same time, we are 
able, through comparison, to identify a crucial difference between the 
respective views of the authors of Thg. and Aeschines' Ale. as to the way in
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which people profited from association with Socrates, in the presence and 
role of the divine sign in the former (on which see lntr. ch. II, b).67 The 
second difficulty in assessing Socrates’ assertion about Ta epajTiKa is a 
less obvious one and concerns a matter of detail. It arises from the 
author’s own shift in his attitude to the concept, in so far as he moves away 
from a Platonic point of view to a less rationalistic attitude. This shift I 
would attribute to the influence of a second philosophical source. To my 
mind this difficulty, though it seems not to have been detected before, is a 
much more serious one than the first.
Our earlier inference (sec. vi) about the function of Socrates' claim to
be knowledgeable in Ta cpcoTLKa, that it served to introduce the crucial
difference between Socrates and those people who profess an ability to
make Theages crowds, would therefore seem justified. For through all the
talk about the divine sign, Socrates’ words imply that it is as the epcoTiKOS
avfjp that he can benefit others. Although he does not disavow any claim
to Texvrl through his assertion of ignorance in all but one thing in 128b1-
4, such a disavowal is implicitly made through his correction of Theages'
misapprehension about Socrates' role in a companion's progress; and he
further emphasizes this irrational aspect of himself when at the end of his
discussion about the divine sign he says that Theages would do well to
look to others who have control (eyKpaTCis 130e10) over the help they
can render (implying knowledge of a Tex121!)* rather than attempt to
achieve anything at random (oti av TUXXIS touto TTpa^ai 130a9-10)
from Socrates. The irony here is not, I think, that Socrates really does
67By comparing Aeschin. Ala, Thg., and Ala I, Gaiser concludes (99) that 0eia potpa 
and to Saipoviov mean essentially the same thing in these specific contexts. Termino­
logical identification of this kind is hazardous, however, when one is relating one author to 
another. At any rate, in Thg. it is much closer to the truth to say that it is Ta epcoTiKa with 
which to Satpoi/iov is conceptually related in the mind of our author (see lntr. ch II, b, c).
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possess knowledge of a tcx^, but rather that the other educators do not. 
Moreover, our author at this point comes near to an expression of the 
antithesis between Texvrl and tux?), placing Socrates firmly on the side 
of tuxt).68 This is also an affirmation that, whatever Socrates does 
accomplish, is achieved through tcc epcoTiKa, closely linked to to 8ai- 
poviov and Ccloc poipoc. As many critics have seen, the whole section 
on the divine sign strongly emphasizes the irrational side of Socrates’ 
character: to borrow from the language of Aeschines, Socrates is shown to 
be evGcos (see Intr. ch. II, bfor an elaboration), to act poipqt (or 
TUXTl), not Tex^Xb and t0 be able to improve others through the one thing 
about which he can express confidence, cpcos/Toc epanwa; to 
SocLpid vlov also fits precisely into this scheme (for the details see Intr. ch. 
II, b, d). The connection between epios and Socrates' positive influence 
on others, and the opposition of both of these to TexVTb prove to be as 
strong in Thg. as they are in Aeschines' Ale.
For all this, the contrast in Thg. between Socrates and others who 
may claim to be educators is not really a contrast between those who 
operate tcxvi3, and Socrates, who does not. It would appear that this 
contrast does lie at the bottom of Aeschines' Ala, where however Socrates 
seems to distinguish himself from craftsmen, rather than sophists or poli­
ticians. But the situation in Thg. is not so simple. For, as we have seen, 
the essential contrast here is not between Socrates and craftsmen; our 
analysis of Socrates' discussion with Theages has shown that it is precise­
ly the sophists' and politicians' claim to possession of a reyvT} that is held 
in doubt; and, moreover, any references which Socrates may make to the
680n the Tey^TT^XT antithesis, see L. Edmonds, Chance and Intelligence in Thucy­
dides (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), esp. 1-6; M.J. O'Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes and the 
Greek Mind (Chapel Hill, 1967) 73 n.41.
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possession of a TexVTl by the sophists or ol ttoXltlkol , or to their claim 
to impart a Tex1'1'!, is ironic. It is rather, as has already been remarked, 
with respect to Ta epumKa that Socrates parts company with others: 
whereas this is the distinctive feature marking Socratic association, atten­
tion is forcefully drawn on the other side not only to the dubious ethical 
value of sophistic association (through the distortion of Theages' aspiration 
into a desire to be a tyrant), but also to the mercenary status of the sophists, 
both at the outset of the dialogue (121d5f.), and immediately before 
Socrates makes his statement about Ta epumKa (128a5ff.; see comm, ad 
128a1, a2-3, a6-7, a6). It is the chief merit of Friedlander's chapter on Thg. 
that he recognizes (152), as an important element in the dialogue, this 
opposition between "Socratic education through love" and "sophistic in­
struction without love." At the same time, this Socratic "education," which is 
portrayed as being so heavily dependent upon Socrates' personal contact 
with one individual, is nothing like the life of ol ttoXltlkol of Athens, 
whose existence is justified only with reference to ol ttoXXol, and who 
are recognized as cro<j>oi only by the masses (127a5-7, e2-4).69
The basic structure of Thg., that is to say, the separation of the dia­
logue into two broadly distinct sections, also brings into focus the opposi­
tion between Socrates and those other individuals who claim to be able to 
train Theages.70 This is emphasized through form - question and answer
690ther writers have also recognized this contrast between Socrates and other educators 
(see Wagner 3; Pavlu 19; Kruger 11,14; Vouverisl 19-23), but generally take into consider­
ation only127d2-tfn., and, like Friedlander, do not argue in precise terms. Hackforth (Plato’s 
Phaedrus [Cambridge, 1952] 40) makes a similar distinction with regard to ''Lysias'” speech 
and Socrates' first speech in Phdr.: "The whole attitude of the speaker [in Socrates' first 
speech], unlike that of Lysias's speaker, shows a real concern for the welfare, especially the 
moral welfare, of the boy....we see the lover peeping through the disguise -- not indeed the 
o'kaids epaaTqs but the true lover as conceived by Socrates and Plato; in fact we get a 
glimpse of the epacrTrjs par excellence, Socrates himself.”
70There is a similar use of clear structural demarcation for thematic purposes in Euthd.: see 
Friedlander 11.183-93, who thoughtfully explores the effects of this use of structure.
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is discarded in favour of the continuous exposition of the divine sign 
section - and through the change in Socrates’ tone; in the divine sign 
section he largely abandons the irony with which he conducted the pre­
vious examination of the sophists and ot ttoXltlkol, and assumes a 
much more serious demeanor. The contrast is essentially that between his 
present gttouSt) and hjs earlier itch8la, much as Socrates' previous 
manner had been opposed to that of Theages and Demodocus.71
One thread that runs through the confrontation of Socrates, sophists, 
and ot ttoXltlkol, and helps to furnish some common ground upon 
which the contrast between them can be made, is the use of the thematic 
words gwouglcc, owelvccl, and GvyyLyveGecu. Although the dia­
logue is ostensibly Kept aortas, yet in an important respect it is about 
gwougloc: how gwougloc with Socrates differs from that with other 
people. Demodocus is anxious that Theages, by being with (GLiy- 
yevop.evos 122a4) someone, may be corrupted. It is association (gw~ 
ouglccv 122e3) with some man that Theages demands of his father. 
When Socrates and Theages have agreed that Theages wishes to become 
a tyrant, Socrates proposes to Demodocus that they set out to determine 
through association (gwouglccv 125a8) with what person Theages might 
become a Go<|)ds TVpawos. The ensuing quotations from "Euripides" 
highlight gwougloc, as does the allusion to the Anacreontic poem that 
follows (in which the use of gwougloc may involve a sexual double 
entendre, see Appendix 2). After Theages declares that he wishes to
^1 It is tempting to link Socrates' crTrouSiq in the final pages with the fact that he is there 
concerned with Ta epcoTiKa, a subject about which he himself claims to possess 
unbounded knowledge (128b5-6), whereas in previous sections of the dialogue he is 
distinguished by 'rraiStd because here he is the character who does not know. Yet even 
in the section on the divine sign, though Socrates is strongly characterized by Ta epco- 
TiKa, he is not the rational expert.
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conform to the ideal of politician established by the likes of Themistocles, 
Pericles, and Cimon, Socrates again reverts to the question, with whom 
Theages should associate (o*uyy£vd|jievo£ 126c8, cf. owcov 127a7) in 
order to fulfill this ambition. Theages' application to Socrates, once ot 
ttoXitikoi are discarded, is an appeal for Socrates to "be (or associate) 
with" him (oweivoti 127a9, cf. avvovcnav 127c4), an appeal supported 
in the same language by Demodocus (cf. owouotqc 127b4, aweTvai 
b5, b7, oriyyeveo'Oa.i b8). And so it goes up to the outset of the section 
on the divine sign (cf. 127e6, 128a5, a6, c3, c4). In this section itself, 
Socrates expressly tells us that the first four anecdotes (128d8-129d8) are 
intended to prove that to 8aLp.oviov is all-powerful in his associations 
(tocs owouotocs 129e2, cf. e6, e7) with others. More than that, this part 
of the dialogue is itself intended as a demonstration of one conception of 
the nature of Socratic association, exemplified, above all, by the story of 
Aristides (cf. cruveiTjV 130d5). Socrates points this up in no uncertain 
terms when, after the story has been completed, he says "That is what 
association with me is like" (’Tcftiv. .. toiocutti q ^(jieTspoc aw over tot 
130e5). And as the account of Aristides functions as the dialogue's climax, 
so awouaicc gains added dimension as a thematic concept: Socratic 
association so obviously transcends other, ineffectual kinds. By exploiting 
awouoTCC as a theme, with its possible social, physical, and educational 
connotations (see comm, ad 122e3), our author is able to shift naturally, 
and without explicit comment, to the subject of Socrates, the epcoTiKOS 
ocvfjp, whose awouaia is characterized by tcc eptOTtKCC.72
72Fr. 11c of Aeschines* Ale. similarly emphasizes Socrates' "being with" Alcibiades, and 
juxtaposes it with epees (qjp.'qv' ctv eKetvcp 8ioc to epav peXTieo TTOi/fjcrcti).
For a development in the connotations of aweTvat, not unlike that which we find in Thg., 
cf. Smp. 211d6-212a2: first it is used (d6, d8) in a strictly sensual meaning; but within a very 
short space the same word is applied (a2) to intellectual involvement with the form of beauty.
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Another way in which Socrates is seen to differ from those who 
profess to be educators is in the effect which he has on his associates. I 
have already alluded to this briefly in drawing attention to Socrates' virtual 
abandonment of the terms ao<|>ds/cro<|)£a at the point at which he 
becomes, in Theages' mind, the candidate of choice to be the young man's 
mentor (see sec. b, vi). As we saw, it is only to be expected that Socrates 
should avoid these words in connection with his own influence. In their 
place he speaks of Theages' becoming "as good as possible"; Theages 
notes that others his own age became "better" (pe\Tious) in Socrates' 
company; and Socrates speaks extensively in the second part of the 
section on the divine sign (129e1-130e4) of those who "improve(d)" 
(eTriSiSdaaiv, (jj^eXoOPTai) by association with him. This is very like 
certain contexts of Aeschines' Ala, in which Socrates asserts that, despite 
his ignorance of any tex^T- he nevertheless thought he could make 
Alcibiades better (fr. 11c (3e\t£(ju kol'qqccl); indeed, it even appears that 
this effect was one of the most distinctive features of the Socrates in 
Aeschines' dialogues generally.73
But despite this particular affinity, the effect of "improving," rather 
than of making another person crowds, has a special application to the 
present work. Theages' ambition is to rule the people of his city, in other 
words, to become a prominent ttoXitikos, and he himself identifies this 
with the acquisition of cro<|>£a. I have argued above that Theages' de­
cision to apply to Socrates as his educator does not represent an alteration 
in his plans: he still at this stage desires to become a ttoXltikos (see 
sec. b, vi). Nor need we suppose that Socrates' avoidance of the terms 
cro^ds/crocjncc is meant to indicate that he has lost sight of Theages' goal.
73See Doring, Hermes 112 (1984) 16-30.
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On the contrary, the ideal of "improvement" with which he replaces it 
demonstrates that, in so far as Socrates produces this effect on others, he 
is himself the true ttoXltlkos. For it is a commonplace in Plato that the 
most famous politicians of Athens, those who have been praised to the 
highest degree (cf. 126a9-10 "Themistocles, Pericles, Cimon, and others"), 
in fact failed in their tasks and were not, in the strict sense, ttoXltlkol at 
all, because they did not make the citizens of Athens better.74 On these 
grounds Plato held that Socrates was the one genuine ttoXltlkos' (Grg. 
521d6-8) 75 And it is a simple development from here that the ttoXltlkos 
comes to be defined generally by Plato as the person who improves his 
fellow citizens, and the ttoXltlkt) tox^T) as the art which brings this 
about.76 Hence it follows that in depicting Socrates as the person around 
whom people "become better," the author is also positing him as the one 
who can make Theages a ttoXltlkos, though of a very different kind from 
that envisaged by Theages at the outset of the dialogue; no longer is ttoX~ 
ltlkt] considered strictly in terms of apx^LV, as had been the case in the 
first part of the dialogue.77
Still, it would be well to recognize that the divine sign section poses 
certain difficulties for the interpreter of this dialogue. Quite apart from those 
problems that concern the authenticity of the work, we must ask how
74Cf. Grg. 515b6-517a6, 517b3ff., R. 493a6-d9.
75As Guthrie seems to recognize (HGP V. 186), Plato’s reference in Pit. 293a2-4 to the art 
of government as being in the possession of only one or two individuals is a probable 
allusion to Socrates.
76Cf. Prt. 319a3-5, Euthd. 292b4ff., Men. 99e4-100a7, R. 487e7-502c7, Pit. 296d6- 
297b3, Lg. 650b6, Amat. 137c6-138b10 (an oblique reference); so also Arist. EN 1099b 
29-32, 1102a7-10. On the origins of Plato's concept of the philosopher-statesman see J.S. 
Morrsion, COn.s.8 (1958) 198-218.
77lt seems to me that Ficino was thinking along very similar lines when he looked beyond 
the dramatic limits of the dialogue and inferred (Comm, in Conv. Plat, de Amore 7.16) that 
"Theagem iustum fortemque in republica civem" [sc. Socrates fecit].
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successfully this section does demonstrate the superiority of Socratic 
association. In the first place, what is the relevance of the first four anec­
dotes (128d8-129d8) in the first part of this section to the second part (129 
e1-130e4)? The author is quite explicit in his answer: the stories about 
Oharmides, Clitomachus, the Sicilian expedition, and Sannio show that the 
divine sign is almighty in Socrates' associations with others (129e1-3). 
This, however, is not at all what they prove. It is true that Socrates' 
subsequent narrative demonstrates the omnipotence of the divine sign: to 
Socipoviov determines which of Socrates' companions are to make 
progress and which are not. But the previous four anecdotes only show 
that the sign has an apotropaic power which makes itself known after a 
companion of Socrates' has already determined on a course of action; it 
does not, however, at least according to these reports, determine the fate of 
an individual.78 It is evident, therefore, that a dislocation of sorts occurs 
between the two parts of the divine sign section, in so far as the first part is 
taken to prove what it cannot legitimately be considered to have done.
This cannot be explained simply by arguing for multiple authorship. 
There is no indication of disunity here. For the first four anecdotes com­
prise the (jidpTUpcs to which Socrates alludes in 128d7, and the second 
part of the section, working from the (false) assumption that the first part 
has established that the divine sign is "almighty," is persistent to the end in 
demonstrating this within the educational sphere, through the story of 
Aristides. A better explanation of the dislocation is, I think, the hypothesis 
that our author wished to reveal the miraculous workings of to Saipov- 
lop, and, as he was more concerned with inspiring a sense of wonder in 
the reader than he was with drawing a strictly consistent portrait of the sign,
78Lamb (345) is alone in recognizing this.
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cast around for stories about to Saipoviov which were already in 
circulation. That those he found did not prove exactly what he claimed for 
them was not of great moment, and he included the stories virtually as he 
encountered them. The dislocation which can be identified in the divine 
sign section may therefore be explained if it is assumed that the first four 
anecdotes were not originally constructed specifically for this dialogue. On 
this hypothesis, we need not ponder for long about the sources of the 
anecdotes; it is as likely as not that they derive largely from oral tradition, 
although they may well have become part of a literary collection by the time 
Thg. was composed (see comm. ac/128d1-130e10).
Not unconnected with this problem is a curious use of pronouns in 
the divine sign section which seems to have gone unnoticed. When 
Socrates turns to Theages in 128d1 to correct the young man's mistaken 
assumption that Socrates himself determines if an associate is to improve 
by his company, he addresses, quite naturally, Theages alone, through the 
use of the singular croi (d2). When, however, he introduces the series of 
four anecdotes that exemplify the apotropaic behaviour of to SotijjLovLov, 
he does so thus: Kai toijtcov papTUpas Trapc^opoci (128d7-8; 
cf. yiyvajcjKCTe 128d8, pouXccrOc 129a1, vpiv a5, tjjjllv c7, ockotjct- 
coGov d1). In other words, these four reports are directed at Theages and 
Demodocus. Yet, there is another shift in 129e1 ff., that is, at the beginning 
of the second part of the divine sign section; for here, once again, Socrates 
explicitly addresses Theages alone (am 129e1, qtj 'QaOriaal e8). Now it 
is tempting to connect this change of pronouns in some way with the 
stratification in the divine sign section identified immediately above; for 
instance, it might be conjectured that they are vestiges of the anecdotes' 
state before they found their way into this dialogue. Yet I think the shift in
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pronouns can be explained otherwise. The singular pronoun at the 
beginning of the divine sign section causes no problem, since it is a direct 
response to Theages. The subsequent switch to the plural would seem to 
have been occasioned by the general nature of the subject matter of the 
anecdotes involved: they consist for the most part of a statement of the (in 
this dialogue) characteristically apotropaic, prophetic, behaviour of to 
8ai|jdi>iov, and, in so far as they provide an introduction to the phen­
omenon, are likely to be of interest to both Demodocus and Theages. The 
description in this part of the section of the miraculous qualities of the di­
vine sign is meant for Demodocus' ears as much as they are for Theages’. 
But the second part of the divine sign section, commencing at 129e1, is a 
different matter. Here Socrates focusses upon one specific aspect of to 
8ocl(jloi/lov, namely, the "educational" effect it exerts over Socrates’ 
companions, conveyed through the story about a young man (Aristides) not 
unlike Theages. Its purpose is to arouse in Theages an awareness of the 
peculiar, "improving" ability inherent in Socratic cwoucnot, for which to 
Saipio vlov is responsible; and so Socrates seems to consider the story 
important for Theages in particular. In fact, this seems little different from 
the way in which Socrates, conformably with his conception of education 
as a matter of personal contact, had earlier directed the discussion away 
from Demodocus towards Theages himself (cf. 122c7ff., 125b3). This, in 
turn, may be connected with Socrates’ emergence in this dialogue as a 
special kind of ttoXltlkos. For, just as it is in a peculiar sense that 
Socrates could be considered a itoXitikos, so his conception of his 
political mission, in so far as it consisted in making his city better by his 
appeal to individual citizens to examine themselves and recognize their 
own ignorance, was distinctive. If Socrates could call himself a ttoX-
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ltlkos, it was because of his concern for and attention to individuals, not 
his conformity to institutional practices.79 Socrates, in the way in which he 
commits himself exclusively to Theages in this dialogue, is behaving in a 
manner consonant with his educational and personal ideal of tto\l~ 
TLKT).80
But there is a more serious issue to consider, and that is whether or 
not the contrast presented to the reader, between the sophists and oi 
ttoXltlkol on the one hand, and Socrates on the other, is an intelligible 
and effective championing of the intrinsic worth of Socrates. For my own 
part, I do not think that it is. It is not that Socrates does not furnish a real 
Toxvri of politics (or of anything else for that matter) to take the place of the 
pseudo-TexVTl or pseudo-ooc|)La offered by others; for in this matter, at 
least, the Platonic Socrates is elsewhere willing to accept that ethical 
concepts are actually unlike other, conventional T€XV0CL*81 It breathes a 
Platonic spirit, I think, that in this dialogue a virtual impasse results from the 
search for a teacher of politics qua T€xvt). Nor, as we have seen, is any 
difficulty implied by the "improving" effect of association with Socrates, 
although in the context we might perhaps have expected some mention of 
the care and improvement of one’s x|/uxt)■ Moreover, the presentation of 
Socrates as the epWTLKds ccvfjp is unobjectionable, because, on the
79See especially Popper, The Open Society^ 125-37; Gulley 173ff.; Morrison, op.cit. 200­
1, 212.
"And, it may be added here, it is in direct contradistinction to sophistic procedure, which 
merely implants doctrine externally, without regard for argumentation or the individuality of a 
student; cf. Men. 71c5-d8: Meno offers Gorgias' opinions to Socrates ready-made, but 
Socrates demands (cf. d5-6) that Meno say only what he himself thinks is the truth about
apeTTj.
81 This assumption lies at the bottom of the aTropiai of the early dialogues; see Shorey, 
"Plato's Ethics" in Plato II, ed. G. Vlastos (Notre Dame, 1978) 9-10 (with reff.); G.M.A. Grube, 
Plato’s Thought (London, 1935) 223-5 M.J. O'Brien, The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek 
Mind (Chapel Hill, 1967) 17-20; Gulley 82; Irwin, PA4T71ff. (who, however, argues that Plato 
in his earliest work believed that analogy with crafts was justified in the ethical sphere).
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testimony of other works in the Corpus (and, as well, of some that are 
independent of Plato), the eroticism of Socrates (whatever that may have 
meant to a given writer of ScoKpocTiKot \dyoi, or to the biographical 
tradition) is one of the most firmly-established characteristics about him, 
and those scholars who have defended the authenticity of Thg. are in­
clined, quite understandably, to point this out. What is unsatisfactory about 
this dialogue is that Socrates emerges as really nothing more than the 
master of tcc epcoTiKcc. True, his customary claim to ignorance in 128b1 ff. 
is matched by Aristides’ later assurance that, while he learned nothing from 
Socrates, he nevertheless made great progress (130d4-5). But whereas 
Socrates’ ignorance usually implies joint examination of himself and 
others, by means of dialectic, leading to improvement through knowledge 
of one’s own ignorance, here it means, at most, improvement through 
cpOJS, through the agency of to SocipovLOP. Clearly, Socrates would 
emerge as a superior alternative to other prospective companions if the 
account of him given in Thg. were more balanced. For Socratic epcos and 
Socratic dialectic are perfectly compatible, even complementary;82 so 
there seems to be little excuse for this dialogue's attempt to present the 
superiority of Socratic association from one point of view only, as a matter 
of irrational influence, especially since the notion of rational cpcns seems 
to be broached, albeit lightly, earlier on (see further below, and Intr. ch. IV, 
d, e). Although we do encounter within the first section of Thg. an example 
of Socrates' examination of a young man, not only is this examination, and 
whatever impression about the workings of Socratic dialectic that it may 
have left on the reader, overshadowed by what is said in the second part of
82See Friedlander I.44-58; Versdnyi, Socratic Humanism 128-46; Guthrie, HGP III. 395-7; 
R.A. Markus, "The Dialectic of Eros in Plao's Symposiums in Plato II, ed. G. Vlastos (Notre 
Dame, 1978) 132-43; Irwin, P/W7167-72.
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the divine sign section (129e1 ff.), but it can hardly be regarded as a perfect 
specimen of the way in which Socratic dialectic could achieve beneficial 
results.83 One might contrast Alcibiades' speech in Smp., in which Alcibi­
ades, though he vividly describes the effect produced upon him by Socra­
tes' presence, is nevertheless careful to give prominence to an account of 
the power of Socrates' \6yoi (221d7-222a6). In Thg. the most we are 
told is that Aristides made great progress when he looked at Socrates 
XeyovTos cron (130d8).
Our author's neglect of the dialectical component of Socrates and 
Socratic ignorance is all the more notable for his disregard of the dia­
lectical nature of certain sources which he seems to have drawn upon for 
his report about Aristides (130a4ff.). In 130b6-7 Aristides, speaking with 
Socrates, passes judgement on Thucydides' annoyance at Socrates: otjk 
oTSev [sc. Thucydides].. .Trpiv aol cruyyevecrOcti oTov rjv dvSpoc- 
ttoSov; (for the text see comm. ac/130b7). There are several other philo­
sophical contexts in which the idea of slavery is introduced, and which are 
of a piece: the person who is seen to live a life without philosophy, or a 
morally unsound life, is said to be a slave, or slavish. The following are 
especially germane to the exposition of our passage.
1) In X. Mem. 4.2.13ff. Socrates brings Euthydemus to a point at which he 
is unable to feel confident that he knows what justice and injustice are. 
Then in 4.2.22 Socrates asks him Olcreoc 8e tlvccs dcpSpaTroScoScLS 
KocXoupcpods;. Euthydemus admits that people are given this name 
because they are ignorant (8l’ ctpocOiocp). Socrates presses the point by 
asking ^Ap’ oSv tgjv tcc kocXoc Kai ayaQa kocl Slkocloc (jlt) eiSoTcov
83See also Hermann, Geschichte und System 428-9; Steinhart 440-41; Kruger 16-7; lntr. 
ch. Ill, a.
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to ovop.cc tout’ ccttlv;, to which Euthydemus agrees. In the end 
(4.2.39), Euthydemus ttccvu dcOupcns eywv dcTrfjXee kocl KCCTa<|)pov” 
paces eocuToC kocl vopLQOcs tcq ovtl avSpcciToSov elvccL; he recog­
nized his remedy to be association with Socrates. Dittmar’s researches 
(124-30, 134ff., 144) have made it probable that Mem. 4.2 is dependent 
upon Aeschines' Ala, and that Euthydemus is essentially an Alcibiades- 
figure (see 3 below).
2) In Ale. 1134e8ff. Alcibiades agrees with Socrates that to do what one 
wishes without good sense and ocpeTT) results in disaster; until one 
possesses ocpeTT), it is better to be governed than to govern (135b7-8); 
such a condition is likened to slavery (c2 SouXctjclv, c4 SouXoiTpCTres), 
which must be avoided (c8-9). Alcibiades recognizes that he is a slave 
(c10-11), and that the cure for this condition is association with Socrates 
(d7-10).
3) Aeschin. Socr. Ale. frr. 6 and 10 (Dittmar) (=Cic. Tusc. 3.33.77) seem 
also to contain the motif that one who does not possess virtue is nothing 
but a slave: [Q]Quid enim dicemus, eum Socrates Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut 
accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse, nee quicquam inter Alcibiadem 
summo loco natum et quemvis baiulum interesse, [10] cam se Alcibiades 
adflictaret lacrimansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet 
turpitudinemque depelleret.... Dittmar (100) connects baiulus (lit. "porter") 
in fr. 6 with the Greek 8ppLOUpyds. He further observes that in the 
passage from X. Mem. discussed in 1) above, 8qpLOUpyoL are equated 
with ocvSpccTroSojSeLS, because they are apa0eLs; and SppLOUpyoL 
are apa0eLS in Ale. / (131a9ff.) as well (because ttoXXou Scodolv... 
yLyvcocTKCLV eocuTOUs). If the section from Mem., and Ale. / itself, are 
dependent upon Aeschines’A/c., as Dittmar supposed (see above), and as
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seems likely enough, it is a reasonable inference that Aeschines' Ale. also 
contained a declaration that Socrates' main interlocutor, in this case 
Alcibiades, is no better than a slave.
4) One can hardly refer to these three passages without noting as well 
Alcibiades’ avowed servitude to Socrates in Smp. 219e3-5. Here however 
the reference is to erotic slavery (a literary topos).Q4 Interestingly, the 
theme of eXeuQepia/SouXeia also occurred in Antisthenes' lost KOpos, 
a composition which, on Dittmar’s analysis, may have shared many of the 
features that can be traced within the Alcibiades-dialogue genre (68ff., esp. 
75-83).84 5 Finally, Aristotle picked up on this motif of slavery in the 
Protrepticus (B.53 During): We must not flee philosophy; if we pursue gain 
at any cost, we should do the same for wisdom: fj p-qv av8paTro8c38es 
ye tou Cqv aXXa pr) tod grjp eu yXiycaOai, Kai Tats tcw 
ttoXXow auTov aKoXouOew 8dgais aXXa pr) tow ttoXXow 
aglow Tais auTou, Kai Ta pev xP71P'aTa C^toip tow 8e KaXcw 
pqSepiav empeXeiav TroieioGai to TrapaTrav.
Some critics have objected to the use of avSpaTToSov in Thg. 
130c6-7, on the grounds that the thought is obtrusive and un-Platonic (see 
comm, ad loc.). I would submit, however, that the context in which it occurs 
belongs within the above group of passages, especially 1-3. The essence 
of Aristides' statement seems to be that association with Socrates has 
effected a positive change in Thucydides; in the past he was as a slave. It 
differs from the first three passages, in so far as Thucydides' "slavery" is a 
former condition ('Fjv b6), whereas in the other places any possible devel­
opment from a servile state is prospective. But a constant feature is, appar­
84See P. Murgatroyd, Latomus 40 (1981) 589-606.
88But for criticisms of Dittmar’s reconstruction of this work, see I. During, Herodicus the 
Cratetean (Stockholm, 1941) 68-70.
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ently, that Socratic association is the cure for moral and intellectual servi­
tude. As well, Thucydides' irritation with Socrates (130b1-2) is highly rem­
iniscent of a regular result of Socrates' reducing of a young interlocutor to a 
state of aTropia (see comm. ac/130b1-2); in fact, the words used to 
describe Thucydides' behaviour could almost be applied to the effect pro­
duced on the young men at the end of the conversations in the works from 
which 1-3 are taken (but see below). It rather appears, particularly in view 
of the elliptical manner in which the notion of slavery is introduced into 
Thg., and in view of the unelaborated mention of Thucydides' annoyance, 
as though our author has drawn upon another source at the outset of the 
Aristides anecdote, in which the original context had clarified (as 1-3 above 
do) the meaning of the reference to slavery. Indeed, the Alcibiades-dia- 
logue genre seems to figure prominently here; to my mind, the likelihood of 
its use is increased by certain parallelisms with Ale. / and Aeschines' Ale. 
that have already been noted.
Our argument for affinities between Thg. and the works numbered 1­
3 above is strengthened by another piece of evidence. In 130c6 Aristides, 
disheartened by his apparent lack of culture since his departure from 
Socrates, remarks: outojs aicrxwoijm eui t*q €|jlocijto£i <j>auXoTT|Ti. 
The feelings expressed by these words happen to conform quite closely to 
the final outcome of Socrates' discussions above, where Euthydemus (1) 
and Alcibiades (2, 3) become depressed by the bad impressions that they 
make (cf. X. Mem. 4.2.39; Aeschin. Socr. Ale. fr.9 [Dittmar]; Alcibiades 
shows less despondency in Ale. 1135c11). The reason why I think this 
reflects an external source, and is not merely coincidental, is not only that 
we have already found several parallels between Thg. and one or more of 
these three works, but also because of the occurrence of 4>au\0Tr|Ti in
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c6. Although cjxruXos is extremely common in the Platonic Corpus, the 
noun <|)au\dTr|S is found in only three other places (Hp. ma. 286d2, Lg. 
646b6, 745d3). But 4>au\dTT)S does arise in the course of the Mem. 
section cited above: at the end of his discussion with Socrates (4.2.39), 
Euthydemus admits to posessing such a quality: ocvccyKctCei pe kocl 
tocutoc (viz., that he misapprehends the difference between "rich" and 
"poor") opoXoyciv BrjAov otl t) cjjrq ^ocuXottis. Moreover, among 
the nineteen papyrus fragments of Aeschines' Ale. published in 1919 by 
Grenfell and Hunt as POxy. 1608* 87 8  are three occurrences of the word 
<j)ccu\os (11.35, 40, 56-7), which, in addition to ^ccuXols in fr. 8 (Dittmar), 
strongly support Dittmar’s hypothesis (105) that Ale. included a discussion 
about ^ocuXottis;87 and the dialogue probably ended with Alcibiades' 
recognition of his own (^ocuXottis.88 In view of the passages from Xeno­
phon and Aeschines, I would suggest that our author was at this point in­
fluenced by another work, quite possibly one of these two.
Notable though these correspondences between Thg. and Ale. I, X. 
Mem. 4.2, and Aeschin. Socr. Ale. may be, what is most important for our 
present investigation is the fact that, given our author's dependence on 
these three works, or, at any rate, on some member of the Alcibiades- 
dialogue genre connected with them,89 he is apparently indifferent to the
QQThe Oxyrynchus Papyri, pt. xiii, ed. Grenfell and Hunt (London, 1919) 88-94.
87See also E.G. Berry, TAPA 81 (1950) 4-6. In fr.10 above, Alcibiades wants to gain virtus, 
which must translate the Greek dpeTfj in the original, and thereby lose his present turpi- 
tudo. Dittmar (100) associates the latter with alo’xpoT'qs, but, as a counterpart for apeTf), 
it is equally possible that (JjccuXottis stood behind turpitudo in Aeschines' text.
88Cf. fr.9 (Dittmar): KXcteiv QevTot tt)v Ke<|>a\f|v eirl tcc yovccvTa deuprjcrctvTct 
cos ou8’ eyyvs ovTa T($ OepioTOKXei Tqv TrapacrKeuriv.
89A leading candidate might be Antisthenes' Alcibiades (for the fragments, see F.D. Caizzi, 
Antisthenis Fragmenta [Milan, 1966] 32-4), of which Aeschines Socraticus is said to have 
made use (cf. D.L. 2.61), presumably in his own Ale.
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dialectical content and qualities of these works. He is concerned with the 
outcome of Socratic association, or with the effects of its absence, not with 
the means by which the outcome is achieved. It is worth drawing attention 
to this, as the author, in the course of composing the divine sign section, 
has similarly ignored the major dialectical aspects of other works, more 
readily identifiable than the ones on which he has apparently drawn in the 
places considered just now (see Intr. ch. II, b). The impression one is left 
with is that this writer has deliberately shunned any details that might divert 
attention away from his emphasis upon the omnipotence of to Saipov— 
iov and the almost mystical quality of Socratic owouora. This, in turn, is 
perfectly consistent with our earlier comments about the author’s move 
from the hint of a Platonic concept of rational, dialectical dpcos in 128b1 ff. 
to an Aeschinean picture of epcos as the antithesis of rational influence.
c. Conclusions: Theme, Unity and Purpose
Thg. emerges as one description of Socrates’ distinctiveness, his
ocTOTrioc. Although this cctotticc is evident in the first, lengthier, section of 
the dialogue through Socrates’ persistent irony and general TraiShct, and 
through the primary importance he assigns to the thoughts and wishes of 
his young interlocutor, it is exemplified most vividly in the course of the 
divine sign section of the dialogue. It is here that we discover in what 
respects Socrates differs from those who would claim to teach the tto\~ 
ltlkt| Tex127!- R is not that he, unlike the others, does possess knowledge 
of such a craft; on the contrary, Socrates is emphatic about his ignorance. 
Rather, association with him is characterized by tcc opcoTLKdc, that is, by a 
concern for the welfare of the companion; and a companion’s progress is 
dictated not by the payment of fees, but by the volition of to Sccipoviov,
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which, as I have argued, and as I shall set forth in greater detail below (see 
lntr. ch. II, b), is closely connected with epoos. Here also we find that the 
effect of Socratic crwouaioc is not to make a companion <jo<J>6s, but 
rather to "improve" him or make him "better," which in the context is con­
sidered to be a superior benefit to the one likely to be gained from the 
sophists or ot ttoXltlkol. Nevertheless, this ability to improve marks 
Socrates out as the one who most nearly approaches the status of 
ttoXltlkos.
These are, in outline, the conclusions at which the previous 
investigations have arrived. But the aim of the dialogue is not merely to 
present a picture of how peculiar an experience it was to be in Socrates' 
presence. Instead, the author goes out of his way to draw the sharpest 
possible distinction between Socrates and other educators. In view of this, 
Thg. may be characterized as apologetic.90 Demodocus had expressed 
fear at the beginning of the dialogue about his son's possible association 
with a sophist, lest he be corrupted. At the same time, he greeted Socrates 
as someone whose advice could be trusted, and, later on, addressed him 
as one who would release him from his anxieties. The contrast vindicates 
Socrates, who is not the person likely to corrupt the young, as his accusers 
had supposed.
This message becomes clearer if we recall the various places in our 
analysis in which parallels have been drawn with Ale. / and Aeschines' Ala 
It must be said now that the parallels between Thg. and these works make 
much better sense if priority is given to the two A/c/b/actes-dialogues. If one 
views these two works as background for Thg., as works to which our 
author was responding to some degree, one becomes aware not only of
90See Hermann, Geschichte und System 427, 429; Grote 437-9.
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the manner and extent to which Theages differs from the Alcibiades of 
these dialogues (not to say from the historical Alcibiades, whose similarity 
to the literary Alcibiades is a separate question altogether), but also of the 
almost certain truth that not all of Socrates' companions were Alcibiades 
"types." Here the choice of Theages as interlocutor must be noted. It might 
be thought that the name of any young man could have been selected to 
represent Socrates' respondent in this dialogue, but there are, I believe, 
special reasons why Theages should have been chosen, and these are 
largely supplied by the two mentions of Theages in the Corpus apart from 
Thg. itself.
First, there isR. 496b6-c3. In this passage Theages is cited as an 
example of those who were worthy companions of philosophy (496a11- 
b1): it is likely that Theages would have abandoned philosophy in favour of 
politics, but ill health prevented him from the latter calling. These 
comments have not received the attention they deserve.91 First of ail, that 
Theages is said to have been held back from the political life for which he 
was apparently destined is a satisfying confirmation of the faithfulness of 
the portrait presented here of a young man desirous of political success.92 
Secondly, he is described in the R. passage as the eTaipos of Socrates, 
and it is implied that he never parted ways with philosophy. From this it 
would appear that this dialogue was intended, at least in part, to depict the 
first meeting of Socrates with a young man who was to become a lifelong 
companion (see also Intr. ch. Ill, b), and who was to profit from this associ­
91 It has, as a matter of fact, been asserted that the juxtaposition of this information about 
Theages in R with the statement about Socrates' divine sign that follows it induced our 
author to connect Theages and the divine sign together as a thematic unit (see Pavlu 15; 
Heidel 53; Souilhd 138; Carlini 43; Robin 1641; Rist 18). My subsequent remarks will, I 
hope, demonstrate that the author of Thg. operated more purposefully than this.
92Similarly H. Muller 465; Friedlander ,1.150.
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ation. In other words, he is, in retrospect, an example of those individuals 
ots.. .ccv auXXdpriTCU, -rqs owouaiots T) to£i SocLpoviou Swapis 
(Thg. 129e7-8). Hence there is no inherent irony in the promise at the end 
of Thg. of continued association between him and Socrates, for it is ex­
pected that the reader will know what the outcome of Theages’ life was. To 
take matters one step further, Theages clearly gave up on the pseudo- 
cro<|)ia offered by the sophists and politicians, as presented in our dia­
logue, and turned instead to cfuXocxcxjna, the proper concern of Socrates, 
in so far as he is not, in Thg. as elsewhere, crowds*.93 Such dramatic cir­
cumstances are roughly reminiscent of the situation we encounter in Tht., 
where we observe Socrates’ initial meeting with a youth of outstanding 
promise, and are fully aware that this promise will eventually be realized 
(though not through association with Socrates). On the other hand, in 
contrast to the ending of Thg. (and the dramatic premise of Tht.) we may 
compare the Alcibiades dialogues and Chrm., where the dialogues end 
with the understanding of continued association between the young men 
involved and Socrates, though the reader is aware of the lives that these 
young men will lead and of the end they will meet (the irony this produces 
is clearly intentional). The contrast between associates of this kind and 
Theages is further reinforced by the third consideration; that it was despite 
his voaoTpocjna that Theages was able to lead a life of philosophy. In R 
407b4-408b5 it is explained that voaoTpo^La (407b1) generally makes 
a person’s life useless, and certainly ill-suited to philosophy; it would be 
better not to treat such a person's sickness at all. Theages, in so far as he 
transcended physical disabilities and attained to the study of philosophy,
93ln this respect Socrates is, in fact, nearly an embodiment of the daimon epcos; cf. Smp. 
203d4-204a7.
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must have been, in Plato's view, an exceptional individual, and the inform­
ation supplied by R. tends to confirm our argument that the author of Thg. 
intended his reader to accept Theages as the virtual antithesis of a char­
acter such as the Alcibiades whom we meet in the dialogues bearing his 
name.94 Thg. thus becomes a powerful antidote for anyone who believed 
that all companions of Socrates were, like Alcibiades, Critias, and Charm- 
ides, morally and socially reprehensible, or that Socrates was ultimately 
responsible for the way these individuals turned out. This is, essentially, 
the impression left by the reference to Theages in the other Platonic 
passage bearing his name, Ap. 33e7. Here Socrates calls upon his 
accusers to bring forth any "fathers or brothers or other kin" (33d5-6) who 
could claim that a young relative had been corrupted by him. Among those 
present at the trial whom he names, but who do not come forward to speak 
out against Socrates, is Paralios, Theages’ brother. The implication for our 
dialogue of Paralios’ tacit support of Socrates is clearly that the influence of 
Socratic owovora on Theages was beneficial, and, from the perspective 
of our dialogue, that Socrates saved Theages from potential corruption by 
other teachers. Again, we can see how the author of Thg. strikes an apo­
logetic note for Socrates, one which, when we take into account all surviv­
ing information about Theages, appears to be the more effective for its 
concentration on one particular companion of Socrates.
The connection between the two formal divisions of this dialogue 
has become evident. In the first section Socrates reviews the nature of 
association with sophists and, at less length, with ol ttoXltlkol; in the
94Pangle (154) claims it is the author’s intention to demonstrate "the severe limitations of 
Theages’ intellectual capacities," and uses the testimonium in R. as corroborating evidence: 
"Theages is not adduced as someone with a philosophic nature, but rather his illness is an 
example of one way in which men with philosophic natures might be saved from politics" 
(154 n.3). I see no justification in this curious distortion (on Theages see also lntr. ch. Ill, b).
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second, he outlines the main features of association with himelf. Thus Thg. 
is a dialogue dependent upon contrast. At the most basic level this is 
exemplified by the broad formal divisions into which the dialogue may be 
articulated, and by the different tones attributable to Socrates from one 
division to the other. The contrast emerges more specifically through the 
pretensions ascribed to the various prospective companions. For while the 
sophists and ol ttoXitikoi would claim to possess knowledge of the 
ttoXltlkt) T€Xvt1» which in the context of this dialogue implies the 
possession of ao<|)ia, Socrates not only leads the discussion to the con­
clusion that these individuals are not o'o^oi, but also denies that he him­
self possesses the political craft. It is, moreover, by comparison with the 
sophists that the distinctiveness of Socrates emerges with greatest clarity. 
They are characterized as mercenary, concerned more with money than 
with the welfare of a young man like Theages, and likely, in Demodocus' 
mind, to corrupt his son. Socrates knows only toc epcoTiKcc, i.e., cares for 
the young man himself. Therefore the difference between Socrates and 
others lies in their respective kinds of owouorcc. And unlike the sophists, 
Socrates refuses to promise what he cannot deliver: nothing is said about 
how others in his company became cto<|)ol, but rather how they became 
better, and not through his own agency, but through that of to 8ocl(jlov- 
iov. In this way the absurdity of sophistic professionalism is pointed up: 
how can a sophist demand money when he is not actually responsible for 
a student’s progress, that is to say, is not tcxvikos? The assumptions 
Socrates entertains about himself are completely at odds with those of the 
sophists.
Apart from the importance of the contrasts evident from one section 
of the dialogue to the other, we have also detected certain resonances
83
between these two sections, functioning as threads which draw the dia­
logue into a unity. One of these is the theme of awoucncx, or association, 
of Socratic and other kinds. Another is the theme of to. opcoTLKcx, which, 
though explicitly mentioned by Socrates only once, was seen to be present 
from an earlier point in the dialogue. Again, there is the important subject 
of tcx12'1!. which is not abandoned once the sophists and ol ttoXltlkol 
have been done away with, but also lies behind Socrates' use of the terms 
antithetical to it, ©olcc p.OLpct and ttjxt) (130e10 TUXflS). We should also 
note that expectations expressed early in the dialogue are in the end ful­
filled: Socrates, so warmly welcomed by Demodocus, is with similar feeling 
exhorted to become Theages' companion. Moreover, while Socrates’ 
reference to his understanding of TUpavi/LKcc in the first section of the 
dialogue carries with it an erotic level of meaning, there is a sense in which 
TUpawLKa, in this dialogue, characterizes Socratic a'uvo'ucria (sec. b, 
v), for in the second section of Thg. one of the most emphatic statements 
Socrates makes about to SaL(jLOVLOV is that it is "all-powerful" in his 
associations with others, and deals in an apparently arbitrary manner with 
those who wish to become his companion (see further lntr. ch. II, b).
At the beginning of this chapter I drew attention to those scholars 
who have asserted that Thg. is unambiguously about to Soclitovlov. Let 
me simply state here that the considerations offered above should serve to 
refute any notions about the disunity, much less the multiple authorship, of 
Thg., implied by theories of this kind on subject and theme. Nor is the 
relationship between the first and second sections a vague one, as is often 
asserted.95 On the contrary, the dialogue itself is only intelligible when 
examined as an integral whole.
95See especially Pavlu 18-9; Kruger 11,14.
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One’s opinions about the purpose of Thg. are bound to be con­
ditioned by any conclusions as to its date of composition. Although this 
latter question will be pursued later (see Intr. ch. V, f, g), where an attempt 
will be made to draw the dialogue's original purpose into sharper focus, it 
is nevertheless desirable to offer some judgements based on the evidence 
adduced so far in this chapter. As we have seen, the author's intentions 
were at least to some extent apologetic. Furthermore, that Socrates is 
presented in the final analysis as exemplifying the qualities of a ttoXi- 
tikos of a special kind, and thus, as embodying the qualities Theages 
was pursuing at the outset, has an interestingly Platonic ring. For it is one 
manifestation of Plato's apologetic ways and means that, behind the 
dcTTopiai of some early Socratic dialogues stands a character, Socrates 
himself, who best demonstrates the ethical concept(s) which he and other 
interlocutors have been unable to define (although here it is never implied 
that Socrates actually possesses ocxlna).96 On the other hand, it is 
clearly not the author's goal to ascribe any particular philosophical "pro­
gramme" to Socratic owouaia, such as eXeyyos leading to ccTropioc 
and self-knowledge. In this dialogue Socratic ignorance implies, as we 
have seen, something rather different from that of other dialogues, and the 
message is manifest enough that the help Socrates rendered others was 
not within his own control. In this respect Thg. has some close affinities 
with other Socratic works, notably those of the A/c/b/acfes-dialogue genre. 
In these works, Socrates encounters a young man who has political pre­
tensions. Through comparison of politics with crafts they are made to re­
alize the deficiency and naivete of their aspiration, and come to desire
96For this aspect of La. see M.J. O'Brien, YCS18 (1963) 133-43; for Men. see Bluck, Meno 
124-5; for Chrm. see T.G. Tuckey, Plato's Charmides (Cambridge, 1951) 95-104; Guthrie, 
HGP IV. 170 (more cautious is R. McKim, TAPA 115 [1985] 59-77).
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Socratic awoucria. The ttoXltlkt) tcx^ ‘n >ts contemporary manifes­
tations, is rejected, while philosophy is extolled. If we press this similarity, it 
will be apparent that Thg. is, in a sense, and not unlike the three speci­
mens of the Alcibiades-dialogue genre mentioned earlier ([Plato], Aeschin­
es, Xenophon), of a protreptic nature, advocating a life of philosophy (i.e., 
continuing association with Socrates; what this association will precisely 
consist in is not made clear, either in Thg. or the other works) over the 
misguided attempt to acquire political power, or, at any rate, a sophistic 
T€XPT|.97 In connection with this it is tempting to believe that the alternate 
second title of Thg., Trcpi ^iXoao^ias (see comm. ac/”Title"), is a gen­
uine variant, and represents just such an interpretation of one of the pur­
poses of the dialogue, namely, that it is partly an exhortation to some kind 
of philosophical way of life (see further Intr. ch. V, /). It has never been 
argued by scholars that this, and not Trepi cro<[>ias, is the true second title 
of the dialogue, but it may well be so, and in that case would provide evi­
dence that Thg. was viewed as protreptic in tone by some ancient scholars.
Four centuries ago Cornarius remarked that in Thg. "magis quae [sc. 
sapientia] non fit, quam quae fit, declarator."98 Our examinations have 
shown that this is a perceptive comment: Socrates scorns what normally 
passes for wisdom, and looks to an altogether different ideal. Indeed, it 
may be reasonable to say that Cornarius' words point up another purpose 
served by the dialogue. For as much as Thg. is about Socrates and what 
the author considers Socrates to represent, nevertheless in the process he 
manages to expound his opinions about ao^ia as it is popularly con­
97For this characteristic of the protreptic strand within the Socratic dialogue, see Gaiser 
33ffand for the protreptic character of the /Vc/b/acfes-dialogue genre, ib. 77-95.
98See i.F. Fischer, lani Comarii Eclogae in Dialogos Platonis Omnes, nunc primum separ­
ation editae cura loh. Frider. Fischeri (Lipsiae, 1771) 61.
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ceived, and about those who claim to possess it. In rejecting the sophists 
and politicians the author is criticizing a pair that Plato regularly couples 
together as false claimants to knowledge. The passage which perhaps 
best illustrates this is R. 493a6-d9, a description of the unphilosophical 
temperament which Plato ascribed to the general populace; another 
appropriate passage is Men. 90b4-95a6. Our author, like Plato, is 
interested in delineating his position on what normally passes for wisdom.
I have stressed the characteristics, methods of composition, and 
aspects of thought in the structure of Thg. which appear Platonic, or can be 
compared with other works which are either fully extant or fragmentary. 
The extent to which this information may be taken as evidence for the 
authenticity of the dialogue will be considered below (lntr. ch. IV, c). 
However, it hardly needs saying that there is no other Platonic dialogue 
that precisely mirrors the structure of this one; specifically, only here is 
Socrates' divine sign made the central feature of a climax, running into 
several pages, of a particular work. Although some remarks have been 
made above concerning the composition of individual places in this section 
of the dialogue, it will be necessary now to look in much closer detail at the 
role and conception of to Saip-dviov in Thg.
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II. The Divine Sign and the Theages
Socrates’ divine sign was the subject of some elaborate and exten­
sive discussion in antiquity,1 and much has been written about it in more 
recent times.2 No effort will be made in the following pages to give a 
comprehensive account of the development or presentation of the sign 
among all ancient authors who contributed anything to the subject,3 nor 
will an attempt be made to describe the precise nature of the sign.4 Such 
consideration of these topics as occurs below will be dictated solely by the 
bearing that they have on the question of the portrayal of the divine sign 
specifically in Thg. The main thrust of this discussion must consist in deter­
mining, as far as possible, the relationship of the excursus on the divine 
sign in Thg. to the Platonic literature on the subject and to other contem­
porary or nearly contemporary literature, and the nature of the novelties 
which the author introduces into this excursus when he goes beyond
1See the fundamental study of A. Willing, De Socratis Daemonio quae antiquis temporibus 
fuerint Opiniones (Diss. Jena, 1909).
2The secondary literature is extensive; no complete bibliography exists, but for references 
see Zeller II.15 74-89 (with nn.); Friedlander I.32-6 (see nn.); H. Gundert, Platonstudien 
(Amsterdam, 1977) 61-4 (= Gymnasium 61 [1954] 528-31); one of the best short accounts 
of the divine sign in early Socratic literature is in Gigon, Sokrates 163-78.
3For a brief but useful account of developments in representations of the divine sign in 
antiquity, see (in addition to Willing, op. cit.) SouilhS 130-7.
Generally speaking, such investigations as I have encountered in the course of (admittedly
cursory) reading on this aspect of the divine sign are speculative in the extreme, and (origin­
ating mostly in the nineteenth century) seem to reflect a first flush of enthusiasm over con­
temporary discoveries in the fields of clinical psychology and psychoanalysis.
88
previous expositors. This last question also involves us in the attempt to 
decide what influences were at play where the author has ventured upon 
extending the functions and activities of the divine sign. As such, the pre­
sentation of the divine sign in Thg. itself will remain the focus of attention 
throughout this section. But since much of the discussion on the authen­
ticity of Thg. has in the past centred around this part of the dialogue - rightly 
and inevitably so - it has proved quite impossible in the course of the 
present investigation not to engage in discussions on this important issue 
where the need has arisen. The evidence for authorship gathered here 
will be reviewed later (lntr. ch. IV,d). However, a selection of the Platonic 
and Xenophontic evidence for Socrates’ divine sign must first be 
considered.
a. Plato and Xenophon
In Plato's indisputably genuine works certain points are consistently 
made on the relatively few occasions when the subject of discussion turns 
to Socrates’ divine sign, and other individual features in these descriptions 
contribute to complete the picture. Above all, the divine sign is only 
apotropaic; it comes to Socrates when he ought to desist from a course of 
action contemplated by him, but it never urges him forward.5 According to 
Plato, the divine sign was responsible for some important decisions made 
in Socrates' lifetime. In Ft. (496c3-5) and Ap. (31c7-d6) we are told that the 
sign prevented Socrates from embarking upon a political career. On the 
other hand, in Ap. (40a8ff.) the non-intervention of the sign on the day of 
Socrates' trial is his guarantee that what has befallen him during the 
proceedings is in fact good, and that death is no evil. That Socrates can
5Cf. /tyz 31d1-4, Euthd. 272e3-273a1, Phdr. 242b8-c3, R. 496c3-5, Tht. 151a2-5.
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here mention the mere non-opposition of the sign as a criterion for judging 
the benefit to him of a series of events may show that Plato, at least in this 
work, viewed the sign quite generally as a guiding force at moments of 
great importance in Socrates' life, and believed that the sign was in some 
sense infallible as a guardian for Socrates; for otherwise he could not have 
depicted Socrates as placing so great a trust simply in its inactivity. But the 
capacity of the divine sign positively to condone an act, in Socrates' 
judgement, by non-opposition is not mentioned elsewhere in Plato, and it 
seems to be merely an exception here.6
Apart from the divine sign's role in important matters, we learn from 
Plato that it often occurred also on trivial occasions. This is stated explicitly 
in Ap. 40a4-6,7 and a particular instance is recounted in Euthd. 272e1- 
273a2.8 The sign is also said to intervene (presumably on both important 
and unimportant occasions, cf. the Euthd. passage in the previous sen­
tence) either when Socrates is about to act (Ap. 40a6, Phdr. 242b8f.), or 
when he is in the midst of speaking (Ap. 40b3-6). It was a frequent 
occurrence for Socrates (Ap. 40b3-4), and he often spoke about it (Ap. 
31c7-8). That it was nothing like a moral conscience is evident from the 
fact that it merely prohibited Socrates from actions that proved to be inex­
6lt should be noted that the inactivity of the sign is not quite enough to prevent Socrates in 
his last words (Ap. 42a2-5) from expressing scepticism as to whether death is a good thing. 
The non-opposition of to SocLpoviov, at least among some later Platonists, was evidently 
taken for granted as the equivalent of a protreptic force for Socrates, cf. Olymp. in Ale. 21.2­
3 (irpcoTov pev otl aei ccutov aTreTpeiTGV, Kai ouppoXov qv TTpoTponqs to 
TTOTC pq OCTTOTpCTTGLV’).
zq yap eicoeuioc pot paPTiKq q tou Saipoviou.. .ttccpu ctu crpiKpois 
evavTtoupevq.
8This passage in Euthd. probably supplied the basic material for an account of one occur­
rence of the divine sign in Thg.\ see comm, ad 129a1-c8.
pedient, rather than morally reprehensible.9 Finally, Socrates asserts (R. 
496c4-5) that his divine sign is unparalleled, or nearly unparalleled, 
among all who have preceded him.
Plato draws repeatedly upon a limited vocabulary in his various 
descriptions of the divine sign. The sign itself is to SarpovLOV (Ap. 40 
a4, Euthph. 3b5, Euthd. 272e4, Phdr. 242b8-9), to yLyvopcvov poL 
SoupovLov (Tht. 151a4), to SocLpdvLOV OTjpewv (R. 496c4), Golov 
tl kocl ScapovLOV (Ap. 31c8-d1), to olcdGos or-qiTOLOV (Euthd. 272e3- 
4, Phdr. 242b9, Ap. 40c2-3), to tol) Goolj crripcLOV (Ap. 40b1), rp .. 
OLcneuLoc poL pctVTLKT) (Ap. 40a4), (jxnvp tls (Ap. 31 d3); at times cer­
tain of these phrases are joined in combination (Ap. 40a4, Euthd. 272e3-4, 
Phdr. 242b8-9). The verb used for the occurrence of the sign is regularly 
yLyvop.ocL (e.g. Euthphr. 3b6, Ap. 31d1, Phdr. 242b9), and jjloXXco com­
monly describes the imminence of Socrates' actions at the sign’s occur­
rence (Ap. 31 d4, 40a6, 40b3, Phdr. 242b8). When Socrates has already 
begun to act or speak, it catches him in the midst (|totoc£lj Ap. 40b4). ov~ 
otVTLoOpcxL is one word used of the opposition of the sign (Ap. 40a6, b1).
Xenophon reproduces a number of the elements in this portrait. The 
divine sign is still regarded as something peculiar to Socrates alone, so 
that Socrates' mention of it at his trial aroused a Gopupos, brought on by a 
jealousy or disbelief on the part of the jurors (Ap. 14); and Euthydemus can 
speak of Socrates as specially favoured by the gods by virtue of his divine 
sign, which gives him guidance even when he does not ask for it (Mem. 
4.3.12). In Xenophon's accounts it is a warning sign (e.g. Mem. 1.1.4 
[TrpooTipctLVOVTOS], Ap. 13), and is explicitly connected with pavTLKfj
9See Zeller II.15 78f.; Gundert 46; Taylor, Socrates (New York, 1952) 45; Burnet ad 
Euthphr. 3b6.
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(e.g. Mem. 1.1.9). The term to Saip-OVLOV' is regularly applied to it (e.g. 
Mem. 1.1.2, 4, Ap. 4, 13), and, as Plato had done, Xenophon calls it a 
"voice" (<|>a)vrj Ap. 12). Whereas Plato regularly employed the term arjpL- 
£lov, Xenophon prefers to predicate the verb (Trpo-)OTip.aiveiv of the 
divine sign's activities (cf. Mem. 1.1.2, 4, Ap. 13). For the instances in 
which the divine sign opposes Socrates, Xenophon occasionally uses the 
word evavTLOUjjLOCL (Ap. 4, 8). Xenophon also is at pains to defend the 
infallibility of the divine sign (cf. Ap. 4ff., Mem. 4.8.1 f.), and it is no more a 
manifestation of conscience in Xenophon than it was in Plato.
The differences between the descriptions in Plato and Xenophon 
are, however, considerable. In the first place, Xenophon has more to say 
about Socrates' sign, which is hardly surprising when one considers his 
apologetic purpose and the connection he draws between to 8aip.dviov 
and the accusations of impiety which were brought against Socrates (see 
below). Secondly, while the tone of the Platonic Socrates in speaking of 
the divine sign often seems ironic or whimsical,10 Xenophon's Socrates is 
in strict earnest about the topic of to 8ocl(jlovlov. Additionally, it seems 
likely that Xenophon's notion of what made Socrates' sign unique was its 
spontaneity, which is not the characteristic that made Plato view it as dis­
tinct (see below). But most significantly, the persistence with which the 
apotropaic element is observed in Plato's portrait is largely disregarded by 
Xenophon. He still speaks of its prohibitive functions, as when his Socra­
tes remarks that the divine sign prevented his attempts to prepare a de­
fence for his trial (Mem. 4.8.5, Ap. 4). But this facet of the sign is entirely 
shrouded by frequent assertions, first, that it also prompted Socrates to 
carry out, rather than simply abstain from, a given course of action (Mem.
10E.g. in the Euthd., Phdr., and Tht. passages mentioned above.
4.3.13, 4.8.1), and second, that its apotropaic and protreptic powers were 
directed towards Socrates' associates as well (Mem. 1.1.4). In Xenophon's 
view the sign is neither for Socrates' utility alone, nor merely protreptic.
Before examining the portions of Thg. that deal with Socrates' divine 
sign, it would be well to consider a little further the respective treatments 
accorded it in Plato and Xenophon. For if plausible explanations to 
account for the different approaches taken towards the phenomenon can 
be put forward, this should constitute a background against which the 
intentions and tendencies of the author of Thg. may emerge with greater 
clarity. Since I am here concerned ultimately with the method of compos­
ition in the divine sign section of Thg., there is no advantage in pronoun­
cing on the relative authenticity of the two accounts, a problem which pro­
perly belongs to a study of the historical Socrates. The texts must speak for 
themselves.
Xenophon has been described as "religious with the religion of the 
plain and honest man,"11 and indeed there is much conventional piety to 
be found throughout the pages of his works. This is nowhere truer than in 
the opening portions of Mem. Acutely aware of the charges of irreligion 
brought against Socrates, and prompt in connecting Socrates' divine sign 
with these charges, Xenophon offers an explanation and defence of its 
existence by means of arguments calculated to be most intelligible to other 
Greeks who shared his own religious presuppositions, in other words, to a 
large segment of the Athenian population. His argument essentially runs: 
Everyone makes use of omens, voices, tokens, and sacrifices, in an 
attempt to determine the future, and everyone admits that signs which are 
generally accepted as betokening a future event are simply media, the
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11 Guthrie, HGP III. 334.
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instruments of the gods. Most people say that they are urged forward or 
checked by these signs, and it was no different with Socrates and his 
divine sign. It showed him both what to do and what not to do (1.1.4 tcc
TTOieiv, tcc So p.f) Troteiv, cf. 4.8.1), and Socrates functioned as an 
agent of the will of god for his friends as well. What is obscure to people 
ought to be learned from the gods through (jlccvtlkti, and the gods give a 
sign to those to whom they are propitious (1.1.9). Hence Xenophon, 
through a rather orthodox filter, interprets all aspects of Socrates’ sign, as 
far as he can, as fairly typical features of Greek religious experience. To 
Xenophon the sign is just another instance of familiar mediumistic activity 
which should never have aroused the suspicion it did, for like other such 
phenomena it existed for the public good, and not for any individual alone. 
In conventional terms Socrates might simply have been called cu8ccL|j.eov. 
This at any rate seems to be the perspective from which Xenophon evalu­
ated the divine sign, and evidently he felt that the opprobrium attaching to 
Socrates from popular stories about it could be mitigated by assimilating it 
into a common strand of Greek religious life.12
Such an analysis of Xenophon’s disposition toward Socrates’ divine 
sign receives corroboration from an overlooked passage in that author’s 
Apology. As already mentioned, both Xenophon and Plato employ a wide 
variety of terms in order to allude to the same thing, to 8ai|^dviov. 
Viewed from one side, this flexibility of nomenclature no doubt reflects the 
indeterminate nature of the sign, as perceived by Socrates as well as by
12See Zeller II.15 75 n.2; Joel l.71ff.; Maier 450f.; Gigon adX. Mem. 1.1.2ff.; Guthrie HGP III. 
403-4. In this connection it may be significant that Xenophon in Mem. 1.1.4 uses the verb 
crr||junveil/ absolutely ("give a sign"), as it is applied to the divine sign (to Saipoviov 
yap e<j>r| o-qpaiveiv); for a very similar use, but of Apollo, cf. Heraclitus DK 22B93 6 
otva£ ou to pocvTeiov ecrTi to ev Ae\c|>ois ouTe Xeyei ovto KpuiTTei aXXa 
crqpciivei.
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the writer in question. At the same time, however, Plato provides much in­
formation that allows us to assume that his use of multiple epithets was in 
fact part of a deliberate effort by him not simply to describe the indescrib­
able, but rather to dissociate Socrates' sign from the general run of SotL— 
jjlopcs'; for 8ocl(Jlcov, while it is never applied by Plato to the sign, is pre­
cisely the word one might have expected to find (see below). Xenophon 
also, whether following Plato or not, avoids using the word 8cxl[jl(jdv of 
Socrates’ divine sign. But in one place in Ap. the distinction between to 
8ai(rdviov, 4>covr\, etc., and 8ocip.cov, clearly begins to break down. 
There Socrates is made to speak first about his divine sign, and then about 
Chairephon's questioning of the Delphic oracle (Ap. 13-4). The connection 
between the two reports is effected by the following sentence: ,zAye 8q 
aKoucraTe kocl ocXXoc, ipot £tl (tocXXov ol pouXop-cvoL up-cov cctt- 
lotcjjol T(jji epee tetl(jl'qo‘0ocl tjtto 8ocl(jlovcdv. Even allowing for a 
certain looseness of expression in the text, a couple of inferences can be 
firmly drawn. First, Xenophon's treatment of the two topics, the divine sign 
and the Apolline prophecy, in Ap. 13-4, demonstrates no real concern to 
distinguish them as separate and unrelated phenomena; instead they are 
classified as elements of one aspect of Socrates' life, viz., that he enjoyed 
heaven's special favour, a general point of view which is punctuated and 
highlighted by the ensuing reference and comparison to the oracular 
utterances concerning Lycurgus (15). Moreover, whereas in Plato's Ap. 
the Delphic response is made the foundation of Socrates' mission (20e6- 
23c1), and the divine sign is put forward as the cause both of his avoid­
ance of political life, and of his calm acceptance of the outcome of his trial 
(31c4-32a3, 40a2-c3), Xenophon evidently has no interest in the divine 
sign or the Delphic oracle's response per se. Xenophon's juxtaposition of
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the divine sign with the much more familiar component of religious belief is 
therefore perfectly consistent with his attitude towards what he saw to be 
the oracular and prophetic role of the sign in Socrates’ daily life. The 
second, and critical, point is that Xenophon, in describing the special ad­
vantage Socrates enjoyed at the hands of the gods, employs the phrase 
tjtto SocL|j.dpcov. These words undoubtedly have a fairly general refer­
ence, in as much as they are being used in a sentence describing Socra­
tes’ relationship with the gods as a whole: they point back to the preceding 
lines as well as to Socrates' further reports (aXXa). Nevertheless, tjtto 
8ai}movcov must reveal the true light in which Xenophon apprehended 
Socrates' divine sign: the "voice" which belonged to Socrates alone was 
demonstrable evidence of how highly he was honoured by 8 cci [moves. 
Hence we may surmise that Xenophon saw Socrates’ "voice" or "sign" 
quite simply as the direct work of a 8a£|mcov; this might have been deduced 
from other passages, but here in any case Xenophon comes closer to its 
explicit acknowledgement than anybody does before the middle-Platonists 
(see sec. c/).13 And that this direct connection of Socrates' sign with a 
8 at }jlco v stems from an essentially popular view of mediumistic activity 
can, I think, hardly be questioned.14
In Plato, as we saw earlier, Socrates' sign is considered unique; but 
in what this uniqueness consists Plato never explicitly tells his reader. 
Presumably, however, its special quality is something that prompted 
Socrates (or Plato) to attach the term to 8ai|moviov (or other sobriquets) 
to the sign, rather than the conventional 6 8a£jma)v. Whereas a specific
13ZelIer no doubt could sustain the following remark (11.15 73) only by athetizing X. Ap.: "An 
kleiner Stelle einer platonischen Oder xenophontischen Schrift ist wirklich von dem Verkehr 
des Sokrates mit einem D&mon die Rede, sondern immer nur von einem gottlichen Oder 
dSmonischen Zeichen, von einer Stimme...."
14See Burkert 179-181.
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body of inherited belief was conjured up by the word Saipicov, to 8ai“ 
jjLovLOV was vague enough to allow Socrates (and Plato) to speak of the 
phenomenon without committing himself to a declaration of its precise 
nature.15 For this reason the common rendering of to Saipidviov as 
"the daimonion" ought ideally to be avoided in each instance, since the 
deliberately imprecise conception of it transmitted by Plato becomes lost in 
the process.16 For this reason also, assertions that the word Saijxdviov 
in this peculiar Socratic context is being used sometimes adjectivally, 
sometimes substantially,17 are misdirected; Plato's Socrates has no 
desire to personalize the sign.18 Further, Plato has much to say about 
8aip.oves, but unquestionably those deities which, in his system, attend 
ali people,19 are not to be precisely identified with Socrates' sign, for, on 
Plato’s evidence, how could it have been so commonplace an element of 
religious belief?20 The application of the term Saipicov to Socrates' sign 
would therefore have constituted a vulgarization (to which, as we saw, 
Xenophon inclines) and would have provoked confusion; thus Plato 
assiduously avoids it in this context. There is full justification in holding 
therefore that to 8aip.6viov and 6 Sa.ip.cov were not seen to be the
15Cf. the vague use of the phrase to Scupoviov in R. 382e6; Hdt. 2.120; Dem. 19.239 
ol Geo! S’eio’ovTai Kat to Saipoviov top jjfq to. Slkcckx i|/Tic|)Lodpevov; Arist. 
Rh. 1398a15 shows clearly the ambiguous use to which the phrase could be put: oTov otl 
to SaLpoPLOV ou8ev eoTLV aXX’ fj Oeds fj 0eoO epyov; Hipp. [?] Morb. Sacr. 3 o 
Te ttoMjs cctjtols tou Xoyou es to GeLov a«pT|KeL kccl to SaLpovLOV.
16See Friedlander 1.33; J. Beckman, The Religious Dimension of Socrates’ Thought 
(Waterloo, 1979) 77 (who however speaks of "the SaLpovLov"). Schleiermacher (I.2. 
432f.) first did the service of stressing the indeterminate nature of the references to the 
divine sign.
17So R.E. MacNaghten, CR 28 (1914) 187ff.; according to Zeller (II.15 73 n.6), it is used 
adjectivally in Plato, substantially in Xenophon.
18See Burnet ad Euthphr. 3b5.
19Cf. R. 620d8ff., Phd. 107d6-7,77. 90a2ff.
20Rist 15f. is especially valuable on this point.
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same; Plato certainly did not equate the two in speaking of Socrates, even 
though in later times the distinction was not carefully upheld,21 and 
modern writers have frequently used question-begging phrases such as 
"the daemon of Socrates."22 Plato, it would seem, sought carefully to dis­
tinguish Socrates’ sign from common and hackneyed aspects of religious 
thought and sentiment.23
Yet the term to Saijjidviov cannot but indicate that the pheno­
menon was vaguely recognized as in some sense intermediary, in other 
words that, though not a Saipuov, it was somehow demonological in 
character. Nor was it possible for Plato completely to avoid describing 
Socrates’ sign in terms that at least sound traditionally demonological, for 
the statement that it originated from Socrates' childhood (Ap. 31d1-2 ek 
rraiSos ap£dp.evov) calls to mind a detail reminiscent of popular beliefs 
about 8oc£(Jlov€S, namely that a Socljjlco v attaches itself to a person from 
birth.24 Moreover, we have already seen that Xenophon, going so far in 
one place as almost to call the sign a Socipcov outright, quite thoroughly 
assimilates Socrates' sign into a stream of popular religious beliefs, and
21 E.g., Procl. in Ale. 60ff.; Herm. in Phdr. 93-4; Lactant. Div. Inst. 2.14.9; Tert. Apol. 22.1, 
46.5; Min. Fel. 26.9; Calc, in Ti. 168.
22E.g. Socher 97f. ("kleiner daimon"); Grote 436ff.; J.-A. Hild, Etude sur les Demons dans 
la literature et la religion des Grecs (Paris, 1881) 243ff.; J. Souilhd, La notion platonicienne 
d’intermgdiaire (Paris, 1919) 198; J. Brun, Socrates (Eng. tr.) (New York, 1962) 64-78; and 
many others.
23For an attempt to show that Plato's consistent avoidance of the term Saipcc v in referring 
to Socrates' divine sign was a denial of old religious concepts, exemplified in tragedy, see A. 
Cameron, Plato’s Affair with Tragedy (Cincinnati, 1978) 36ff.
24Cf. Men. fr. 550 K. octtocvti Saipcov avSpl crup/rrapLcrTaTai eueus yevopevq) 
pucrTayoyos tou (3lou; the same idea is behind Phd. l07d6-7 6 €koccftod Saipcov, 
ociTrep CffivTa ktX. (Plato however rebuts this traditional way of thinking in H
617e1); see Wilamowitz, Der Glaube P 362; Dodds, G. and 1.42. It also seems possible that 
Plato was drawing upon colloquial usage in employing yiy vopai to describe the occur­
rence of the sign; at any rate, it is so used with <t>covfj very frequently in the New Testament 
(see F.F. Bruce, The Acts of the Apostles? [London, 1952] 83).
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tends to attribute qualities to Socrates' sign which indicate that the differ­
ence between SocLjioves and to 8aip.dviov was probably in his mind 
not sharply discernible.25 Where Plato and Xenophon part company is in 
the degree to which each feels at liberty to describe Socrates' sign in terms 
that directly recall Soct|jLOPes. Plato consciously reacted against any 
tendency to do so, while Xenophon may not even have clearly perceived 
any need for a real distinction.
Generalizations may tend to mislead, but here I think a few summary 
remarks about the respective treatments of to 8ocl|jl6vlov in Plato and 
Xenophon are in order. Xenophon's discussions on this topic are every­
where conditioned by a desire, consonant with his apologetic intentions, to 
integrate Socrates' sign into an orthodox strand of belief, and he accom­
plishes this for the most part by setting the sign, as far as he is able, com­
fortably alongside accepted forms of prophecy. As well, he attempts to 
show that the special favour that Socrates apparently enjoyed was not un­
paralleled. Plato's intentions clearly have little in common with Xeno­
phon's. Far from wishing to exonerate Socrates of the claim to the exclu­
sive enjoyment of a unique gift, Plato maintains the sharp distinction, con­
ceptually and linguistically, between Socrates' divine sign and Saip-oves. 
To judge from the scant information on which we may draw, it was 
precisely attempts such as Xenophon's to popularize the divine sign that 
Plato militated against. Plato, in sharp contrast with Xenophon’s purpose, 
was concerned to demonstrate that Socrates' divine sign had nothing to do 
with oracles or 8oti|jioves. It was, on the contrary, seen by Plato to be 
another aspect of Socrates' octoitloc, and, apparently, he was honest 
enough to represent to SccipLOPLOV for what he thought it actually was.
25See Rist 17.
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b. to Saipoviov in the Theages
The literary picture of the divine sign which the author of Thg.
inherited must, if my conclusions about date of composition are essentially 
correct (see lntr. ch. V, f), have been basically as sketched above. Among 
the similarities between the presentation of the divine sign in Thg. (128d1- 
130e4, but 130e5ff. will be considered also) and the depiction of it in Plato 
and Xenophon are numerous details in the activities ascribed to it, and in 
the author's description of the sign itself. Hence the sign is tl. .. Sai— 
jjlovlov (128d2-3), (T)) <j)wrj (128d3, e3, 5), to etcoeds ot)|jiclov to 
Saipuoviov (129b8), to crr||J.€LOV (129d3, 5), to Socljjlovlov (129e1-2, 
e7-8); the simple occurrence of it is signified by yiyvetch (d4, d6, e3, 
etc.), while the verb crr||j.aiVEi, which was more common in Xenophon 
than in Plato, is also in evidence here (d4, e6); its intervention is indicated 
once by evavTLoflp.cn (129e3); it also occurs in the midst of an act 
(Plctoc^ij 128e5), and when someone is on the verge of acting (p.eXXtn 
128e2, e3). The author's vocabulary for describing the divine sign is 
therefore very similar to that of Plato and Xenophon,26 but it is worth noting 
that the familiar term to Schjjlovlov usually occurs in an oblique case 
(genitive) in Thg. (128e5, 129e1-2, e7-8, 131a2), whereas in Plato it 
appears in the nominative in all instances but one (Ap. 40a4).27 Also, in 
Thg. the term Sflvaprs governs to 8aip.6viov on two of these occa­
sions (129e1, e7-8); this specific use, which will be discussed in detail 
below, is nowhere to be found in Plato or Xenophon, although it does 
occur in Ale. I (103a4-6; see sec. c). As for the events in which the divine
26See Willing 139-40.
27See comm, ad 128e5.
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sign takes part, conformably with the picture drawn in Plato and Xenophon 
it does not function as an aspect of conscience, since it occurs simply to 
prevent Socrates' companions from committing acts which are not in their 
best interests; there is no question of the "health of the soul" if someone 
disobeys the warnings of to Socl(jlovlov (see comm, ad 128d1-129d8). 
These then are a few of the similarities which Thg. 128d1-Z//7. shares with 
the Platonic and Xenophontic portraits of the sign. However, much more 
enlightening are the differences, and these must occupy the largest share 
of the following discussion.
The author of Thg. attempts to establish at once (128d2-5) his per­
spective for treating of the divine sign by quoting, with small (but, as we 
shall see, not unimportant) changes, a famous passage from Ap. 31 c7- 
d4.28 As Thg. in a number of ways is constructed as a Platonic work (see 
Intr. ch. I, b, v; c), so also the conception of the sign is placed on an equal 
footing with that of Plato's by the invoking of this locus classicus for to 
Soupoviov. We are assured that the divine sign is only apotropaic 
(TTpOTpeTT€L 8e ovSeTTOTe d5), as it had been in Plato. But no sooner 
does the semi-quotation of the Ap. passage end than a feature which never 
surfaces elsewhere in the Corpus is added to the initial description: the 
sign is at the direct service of Socrates' friends as well, for if the "voice" 
comes when Socrates is communicating with an acquaintance, that person 
must by implication desist from what he has set out to do (d5-7). And so 
unlike its performance in the Platonic instances recounted above, the
28The connection of Thg. with this passage in Ap. has, of course, been remarked upon 
often, e.g., Stallbaum 223; Schleiermacher 351; H. Muller 464; Heidel 53; Pavlu 28-9. 
Defenders of authenticity seem to be particularly uncomfortable about this correspon­
dence. Grote, Friedlander, and Pangle, e.g., do not even mention it; and Knebel confronts 
the similarity by asserting that Plato in both Ap. and Thg. was merely reproducing the words 
which Socrates himself used to describe the divine sign, thus producing the close verbal 
parallels in the respective passages of the two dialogues. But few people, I think, will feel 
compelled to believe that the words in the Ap. passage are necessarily Socrates' own.
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divine sign in Thg. is not merely for the advantage of Socrates. This is a 
feature, on the other hand, which Xenophon did not eschew; yet Xenophon 
never quite gives his reader what the author of Thg. at this point provides, 
namely examples (128d7 (jidpTUpas) of the truth of Socrates’ statement 
about the efficacy of the sign in his associations with others. Has Xeno­
phon directly influenced the representation of the sign in this part of Thg.? 
Since other data must be collected before a judgement can be made on 
this question, a consideration of it must be postponed until the conclusion 
of this chapter.
What we may clearly infer here, however, is that when Socrates' 
sign is said in Thg. to benefit his friends as well as Socrates himself, we 
are dealing with the admission of a popular element, as comparison with 
the Xenophontic accounts demonstrates. This description of to Scupov- 
lov tends to blur the distinction between Socrates’ sign on the one hand 
and conventional Saipoveg on the other; but the author of Thg., in the 
short compass of the passage that he has paraphrased from Ap., has 
added a couple of further details which produce a similar effect
to SatpLOViov, we are told in 128d2, attends Socrates Oolql 
|Jlolpq. This phrase is an accretion onto the original Ap. passage, and 
nowhere else (as far as I can discover) is Socrates’ sign ever said to attend 
him 0olqc poipq.29 I have already drawn attention (see Intr. ch. I, b, vii) to 
the role this concept plays within the structure of the dialogue at this point, 
and to the character of Socratic OTiPOUOTa in Thg. But the use of the 
phrase is rather complex, and it is worth considering why it is so closely
29The expression has a long and complex history, into which there is no need to delve 
here; see, e.g., W.C. Greene, Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1944); E.G. Berry, The History and Development of the Concept of DEI A MOI PA 
and ©ElA TYXH down to and including Plato (Diss. Chicago, 1940); B.C. Dietrich, Death, 
Fate, and the Gods (London, 1965) 59-90, 194-231.
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associated here (and only here) specifically with to Saipoviov. It may 
be argued that it never even occurred to Plato to employ the phrase else­
where in connection with Socrates’ sign, or that its appearance here simply 
underlines the unique favour Socrates was shown by the attachment to 
him of to Saipoviov. But given the frequency in classical and earlier 
Greek literature with which a Saipajp is closely connected in one way or 
another with 0£ia poipa, or with its variant 0eia tijxtj,30 it seems likely 
that Plato studiously avoided linking it up with to Saipoviov, because to 
his way of thinking the connection would have set Socrates’ sign squarely 
in the realm of the conventional run of Saipoves. True, Socrates claims 
(Ap. 33 c4-7) that the signs which were sent to him indicating that he must 
take up his mission of elenchus were conveyed to him by 0eia poipa 
(nominative). These signs, however, are to be carefully distinguished from 
the ’’messages" Socrates received from to Saipoviov, for the com­
mands sent to him by god through dreams and oracles (ok pavTEiojv 
Kai kizuTTVici)v) gave positive instructions (TTpaTTOiv c5), while to 
Saipoviov was, of course, apotropaic.31 Certainly in Ap. Plato did not 
wish to merge these two phenomena. But we need not believe that the 
author of Thg. considered himself to be under any restrictions of this kind; 
for, if I may anticipate some later arguments in this chapter, he clearly felt 
quite free, as had Xenophon, to "de-mystify" the divine sign by classifying it
30E.g. Saipcov and (Oeia) poipa/TUXT virtually equated or coupled: S. Ph. 1466-8; E. 
I A 1136, Ion 1512-14, Hel. 213, Cyc. 606-7, fr.901.2 Nauck; Lys. 13.63; Saipcov pro­
ceeding from ©eia poipa: Ar. Thesm. 1047; (Geia) poipa/TuxT allotted by (or to) a 
Saipcov: Pi. Ol. 8.62; A. Pers. 602; E. Andr. 1007-8, Heracl. 934, fr.37 Nauck; Lys. 2.78. 
For the relationship, see Wilamowitz, Der Glaube P 356f.; R.P. Winnington-lngram, Soph­
ocles: An Interpretation (Cambridge, 1980) 187.
31 Moreover, Socrates' mission was enjoined on him in adulthood, whereas to Saipov- 
iov, as we have already seen, had attended him since childhood.
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as a species of (jiccvTiK-q or of oracular utterances generally. And the 
author would have had sound Platonic precedent behind his connection of 
Geicc fjLOLpoc with (what he took to be) a prophetic phenomenon: not only 
is this connection made in the Ap. passage, but in Phdr. 244a6ff. as well 
Socrates remarks that the prophetic madness is one of the greatest goods, 
adding the condition (a7-8)0CLQC [jievTOi Soaei SiSojrev’qs (where 
OeiQL .. Sdaci is virtually equivalent to 0ei$ poipO- [°f- c3]). ,n his use of 
©eta. (jLOipcc the author of Thg. demonstrates that he has a more specific 
notion than Plato, and probably Socrates, held, of where to SaipovLov 
might fit within a conventional framework of religious belief. That it accom­
panies Socrates OeiQC (jlolpqc strongly suggests the association in popular 
belief of that phrase and concept with Saijjioves (he appears even to 
have a specific SaXpcov in mind, see sec. c[fin.]), and at the same time it 
seems hardly fortuitous that both Plato and the author of Thg. should use 
the same phrase of phenomena that are seen by the respective authors as 
essentially prophetic.
Further confirmation of the author's tendency to view to Sccipov- 
iov in the light of SaijjLoves is provided by the appearance alongside 
0eiQC jJLOipQC of the participle TrctpeTropevov (128d2): from childhood the 
sign has "attended" Socrates. Again this word does not occur in the parent 
passage in Ap., and again its presence must be significant Never in the 
Corpus, apart from its appearance in this place, is errop.ai or any of its 
compounds used in conjunction with the activities of the sign. Yet the word 
is frequently applied to the behaviour of 8aifjiovcs, both in Plato and 
elsewhere.32 And so, while it may be offered once more that Plato did not
32Cf., e.g., Phdr. 246e6, Lg. 730a1-2, 848d2; of tis. . .tcdv KpetTTOVCov in Sph. 216 
b4; cf. also, e.g., the passage of Plotinus quoted in n.80.
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deliberately avoid using the word in connection with Socrates' sign, the 
specific demonological applications of ciropiaL, and the coincident 
appearance of 0eig jjlo£ppc, to my mind strongly rule this possibility out. In 
fact, it seems quite obvious why Plato in the other dialogues did not use 
this word of to 8ai|j.dviov: it implies the omnipresence of the sign and its 
consequent status as a "guardian angel," carefully watching over and 
protecting a person at all times33; yet never in the other relevant Platonic 
passages is this stressed as an aspect or characteristic of the divine 
sign,34 and only once can it be inferred - perhaps doubtfully - from a cer­
tainly genuine text in the Corpus (see above sec. a). Thus €TTO(jlocl and its 
compounds are often, quite naturally, part of the reservoir of language 
applied to conventional 8aip.oves, and come to be used of Socrates' 
divine sign centuries later35 But Plato, not eager to confuse these with to 
SocipLoviov, strictly avoided the verb in the context of Socrates' sign.
Having suggested therefore that the divine sign section of Thg. 
commences from the position of the classic Platonic description, but con­
comitantly vulgarizes that description, first by introducing details con­
cerning SaijJLoves and prophetic warnings that are more closely related 
to beliefs of popular religion, and then by extending the activity of the sign 
to include apotropaic warnings for Socrates' friends, we should expect that
33ln Thg. this is further emphasized by the Trap— prefix of TrapeTropevov; see on 122a7 
Trape<j>dvr|s. The role which a Saiptov plays as guardian in Greek belief is obviously very 
old, cf. Hes. M/D121ff.
34Thus Plato's regular use of the instantaneous yiy vecrGai in connection with the sign. 
In Ale. I 124c5-10 6 Geos, which in that dialogue is identified with to 8aipoviov, is called 
by Socrates 6 erriTpOTTOs 6 epos (c5); on the divine sign in Ale. I see below sec. c.
35E.g. Max. Tyr. 8.1. We are also reminded of the later classification of Socrates’ divine sign 
as a Saipcov TrapeSpos or daemon assiduus (see J. Den Boeft, Calcidlus on Demons 
[Leiden, 1977] 2).
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from this point forward other evidence will emerge to support the initial im­
pressions of a systematically popularized divine sign.
This, I think, is unambiguously the case. Taking as a whole the first 
part of the divine sign section (128d8-129d8), it is noticeable that three of 
the four stories that are related involve incidents which may be character­
ized as "typical" occasions for prophecy, viz., athletic contests and military 
expeditions (see comm. ac/128d1-129d8, 129d3). Moreover, in the course 
of these narrative accounts Socrates emerges in his behaviour as a 
"warner" or "wise adviser," a figure especially familiar from Herodotus (see 
comm, ad 128d1-129d8); and the dramatic quality of the Charmides and 
Timarchus episodes appears to be as important as any "message" which 
Socrates attempts to convey through the recounting of the stories (see 
comm. ac/128d8-129c8). The medium of expression for these stories, the 
anecdote, is also noteworthy. In Ap. 31c7-8 Socrates mentions that his 
fellow citizens had often heard him alleging his divine sign as the reason 
for his inactivity in public life. This is in itself strong evidence of something 
we could have safely inferred anyway, that the sign was well known among 
Socrates' contemporaries, not to mention his closest companions. Com­
bine with this the piece of information in Ap. 40a5-6, that the sign came to 
Socrates even on quite trivial occasions, and we may well suppose that the 
divine sign early became a subject for anecdotes not unlike the kind we 
encounter in Thg. Wide circulation and trite subject matter are the essence 
of an anecdotal tradition, and as a form of communication anecdotes gen­
erally represent an impure and vulgarized (and often oral) form of bio­
graphy (see also Intr. ch. I, b, vii}. Significantly, it is through anecdotes that 
we first encounter Socrates, in Aristophanes' Nu.’, and much of Xeno­
phon's Mem. assumes the form of collected anecdotes (see comm, ad 
128d1-130e10).
The most serious questions about this first part of the divine sign 
section arise when specific details of exposition are scrutinized. The first 
account, concerning Charmides (128d8-129a1), is of least interest in this 
respect;36 it involves the occurrence of the sign when someone other than 
Socrates himself is to desist from a particular course of action. The Tim- 
archus episode (129a1~c8), on the other hand, must be examined more 
closely. Once its considerable dramatic persiflage has been set aside, a 
single striking feature confronts the reader. As the matter stands in this 
account, the efficacy of Socrates' sign is beyond any doubt only so long as 
Socrates is fully cognizant of Timarchus' attempt to depart from the sym­
posium to undertake the assassination which he and Philemon have 
plotted. The sign comes to Socrates the first two times Timarchus tries to 
leave the drinking party, after he has anounced his departure to Socrates; 
Socrates thus has the opportunity to check Timarchus. On his third attempt 
to depart, Timarchus is careful to leave when Socrates' attention is directed 
elsewhere; the result is that the sign, which would otherwise indicate that 
something is amiss, fails to occur to Socrates. Hence, any claim to 
omniscience which could have been made for the sign is here lost.
In the commentary (ad 129c3-5) I have considered what the con­
sequences of this passage must be for our judgement of the author's 
conception of the divine sign, and they accord closely with the notion of to 
8ocl(J.ovlov as a product of popularization. Simply put, they are 1) that the 
idea of a "fallible omniscience" in 0oo£ and Saijjioves, of the kind just
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36Some brief comment is made in the commentary (ad 128d8-129a1) on the actual method 
of composition of this anecdote; the dialogue Chrm. was possibly its inspiration.
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described, is compatible with conventional Greek religious feeling (espec­
ially for Salpoves, which share the qualities of men and gods), and 2) that 
Socrates was, on the other hand, if not unique, at least characteristic in his 
religious attitudes by a belief in the absolute omniscience of deities. The 
Timarchus story, therefore, runs strongly counter to the religious beliefs that 
we might regard as reasonably compatible with Socrates' own, while at the 
same time it betrays the intrusion of elements which derive from a 
commonplace stratum in religious thought.
The third report concerns the Sicilian expedition. This short account 
does not even expressly connect the sign with Socrates' warning of disas­
ter, and provides little material for the present discussion (see comm, ad 
129c8-d2 on the historicity of the warning). Such evidence as it does 
furnish will be considered in conjunction with a particular aspect of the 
story following it.
In the fourth anecdote (129d3-8) the divine sign receives some 
further elaboration. Especially peculiar is the sentence d3-4 TTeipocv S’ 
vui/L Xapeiv toxj ctujlclotj et apa ti Xeyei. Evidence is 
collected in the commentary (ad loc.) to demonstrate that the phrase 
Treipav Xapeiv has a distinctive use in Plato, and indeed to an extent in 
Aristotle as well, in connection with dialectical processes, specifically with 
the "putting to the test" of an interlocutor. The phrase ol apa ti Xeyei in 
this context is also unusual because the subject of Xeyei is to or||jLeiov. 
The language of the sentence as a whole, in other words, is of a kind that 
one would expect to find applied to one of Socrates’ interlocutors rather 
than to to Saipoviov. Consequently, we might be tempted to identify 
this as the product of a writer imbued with the language of Socratic dia­
lectic, who has confounded the customary functions of question and an­
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swer in the Socratic tradition with the very limited and peculiar operations 
of the divine sign. And perhaps this is supported by the fact that the author, 
as will be pointed out later in this chapter, takes a serious step in the final 
section of the dialogue by substituting the workings of the divine sign for 
active philosophical dialectic. However, it would be best to set aside 
speculation about the subconscious state of mind which gave rise to the 
particular language that we encounter here. But what can be safely in­
ferred is that the author envisages to 8oci|j.dvLOV as an entity susceptible 
of language which is more familiar and precise in its reference than either 
Plato or even Xenophon had ventured to use.
My own feeling is that this way of speaking about the sign could only 
have come from a person who viewed it in conventional deistic terms, for I 
see no reason to doubt that in this anecdote the main influence on the 
author’s conception of a prophetic "sign” that can be put to the test is the 
paradigm of the oracular utterance. As we saw a moment ago, the author 
of Thg. applies language to the divine sign which is quite regularly used for 
procedures of elenchus. Certainly outside of Thg. no work in the Corpus 
speaks in this fashion about to Sccijjdviov. Yet that the author here is 
not actually thinking of philosophical dialectic, but rather of the testing of an 
oracle, would seem to be supported by a fairly obvious parallel in Ap. 
Socrates has just revealed to his jurors (20e6-21a8) the response from the 
Delphic oracle which Chairephon received to his famous question. 
Doubting that he can be in any sense o-o<j)ds, Socrates sets out to "refute" 
the oracle to (jlocvtclov 21 c1). The process of refutation con­
sists of nothing less than the questioning of the politicians, poets, and 
craftsmen (21c3-22e5), and the outcome is, of course, ctveXeyKTOS T) 
(jLCCVTeia (22a7-8). Hence we can observe that in both Thg. and Ap.
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phraseology which might be considered compatible with Socratic cross­
examination is employed, in one case (and with full amplification) of an 
oracular utterance, in another of Socrates’ divine sign, and in each in­
stance that which is put to the test is not found wanting. It seems to me en­
tirely plausible that Socrates’ application of the language of eXeyxos to 
the testing of an oracular utterance in Ap. set our author onto the use of 
similar language in the context of Socrates' sign. However this may be, it 
is not difficult to deduce the reason why Plato himself does not elsewhere 
speak of "putting to the test" to Saip.dviov: that is what one may do to an 
oracle, but Socrates' sign, in so far as it was unique, was not to be con­
fused with this. In fact, it never occurs to Plato's Socrates to question the 
truth of his sign's warnings. On the other hand Xenophon's Socrates, who 
uses words that are, again, conditioned by Xenophon's overwhelming 
tendency to view to 8ocl(jlovlov merely as another form of oracular 
phenomenon, is by no means above this.37 Similarly, the assimilation of 
all prophetic utterances under one classification seems also to have taken 
place in Thg. 129d3-4 (and the second anecdote showed that the Socrates 
of this dialogue cannot take for granted the sign's infallibility).
This same episode is peculiar in another respect, for along with the 
report that precedes it, it would seem to indicate that the apotropaic force of 
the divine sign is not restricted, as it now turns out, to Socrates or his 
friends, but extends to deliberations which are being made by the ttoXls
37>4p. 13-14 ins' ye p.T)v ov 4/eu8o|jLai Kara tov 0eov Kai tout’ exco TeKprjpiov 
Kai yap tgdv cJaAcov ttoAAois 8t) e^ayyeiXas ra tov Geov GviJLpovXeupaTa 
ovSeircoTTOTe i|/ever ape vos e<f>dvr|V (cf. also Mem. 1.1.5). The verb avaKoivaoTai, 
"consult," is used somewhat illogically in 128d6 (cf. 128e2) of our dialogue (see comm, ad 
loc.), and it rather looks as though the "consulting" of Socrates is seen in terms of the con­
sulting of an oracular authority. Much later, in the first Socratic epistle, the assimilation of 
Socrates’ sign with the Delphic oracle is actually complete (Socr. Ep. 1.8-10).
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at large.38 In the previous account we are told that Socrates foresaw the 
destruction of the Sicilian expedition; in the present one we learn that the 
sign came to him upon Sannio’s departure on a military expedition to Ionia, 
and this has now caused Socrates concern for both Sannio and the 
expedition in which he is involved. This evolution of the divine sign’s 
sphere of influence is consistent, again, with the tendency in these stories 
for the sign to be assimilated into conventional perspectives about the 
proper role and performance of all prophetic statements. As we have seen, 
Xenophon developed the sign in the same direction by classifying it as one 
more instance among several of p.otvTiKrj. Whether in this story the sign 
has also taken the substantial leap of endowing Socrates with the ability to 
predict unerringly another's actual fate, rather than simply to forewarn 
disaster, if that person disobeys the warnings of the sign, as has been 
assumed,39 is another matter. It seems entirely natural that, if the divine 
sign, apotropaic in nature, occurred when a friend of Socrates' was de­
parting on a military expedition, and that he either did not heed Socrates' 
warnings, or did not have the opportunity to obey them, the ultimate per­
sonal disaster in this connection will be death; it does not require special 
mantic powers to envisage this. It may be noted that Socrates does not lay 
special claim to the adamantine force of his predictions: he "thinks" 
(oLop.cti d7) that Sannio will die, or suffer something almost as bad, and 
he "fears" (^opoupLoci d8) for the fate of the expedition generally.
It is clear, then, that in this first part of the divine sign section of Thg. 
the activities of Socrates' sign have been enhanced. It remains apotropaic, 
as it had been in the other related passages of the Platonic Corpus, but it is
38See Schleiermacher 173; Tarrant, CQ 32 (1938) 172.
39See Tarrant, ib. 172.
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now at the service of Socrates' friends as much as it is at his own behest, 
and also offers apotropaic warnings in connection with public policy. As 
well, some new methods of describing to SotL(jLOPLov are invoked, which 
seem to derive from and reflect popular and conventional concepts about 
Soci|jLOves, or about deities in general. Comparison with Xenophon's 
description of the sign, as well as with Plato's references to oracular utter­
ances, would also seem to reinforce the notion that the author of Thg. 
approached the divine sign as though it were a phenomenon explicable 
within a framework of commonplace religious belief. And finally, the medi­
um of communication in use here, i.e. the anecdote, generally reflects the 
essentially popular viewpoint which is established in these stories.
These are findings which are developed and reinforced by the 
second part of the divine sign section (129e1-130e4). As argued in the 
introductory chapter on the structure of this dialogue (see Intr. ch. I, b, vii), a 
dislocation can be detected between 128d7-129d8 and 129e1-130e4, 
which suggests that in the composition of these parts our author has drawn 
upon different sources, or, at least, from a heterogeneous source. As we 
shall see, the consequences which this has for the investigation at hand, 
are that while religious attitudes no less commonplace than those of the 
previous section are identifiable in 129e1 ff., there emerges also a formid­
able component the inspiration for which has been gained mostly from 
philosophical sources. This part also deals not with specific individuals 
who have suffered by refusing to heed the warnings communicated to 
Socrates by to Saiiroviov, but rather with the idea that it is "all-powerful" 
in his educational contacts with his companions. Socrates plays no active 
part in the advancement of an associate; this is left entirely to the activity of 
the divine sign, which stimulates the progress of an individual through its
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participation in his contact with Socrates. This information is fleshed out 
with a story about Aristides, who actually experienced this for himself 
(much as the anecdotes in 128d8-129d8 illustrated the general statement 
in 128d2-7).
The remarkable correspondence between this part of the divine sign 
section and the famous |juxi€iJTiKrj passage in Tht. (esp. 150c8-151a5, 
151 b2-6) has not gone unnoticed.40 I can see no reason for doubting that 
the lines before us are indebted to Tht. 41 although some ingenious deni-
4^See, e.g., Stallbaum 223; Schleiermacher 352; Hollenberg 360-1; Bruns 347; Heidel 53 
n.2; Pavlu 21-2; Rist 17-8.
41 This need not be taken to imply that Plato could not be the author of both passages; that 
can only be decided by a close examination of the relevant details in each work (see below). 
A simple scheme for the various points of contact would be: 1) to Saipoviov prevents 
Socrates' association with some individuals (Thg. 129e3-5 ~Tht. 151a3-4); 2) to 8aipdv- 
iov at times sets up no obstacles between Socrates and other men, but the latter never­
theless derive no benefit (Thg. 129e6-7 ~Tht. 151b6-7); 3) among those who make rapid 
progress in Socrates’ company (Thg. 129e7-130a2 ~77rt. 150d2-6), some leave him too 
early and lose the gains they have made (Thg. 130a2-4 ~Tht. 150e1-151a1); 4) Aristides, 
the son of Lysimachus, was an instance of this (Thg. 130a4ff. '-Tht. 151 a1-2); 5) those 
associates who improved by Socrates’ company have never actually learned anything from 
him (Thg. 130d4-5 -Tht. l50d6-8). The all-important differences will be examined below. 
One discrepancy about which I shall have no occasion to speak is that nothing is said in Tht. 
of those who, admitted by to 8aipoviov, simply make lasting progress (cf. Thg. 129e9- 
130a2). Certain linguistic parallels may or may not be significant. Souilhe remarked (140; 
see also Tarrant, CQ 52 [1958] 95; Carlini 44) that cruvouorct, cruveTvai, and enrSiS- 
ovcti in the Thg. passage (cf. e2, e6, e7, e9,130a3) have simply been lifted from the con­
text of Tht. But CFUi/ovoTa/cruveti/ai are at any rate highly thematic to Thg. (see Intr.ch. I, 
b, vii). On the other hand, cf. T/?p.130a2-3 eaupdorop eiTiSiSocxoTV, and 77?M50d5 
eaupaoTov dcrov enrSiSovTes.
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als of this generally accepted position have surfaced now and then.42 But 
as with the preceding discussion, differences in exposition prove more en­
lightening than the similarities that exist between the accounts, and it is 
necessary once again to place the emphasis on these differences.
What is required is a detailed examination not only of the re­
lationship between Thg. and Tht.,43 but also of certain generally over­
looked aspects of the (ulocleutikt) passage itself. I will state immediately 
that at the centre of such an investigation must be a consideration of the 
use Plato makes of the terms to Sctipoviov and 6 Geos in the Tht. 
passage. It is surprising that so little effort is made by scholars to dis­
tinguish Plato’s use of these terms. Most critics, it is true, acknowledge that 
Plato is not referring to the same thing when he employs the two phrases in 
Tht. 150b6ff. But if 6 Geos is different from to SaLpoviov, wherein does 
this difference lie? The importance of this question cannot be overesti­
420ne such denial was put forward by Janell (434-6), who wished to date Tht. after Thg. (as 
Socher and Friedlander did [see lntr. ch. V n.1], but at the same time defending the authen­
ticity of Thg., as Janell did not), and to make the former's pctieuTiKirj passage Plato's 
implicit rehabilitation of the distorted impression about Socrates that Thg. had supposedly 
created. But the jjctieuTiKrj passage is so closely bound up with the rest of Tht. 
(references to Socratic midwifery punctuate the remainder of that dialogue) that it would be 
artificial to separate it off as Janell wished to do; and surely all of Tht. is not to be taken as a 
refutation of Thg. (for some further arguments against Janell, see Pavlu 22 n.1; H. Gomperz, 
AGPh 19 (1906) 540ff.; Jane Il's thesis has not found any supporters). Another denial of the 
dependence of Thg. on the paieuTLicrj passage was made by Willing (177-8; he con­
demned Thg. as spurious) on the grounds that any writer drawing upon the Tht. section in 
question, as the author of Thg. allegedly did, could not have failed to exploit the metaphor 
of midwifery (so also Janell 434; Willing postulated a popular source for the version of the 
story found in Thg.). Certainly the midwife metaphor is a famous one to the modern 
interpreter, and it was by Plutarch's time as well (cf. Quaestiones Platonicae 1 =Mor. 999c- 
1000e). But whether it struck a contemporary or near-contemporary reader as such, and as 
an absolutely essential part of its context, is another matter, for it is possible, I think, to lay 
the section in Tht. bare by removing the metaphor. A much more important consideration is 
that the author of Thg. actually has positive reasons for leaving the metaphor out, since he 
wishes in this work to de-emphasize the dialectical side of Socrates' character. When Socra­
tes says in Tht. that nobody learns anything from him, this implies p.aieuTiK'q; but when he 
makes the same claim in Thg., the statement means something very different; see further 
lntr. ch. I, b, vii; ch. IV,d. Most upholders of authenticity are content merely to argue that the 
two passages are not contradictory (see Knebel 6-7; Friedlander 1.148ff.; also n.51 below).
43This has been done in outline in n.41 above.
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mated, for if it can be shown that the author of Thg., who speaks only of to 
8ocLjJid vtoy in this part of his dialogue, has manifestly misunderstood the 
structure of the Tht. passage and its references to 6 0oos and to 8oci“ 
poviov, this must go a very long way towards settling the question of 
authenticity, which will itself be formally taken up later.
In fact there are two stages to the educational process Socrates de­
scribes in Tht. The first consists of Socrates’ association with certain indivi­
duals, who make wonderful progress "if (the) god/heaven permits it" 
(olcnrep ctv 6 0eds TrapeiKXl 150d4), though they learn nothing from 
Socrates; some of these, one of whom was Aristides, leave him too early 
and thereby suffer "miscarriage" (150e4ff.). The second stage of the pro­
cess takes place when those who have "miscarried" attempt to return to 
Socrates; it is only then (151a2-5) that to Saiptoi/Lov explicitly enters the 
picture, for it prevents Socrates from associating any further with some 
individuals, while others are allowed back into the fold, and they again 
make progress.
What emerges from this analysis is that, according to the termino­
logy employed, 6 0eos is involved solely in the first stage, while to 8ocl~ 
P-ovlov alone takes part in the second. That these two entities are not to 
be identified is clear, I think, from several considerations. The first is that 
one term is used to the exclusion of the other in the first and second stages 
respectively. When Socrates finally introduces the divine sign, he does so 
using descriptive phraseology which suggests that it had not been 
mentioned or alluded to until now (151a4 to yiyvopevov pioi Soci— 
pioviov). The second consideration is the nature of the activities which 
Plato ascribes to 6 0eo$ and to Socipoviov. The former "compels" 
(dvotyKotCei 150c8) Socrates to "deliver" (pmeu6O0ccL), and both it and
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Socrates are "responsible" (ai/rios 150d8-e1) for the delivery of intellec­
tual "offspring." In this context of mental midwifery 6 0eds has clearly 
assumed an active role; and when the verb TrocpeiKi^ (150d4) is predi­
cated of it, this presents at most its passive side, rather than anything 
inhibitory, to Sctipomov on the other hand, in its very brief mention, 
preserves its purely apotropaic pattern.
The third consideration serves both to distinguish 6 0eos from to 
8ocl|toplov and to shed some light upon the role of 6 ©cos in the 
paieuTiKfj passage. If 6 0eds is to be distinguished from to Saipidv" 
lov, it is anything but clear what Plato intends by the former; the latter at 
least is familiar from several other passages elsewhere in the Corpus (see 
sec. a). But we may look at other Platonic texts for possible illumination on 
Plato's use of 6 0oos. For instance, in Euthd. 290e1ff. Crito interrupts 
Socrates' recounting of the previous days' discussion to express wonder at 
the words attributed to the young and inexperienced Cleinias, who has just 
now shown such stunning capacity for dialectic.44 To explain the young 
man's progress (291a3-4) Socrates proposes that tis tcop KpeiTTOVcnv 
was perhaps at hand to utter the words.45 In a different context (Sph. 
216a5ff.) Socrates (ironically again) suggests that the Eleatic stranger
44For Plato’s disruption of the reporting of a dialogue to indicate that what has just been 
spoken is truly extraordinary, cf. similarly Phd. 102a3ff.
45Gundert (56-7) sees this as an oblique reference to to 8aip.oviov which had been 
mentioned earlier in the dialogue (272e3f.). But Socrates is certainly ironic here, and Crito, 
who takes Socrates to be the "higher being" to which Socrates referred (see Gifford ad loc.-, 
perhaps this was Plato’s intention), responds in an equally ironic manner in 291a6-7 (tqjv 
KpeiTTovcov pevToi tis ep.01 Soicei, Kai ttoMj ye). This passage may be seen to 
be still more closely connected with the paicuTiKfj section of Tht. if we compare Euthd. 
279d7-8 outccs ctl veos1 tc Kai eurjer|S ccfti (said of Clinias before he has been 
examined) with Tht. 150d2-3 ol 8’ epol crvyyiyvopevoi to uev tto(5tov <t>aiy~ 
ovTat evioi piev Kai Travu apaeei?. Trai/Tes 8e TrpoLoucrr|S tqs cruvouoras, 
olcnrep av 6 0eds TrapeiK-q, eaupacrTov oo’ov emSiSovTes kt\.
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might be tis ... tcSv Kpemow, in other words ©cos dov tis eX~ 
cyKTLKOS (b4-6). Meno turns all this on its head when he asserts that, 
were Socrates to practice his eXeyx°S anywhere else but in Athens, he 
would be arrested as a sorcerer (Men. 80b4-7). Now the (jLaieuTLKfj 
passage in Tht. seems to be offered in greater earnest than any of the three 
other passages cited. Nevertheless, they all point, it seems, to a similar 
way of viewing dialectic (especially as it was opposed to eristic and other 
sophistic practices) on the part of Plato and the Platonic Socrates, namely 
that the means by which it could produce its results were often too difficult 
to apprehend and explain in rational terms, so that reference was made to 
the assistance of a god; or, again, that the person who was in some way 
adept at dialectic seemed to transcend the normal lot of humanity and to be 
specially favoured. I would venture to suggest that in Tht. 6 ©eos is being 
used in just this sort of way: Socrates knows nothing himself, but is yet able 
to elicit latent knowledge from his respondents; and to account for this 
otherwise unexplainable efficacy of eXeyyos, and for the fact that some 
individuals make progress while others do not, Plato fell back upon the 
notion of divine intervention.46 *Whether or not Plato in this is to be taken 
au pied de la lettre, it is clear that the reference served to emphasize the 
difference which he perceived to exist between Socratic eXcyx°s and 
other forms of argumentation and education (though Socrates would 
hardly have used the term "education" of his own methods).47 But Plato, it 
should be added, is also quick to point out the effort an individual must
46Probably the most illuminating discussion on the p.otieuTiK'q passage in general, and 
on the point made above, is that of M. Burnyeat in BICS 24 (1977) 7-16, esp. 12-3.
47whereas Plato may speak of divine intervention in Socratic elenchus, the sophist is 
regularly called a sorcerer, and eristic is labelled as sorcery or magic; see E. Belfiore, 
Phoenix 34 (1980) 128-37.
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himself make if he is to achieve progress in philosophy. This much is 
demonstrated by the remainder of Tht., and is hinted at also by the ex­
hortation to Theaetetus at the end of the jjloclcutlkt) passage (151d3-6): 
ttocXiv oljv e§ ctpX'QS, 0eaiTr|Te, otl ttot’ cqtlp cttlo’T'qpt), 
Treipco XeyeLV (is S’ oix t’ cT, pLqSeTroT’ €lttqs. eav yap 
0ed<? €0eX73 kocl avSpL^. oTos t’ (where the formulaic eccv... 
60€X73 is, I think, a play on earlier references to 0eds).48
That the identification of 6 0cos and to SocLpovLOV is unneces­
sary and unwarranted thus seems quite evident. It should be acknow­
ledged at this point that 6 0eos is in fact used in one place by Plato with 
reference to the divine sign;49 but there is no reason on this account to 
abandon the distinctions we have already arrived at, since 6 0eos is in 
any event a ubiquitous phrase with a highly indeterminate frame of refer­
ence, and can be used on an ad hoc basis, as indeed it is so used in that
48Cf. Men. 81c9-d4 aTe yap Tris pdaecns aTracrris cnjyyevoOs otjotis, Kai 
p.epaQ'qKuias Tqs i|/uxf[S aTravTa, ouSev KwXdei ev povov avapvr|O‘©evTa — 
o 8r) p.d©r)orv' KaXoucnv avOpeoTTOi - T&Wa TravTa auTov aveupeip, eav 
tl<? dvSpeios Kai p.p d.TTOKdp.vT] 6r|T(5v. Anamnesis can be achieved, and can 
produce its wondrous results, only when the efforts of a given interlocutor are also brought 
to bear.
Gundert (54) argues that the Tht. passage quoted above deliberately connects the 
earlier reference to Aristides (151 a1f.) with the final lines in La. (201b6ff.), where Socrates 
responds with the words eav Qeds eSeX-© (c5) to Lysimachus* request that they meet on 
the following day over the education of Aristides and Thucydides. Gundert remarks that it is 
left open at the end of La. whether, in the case of Aristides, god was actually willing or not. It 
is indeed plausible that Tht. does cast a glance back at La. to elaborate on the mention there 
of ©eos (see also Burnyeat, op. cit. 16 n.20; Friedlander 111.154), though I am hesitant to 
accept that eav ©eos e©e\i3 in the earlier work was charged with any higher meaning than 
the stock "god willing."
49Ap. 40b1 to toO ©eou OTpeiov.
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one instance.50 Moreover, although the precise function of 6 0eos in the 
jjLocLCUTiKfj passage of Tht. remains somewhat obscure (and was prob­
ably vague enough in Plato's mind as well), it was apparently seen to be 
an essential part (but only a part) of progress in dialectic, to Saipidi/- 
iov on the other hand performs its familiar role in Tht., and is strictly limited 
in the place which it assumes in the process Plato describes in that dia­
logue.
We must return now to Thg. 129e1 ff. and consider what its precise 
relationship to the above analysis is. In the first place, the author of Thg. 
reduces the stages in Tht. from two to one, so that the role of to 8aip.dv— 
lov in preventing Socrates from associating with a prospective compan­
ion, or in allowing him to associate with an individual who is destined not to 
improve, occurs at Socrates' first meeting with that person. In Tht. to 
Seeledviov occurs only after a former associate attempts to return to 
Socrates subsequent to his abandoning him too early. Moreover, when 
Aristides is presented in Thg. as an example of such a one who went away 
from Socrates too soon, his departure is fixed in the period after to Sai- 
poi/iov had enabled him to make surprising progress. In Tht. on the other 
hand Aristides is used as an example of someone who, after o Qeos had 
"compelled" Socrates to deliver his intellectual offspring, left Socrates 
sooner than he ought to have done; he is also an example of the sort of 
person who then returns to Socrates, and whose possible future relation-
^°See Burnet ad Ap. 40b1; also n.53 below. Among others, Grote (440-1) used this 
passage to argue for the identification of 6 Geos and to 8ai|^oviov in Tht. Unless we 
recognize that 6 eeos can be employed in an indeterminate fashion and with varying points 
of reference, we will be forced into the paradox of claiming that every time Socrates uses the 
phrase 6 Qeos he is alluding to Apollo, who was Socrates' patron deity (cf. Phd. 85b1-5), 
and who is sometimes (e.g. Ap. 23b7, c1) referred to as 6 ©eos by him (so, e.g., Socher 
[97] identifies 6 0eos in Tht. with Apollo; see also Burnyeat, op. cit. 16 n.19).
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ship with Socrates is vetoed or accepted by to Saipioviov. The author 
of Thg. has therefore conflated the two stages set out in Tht. It may be that 
he did this in order to emphasize the omnipotence of to 8ccl|jl6vloi/ in 
Socrates' associations. But it seems more likely that, not understanding 
what Plato meant by 6 Geos, he simply confused it with to SocLpovLOV 
in Tht., equating the former with the latter on a "one-for-one" basis (see 
also next paragraph), even though, as argued above, this was anything but 
Plato’s intention when he wrote the (JbaieuTiKT) passage.
Although this evidence in itself would be enough to show that the 
Tht. and Thg. passages under consideration are not complementary, but 
that the latter represents a distortion of the former,51 other specific details 
can be offered which confirm the presence of this distortion and confusion. 
In 131 a1 ff. Theages suggests that he and Socrates make a test of to 
8ocl(jlovlov to determine if it will admit Theages into Socrates' company. 
In a3-7 Theages continues: koll eav piev TrapeiKX) riM-tv, tccutcc peX— 
TLcrTOf cl 8c pcfj, totc t]8t) TrapaxpT]P-a poLjXcijaojjiceoc OTL 8pd“ 
copcv, cltc a\\q) owe a ope 0 a, cltc kccl cctjto to Gclov to ool
51 This has been basically the conclusion of a few other interpreters, who have however not 
followed up this line of argument in any detail, see Stallbaum 220-1; Schleiermacher 171-2; 
Wagner 9; Bruns 346. Pavlu (22 n.1), on the other hand, draws attention to what he 
considers to be a confusion in Thg. of the syntax in Tht. (but his arguments are not cogent, 
see comm, ad 129e6). Taylor, though he judged Thg. to be spurious, nevertheless saw no 
evidence in the dialogue which might suggest a misunderstanding of Tht. (PMV\fi533). But 
his conclusion results from an oversimplification of the problems at hand and is, I believe, 
refuted by the evidence presented above (it is curious that elsewhere [PMW6 523 n.3] 
Taylor asserts, against the authenticity of Ale. I, that "God and the 'sign' are never con­
fused...in any certainly genuine works of Plato"). It is only to be expected that upholders of 
authenticity consider 6 eeos and to Saipoviov in the Tht. passage to refer to identical 
concepts: Socher 97-8; Knebel 6-7; Grote 440-1; Hollenberg 360-1; Friedlander I.35 (who 
calls it "pedantic" to attempt to distinguish 6 0eos and to 8aipdmov), id. II.328 n.14. 
Gundert also (54), who athetizes Thg., tends to view the two as representing one concept 
(similarly, e.g., C. Piat, Socrate [Paris, 1900] 211; MacNaghten, op. cit. 188). The equation 
of 6 6eos and to Saipoviov (apropos Ale. I) goes back at least to Proclus (in Ale. 
78.1 Off.); but cf. also the title of Apuleius’ (second-century A.D.) treatise on Socrates' sign, 
De Deo Socratis.
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yLyvopovov TroLpaGopoGa TrapapuGoLGQaL ouyaLGL Te kocl 
GVGiaLS kocl ocWcn otll) av ol pavTOLS o$Tyy(3vTai. In a3 the sub­
ject of TrapeLKi^ is to SaLpovLov (cf. a2),52 and the whole expression 
KaL.. .Tjpiv inevitably calls to mind Tht. 150d4 olgtfop av 6 Gods 
TrapeLKX), of which the author of Thg. must himself have been thinking. 
Again, we may observe the innocent substitution implicit in Thg. of to 
SaLpovLov for 6 Geos of Plato’s version. This alone is sufficiently re­
vealing, but also to be noted is the phrase in a5 to Golov to go! 
yLyvopovov, which once more in this context refers to to SaLpovLov. 
The closest parallel for these words is Tht. 151a4 to yLyvopovov jjlol 
SaLpovLov, where the only difference of substance from the phrase in 
Thg. is the occurrence of SaLpovLov instead of Golov. Now this latter 
word is quite unobjectionable in a reference to to SaLpovLov, as Ap. 
31c8-9 Golov tl Kai SaLpovLov demonstrates. But that it is merely by 
coincidence that the passage in Thg. 131a3 recalls the parallel in Tht. 
would seem to be ruled out by the other correspondence in wording 
between Tht. and Thg. commented upon just now. Consequently, the 
exchanging of Golov in Thg. for the original SaLpovLov, while not to be 
faulted per se, is probably not fortuitous. On the contrary, it could well 
represent the influence of the phrase 6 Gods, now expressed in adjectival 
form, in the original place from which the author of Thg. likely composed 
the sentence Kai...qpl v in 131a3. Indeed, this writer explicitly identifies 
to SaLpovLOV with d Gods earlier in 130e6, where, summarizing the 
effect of Td SaLpovLov as described over the previous few pages, he 5
52Pavlu (21 n.2) supplies 6 0eds as subject, which is correct only in so far as it and to 
SotLpoviov are now being treated as interchangeable; but it must be kept in mind that the 
distinction which was drawn in Tht. is in reality not observed here.
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remarks eav jjuev tcB 4>iXov ttccvu ttoXu eTriScocreis roti 
Tax'd ktX. Here T(? 0ecB can be nothing other than to 8aip,6mov, an 
equation which further confirms the conflation that this author has per­
formed over the paieLiTiKfj passage in Tht.53
Finally (and this anticipates some points which will be made below), 
we may look to a further confusion of the Tht. passage, one which likely 
prompted the author of Thg. to include in his work the category of those 
who are actually assisted by to Saipoviov (129e7ff.). Nothing like this 
is mentioned in Tht. of course, but if we it take it for granted, as now seems 
most natural to do, that the author of Thg. drew no distinction (as Plato did) 
between 6 0eos and to 8ai|adpiov, it is reasonable to assume that in 
speaking about the positive assistance of to Saijjdviov he is elabor­
ating on the notion in Tht. that 6 0eos is "responsible” (aiTios 150e1, cf. 
c7) for the delivery of the intellectual offspring of Socrates’ companions,54 
and actually compels him (avayKaCei 150c8) to play the role of midwife.
We must conclude therefore that Thg. 129e1 ff., while drawing direct­
ly upon its corresponding passage in Tht., is at fundamental variance with 
it, and that in all probability it stands apart from Tht. because of a misunder­
standing of Plato's intentions. The consequences of this for evaluating the 
question of the authenticity of Thg. will be fully drawn out later (see lntr. ch. 
IV,d), but our discussion may continue with a look at some further novelties 
that the author has introduced into this part of his work.
53The passage in Ap. 40bl mentioned above (n.49) may also have helped to induce the 
author of Thg. to identify to 8aipoviov with 6 eeos, rather than with to totj 6eo0 
o-qpetov of that passage (where the use of the oblique case is important [pace Mac- 
Naghten, op. cit. 188]: to toO 0eoD crqpeiov = to Saipoviov [aripeiov], not to toli 
Saipoviou oripeiov).
54See also D.L. Blank, ClassAnl4 (1985) 23.
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The first of these occurs in 129e1, where the phrase q 8u vcqju,s 
ccuTq toO SaipiovLOLi toutou is encountered. It has been observed 
that elsewhere in the unquestionably authentic works of the Platonic 
Corpus STJVOCjJiis is not applied to Socrates’ divine sign, and the truth of 
this statement cannot be disputed. However that may be, what is at issue 
is the problem of whether this betokens an un-Platonic element within the 
depiction of the divine sign.55 This is not an easy question to settle, but 
some information may be adduced to place the use of the word into its 
proper context. Much depends, of course, on the meaning which we now 
assign to Swoons. But if it is given a fairly conventional translation such 
as "capability" or "power,"56 it will become evident why Plato avoids the 
use of it in conjunction with to Sctip-dviov. Plato, as we have already 
seen, is decidedly vague about the nature of the divine sign; it would there­
fore have been unusual for him to speak of its Swaprs when he could not 
sharply define its characteristics.57 In Thg. on the other hand the word 
Suvaprs is wholly appropriate, as it occurs in a context in which the 
author is about to speak of the active role that to Socljjlovlov plays in 
Socratic association (see below). Moreover, Sweeps s arises naturally out 
of its context precisely because the preceding part has extended the 
properties of the sign beyond anything that can be found in the rest of the 
Corpus; thus the pronoun ocutt) which follows q Swapiis is retrospective, 
and refers to precise qualities of the sign that appear, within the Corpus, 
only in this dialogue. It seems likely therefore that Swaprs is not em­
55As is suggested, e.g., by Gundert 63 n.14; Pavlu 25 n.2.
56Not unnaturally this is, to judge from Souilhd’s list of uses (Etude sur le terme Avvanis 
dans les dialogues de Platon [Paris, 1919], with the table following 192),one of the 
commonest meanings of the word among all dialogues.
57Kruger (21) seems to be thinking along these same lines.
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ployed elsewhere of the sign by Plato because the qualities ascribed to it 
here are not mentioned elsewhere as well. Although in this dialogue to 
8cti|^dviov has not been called (and will not be called) a 8aipicov, its 
description has been such as to suggest this familiar concept; and there 
would be nothing unnatural in speaking about the Suvap.is of something 
that is so described.58
A second point about the use of 8vvcqns draws this part of the 
divine sign section more specifically into line with demonology, as certain 
peculiarities in the previous part had done. In Smp. 202d13ff. Socrates, 
recounting his discussion with Diotima, relates how she told him that Eros 
is a "great Sect(jlcov," and she supposedly continued in the following vein: 
Kai yap Trav to Saijjidviov peTa^ij ecm ecov to Kai Svetov. To 
this Socrates responded with the question (202e2): Tiva.. . Suvapiv 
oxov;. Clearly to Saipoviov in this exchange and to Saipoviov as 
applied to Socrates' divine sign are not the same thing: in the Smp. 
passage to Saipoviov has a precise area of reference; it is the quality 
that makes a SaijjLtnv what it is. That, as we observed earlier, is definitely 
not the force of to Saipidviov when it denotes Socrates' divine sign, at 
least not in Plato. But to Saipdviov, in the sense it bears in Smp., can 
be said to possess a Swcqjiis for the same reason that to Saipoviov 
in Thg. can, namely because Saipoves are characterized by a particular 
role and pattern of behaviour, elaborately described by Socrates in 
202e3ff. Even some of the functions of Saipovos he lists, i.e., the re­
ceiving of prayers and sacrifices and the relaying of them to the gods (e4-
58Thus while Schleiermacher's objections to the use of the oblique case (genitive) for to 
Satpoviov in Ap. 40a4 and in Thg. 128e5 are not well-grounded (see comm, ad 128e5), 
here at least the same criticism would seem to carry greater force: to speak of the Suvapis 
of something is, inevitably, to objectify it.
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5), and the acting as medium for various forms of (JLOtVTLKrj (e7-203a1), 
may be closely paralleled in Thg.: as we have seen, in the previous part 
the prophetic powers which are imparted to Socrates by to Saip-dviop 
are much extended, and at the end of the dialogue, Theages proposes to 
placate to Sccipidviov with prayers and sacrifices and whatever else the 
(jbavTOig prescribe (131a6-7; see n.76). One cannot be certain that the 
author of Thg. has XheSmp. passage in mind when he uses the word 
Suvapiis of to SotLjjidmov, since Plato's use of language and his 
assigning of particular functions to 8aip.oves could be indebted to con­
ventional beliefs.59 But if the author here has indeed cast a glance at 
Smp., he would not have been the first to do so: others very quickly either 
developed the demonology they found in that work, or misunderstood it 
altogether.60 In any event, comparison of these passages suggests 
strongly that what is being presented here is not to SaipcovLOP of the 
Socrates in the indisputably genuine works of Plato, but rather Socrates' 
sign conceived in terms of a 8aL(jLcov, Platonic, or traditional, or both.
The predicate of q Stjvocjjlls ocutt) tou Soclitovlov toijtou is to 
ctTTOCV Sui/ocTCti (e3): the power of Socrates' sign is "almighty" in his 
associations with others. This takes the theological context further, on two 
counts. First, the phraseology is traditional: it occurs as early as Homer, 
and expresses a fairly vague notion of divine omnipotence (see comm, ad 
loc.). Taking this expression together with its subject Swap-is, discussed 
in the previous paragraph, it emerges still more clearly that in its context in 
Thg. 8vva|JU,s possesses the kind of theological associations that Plato
59See Burkert 179-81.
60See lntr. ch. V,b; and for the development and modification of Plato's demonology in 
Epin., see L. Taran, Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis 
(Philadelphia, 1975) 42-7;
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was bound to avoid in referring to to Socl(jloplov. Second, in popular 
religious sentiment omnipotence is often considered to carry with it 
capriciousness, at least in the sphere within which that omnipotence is 
exercised. Here the omnipotence of to Saip.dviov is manifested in 
Socrates' educational contacts, and conformably with the behaviour that 
might have been expected, it deals in an apparently arbitrary fashion with 
prospective associates: it prevents Socrates from spending time with some; 
it does not hinder him from association with others, but these nevertheless 
make no progress (nothing like this is mentioned in Tht.)-, while it actively 
participates in the advancement of certain other individuals, many of whom 
then make rapid and lasting progress (129e3-130a2). If any reasons can 
be brought forward to explain and clarify this selectivity on the part of Td 
SocLimovLOV, the author does not bother to do so (see comm, ad 129e3). 
In contrast to this is the (jloclcutlkiq passage in Tht, in which, as we saw, 
Plato is determined to preserve at least a share of the responsibility for a 
companion's progress for the efforts of the companion himself.61
The author of Thg. is especially interested in those individuals who 
experience direct intervention from r) tou 8cxijjiov£ou 8wapis (e7-8), 
for the progress they make, provided they do not shun Socrates' company, 
is eaupctciLOV (130a2). Now neither in the Tht passage discussed above 
nor elsewhere in the Corpus does Plato attribute the role of active parti­
cipant to Socrates' divine sign in connection with his educational contacts, 
and attention has already been drawn to the component in the Platonic 
account that probably provided the inspiration for the extension we find 
here (Tht 150c7, 8, e1). Equally notable is the fact that Xenophon, whom
61 And, as Gundert (54) has shown, Socrates in the Tht. passage is still allowed a discretion­
ary voice as to whom he accepts or rejects.
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we might have expected to assign this co-operative property to Td Sai­
led viov, does nothing of the kind. To him the sign may be apotropaic or it 
may be protreptic, but it is never represented as an agent. Thus what we 
are confronted with at this point in Thg. is the further development of the 
divine sign, but this time beyond anything that can be traced in contem­
porary or near-contemporary literature. It has become further personal­
ized, past the stage where it can be merely "put to the test" to determine "if 
there is anything in what it says" (129d3-4, see above). Its behaviour now 
is entirely that of a conventional Scap-cnv which intervenes on behalf of 
mortals, an ayaQos SoclpLcov in common parlance. It can be called "al­
mighty" precisely because it has the ability to offer or withold active assis­
tance. And again its character as a Sai(jlcdv is underlined by linguistic 
details, since the word employed to describe the "assistance" of to 
SocLjjLOPLov, i.e. cnjXAdprjTOLi (129e7), is one which occurs occasionally 
to describe the activities of vague divine co-operation.62 Thus the author’s 
distortion of the Tht. passage which stands behind the present lines, deli­
berate or not, is in any event consistent with his over-all view of to Socl— 
(jlovlov.
Exactly how to SocLp-dviov "co-operates" with one of Socrates’ 
companions is exemplified in the anecdote about Aristides, the son of Lysi­
machus. Investigation has already shown that Tht., misunderstood, elabor­
ated, and improvized upon by the author of Thg., provided the basis for this 
account. But other sources have also been used. One of these seems to
62Cf. Phdr. 237a7-9 ’'AyeTe 8rj, (3 MoDom.. .£u|ji poi \dpecree toO pueou; S. fr. 
841 Nauck ou tols d0iJ|TOLS T| Tuxq cruXXappdveL; E. fr. 432 Nauck avTos tl vvv 
Sptov oTtoc SaL(jiovas Kd\£L7Tt$ yap ttovoDvtl Kai 0eds oriX\a|jipdveL; for 
the cognate noun cnjXXrj'TTTtnp used of a divine accomplice, see comm, ad 129e7 ctvX- 
\d(3-qTaL. Note also the description in Smp. of the SaLpcuv Eros as o'wepyos (212b3).
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have included a dialectical context, and was probably a representative of 
the Alcibiades-6\a\ogue genre (see lntr. ch. I, b, vii). Another source is 
likely to have been Smp., namely the passage in which Socrates remarks 
to Agathon that the acquisition of cxcxjna by "capillary action" would be a 
fine thing, if only it were possible.63 What is remarkable about the use of 
these latter two sources is, first, the author's apparent disregard for the fact 
that in Smp. the idea of education by contact is ridiculed (see comm, ad 
130d5-e4), in as much as he seems to make this concept a cornerstone of 
Socratic "education" in Thg.’, and second, the author's neglect of and 
general lack of interest in the probable dialectical context of the work or 
works in which he found further material for the Aristides story. This of 
course is in addition to his disregard for the dialectical activity which is 
integral to the ploclcutikt) passage in Tht. The author of the dialogue at 
this point in his work has so greatly reduced the importance of dialectic, 
deliberately it would seem, that it is almost non-existent, this in contrast 
with the general content of the works on which he has drawn (see also lntr. 
ch. I, b, vii; c). In its place he has introduced a notion about intellectual pro­
gress which is diametrically opposed to anything that Plato could have 
found acceptable, as comparison with the tone of the Smp. passage 
proves. Presumably our author gathered from his reading of Tht. that the 
"miraculous" quality of Socratic elenchus, or more generally Socratic 
association, was implied by the part that he believed the divine sign 
actually played in it. But the picture he chose to present is completely one­
sided.
63 Smp. 175d3-7 E$ av exoi.. .ei toloutov evq tj cjo^loc loot’ ck toO TrX'qpeo—
Z > X Z C > X < Z . Z . CZ X >Tepov eis to KeycoTepov peiv ripcov, eav otTrTtnpeea. aXXriXcov, cooTrep to ev 
tolls kuXl£lp vScop to Sia tou epiov peov ok rqs TrXT)peoTepas eis T*qv 
KePooTepav; see further comm, ad 130d5-e4.
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However, Kruger (20) has argued that the story about Aristides is 
really nothing more than an impassioned, metaphorical statement of the 
impact Socrates' presence exerts on young men.64 He also holds, as a 
consequence of this, that there can be no argument about a misunder­
standing of Smp., as numerous scholars have suggested.65 Now, one 
cannot doubt that the Aristides episode does quite adequately convey the 
effect Socrates' presence may have had on others, and Kruger may well 
have been correct to assert that our author was not so foolish as uncon­
sciously to misinterpret the Smp. passage in question. Indeed, it must be 
granted that the author realized fully that he was departing from Smp. in 
speaking of education by contact; that he was unaware of that passage 
seems implausible. Given this assumption, we may go further by attri­
buting the difference of approach to a desire to emphasize his peculiar 
notion, or a particular side, of Socratic education.66 This at least is the 
reason for which he departs from other sources he uses in this story, and 
would also seem to represent the most plausible explanation for the 
notional use of Smp. in Thg. And if our author could distort the p,ocieu- 
TiKfj passage in Tht., as he clearly did, there need be no doubt that he 
could have done the same with the passage in Smp.
The difficult problem, however, is what connection, if any, exists 
between the statement that to SocLjjidvlov is "almighty" in Socrates’ 
associations with others, and Aristides’ description (130d2-e4) of the way 
in which physical proximity with Socrates brought "improvement" (cttc— 
SlSouv d5). Is Aristides' description to be taken, not as a statement of
64Kruger was anticipated in essentials by Socher 95-6.
65See Stallbaum ad 130e; Wagner 174; Fritzsche ac/130e; Heidel 55 and n.10; Souilhe 
136 n.4; Robin 1644; Tarrant, CO 52 (1958) 95.
660n this see Intr. ch. I, b, vii.
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what the author himself believed to be objective fact, but only, as Kruger 
thought, as a symbolic expression of the way young men reacted to Socra­
tes' physical presence? Certainly it is presented as the highly individual 
account of one young man. But to deny any organic relationship between 
Aristides' experience and the role of Td SaL(jLOVLOV is to deny real struc­
tural integrity to this part of the divine sign section. Nor would this be the 
natural way to interpret these lines, for in this context, it is appropriate that 
the remarkable educative force of the divine sign be complemented by an 
equally remarkable description of its actual educational efficacy. In fact, it 
seems clear that the author intended Aristides' description to be more than 
simply figurative language. The sign is "all-powerful" in educational 
associations with Socrates (129e1-3): if the author truly believed this state­
ment, and was determined to substantiate it, the most convincing way was 
to provide an account of an associate of Socrates’ who laid claim to the fact 
that, though he himself did absolutely nothing while in Socrates' presence, 
he nevertheless gained full advantage from this physical proximity; and 
Aristides' story performs this very function. This, then, is the author's proof 
of Socrates' assertion that to 8aip.oviov is "all-powerful," that it alone is 
responsible for the "improvement" of Socrates' associates.
Yet precisely how the divine sign "co-operated" in this association is 
never stated, and doubtless the author never thought the whole process 
through, if in fact the problem occurred to him at all. But this is not to say 
that we cannot now identify the influences which produced the description 
that we find in the text. Indeed, that the miraculous effect of Socrates' phys­
ical presence is to be interpreted as a direct manifestation of to 
SaijJLovLOV is all but confirmed by evidence of a theological kind. In the 
commentary (ad 130d5-e4) I have argued that, while influence or educa­
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tion by physical contact was not unheard of among ancient peoples, it was 
somewhat rarer among the Greeks. Where such instances of it do occur in 
Greek literarture, it is usually in the context of a god operating through a 
person and thereby influencing a third party, or of a god exerting his in­
fluence directly. Within a framework of traditional beliefs we seem, in Thg., 
to have an instance of a related phenomenon.67 The power which is 
operating on Aristides through Socrates can hardly be any other than to 
Scchjlovlov itself; Socrates is now, for all intents and purposes, barely to 
be distinguished from it, with the result that he appears here to have exper­
ienced a kind of unio mystica with to Saijioviov. Under other circum­
stances (i.e., than when the source of inspiration is the divine sign), Plato 
himself would have called such a state ev@ouoioto|j.ds. But what we are 
confronted with in this case is an early stage in the hagiographical tradition 
of the Socratic biography, for the inspired Socrates whose effect on his 
companions, in Plato, was wrought by the process of dialectic, is now a 
Socrates possessed by his own divine sign, who improves his companions 
in a manner devoid of any identifiable philosophical context.68 And where 
6 Geos in Tht., carefully distinguished from to 8aip.6vLOV, participated 
in the dialectical progress of others, here to Sai|jidvLov emerges in 
effect as the sole force behind the sort of dialectical progress which Aristi­
des claims to experience.
In reading of the effect which Aristides' gazing upon and touching of 
Socrates had on him, a couple of Platonic loci may come to mind besides
67Tarrant (CO 52 [1958] 95) was the first to suggest that "influence by contact" repre­
sented an appeal to popular belief.
68See Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge, 1952) 54 (refuting Robin): "Nowhere do 
we find Socrates regarding himself as inspired by the Sign, in the sense of being 
possessed by the deity from whom it emanated...." But for the view that Plato saw philo­
sophy largely as evOovoTacTpos, see H. Gundert, Lexis 2.1 (1949) 25-46 (on Phdr.).
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the one from Smp. mentioned above. One of these is Ion 533d1 ff., where 
Socrates, telling Ion that it is a divine force (Oeia Swapus d3) which stirs 
the rhapsode, draws a comparison with the magnet (in Euripides' tragedy 
Oeneus) which could produce a chain of rings, each in turn able to gain a 
magnetic force of its own by contacting the preceding ring. This passage 
would seem to furnish a respectable Platonic tenor for the content of 
Aristides' words, but a close examination affirms that this should not be 
assumed. For one thing, the passage about the magnet is brought in ex­
pressly as a simile (d3 (naircp ev t*q \i0cq ktX.), whereas the literal 
truth of Aristides' words is never made an issue in Thg. Secondly, the ele­
ment of touch, so highly emphasized in the context of Thg., is incidental to 
the Ion passage, since it is not transferred from the simile of the magnet to 
the primary concern at hand, namely poetic inspiration. The author of Thg. 
doubtless intended to represent Socrates as evSeos (we have seen 
whence Socrates' inspiration comes in this dialogue), but if it was his 
intention that Aristides' words be taken merely as figurative language (in 
which case we might have expected Socrates to distance himself ironically 
from the literal truth of the young man's account), he has lost sight of his 
reader, as Plato in Ion does not.69
A second Platonic text which may be considered more relevant to 
the present passage in Thg., in particular to the influence of Aristides' 
gazing upon Socrates, is Phdr. 250b1-252b1. This passage must be con­
69There is the additional difficulty of determining precisely how serious Plato was about the 
inspiration he describes in Ion; see Guthrie, HGP IV. 209-10. Socher argued (95 n.2) that 
Aristides' reporting in propria persona furnished the disinterested tone which one looks for 
in Socrates’ words. But this explanation will not do, for the stories are still highly personal to 
Socrates himself, and for my own part I do not see much difference between Socrates' 
telling the story himself, and reporting it as another's words in oratio recta. I should think that 
the desired effect would have been achieved much better if the words were put into the 
mouth of another participant in the dialogue, as for example when Plato makes Alcibiades 
recite the eulogy of Socrates in Smp. 215a4- 222b7.
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sidered one of the most vivid in Plato for the description of the power which 
vision (the "sharpest of the senses" 250d3-4), in this instance vision of 
transcendent beauty followed by vision of corporeal beauty, can exercise 
on an agent.70 The reaction to the vision of corporeal beauty is irrational 
and is itself the product of an irrational impulse (jjlocvloc 249e3); the 
experience is called cpcos (252b1-3). The connection between this de­
scription in Phdr. and Aristides' visual contact with Socrates may on the 
one hand be considered rather tenuous: in comparison with the place of 
vision in Phdr. little is made of Aristides' concentrating his sight on Socra­
tes, and it is presented as only one step in a progression which leads to the 
actual touching of Socrates. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the ulti­
mate goal of the lover’s soul in Phdr. is also clearly to draw as near as 
possible to the beloved.71 Similarly, it is one of the main purposes for the 
author of Thg., as a study of the structure of the dialogue has shown (see 
Intr. ch. I, b, vii; c), to present Socrates in this dialogue as the epcoTiKds 
avqp; thus the experience that Aristides undergoes in Socrates' presence 
is essentially that which is described in Phdr., namely the impulse of epcos. 
I would suggest therefore that some affinities do exist between the Phdr. 
passage cited above and the Aristides episode in Thg., for they each de­
pict, in quite emphatic terms, a physical attraction occuring in the context of
70The number of references in Plato to vision is considerable, as is its importance for the 
philosopher; see Friedlander l.69f.
71 Cf. 252a5-7 ttccvtcov KttTa<|>povq<jacra [sc. q i)/uxq] SouXeueiv eToigq Kai 
Koigaaeai ottou av eg tis eyyuTaTco toD Trdeou; 255e2ff. eiTieugei Se 
eKeivcp TrapaiTXqoTCos gev, acreevecrTepcas Se, opav, aiTTecreai, 0iXeTv, 
ovyKaTaiceiaeai- Kai Sq, olov eiKos, Troiei to geTa tovto Taxu TavTa. ev 
ovv Tq ori'yKoigqcrei tod gev epacrTOV o aKoXaoTos ittitos e\ei oti Xeyq 
Trpos top qvioxov ktX. For the verb of touching that Aristides uses (aTTTogevos 
130e3) as employed in the context of mystical union, cf. also Smp. 129a4, a5 (e^aiTTo- 
gevcp).
133
toc epcnTiKoc.72 Whether this can be taken as a sign of Platonic author­
ship, or simply as a manifestation of an approach which one might style as 
"Platonic," is another matter, and one not easily to be solved. I can only 
state here as one of my reasons for believing in the latter, that the de­
scription Aristides offers is embedded in much other material that must be 
considered un-Platonic (see above; lntr. ch. I, b, vii; ch. Ill, a; ch. IV, d); but 
further arguments will be developed below. It seems nonetheless evident 
that the author was working from what he considered to be a Platonic 
framework, and this holds not only for what is a very likely use by him of 
Phdr.; for the possibility that he has been influenced by Ion, despite the 
discrepancies noted above, should not be excluded either.
Finally, this exegesis of the Aristides story may be taken one step 
further through a synthesis of the findings already made. We have seen 
that in the context of this report to Saipoviov is essentially responsible 
for the effect Socrates exerts on Aristides. It has further been argued 
throughout this section of the chapter that the author's conception of to 
SatpovLov of Socrates has been conditioned in a peculiar way by con­
ventional beliefs about Socipoves. But it is evident also that a number of 
philosophical sources have additionally had a hand in the Aristides anec­
dote, most notably Smp., Tht., and, as I believe, Phdr.; a fourth, lost, source 
has also been postulated. Moreover, as a function of the dialogue's 
structure, Aristides' experience is set forth as a product of cpcos and as
72For the attraction to Socrates one thinks of Alcibiades in Smp. 216d1-217a2, and of 
Socrates' response to Alcibiades in 218d6-219a4; cf. also Phdr. 279b8-9 Sot-QTe pot 
KOtXtp yevecreai TavSoSev; see further lntr. ch. I, b, vi, vii. Vlastos' observations ("The 
Paradox of Socrates" in The Philosophy of Socrates, ed. G. Vlastos [New York, 1971] 18) 
seem apposite: "[Socrates' character's] surface traits, uncouth, ludicrous to the casual eye, 
were so severely functional, so perfectly adapted to the work he had to do, that men with 
the keenest eye for beauty, men like Alcibiades and Plato, found more of it in Socrates than 
in anyone they had known."
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proof that Socrates is the epamKOS indeed, two of the works the
author has drawn upon, Smp. and Phdr., contain classic Platonic exposi­
tions of epcns. The conclusion to be drawn from this amalgam of evidence 
seems compelling: if to SccLjjidnov of Socrates is represented in effect 
as a Socljjlcov in this story, and if it is responsible for the impulse of opens 
produced in Aristides by Socrates, can the author have understood to 
Sotipovtov in this context to be anything but the Socipcov opens which we 
encounter in Smp.? To be sure, in that dialogue Socrates is seen to be the 
individual who best embodies the 8ocipcnv about which he speaks.73 But 
that opens should be viewed as nearly identical with Socrates’ divine sign, 
to Saipoviov, as clearly seems to be the author's intention here,74 
conflicts with the textual evidence we can uncover in the undoubtedly 
genuine works of Plato: to suggest that Plato wished to make this equation 
would run counter to anything he tells us.75 Then again, an occurrence of 
the sign in a Platonic passage may ultimately have caused, through mis­
understanding, the identification made in Thg. In Phdr. 242b8ff. Socrates 
says that his divine sign came to him, and a voice thereupon prevented 
him from crossing the llissus until he had atoned for his wrongdoing 
against Eros (to Oeiov c3). Is it not possible that this prevention by to 
8ccl|jlovlov led some to believe that Eros was virtually forcing Socrates to
73See e.g. Guthrie, HGP IV. 394-6.
74Though the connection of to Saipoviov with epeus was envisaged much earlier, see 
Intr. ch. I, b, vii (also for epens as the gift or dispensation of 0eict poipct in Aeschin. Socr.; 
for the same connection in Plato, see J. Souilhd, Philosophia Perennis I [1930] 24-5; Berry, 
op. cit. 53-7).
75lt may be true to say, with Friedlander (I.44), that "daimonion and Eros, the inhibiting and 
the driving force, cannot but appear as fundamentally akin." But Friedlander goes astray in 
his chapter on Thg. precisely because he fails to apply this same distinction to the stories in 
this dialogue: in Thg. the inhibiting and driving forces are not akin; they are indistinguish­
able. Strauss (Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy [Chicago, 1984] 46-7) and Pangle 
(170-1) identify the divine sign with Eros, and take this (without justification, as I believe; see 
Intr. ch. IV, d) as a sign of Platonic authorship. Kruger (33) is aware of this problem.
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perform a palinode to it, to compensate for his first speech, and that Eros 
and to Saip-oviov were therefore one and the same?76
c. Remarks on the Alcibiades I
However this may be, it would be quite false to assert that a similar 
identification of to 8a.Lp.di/iop and epoos does not occur elsewhere in 
the Corpus itself, for the presentation of Socrates’ divine sign in Ale. I, if I 
have read the opening pages of that dialogue rightly, is not altogether 
different, and calls for a close examination.
Socrates was Alcibiades’ first epaoTrjs, but has not even as much 
as spoken with him for a number of years (103a1 ff.); the reason for this is 
tl SaLpoPLOP epaPTLcnjjia (a5-6). But Socrates now has cause to hope 
that this prohibition will no longer be in effect (b1-2). There follows some 
comments by Socrates on Alcibiades’ disposition towards past lovers, and 
an affirmation by Socrates that Alcibiades' only hope in becoming master 
of Asia and Europe lies in his submitting himself to Socrates (105a3-d4); 
now that 6 0cos is not preventing Socrates from speaking with Alcibiades, 
Socrates is confident that he can exercise great power over him (d4-5). 
But Socrates offers a proviso at this point: he will impart to Alcibiades the
76The last reference in Thg. to the divine sign comes as something of an anticlimax, and 
may be discussed very briefly here. Theages wishes to spend time in Socrates' company, in 
effect "putting to 8aipomov to the test" (131a1-3). Theages' plan is that, if the sign 
turns out not to be favourable, he will placate it "with prayers, sacrifices, and whatever else 
the pavTEis prescribe" (a4-7). Needless to say, such behaviour is never mentioned else­
where in the Corpus in connection with to Saipoviov, and in this instance it provides 
proof, if proof were still needed, that the approach of the author of Thg. towards to 8at- 
poviov is to treat it as though it were hardly distinguishable from a 8aipcov. Theages' 
mention of swift recourse to pavTEts once again recalls Smp. 202e7ff., in as much as the 
art of seers and priests is there said to operate exclusively through to Saipoviov (Sia 
toutou [sc. tou Saipoviou] Kai T) pavTiKq Tracra xcopei Kai T) tgov tepecov 
Texv-q t(5v te irepi Tas Oucrias Kai teXetcis Kai Tas ETrtoSas Kai Tqv pav- 
Teiav Tracrav Kai yoT)TEiav). See lntr. ch. V, b for further discussion of this passage.
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SvvapLS which he is seeking, peTa totj QeoO pcvtol (105e5). This is 
elucidated by the two sentences that follow: vecoTepcn pev oSv ovtl 
ool kccl TrpLV ToacciJTT|S cXttlSos yepeLv, cos epoL Sokol, otjk 
olcc 6 Geos SLCcXeyoaeccL, iva pq paTrjv 8La\eyo£pqv. vvv 8’ 
e<j)f]K€v vOv yap av pou aKouaaLS (105e6-106a1).
Several items here square with certain details in Thg. and are worth 
drawing attention to: the identification of to SaLpovLov and 6 Geos;77 
the protreptic force of the divine sign (n.b. €<jyf)K0V 106a1); and the use of 
the word SvvapLS* in the context of the sign (103a6).78 Most important 
however is the close association in these early pages of Ala I between 
Socrates' avowed capacity as lover (epaoTqs 103a2 et pass.), the active 
role which 6 Geos has now played in bringing Socrates together with 
Alcibiades, and the role it will actually play in Socrates’ improving of 
Alcibiades. The close proximity of these concepts shows that 6 Geos, 
which is virtually equated with to SaLpovLov and is presented as the 
force that has drawn Socrates to Alcibiades, stands for the erotic im­
pulse.79 There is nothing original in this interpretation. It is essentially the
77Cf. in addition 127e5ff. Kai eav touto ttovQs, av ©eos 0eXn, ei ti Set Kai t-q
> Z Z _epq pavTeiQt TricFTeueiv ktX.
78Totjtou 8e to a’lTiov [cf. a’lTiov Tht. 150c7, avrios 150e1?; see above in sec. b] 
yeyovev otjk avOpajTreiov, aXXa ti 8aipoviov evavTicopa, ofi or Tqv 8ijv- 
apiv Kai vcrrepov ireucrq.
79Cf. Aeschin. Socr. Ale. fr. 11c, quoted in Intr. ch. I, b, vii; with 8ia to epav in that 
passage cf. Ale. /105e5 peTa toD 0eou pevToi. As we have seen, the similarities in 
thought between the two Alcibiades-bialogues are not likely to be merely coincidental.
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way in which Proclus understood the introductory portions of Ale. /,80 and 
although his exegesis naturally betrays preoccupations with the systematic 
demonologies imposed by later Platonism, it is consonant with the 
intentions of the author he is commenting upon.
The above analysis of the context in which Socrates' divine sign is 
introduced in Ale. I may be offered as one more piece of evidence against 
our assigning a late date of composition for Thg., in so far as both dia­
logues demonstrate a close similarity of approach to to 8oci|pdviov and 
may therefore be regarded as products of a similar philosophical atmo­
sphere (for the details about this see Intr. ch. V, b).81 However, the 
authenticity of Ale. / is still hotly debated by some; as a small contribution to 
this controversy, I should add the above remarks as further evidence 
against Platonic authorship.82 But of greater relevance to the present 
investigation is the likelihood that these correspondences in the treatment
in Ale. 60ff. (Westerink); cf. esp. 62.13-4 KatTot Kai tou GpcoTOs auTq) TravTCOS 6 
8atptov a’lTios; 63.12ff. Kat p'qv Kat T| pvqpiq tou 8atpoi/tou auvpSei tt) tou 
epcoTos oucrtQc Te Kat 8uvapet- Kat yap o auTos ecrTtv epamKos tg Kat 
Saipovios aizrip. o Te yap epomicos, eav evOeos TTpocrextos pev cctto- 
Xauet tou Satpovos, 8ta 8e toutou cnjvaTTTeTat Tots eeots Kat aurqv T-qv 
eiTtiTPotav 8ta pecrou SexeTat tou 8atpovos.. .Kat atf 6 8atpovtos 
epcoTtKOs Tts eo-Ttv ktX. (see also T. Whittaker, The Neo-Platonists^[eaxrtoh6ge, 
1928] 242-4). The suggestion that each person's Satpcov might be epws itself is earlier 
made by Plotinus (Enn. 3.5.4): Kat Spa 6 epcos oStos wnv 6 8atptov, ov 4>acrtv
« Z Z «>/^<Z ,zeKacTTtp ouveTrecreat, o auTou eKao’Tou epcos;
81 Proclus' words near the end of his comment on the lemma 103a6 pw.. ,b2 auTO (93. 
12-4 [Westerink]) show that, to a certain extent at least, his understanding of the role of the 
divine sign in Ale. / was in harmony with the place assigned to it by the author of Thg. in his 
dialogue: oukouv ooco paXXov 6 veavtoKos eiTtStSajoti/ [cf. eTrt8t8oao-tv, 
eTrt8t8ovTtov Thg. 129e9, £Trt8t86acrtv 130a3] £K T(3v ev <|>tXoo-o<|>tQL Xo'ycov, 
TocrouTty TrXeov uiTeXappave [sc. Socrates] Kat top 8atpova cruXXiqt|/eaeai [cf. 
0-uXXap-qTat Thg. 129e7] auT(J Trpos top eptOTa. These words could not be 
applied to the activities of the divine sign in any passages in the Corpus in which it is 
mentioned other than those in Ale. / and Thg. (Proclus may have had Thg. in mind).
82For a brief consideration of the authenticity of Ale. I, see Intr. ch. V, g.
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of the divine sign ought to be set alongside other details which also 
indicate a connection between Thg. and Ale. I (see lntr. ch. I, b, iii; v, vii}.
d. Conclusions
From what has been said above concerning the representation of 
to Scxt|j.6 viov in Thg., it should be apparent that to speak of occasional 
un-Platonic features in its description83 is only half-correct, in so far as 
such a statement does not go far enough. It would be more precise to 
recognize that the divine sign in Thg. is no longer the vague to Sai|jdv“ 
iov evidenced in Plato, but has been transformed, quite systematically 
(though not nominally) into a 8ocL(JLajv, i.e., a representative of traditional 
patterns of Greek religious belief, as defined both in the way it is said by 
the author, through Socrates, to behave, and in the traits attributed to it. 
Schleiermacher, as it turns out, was clearly on the right track when he 
characterized the divine sign in Thg. as ”eine kleine Daimon" (172).84 
However, such statements as that have always been the product of 
assertion rather than comprehensive argument. Hence it has been the aim 
of this chapter to examine all the details pertinent to forming a decision 
about the meaning of, and the influences which were exerted upon, this 
representation of Socrates' divine sign.
In the course of the inquiry it has become evident that Plato per­
sistently attempted to avoid introducing commonplace elements in portray­
ing Socrates’ sign, and that this included any possible "debasing" of the 
sign into the status of a 8ocl(jlco v, or the presenting of it as simply a kind of 
oracle. It cannot perhaps be said that the divine sign in Thg. is merely
83So, e.g., Shorey, WPS 430; Heidel 53.
84See also Wagner 9.
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commonplace, but it has certainly been assimilated into some orthodox 
strains of belief. Nevertheless, to attribute this assimilation, as well as 
other novelties introduced into the divine sign section of Thg., largely to the 
influence of Xenophon, as has frequently been done,85 seems unwar­
ranted. It might be argued that the author of Thg. reproduces the popular 
view of Socrates’ divine sign which Xenophon presents, and indeed we 
have seen several points in which the descriptions coincide. But, apart 
from the evidence furnished by certain disrepancies in detail between the 
representations of the two authors (e.g., the active co-operation of the 
divine sign in Thg., and the use of a collection of anecdotes in the same 
dialogue to illustrate specific points about the divine sign), a popular view 
of to 8ai|j.dviov is exactly what we should expect from any writer who 
did not impose on the divine sign the restrictions that Plato obviously did 
(see sec. a). It should be no cause for surprise if to 8aip.6 viov came to 
be assimilated, for all intents and purposes, into the class of Scclitoi/os 
independently by two authors who did not share or understand the philo­
sophical outlooks of Plato, and who viewed the divine sign simply as a 
component of conventional beliefs. Still less unusual is the fact that their 
accounts can also be seen to diverge in some details. Thus while our 
author may have been familiar with Xenophon's writings, I see no reason 
to postulate such a familiarity in order to explain the nature of the account 
of to SaLjjLoviov that we find in Thg. There must have been a great 
many individuals, both within Socrates' lifetime (as for instance his 
accusers) and in the decades that followed, who found his divine sign to be 
an obscure matter, and recourse to Plato's writings, when this became 
possible, will not have provided much illumination. But it was the province
85E.g., by Willing 140; Maier 453; Shorey, WPS 430.
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of 8ocl(jlov€S to account for the unexplainable,86 and once one of these 
was invoked to give meaning to to 8ai{j.6viov of Socrates, the results, it 
seems, were inevitable. Both Xenophon and the author of Thg. attest to 
this.
Some conclusions can be drawn about a stratification within the 
divine sign section as a whole. That the author had the Platonic model be­
fore him is indisputable. But its influence is unevenly distributed through­
out this section. Plato’s version is prominent at the very outset, as is seen 
by the use of Ap., but adaptations are quickly made to it. The series of 
anecdotes which follows the general prelude, beginning with the one on 
Charmides and ending with the story of Sannio, are likely to reflect popular 
stories about Socrates, possibly from an oral tradition.87 Not only does the 
use of anecdote indicate this, but also the way in which Socrates in the 
course of the four reports is transformed into a kind of "Wundermann," to 
adopt a phrase often used in this connection. To appreciate the degree to 
which commonplace elements have left their mark here, we need only 
reflect upon the ease with which almost any other figure of legendary 
prescience could be substituted for Socrates in these reports: the stories, in 
other words, are stereotypical (see Intr. ch. V, b). On the other hand, the 
second part of the divine sign section (129e1ff.) is deeply imbued with 
concepts deriving from philosophical sources, mostly but not only Platonic, 
although even here a good deal of popular thought has made its presence 
felt. I cannot however agree with Willing when he suggests (see n.42) that 
the prelude to the Aristides story in Thg., as well as the story itself, derives 
from popular accounts in circulation at the time of the dialogue's composi­
86See Dodds, G. and 1.11f., 39-43; Burkert 179-81.
87So Willing 143-4,178; Stefanini I.28; see also Intr. ch. I, b, vii.
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tion. No doubt stories about the descendants of Aristides the Just persisted 
as chastening rhetorical fare well ino the fourth-century (see comm, ad 
130c2-3); but all the evidence accumulated above points merely to the 
author's use and distortion of Tht. (and of other works to a lesser extent) in 
the composition of this part of the dialogue. It is of course possible that a 
few well known facts about Aristides and Thucydides have found their way 
into the dialogue, but it is not necessary to assume this in order to explain 
the background of each detail; 129e1-130e4 can be satisfactorily 
accounted for strictly on the basis of a text-imminent study.
A word is also in order about the use of sources in this section of the 
dialogue. As we should have expected, the author draws liberally upon 
the passages in Plato where the divine sign is mentioned. Two Platonic 
works figure conspicuously in this respect, namely Ap. and Tht. It is 
possible moreover that the author had Ap. in mind in 129d3 as well. No 
doubt our author also used Euthd. (see n.8). Whether he also looked to the 
relevant place in Ft. is a matter that can safely be left to a consideration of 
the composition of Thg. (see lntr. ch. I, c). But notable for its apparent ab­
sence is the passage concerning to Saipoviov in Phdr. Yet the ab­
sence may only be apparent, for in this place Socrates states, immediately 
after the reference to his divine sign, etp/L 8r) ofiv pdvTis pev, oil 
ttocitu 8e cTTrouSaios, aXX’ djorrep ot tcx ypocppaTcx 4>ot£iXoi, oaov 
pev epocura povov lkocvos ktX. (242c3-5). It has been said (Rist 15­
6) that this passage probably provided the impetus for some Platonists to 
elaborate upon a connection which is made in Ap. 40a4 between the 
divine sign and pavTiKfj. As far as the author of Thg. is concerned, we 
might rather say that Phdr. could have fostered the notions he already 
entertained about the divine sign’s furnishing of an oracular voice for
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Socrates.88 The author may also have been influenced by Phdr. in his 
assimilation of Td 8ai|jdviov to the Socljjlcjv epcns. This assimilation 
also seems to point to the account of the divine sign given in Ale. /; certainly 
there are other connections between the two dialogues, and they both part 
company with the Platonic representations of to Saipoviov in similar 
and distinctive respects. In addition, it seems to me that this author, in his 
report of the Aristides anecdote, drew upon, or was at least influenced by, 
the description of evCo'uo'tcco'pds in Phdr., and very likely by that in Ion 
as well. It is no surprise that Smp. should also figure in this list: for an 
author concerned to transform to Saipoviov into a Saipcov, it would be 
curious if he did not look to the definitive Platonic expression on the subject 
of Satpoves, as other authors interested in Sccipoves around his time 
were doing; and the use he makes of another passage in the same work to 
introduce the notion of learning by "osmosis" is remarkable only to those 
who do not appreciate the distortion he has brought about on Tht. Finally, 
in this section of the dialogue the author has employed a work of which we 
can reconstruct only a few outlines; but since this falls outside the actual 
treatment of the divine sign, reference can be made here to the discussion 
of this source in Intr. ch. I, b, vii.
In the systematization of its demonological characteristics in Thg., 
the divine sign attains to a position which it was to preserve for most of anti­
quity (especially later antiquity).89 Interestingly enough, there is evidence
88Friediander (153-4) attempts to find Platonic precedence for a prophetic Socrates in 
Phdr. 278e10ff., where Socrates "prophesizes" (pavTevopai) about Isocrates, and in 
Tht. 142c4ff., where Socrates is said to have spoken "prophetically" (pavTiKtus) about 
many things. But this is special pleading, since such statements in these dialogues are not 
meant to be taken in a literal sense (see R.J. Collin, CQ n.s. 2 [1952] 93-6, on metaphorical 
paPTeuopai).
89See Willing 151-66; Souilhe 130-7.
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to show that some of these authors in later antiquity were disposed to view 
to SocLjJidviov as it is presented in Thg. in just this light. When Clement 
of Alexandria (Strom. 1.133.3) and Calcidius (in Ti. 287-8, cf. 221) wish to 
make reference to Socrates' divine sign as a component within a demono­
logical system, it is not the locus classicus in Ap. 31d2-4 that they quote, 
but rather the very similar passage in Thg. 128d2ff.; and demonological 
preoccupations are likely to have been the reason for Plutarch's interest in 
Thg. (see Appendix 1). A cautious inference from this could be that these 
later interpreters recognized the divine sign in Thg. to be basically what the 
author of the dialogue conceived it to be. Accordingly, on the basis of the 
date of composition suggested above (see Intr. ch. V, g) and the evidence 
adduced in this section, it seems reasonable to conclude that Socrates' 
divine sign was assimilated into systematic ways of thinking about 8oti— 
jroves at a very early stage; there is certainly no need to assume that the 
middle-Platonists were responsible for this,90 while there is evidence to 
suggest that it did happen among Plato's immediate successors.91 This 
would not be surprising. Socrates' emergence as a figure of legend was
"This is commonly taken for granted, e.g. Willing 157ff.; Friedlander 36f., 40f.
91 See Intr. ch. V, b. Gigon (Sokrates 164) articulates what I take to be the most reasonable 
supposition on this question: "Dass aber der Schopfer der antiken theologischen Damon- 
ologie, der Platonschuler Xenocrates, auch das sokratische Daimonion in sein System 
einbezogen hat, ist mir von vornherein wahrscheinlich."
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not slow,92 and despite the lack of direct evidence, it is only natural that the 
development of Td Sctipidviov will have kept pace with the swiftly- 
working hagiographical process of Socratic biography. Indeed, it is to be 
expected that the divine sign, by its very nature, would become an integral 
part of this whole process. Thus Thg. may well represent by far the earliest 
extant evidence for the extended depiction of Socrates' divine sign after it 
had already found a place within current demonological speculations. 
Concomitantly, this portion of Thg. is probably also our earliest example of 
a truly hagiographical approach to the Socratic biography.93 It represents 
a demonstrable break with Platonic treatments of Socrates, and even in 
Xenophon there is nothing that approaches it. The Socrates of this part 
erf Thg. points forward to a good deal in that which was to become common­
place in the later biographical treatment of him.
92This is the principal argument of MagalhSes-Vilhena, Socrate, which I see no reason to 
dispute. Pavlu however (34 and Phil.Woch. 59.22 [1939] 596) was not in sympathy with 
this reasoning, and made his disagreement the basis for dating the dialogue to c. 300-275 
("Vieimehr muss man m. E. eine nicht unbedeutende Zeit verstreichen lassen, damit aus 
dem Sokrates des Platon und des Xenophon...der Wundermann und Prophet des 
Theages werde” [Phil. Woch. 596]). In answer to Pavlu's assumptions it is important to call 
attention to an overlooked piece of evidence for the presence of the fabulous in the earliest 
phase of Socratic literature. In the Kupcras (less likely Kvpos) of Antisthenes (and so not 
later than c. 365), the deceased Socrates appeared, at his grave, to a young man in a dream 
and instructed him; see Wilamowitz II.27 n.3. The story appears (without mention of source) 
in Suda s.v. ZccKpctTris, but Caizzi in his collection of fragments (Antisthenis Fragmenta 
[Milano, 1966]) seems unaware of Wilamowitz’s argument (see also Dittmar 63-4). Also, if 
the hypothesis is correct that the author of the first Socratic epistle derived his anecdote 
about an occurrence of Socrates’ divine sign (Socr. Ep. I.9) from Antisthenes' Archelaus 
(see J. Bernays, Phokion [Berlin, 1881] 114; F. Dummler, Akademika [Giessen, 1889] 3ff.), 
it is further proof of a predilection for the miraculous in at least one of the earliest Socratics.
93For the hagiographical quality of this portion of Thg., see among others Bruns 345-7; 
Fritzsche 228-9; Gauss 209. At the risk of oversimplification, one might draw upon the 
hagiographical classifications formulated by M. Hadas and M. Smith (Heroes and Gods [New 
York, 1965] 12) as regards the terms "hero" and "saint": the hero works by his own power, 
the saint by divine will; and within this scheme Plato's Socrates (according to the authors) is 
conceived along traditional heroic patterns (49-56). In Thg. on the other hand, we might say 
that Socrates has crossed the line towards "sainthood."
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III. Characters
a. Socrates
The question of the authenticity of Thg. has sometimes been held to 
depend largely on the author's presentation of Socrates.1 It will be evident 
therefore that an examination of his characterization in Thg. is of some 
importance. But the investigation is not a simple one, for while there is no 
question about the unity of the dialogue itself (see Intr. ch. I, c), Socrates 
does emerge here as something of a dual figure, now addicted to question 
and answer, now devoted to p.aKpo\oyia on a topic (the divine sign) 
about which he usually avoids any lengthy discussion. How does this 
Socrates compare with the homonymous character with whom Plato 
presents us in the other dialogues of the Corpus?
There is much that is familiar about the Socrates we encounter in 
Thg.2 He first appears in the agora of Athens, in the Stoa of Zeus Eleu- 
therios (121a6-7), and, as so often, he is the person with whom others are 
especially eager to speak. He shows a seemly deference towards one 
older than himself (127e1). His initial words after Demodocus' opening 
speech express a strong concern for the education of the young (122b2ff., 
cf. 127d2ff.); conformably with this attitude, he conscientiously fixes his
1See, e.g., Stallbaum 222; Hermann, Geschichte undSystem 429-30; Bruns 345-7; Pavlu 
23-5; Tarrant, CO 32 (1938) 168,171-2; I.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines 
(London, 1962) 12.
2For the Platonic passages bearing upon the following features of Socrates' depiction in 
Thg., see in each case the commentary ad loc.
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attention exclusively upon the young man with whose education he is 
presently concerned (122c8-d4, 125b3). Socrates is particularly careful 
from the outset of Thg. to make provisions for determining precisely the 
topic of discussion (122b6ff.). His method of investigation consists prim­
arily of a few series of question and answer (esp. 123c1 ff.), and of conver­
sation-type discussions (e.g. 125d13ff.). He innocently claims at first to be 
offering himself as a passive witness (jJLocpTVS 123b2-3) to the difficulties 
Theages has experienced with his father, but turns out to be the inter­
rogator of Theages, one in fact who distorts the young man’s desire to 
become crowds into a desire to become a tyrant, and who on this account 
engages the apparent anger of the young man at one point (125e4). 
Throughout his questioning of Theages, he employs analogies from var­
ious crafts. He makes ready use of poetic quotation (125b6ff., d1 Off.), and 
demonstrates, en passant, an interest in etymology (122d9-e1). He em­
ploys irony to force his interlocutor to clarify himself (125e5-126a6). In Thg. 
Socrates maintains that he is ignorant (128b1 ff.); this is, of course, char­
acteristic of the Platonic persona, and so, too, is the irony that it implies.3 
But here there are limits to his ignorance, for he is an expert at Ta 
epcoTiKa; and we have also seen (Intr. ch. I, b, vi, vii; ch. II, b) that this 
quality informs the Socrates of Thg., and is responsible for some of the 
structural features of the dialogue. Though a similar claim to expertise in 
tcc epcoTiKa is rarely ever made by Socrates, an erotic disposition is 
nevertheless a familiar trait of the character whom we meet elsewhere in
3Irony is primarily a characteristic of Plato’s Socrates, see W. Boder, Die sokratischen ironie 
in den platonischen Fruhdialogen (Amsterdam, 1973) 23ff.; but perhaps not exclusively 
Platonic, see Guthrie HGP III. 337; Vlastos, CQn.s.37 (1987) 85-7; cf. also Cic. Brut. 292, 
who ascribes Socratic irony to Xenophon and Aeschines Socraticus as well. It would be 
interesting to know if the presence of irony was a criterion in Panaetius’ judgement about 
"true" (a\T)OeTs) Socratic dialogues (D.L. 2.64).
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the Platonic Corpus. Finally, Socrates' recommendation of the sophists as 
superior educators to himself (127e8ff.) is typical of the Platonic character; 
but the fact that this recommendation occurs within a passage that is taken 
directly from Ap. (see Intr. ch. I n.54) is in itself evidence that the author’s 
aim is not to create a wholly original character in Socrates. This writer, in 
other words, is aware of the tradition of Socratic characterization in which 
he is working.
Throughout the first seven and a half (Stephanus) pages of the dia­
logue (i.e., as far as 128d1) Socrates furnishes much evidence of humour 
and affectation. Besides the instances cited in the previous paragraph and 
in Intr. ch. I, b, other pertinent samples have been collected in the 
commentary (pass.). Generally speaking, Socrates’ manner of expression 
is decidedly colloquial and lively (but see also comm, ad 127d2-128b7), 
and the ttoclSlcc for which he is distinguishable in Thg. is the more con­
spicuous for its contrast with Demodocus’ (JiTOuSt) (see below sec. c, and 
Intr. ch. I, b\ c). This contrast between play and earnest can be detected at 
the very outset of the dialogue. Thesleff remarks (156) that Socrates 
exhibits a ”mock-dignified adaptation of the tone of Demodokos" in 122b2- 
c4 and 127d2-128b6. Although this is, I think, basically right, I would 
extend the observation to cover 121a4-5 as well: Demodocus’ clumsy 
opening address4 is aped by Socrates’ heavy ocXXoc kocl aXXcos and kocl 
cou ye evcKOC kocl ttccvu. This early play at Demodocus’ words es­
tablishes at once the opposition in the tones of Socrates and Demodocus, 
and entrenches the dialogue immediately in a recognizable Platonic
atmosphere.
4See below sec. c, and comm. ad121a1-3.
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It can be seen, then, that our author has done a great deal to char­
acterize Socrates along distinctive lines. Moreover, the many points of 
contact that the Socrates of Thg. exhibits with the Platonic character show 
clearly and decisively where his essential affinities lie. It is necessary, 
however, to look in closer detail at Socrates’ method of discussion and the 
actual doctrines and beliefs that he is made to hold in this dialogue, for the 
light that they shed on the authenticity of his characterization.
The result of Socrates’ interrogation of Theages is a rather familiar 
one: Theages is made to recognize that he does not know what he thought 
he knew, namely, who would be likely to make him crowds in the skill with 
which he is most concerned.5 Yet in Thg. this process, in terms of both 
structure and content, is far from identical to the one with which we are like­
ly to associate it in other Platonic dialogues (especially Socratic dia­
logues): Socratic eXeyyos leading to an interlocutor's state of ccTropLa.6 
Yet, while an elenctic, aporetic, and aporia-producing Socrates is certainly 
a very prominent figure in numerous Platonic works, should we expect that 
precisely the same character will make his presence known in this dia­
logue as well? We have already seen that we should not; for in Thg. 
Socrates' interlocutor is not like all the other persons whom he reduces to 
a condition of airopiot. Instead, Theages is able to acknowledge his own 
deficiencies; hence the requirement that he be purged of 8o£oao<jna is 
not nearly as urgent as it is in other situations. Consequently, Socrates 
understandably (and quite conformably with the Platonic Socrates) con­
ducts his interrogation of Theages largely ad hominem; there is no search 
for the definition of an ethical term, nor is Socrates confronted with a con­
5For elaboration on the points made in this and the following paragraphs, see the relevant 
sections of lntr. ch. I, b, c.
5See also Hermann, Geschichte und System 428-9; Steinhart 440-1; Kruger 16-7.
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ceited or sophistic adversary. We need not feel therefore that the Socrates 
of Thg. is un-Platonic because he does not lead his interlocutor to ociropia 
as he does elsewhere; unless, that is, we subscribe to a theory of the 
Platonic dialogue which dictates strict and rigid rules about form. But, in 
any case, such works as Ap., Cri., and Men ex. prove the futility of an 
approach of this kind. We only have to consider the characters and circum­
stances of this dialogue to recognize that Socrates has justification for 
behaving as he does in the first part of Thg.
Socrates' use of craft-analogy in Thg. has already been mentioned 
above. While the assertion that this is a trait of the Platonic Socrates is 
surely uncontroversial, it is nevertheless incomplete and, possibly, mis­
leading. For the homonymous character in other ZcoKpocTiKOi \6yoi 
also makes use of analogies with crafts, and we may assume that when the 
writers of these dialogues represented Socrates as employing craft-ana­
logy, they were simply remaining faithful to the spirit of the historical Socra­
tes (whether they realized it or not). The crucial issue for us, then, must be 
whether anything specifically Platonic, or otherwise, can be detected in the 
use of craft-analogy in this dialogue. In the first place, it may be labelled as 
Platonic that in Thg. Socrates' employment of craft-analogy demonstrates 
that the political craft resists classification with other, conventional Teyyox. 
As well, that the use of analogies with crafts leads to a virtual impasse in 
the discussion with Theages (but note the restrictions in the preceding 
paragraph) is a recurring feature of the Platonic dialogues. Likewise, it is 
characteristic of the Platonic Socrates, not only that he refuses to acknow­
ledge that the sophists and politicians understand and can teach the 
genuine art of politics, but also that he himself does not emerge here as an 
expert in some Texvrl- Moreover, Theages’ attribution to Socrates of the
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maxim concerning the failure of the sons of successful fathers implies the 
latter's Ignorance of the true ttoXltlkt) Texvrl> and draws the Socrates of 
this dialogue firmly into line with the Platonic character who elsewhere 
expresses a similar reservation (see comm. ac/126d1-4).
But there are difficulties. In Thg., an individual's progress within 
Socratic association depends, in effect, upon chance or luck (cf. 128d2 
0€LQC pLOLpQC, 130e10 TTOCp’ £[JloO OTL Sv T'UX'flS TOUTO TTpCt^OCL, and 
see Intr. ch. I, b, vii), and is dictated by the whim of to SaLpopiov. As 
well, Socratic association, even if not outwardly extolled, is nevertheless, 
within this context, clearly considered to be superior to anything that others 
(i.e., sophists and politicians) may offer under the present circumstances. 
At the same time, however, nothing is said of the advantages that might 
accrue from the existence of an ideal, genuine tox^'Q of politics, and of an 
individual who possesses this tcx^tj (or any other, for that matter), if there 
were such a one. Now, it may be that in this dialogue Socratic association 
is considered to be simply a SeiJTepos ttXous to association with one 
who can legitimately claim knowledge of the genuine art of politics. This, 
however, is never stated, though Socrates does caution Theages about the 
arbitrary nature of the progress that might be achieved in his company 
(130e5-10). What we find instead is that the author, through Socrates, 
recommends (both by the length of the section on the divine sign, and, in 
particular, by the story about Aristides) only one thing, namely the benefit 
that can be derived from an educational contact that is essentially charac­
terized by tuxt). Is this a position which could reasonably be ascribed to 
the Platonic Socrates? For the most part it seems unlikely; for it is precisely 
the vicissitudes of tijxti that he persistently abhors and seeks to eradicate 
from the lives of men by advocating the supremacy of tcx^T). "Virtue is
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knowledge" implies as much, and the same frame of mind animates the 
value attached to the hedonistic calculus in Prt.;7 in one striking instance 
(Euthd. 279c4-280b3) Socrates argues that luck is nothing other than 
<jo<|ncc, and that when one possesses the latter there is no need of the 
former; ultimately, the desire to remove contingency and change leads to 
the theory of forms. Whatever may have been the role of the historical 
Socrates within debates on these issues, in Plato's dialogues, at any rate, 
he is actively involved. Yet for all of that it must be said that this picture of 
the Platonic Socrates will not quite suffice. In Phdr. Socrates' attitude 
changes: he openly attaches value to non-rational elements in life, for it is 
his conviction that madness which comes to us Gelqc poLpQL is responsible 
for the greatest blessings (244a6-8, c3). Here Socrates is able to find room 
for certain aspects of human life to which he would elsewhere deny any 
role.8 Thus, while it is hard to find any common ground between, on the 
one hand, the Platonic Socrates who places exlusive importance on ration­
al deliberation, and, on the other, the character in Thg. who demonstrates a 
certain satisfaction with the kind of association whose benefits depend on 
a power completely outside of Socrates’ control, nevertheless there is a 
Socrates within Plato's works who, we have reason to feel, would not be 
unsympathetic towards the importance assigned to non-rational impulses 
in Thg.9
7See most recently M.C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge, 1986) 89-121 
(esp. 109ff. on the hedonistic calculus as a piece of doctrine which Socrates seriously 
holds); also Crombie, op. cit. 232-45 (esp. 240f.); Irwin, PMT102-14.
8See Nussbaum, op. cit. 200-33.
9Such a Socrates (the Socrates of Phdr.) is usually taken to be more of a Platonic creation 
than a faithful representation of the historical person; see, e.g., Guthrie, HGP IV. 417-9; 
Irwin, PMT 172-6; Nussbaum, op. cit. 228-33. On the other hand, it may be recalled that the 
ability to improve an associate in a non-rational way, and merely by his presence, seems to 
have been a characteristic feature of the Socrates of Aeschines of Sphettus (see lntr. ch. I, 
b, vii, and nn.72, 73).
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However this may be, sympathy with a concept or disposition, and 
total subordination to it (such as we find in Thg.), are not the same thing, 
and it is one of the most disturbing features of the Socrates in this dialogue 
that the irrational element in his awouaia is so predominant (see Intr. ch. 
I, b, vii). It will be helpful to consider the ramifications of this by examining 
the precise role in Thg. that chance is made to play within Socratic assoc­
iation. In this dialogue Socrates claims, through the reports of the young 
Aristides, that he is not responsible for any progress that a companion 
might make. Essentially, this is nothing other than Socratic ignorance (cf. 
128b1 f.), and, as far as it goes, it is perfectly compatible with the position 
Socrates assumes elsewhere in the Platonic Corpus; this is the Socrates 
who is no expert in any tcxvtV But, whereas Socrates’ denial that he 
actually teaches usually in Plato implies an elenctic, maieutic persona, in 
Thg. the assertion that others do not learn from him is exemplified by a very 
different process, one over which Socrates apparently has no control 
(education by contact, see Intr. ch. II, b, d). Clearly, in Thg. Socrates' ignor­
ance and inability to teach are part and parcel with the prominent role that 
he assigns to chance within his associations with others. This dialogue, in 
other words, introduces a new explanation for the Platonic Socrates' 
traditional claim that he does not teach, for the void produced by his own 
"incompetence" is now filled not by p.ccL€UTLKtj, but by TuyT); and this 
tuxt), in turn, is the effect of Socrates' inability to control the participation 
of to 8cti[idviov in an educational context.10 It is true that here, as else­
where, Socratic ignorance potentially provides a means of advancement 
for a companion; in this instance, however, the efficacy of this ignorance is
10For the connection of divine intervention and chance made by the Socrates of Aesch­
ines Socraticus, see T. Saunders, Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues (Harmondsworth, 1987) 
377-9.
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simply a by-product of Socrates’ pervasive subjection to chance. It is 
therefore not the mere fact that Socrates perceives some advantage in an 
irrational facet of life that raises suspicions of un-Platonic characterization, 
but rather the use to which the element of contingency is put in this 
dialogue.
The sphere within which chance operates in this dialogue, and the 
primary role it is given over tcxvt), are unusual. But it must be pointed out 
that in Thg. the progress of an individual is not merely "what just happens," 
that is to say, it is not completely without cause; rather, Socrates identifies 
the workings of chance in his associations with the agency and arbitrary 
behaviour of to Satsop io v, and this raises problems of its own. We 
may, first of all, put out of account certain objections that might be ad­
vanced about this section of the dialogue as it relates to Socrates’ char­
acterization. There is, first of all, no difficulty perse in Socrates’ use of ex­
tended narrative. The eschatological myths of Grg., Phd., R., and Phdr. 
provide the most obvious parallels for this mode of expression. Nor is 
Socrates' autobiographical manner a sign of inauthenticity. Apart from Ap., 
which necessarily contains much self-revelatory material, we may look to 
Socrates' sketch of his early interest in natural science in Phd. 96a6-99d2 
for a Platonic precedent. This same passage, moreover, furnishes ade­
quate evidence of a Socrates who, like the character in Thg., can speak 
about himself in non-ironic terms.11 Again, Socrates' change of tone from 
playful in the first section of the dialogue to earnest in the second corre­
sponds to a similar transmutation in Menex., where there is ironic banter in
11 His tone in this part of Thg., according to Hermann (Geschichte und System 430), 
Fritzsche (228-9), and Bruns (346-7), is not only serious, but boastful. According to Pangle 
(168), Socrates' tone changes because he is now enlarging on a topic which his super­
stitious rural interlocutors will understand.
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the prelude, and (ostensibly at least) a resounding gravitas in the Funeral 
Speech.12 That in Thg. Socrates chooses a series of anecdotes to ex­
press himself is somewhat more difficult to reconcile with the Socrates 
whom we encounter elsewhere in the Corpus (see comm. ac/128d1-130 
e4). But it is simply his subject matter, the divine sign, that represents the 
single significant departure from the usual custom of the Platonic Socrates. 
The references to to Saijjidviov in the rest of Plato contain nothing to 
compare with this, either in magnitude or tone. Plato, it must be noted, has 
sound reasons for not allowing his Socrates much space to enlarge on this 
topic, and for portraying Socrates, for the most part, as speaking about it in 
a relatively light and incidental manner (see lntr. ch. II, a). On both these 
points the Socrates of Thg. seriously contravenes regular Platonic practice.
To assert that the Socrates of Thg. is un-Platonic merely because he 
displays certain characteristics that are not found in other Platonic com­
positions is to commit the serious error of viewing Plato's Socrates as a 
homogeneous character, which he patently is not. In any event, it may be 
felt that the portrayal of Socrates in Thg. is sufficiently Platonic to override 
concerns about deviations from the "normal" Platonic portrait. On the other 
hand, if greater faith can be placed in evidence which demonstrates that 
the Socrates of Thg. adheres to certain ways of thinking which the Platonic 
Socrates avoids not only persistently, but also deliberately and for iden­
tifiable reasons, then we are likely to feel that there is something seriously 
wrong with the Socrates of our dialogue. Perhaps in the end it does not
12See G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, 1963) 158-9. Kennedy's 
remarks on Menex. (158) may be equally applied to the interpretation of Socrates’ tone in 
Thg.: "Elsewhere Socrates sometimes affects a serious tone when he does not mean to be 
taken seriously in the final analysis, but in such cases, for example in his first speech in the 
Phaedrus, the real situation is made clear before the dialogue is over." If Socrates' tone in 
the divine sign section of Thg. is anything but serious, there is no indication of this 
whatever.
compel the verdict that he is not the product of Plato’s own hand; but, I 
think, it comes quite near.
b. Theages
Theages is a type more or less familiar in Plato (and in Xenophon's 
Socratica for that matter): a young man, ready to converse with Socrates, 
but unaccustomed to his manner of investigation and his irony, and in 
some cases eager for success in the public sphere. In this connection we 
are likely to think of Meno, Hippocrates in Prt., Charmides, Clinias in 
Euthd., Lysis, Alcibiades in the A/c/d/ades-dialogues, and, to a certain 
extent, Callicles inG/p.13 Some scholars have however been more 
precise about possible affinities. They point to Thucydides and Aristides, 
the sons of Melesias and Lysimachus, in La., as the figures who provided 
our author with the model for his characterization of Theages.14 But since 
these two characters are little more than mutae personae in that dialogue, 
it is evident that much can be gained from a closer look at the character­
ization of Theages.
Theages, it is true, shows a number of youthful traits; this is as we 
should expect. He has undergone the traditional Athenian educational 
curriculum (122e8-10). Although he wants to become crowds, he has no 
precise idea of what this may entail. He complains of his father’s feigned 
ignorance of what he himself has often told him, and of his father’s refusal 
to comply with his wishes (123a5-8). He is unfamiliar with Socrates' 
method of inquiry (see Intr. ch. I, b, iii},15 and becomes frustrated at Socra­
tes' playful attitude towards him (125e4). Yet he becomes despondent
13Xenophon's description of Proxenus in An. 2.6.16f. might also come to mind.
14See e.g. Pavlu 25-6; Kruger 27~8.
15See also Kruger 15.
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when it appears to him that Socrates is refusing to associate with him, and 
is quick to cite the fact that he is requesting no more than what Socrates 
has done for others roughly his own age and in a similar position (128b7- 
c5). Finally, his dactylic innovation ojxoclcji Te kocl OuaiocLS (131a6) 
may be, as Friedlander supposed (329), a demonstration of what he has 
learned at school.
Theages’ desire for a sophistic education (122a5ff.) is shared by a 
number of youths in Plato's dialogues: the conventional training is simply 
no longer good enough. We learn that this desire originates in conversa­
tions Theages has had with some friends who have "thrown him into a 
state of confusion," SictTCtpccTTOUcrLV (121d3), an appropriate word to 
describe youthful enthusiasm towards a current fashion (see comm, ad 
loc.). As a result of his friends' reports, Theages has caused Demodocus a 
great deal of trouble (ttoc\ocl jjlol Trp<ry|jiocTct Trccpexet 121d4), and has 
set certain demands on his father (dcgimv 121 d4). But despite the occa­
sional obstinance Theages shows towards Demodocus (see Intr. ch. I 
n.27), it would appear that he still identifies himself closely with his father 
(see comm. ad131a4-6).
Theages' language is sometimes vivid and exuberant. Perhaps the 
best example of this is the sentence 125e8-126a4 El^oclptiv. . .cttl- 
0ujjL€LV (see comm, ad loc.). His criticism of his father (123a5-8) is also 
expressed quite sharply. From 125d7 up to the commencement of the 
divine sign section (128d1) Theages swears vq/pcc Aia five times, but
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never before. We may infer that he has worked himself up to a fever pitch 
by the time Socrates begins his exposition.16
But Theages is not one-dimensionally naive or juvenile, as some 
critics have imagined.17 Though his knowledge of a specific Socratic tenet 
(the failure of the sons of successful Athenians) is, as mentioned above, 
not unparalleled in Plato, his willingness to express an opinion about it 
(126d4-7) is another matter, and sets him apart from some other youthful 
interlocutors in the Platonic Corpus. While Theages complains about the 
ttat8Let which Socrates has directed towards him, our analysis of 
Socrates' use of the Anacreon fragment which prompts this complaint (see 
Appendix 3) suggests that Theages' annoyance is to a great extent justi­
fied. Moreover, Theages is not simply a duplication of Alcibiades in certain 
A/c/b/acfes-dialogues (again, as some scholars have supposed).18 On the 
contrary, the author of this dialogue has gone to some lengths to leave the 
impression that Theages is, in certain ways, the antithesis of an Alcibiades 
figure, and that his character and capacity is different from that of young 
men like Alcibiades (see lntr. ch. I, b; c). Thus, for instance, his statement in 
125e8-126a4, though admittedly conveyed in an excited tone of voice (see 
above), is nevertheless notan expression of a real desire for tyranny. This 
assumption leads, and has led, to some curious interpretations of Theages' 
character; but the passage in fact furnishes evidence of a different kind
16For the concentration of oath-swearing, cf. Hippocrates in Prt. 310b9, d5, d8. Pangle 
(161) has also noticed Theages' repeated oath-swearing, and concludes that he swears by 
Zeus because he is standing in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios (he explains Demodocus' oath 
in 125b1 in the same way), and because Zeus is "the very model of the tyrannic rule of the 
wise" (160). A glance at a sample of the references in Brandwood’s Index s.v. Aict will, 
however, show how unexceptional the oath by Zeus is in Plato, and with what little deeper 
significance it is expressed.
17See Kruger 14; Thesleff 156; Friedlander 149-50, 329.
18See, e.g., Hermann, Geschichte und System 230, 598; Steinhart 441; Pavlu 26-7; 
Friedlander 149 falls just short of a similar judgement.
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about him (see Intr. ch. V, c, d). Theages’ failure to supply an answer at 
125d7 in response to an exceedingly simple question from Socrates about 
the special knowledge of TUpavvoi has also been taken as proof that the 
young man is particularly dim.19 20But it is much better, as C.W. Muller 
observed (136 n.3), to interpret Theages' reticence as an indication that he 
actually recognizes Socrates' irony and refuses, out of annoyance, to offer 
the answer which, he thinks, will satisfy Socrates' expectations (see comm. 
ad loc.). Muller (137 n.10) was also right, I believe, in his evaluation of 
127a1-10. Here Socrates states that he will entrust Theages to one of ol 
kccXol KcryaOoi to. ttoXltikcx, that Theages will gain a fine reputation 
as a result, and that it will cost his father nothing. Theages then asks: is not 
Socrates one of ol KaXoi Kaya0oi?, and follows this up with a request 
that Socrates himself become his companion. This request, to be sure, is 
seriously meant, for Theages does subsequently place a good deal of im­
portance in enlisting Socrates as his mentor. But the repartee in Theages' 
words should not be missed: he understands the irony in Socrates' use of 
kocXol KCtyaOoi, and immediately throws the phrase back upon Socrates. 
All this does not seem to be the sort of behaviour that is characteristic of the 
earlier years of adolescence. Indeed, we may perhaps suppose that, since 
Theages is now thinking in realistic terms about attaining success in public 
life, it is most likely he is at, or very near, the age of majority (i.e. 18), at 
which time he would be enrolled in his deme (note that Demodocus 
speaks of Theages' fellow demesmen, Sthjlotocl 121d2), and would be 
allowed to address the ecclesia.2®
19See Kruger 16; also Pangle (152-63) on Socrates' questioning of Theages in general.
20See also comm, ad 122c8. H. Muller thinks along the same lines (465), but suggests 20 
as the approximate age of Theages; this may be slightly too high.
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Outside of Thg., Theages’ name occurs only twice, in Ap. and R; 
these two instances, and the inferences that can be drawn from them, have 
been discussed in some detail in Intr. ch. I, c. The indication from the Ap. 
passage (from the use of the past tense flv) is that Theages was already 
dead by the time of Socrates' trial in 399. If any confidence can be placed 
in the portrayal of Theages as a pieipctKiov at the time of the dialogue's 
dramatic date (409, see Intr. ch. V, appendix), we may gather that Theages 
died at a fairly young age; and this supposition may be supported by the 
allusion in the R passage to his voaoTpo^ioc. Kirchner has identified the 
AHM0A0K0Z [ANATYPA2I]0Z named on an Attic inscription of c. 400­
350 as the son either of the Theages of our dialogue, or of his brother 
Paralios.21
c. Demodocus
Demodocus has been seen as the "type" of concerned father who 
has the good intention of providing for his son's education, but is uncertain 
as to the identification of the person who will be the most likely to help him 
in this endeavour. Not unlike Demodocus are Lysimachus and Melesias in 
La., and Crito in Euthd. (306d2ff.); we may also think of the role Socrates 
performs in loco parentis for Hippocrates in Prt. 316b8ff. C.W. Muller (138­
9) sees in Demodocus a combination of two "fathertypes": on the one hand, 
he is the father who wants his son to be trained in the ttoXltlkt) Tex^P, 
but is ignorant of the art himself (cf. Lysimachus and Melesias in La.); on 
the other hand, he is the successful politician who is yet unable to pass the 
political art on to his sons himself (cf. Aristides and Thucydides, the fathers 
of the mediocre Lysimachus and Melesias). This seems a highly schem­
21 See I. Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica I (Berolini, 1901) 230 (§ 3465).
atic assessment of the characterization of Demodocus, and we must con­
sider if it is an apt evaluation of our author’s modus operandi.
It will be best to begin with Demodocus’ opening words in this dia­
logue. Shorey criticized them as follows: "Plato could hardly have written 
the intolerably clumsy and scholastic first two sentences [i.e. 121 a1 -3] of 
the Theages."22 I think it is safe to interpret this statement to mean that 
Demodocus' first words are evidence of incompetent writing on the part of 
the author of Thg. Clumsy they are (see comm, ad 121 a1 -3), but we have 
already observed that Socrates recognizes the inconcinnity of Demodocus' 
means of expression, and responds to it at once in an appropriately stiff 
manner himself. In view of this it rather appears as though the effect of 
Demodocus' words, as they were understood by Shorey, is deliberate.23 
And the purpose which they serve is, I think, to underscore the intensity of 
Demodocus' anxiety in the present situation, or, at any rate, to reveal the 
importance which Demodocus attaches to the subject which he wants to 
broach with Socrates (the length of his imminent monologue contributes to 
the same end, see below). Moreover, Demodocus’ personality, as evoked 
by his manner of speaking, is developed with some consistency in this 
dialogue, yet this is not what we would expect if his first words merely 
represented an example of bad writing. It will be necessary to elaborate on 
this last point.
There is no single item of Demodocus' language which might be 
considered solecistic or obscure. But several combine to impart what 
Thesleff (156) calls a "somewhat solemn and circumstantial" manner of 
speaking. Apart from the first two sentences of the dialogue, there Is to
160
22See Shorey, WPS 429.
23So also Friedlander 326-7; Rist (18 n.8) disagrees.
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Trepi tcBv dvOpoJTrcov as subject in 121c1; the hyperbaton of eych in 
121c2; the emphatic position of epoi, and the pendant article T), in 121c3; 
the rather unusual phrase Sokcb yap jjlol (121 d1); the officious use of 
Trpa^eiv in 122b8; the affected sound of 127b5-6 Kai (aevToi Kai 
aiax^V0PaL Xeyeiv cos cr^dSpa (3ouXo|aai; and the heavily worded 
sentence 127c6-d1 (eyco.. .tJs; on each of these features see the comm. 
ad loc.). Demodocus speaks in a stilted, halting fashion, and consistently
so.
Demodocus' early monologue (121 b1-122b1) represents his main 
contribution to this dialogue, and is noteworthy, structurally speaking, 
because a character other than Socrates rarely has a lengthy opening 
speech in a Platonic dialogue. The closest parallel to what we find here is 
Lysimachus' opening harangue in La.: both speeches take up approxi­
mately the same amount of their respective dialogues (about one-tenth), 
and both are aimed at soliciting advice from the present company con­
cerning the future education of the speaker’s son (see Intr. ch. I n.7). But 
apart from these similarities of situation and content, it is possible from a 
close examination to see that the two passages share little else in
common.
A suitable point of departure is the criticism of Demodocus' speech 
made by one ancient writer. In a work attributed to Dionysius of Halicar­
nassus (Rh. 405 [= 11.381.5-7 Usener-Radermacher]), we find the following 
judgement: Trapa tq5 nXaTCOUi 6 A^po8oKog Xeyei iTpos ZcoKpa- 
tt|V* "ejjioi yap, (5 ZafopaTes, T) toutou tou TraiSds evre 4>ut- 
eiau e’lTe TraiSoTroiiav XP^ 4>avai" [a slight adaptation of Thg. 121 
c3-4]. touto 8e ou xpn vopiCeiv otl p.eyaXi3 t-q 4>cokq xp’QTai 6 
nXaTcuu, aXXa eTreiSr) 6 AiqiadSoKos epyaTiKOS Kai yecopyiKOs,
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4>covccs dc^iricn Tfjs Texvris. The second part of the last sentence is 
clear as to its meaning: as Demodocus is a farmer and a worker, his 
language is fashioned to suit his occupation. The first part of the same 
sentence would seem to indicate that the passage in Thg. could be 
understood (mistakenly) as evidence that "the language which Plato is 
using is grandiose/impressive."24 Now, the work in which these evalua­
tions occur is probably not an authentic composition of Dionysius’ (see Intr. 
ch. V, a and n.5). But, since the composition is itself a rhetorical handbook, 
its value as evidence for the way in which a Greek ear responded to Demo­
docus’ opening monologue remains undiminished.25 And the verdict was 
that the author’s portrayal of Demodocus as a farmer through linguistic 
means was convincing and effective.
Still, [Dionysius’] testimony pertains, strictly speaking, only to Demo­
docus' simile between plant-rearing and child-rearing within the words that 
he quotes. The use of this simile would incline us to believe that his state­
ment that Demodocus is a farmer must be correct (cf. also 121d2 ets to 
ocgtu KaTcxpocLVovTcs, 127e3 ’Avayupaalcuv to tov 8r)p.0T(Dv, 
and comm, ad locc.). But to what extent is our author’s characterization of 
Demodocus as yecopyiKOS consistent? A passage from Arist. Rh. (1395a 
6ff.) may be evidential. According to Aristotle, ol yctp aypoiicoi piaX— 
LQTa yvcopoTwoi eiai Kai pQtSicos aiTo^aivovTai [sc. Tas 
yvajpas]. This could be an accurate description of Demodocus* style in
24jjLeyd\i3 in this sentence can hardly mean "loud,” as it usually does in similar contexts. 
For the meaning assigned to it in the above translation see LSJ s.v. peyas A.li.6.
25Stallbaum (ad 121c) rejects outright the hermeneutical value of this piece of evidence, 
asserting that the passage in Thg. "ridiculum est et absurdum," and that Plato would have 
expressed himself "elegantius." Apart from the fact that Stallbaum misapprehends some of 
the features of Demodocus' monologue (see comm. acf121b6, c2), it is questionable 
whether greater reliance should be placed on the feel for Greek on which Stallbaum appar­
ently based his assessment, than on the judgements of a native Greek speaker such as 
[Dionysius].
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the earlier part of his monologue, for his use of the simile mentioned above 
does make him appear y vco|JOTVTros. Moreover, sententiousness is a 
conspicuous quality of the language of rustics in comedy (especially) and 
elsewhere.26 Demodocus' clumsy, halting language would also seem to 
point up his rusticity: of the country dweller Gorgias in Men. Dysc., it has 
been said that he speaks with "stilted formality," and that his language 
"always tends to stiffness."27 Additionally, Demodocus' complaint about 
the anxieties which a husbandman must always feel is a commonplace in 
the mouths of farmers in Greek literature.28 Finally, the dramatic circum­
stances of Thg. also lay emphasis on Demodocus' position as a rustic, in 
so far as they imply the familiar contrast of city and country, and dictate, in 
part, what will be Demodocus' attitude regarding novel and unfamiliar 
trends; and it does emerge that he is suspicious of the sophists, who have 
so animated his son's mind (see lntr. ch. I, b, i).
There are, therefore, sound reasons for believing that our author has 
taken some care to depict Demodocus along lines which could be recog­
nized by contemporary readers as fairly typically rustic. This does not im­
ply, however, that the portrayal of him here is also unsympathetic. Demo­
docus' keen interest in Theages’ future, as well as the trepidation he twice 
expresses that his son may be corrupted (122a5, 127c2), are evidence of 
our author's attitude towards him. So also is the priority over financial
26See the interesting observations of A.G. Katsouris, Linguistic and Stylistic Character­
ization: Tragedy and Menander (loannina, 1975), esp. 104, 117-8, 132ff.; to the examples 
cited there add Plaut. Most. 72-3; Demea in Ter. Ad., e.g. 855ff.; the oruToupyos in E. El. 
80-1 (see Denniston's n. ad loc.); cf. also Hor. Sat. 11.2.1-4.
27See E.W. Handley in Entretiens Hardt 16 (1970) 137; Gomme-Sandbach ad Dysc. 272. 
As an (admittedly subjective) point of observation, a parallel to Demodocus' verbal style in 
the first half of his monologue is the stiffly pedantic comparison which Eryximachus draws 
(Smp. 186a2ff.) between the opposites good-bad epcos and polar opposites in science 
and medicine.
28Cf., e.g., Men. Dysc. 604ff., and see lntr. ch. I n.14.
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considerations which Demodocus gives to his son's welfare (see comm, ad 
121d6-122a1), and his reluctance to entrust his son to anyone at all (see 
comm, ad 127c1 -2). If anything, Demodocus is, to judge by Theages’ treat­
ment of him, perhaps too indulgent.29 Furthermore, though Demodocus' 
frame of mind might be characterized by the term orrou8rj (see Intr. ch. I, 
b), he does show himself well aware of Socrates' irony when the latter is in 
the process of forcing Theages to realize the complexity of his desire, and, 
to judge by Demodocus' own words (125b1 -2), he approves of Socrates' 
behaviour (see Intr. ch. I, b, iv). But, above all, the one feature about Dem­
odocus that cannot be questioned is his sincerity. He is, surely, more than 
just a "type."
We know little about Demodocus as an historical figure. He is 
mentioned in one other passage in Plato, Ap. 33e7, as the father of Thea­
ges and Paralios 30 Apart from his occupation and home (the deme Ana- 
gyrous, 127e3), we learn in Thg. that he was older than Socrates (127e1), 
i.e., older than 60 years of age at the dramatic date of the dialogue (409, 
see Intr. ch. V, appendix), that he had held many important offices in 
Athens, and that he received high honours from his demesmen (127e2ff.). 
It seems probable that our Demodocus is the Athenian general who, in the 
summer of 424, was in command, along with a certain Aristides, of oi 
apyupoXoyoi vqes around the Hellespont, and organized the recapture 
of Antandros after it had been taken by the Mytilinaean exiles (cf. Thue. 
4.75.1).31 It has also been judged likely that the AHM0A0K0Z ANA"
29So Steinhart 465.
30The pseudo-Platonic Demodocus may well be named after the Demodocus of our dia­
logue (see further Intr. ch. V n.3); there he is addressed only once and does not speak.
31 See Gomme ac/Thue. 4.75.1; Souilhd ad Thg. 127e; Robin 1643. Gomme’s statement 
that in 424 Demodocus, if the same as the character in this dialogue, was nearly 60, is a 
mere slip. All we know is that he was older than Socrates, who was about 45 in 424.
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rYPASIOZ named in an Attic inscription (not the one cited in sec. b[fin.]) 
is to be identified with the character in this dialogue.32
32See Kirchner, op. cit. 230 (§ 3464).
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IV, Authenticity
Discussion of the authenticity of Thg. has been postponed until all 
the larger issues pertinent to a final decision on this question were con­
fronted. Accordingly, in each of the three preceding chapters material 
which was considered to be important for a fair critical assessment of the 
authorship of this work has been introduced, and even though in the 
course of these investigations I have tried to put aside explicit argumen­
tation about authenticity in order to evaluate Thg. on its own terms, system­
atic comparisons with the evidence furnished from other Platonic works 
has made some preliminary judgements inevitable (this is especially the 
case for our author's treatment of the divine sign). Moreover, although the 
commentary does not assume a polemical position as regards authenticity, 
some of the data presented there bear directly upon the present examin­
ation. It will therefore be understood that much of what follows takes the 
form of a summary and application of findings made in previous chapters.
a. Some ancient and modern opinions
The authenticity of Thg. was never questioned in antiquity; wherever 
an actual reference is made by an ancient critic to the author of Thg., that 
author is without exception Plato. The claim has been made now and then 
that Plutarch, who is the only individual reported to have written a com­
mentary on Thg., regarded the dialogue as spurious, or that its authenticity 
was in general a subject of some debate, but such arguments are based 
on tenuous evidence and fail to stand up to closer scrutiny (see Appendix
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1).1 Thg. was accepted into the canon of Platonic writings certainly by 35 
A.D., and in all likelihood considerably earlier (see lntr. ch. V, a). Albinus 
(second-century A.D.) even reports (Eisag. 4; cf. D.L. 3.62) that Thg. was 
the first dialogue to be read by some students of Plato. In late antiquity 
Stobaeus (fifth-century) quotes from Thg. and attributes it to Plato without 
hesitation, as does the grammarian Priscian (sixth-century) in a direct 
quotation from the dialogue. Proclus (410-85), who was critical enough to 
reject the Platonic authorship of Epin.,2 speaks of "Socrates in the The­
ages" without explicit mention of Plato, but since this is followed at once by 
"and again in the Phaedrus" (similarly in the preceding sentence, "in the 
Theages and the Phaedrus"), we may confidently surmise that he attributed 
both works to the same author.3 Although my information is far from com­
plete for the Renaissance, there seems to have been no question about the 
genuineness of Thg. in this period: in the fifteenth-century Ficino attributed 
the work to Plato;4 in the sixteenth-century Thg. is ascribed to Plato by 
Jean de Serres (Serranus), in his introduction to Stephanus' edition of the 
dialogue (1.119-20), and both he and Francesco Patrizzi included it in their 
own peculiar arrangements of the Platonic Corpus.5 We need have no
1Theopompus asserted (FGrHist 115 F.259) that most of Plato's dialogues had been 
borrowed from Aristippus, Antisthenes, and Bryso; but we do not know which dialogues 
Theopompus was thinking of, and at any rate his comments can be disregarded as the 
product of an exceedingly caustic witness.
2For a detailed consideration of his arguments, see L. Tar^n, Academica: Plato, Philip of 
Opus, and the pseudo-Platonic Epinomis (Philadelphia, 1975) 8-13.
3For the references in this and the preceding sentence, see the testimonia on the text ad 
121b1-c5, 127d3-7, and 128d3.
4Cf. Comm, in Conv. Plat. 7.2: "Fuit enim tanta prudentia, et in praesagiendo tarn perspicax, 
ut quisquis contra eius consilium quicquam auderet, perderetur, quod in Theage a Platone 
narratur."
5Serranus put it between Phd. and Amat., while Patrizzi (F. Patritii Nova de universis philo- 
sophia libris quinquaginta comprehensa [Venetiis, 1593] 44ff.) placed it after Clit. and 
before Crat.
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doubt that in this period scholars were merely following the testimony 
which they had received from ancient authorities.
It was, apparently, not until the nineteenth century that the authen­
ticity of Thg. came to be questioned. The first critics to doubt the authorship 
of Thg. were, as far as I can ascertain, Heindorf in his 1802 edition of Lys. 
and Boeckh in 18066. Since that time the verdict has been nearly unan­
imous: Thg. cannot have been written by Plato.7 Against an army of 
doubters relatively few have ventured to make a stand. Socher, Knebel, 
and a little later Hollenberg, by asserting the authenticity of Thg., were all 
reacting to what had become a dogma by the 1820’s. Grote also upheld 
the claim for Platonic authorship, but he in any event defended the integrity 
of the Platonic Corpus as a whole; and in France, Waddington added him­
self to the list of supporters of Platonic authorship. The dialogue has not 
fared much better in the twentieth century. Friedlander put forward an elo­
quent, if somewhat tentative, argument for authenticity. H. Gomperz sought 
to emphasize the Platonic qualities of the dialogue, especially as regards 
the author's depiction of Socrates. O. Wichmann has attributed Thg. to 
Plato, although he does the same for Min., Ale. Il, lust., and V7/t, all of which 
have few, if any, modern supporters. The defence of the dialogue's 
authenticity in recent years by Fischer, Strauss, and Pangle (who has 
reverted to Grote's position in accepting all dialogues in the Corpus) can 
also be mentioned. Amongst this rather small group may also be counted 
H. Muller and K. Steinhardt (455-8), who in 1857 put forward the hypo-
6L.F. Heindorf, Dialogi quator (Berlin, 1802), ad Lys. 204b8-c2; A. Boeckh, In Platonis qui 
vulgo fertur Minoem eiusdem libros priores de legibus (Halis Saxonum, 1806) 33.
7lt would be pointless to attempt to rehearse the names of all who have rejected Platonic 
authorship. For convenient and selective lists of this kind, see Fritzsche 227; Pavlu 14-5; 
Souilhe 137 n.5. The following references are to the bibliography entries under the 
authors' last names.
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thesis that 128d7-130e4 was composed by Plato, while the remainder of 
the dialogue was completed by another hand.8
Obviously the problem before us cannot be settled by a head-count 
of those who stand on the pro and contra sides of the issue. Nor can the 
silence of ancient writers on the question of spuriousness be accepted as 
evidence one way or the other. It is demonstrable that even some of the 
Platonic Spuria, which were generally reckoned as inauthentic even by 
ancient critics, were occasionally attributed to Plato.9 On the other hand, a 
number of the arguments of modern critics, both for and against authen­
ticity, must be freshly examined. Not all of these are equally cogent (a 
number have been dealt with in the commentary); but taken together they 
constitute the inherited framework by which Thg. is, for the most part, 
considered to be spurious.
b. Linguistic evidence and style
A number of peculiarities of language, considered un-Platonic or 
late, have been cited in the past to "prove" spuriousness. I have dealt with 
these piecemeal in the commentary, and it can be concluded that they are 
of very limited value for our present purposes (see comm, ad 121a1 
iSioXoyfjcjao'Oai, 121b6 |3i(B, 121d1 8okco yap poi, 123b2 KaTeirre, 
124b1 TTpiCovTCOV, 128b5 Troioflpiai, 129d7 opou ti, 131a6 ox al­
ert). A few features even tell positively against a late date, and some are 
highly Platonic. Thus aXXa (Kai).. .ye (130b8) is virtually absent 
from Hellenistic Greek, but very common in Plato; postponed Spa (124c2)
8See further above, Intr. ch. I, a. Valentin Rose, it may be noted, wavered as to the 
authenticity of Thg. (De Aristotelis librorum ordine et auctoritate 25), and so, to ail appear­
ances, did Guthrie (HGP III. 399ff., V. 392-4).
9See Taran, op. cit. 7 n.23.
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is encountered a good deal more frequently in Plato than in all other prose 
authors; the first person plural pro singular (TTpoaccyopeucopLev 122d7) 
seems to be a trait of the Platonic Socrates; Kai pevToi Kai (127b5) 
appears more often in Plato than in other authors, who tend to use Kai 
pevToi; Travu tis (121a2) in its particular use in this dialogue can be 
paralleled, in classical Greek, only from Plato (see comm, ad locc.). There 
are a great number of other features of language and turns of phrase in 
Thg. which can be compared closely with passages elsewhere in genuine 
Plato. These have been listed in the commentary as they occur, and need 
not be enumerated here. Of course, some less distinctive features may be 
pointed out in addition which cannot be paralleled precisely with examples 
from the remainder of the Platonic Corpus, but these hardly constitute evi­
dence for inauthenticity; see, e.g., comm. ad123b7 Tiva.. .elvai; 130 
e1-2 ttoXtj. .. TrXeiaTOv.10 I might add that there are no exaggerations 
of recognizably typical Platonic usages, as may perhaps be expected in a 
deliberate forgery.11
In sum it must be concluded that no objections can be brought 
against Thg. on syntactical or grammatical grounds, or on grounds of in­
authentic vocabulary. To invoke arguments claiming that Thg. here and 
there deviates from ’'normal" Platonic usage is in any event a highly arti­
ficial way of approaching the question of inauthenticity. Plato frequently
10Kruger (12) rightly sounds a warning against condemning words and phrases which are 
not found in Plato, but nevertheless do occur elsewhere in fifth and fourth century 
literature; see also Thesleff, Platonic Chronology 73.
11 See R. Syme, "Fraud and Imposture" in Entretiens Hardt 18: Pseudepigrapha I 
(Vandoeuvres-Gendve, 1972) 10. A prominent example of such exaggeration in a probable 
literary imitation is the repetitious Kai pev Srj in the speech of "Lysias" in Phdr. (230e6- 
234c5); see R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge, 1952) 17; K.J. Dover, Lysias and 
the Corpus Lysiacum (Berkeley, 1968) 69-71; see also G.E. Dimock Jr., AJP 73 (1952) 381­
96, on Plato's apparent caricature of Lysias' characteristic uses of d\Xa in the same 
speech.
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indulges in solecisms, employs hapax legomena,12 and uses technical 
language which does not become conventional until much later.13 It is ob­
vious that Plato’s prose developed continuously and never became static; 
there is no single Platonic style. Moreover, some caution must be exer­
cised before trust is placed in the more objective criteria of the so-called 
unconscious formulae of language and features of style, the study of which 
was initiated and promoted by Campbell, Dittenberger, Lutoslawski, and 
Ritter.14 For one thing, Thg. is a relatively short work (slightly over ten 
Stephanus pages), and it thus does not furnish as useful a subject for 
statistical study as a longer work should. Secondly, Thg. is a polymor­
phous composition: it contains both dialogue and extended narrative 
portions. Any statistical count based on ratios and percentages must take 
this into consideration. The presence of lengthy narrative portions in Thg. 
also further decreases the extent to which one can measure such things as 
response formulae in the correspondingly reduced dialogue segments.15
All the same, cumulative evidence from statistical study should be 
brought to bear on the question of style and its relation to the problem of 
authenticity. Accordingly, I have carried out several tests in order to 
observe any possible tendencies in the use of answer formulae, clausulae, 
etc. But since the precise value of such statistical evidence cannot yet be 
judged as established, I have limited its importance to this study by rele­
gating the material to an appendix at the end of this chapter.
12See A. Fossum, AJP 52 (1931) 205-31.
13See R. Janko, Aristotle on Comedy (London, 1984) 78.
1 References for this sentence :Sop/?/stes and Politicos (Oxford, 1867) xxivff.; Hermes 16 
(1881) 321ff.; The Origin and Growth of Plato’s Logic (London, 1897) 64-193; Unter- 
suchungen fiber Platon (Stuttgart, 1888).
15The measurement of response formulae is not nearly as accurate a method for deter­
mining date of composition, or authenticity, or both, as has been imagined; see the im­
portant arguments of K. Vretska, WS71 (1958) 30-45.
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Decisions about the overall style of Thg. cannot be reduced to 
numerical figures, and are of necessity founded on rather more subjective 
judgements and impressions, but a statement must nevertheless be made. 
Simply put, the style of Thg. has most in common with the dialogues of 
Plato's early period.16 There is a noticeable absence from Thg. of what, 
since Campbell,17 have been considered markers of Plato's "late style.” 
Most prominent among such stylistic traits are the employment of con­
voluted and artificial word order and a marked avoidance of hiatus. The 
only evidence in Thg. of anything approaching a tortured order of words 
occurs in 128b4-6 (see comm, ad loc.), but even this is by no means a 
remarkable example. Periphrastic verb constructions (which can them­
selves contribute to a strained word order) have also been judged to be 
largely a late feature of Platonic style, and two examples of this occur in 
Thg. (123a9 and 128d2); the periphrastic nominal construction to Trepi + 
gen./acc. as subject of a sentence (121 c1) also has strong affinities with 
late style. This evidence can hardly overcome the general impression of 
early Platonic mannerisms. As well, hiatus is admitted freely in Thg. (see 
Appendix below); and on two occasions hiatus is caused by a mild dis­
ruption of normal word order (121c2 eyd), 124c2 apot; cf. also 128c6 
touto ccttiv), even though such deviation from regular word order in 
Plato's mature works is frequently caused by a desire rather to avoid hia­
tus, as even a selective reading can show.18 Further, certain linguistic 
items that are without doubt peculiar to Plato’s late style, such as the in­
creasing use of KaOaTrep for eoaTrep, of SflXov ens for 8f)Xov otl, and
16This has been the judgement of most scholars (including those who athetize the work), 
e.g. Ritter op. cit. 94; Pavlu 28; Friedlander 154; Vouveris 116.
17See Campbell, op. cit. xxxivff.; also Thesieff, Studies 77-88 ("onkos” style).
18See Burnet, Platonism (Berkeley, 1928) 55; Cherniss, AJP 78 (1957) 232 and n.21.
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of tl (jltjv; ("of course"),19 are not to be found in Thg., though they could 
easily have appeared (cf. cocriTep 123b1, 125c1, 125e2, 126a7, a9, 
SfjXov otl 126 b7). Such as it is, statistical analysis tends to corroborate 
this impression of an early Platonic style (see Appendix at the end of this 
chapter).
If the style of Thg. is to be characterized by any label, it must be said 
that its language is markedly colloquial (with occasional admixtures of 
rhetorical elements); an attempt has been made in the commentary to 
quantify this general observation. It is my own personal impression that the 
style of Thg. is as pervasively colloquial as any early work of Plato’s; this 
applies not merely to any specific segment of Thg., but to the dialogue as a 
whole, extended narrative portions as well as question and answer 
sections. Speaking subjectively again, I can see no similarity between the 
style of Thg. and, for instance, that of Phlb., Ti., or Lg.
c. Compositional techniques
If therefore one were to base a judgement of authenticity solely on 
the criteria of language and style, it would have to be said that this work, 
transmitted as it is among Plato's genuine dialogues, is probably Plato's, 
and, on that assumption, that it must also in all probability be an early 
composition. The discussion of the structure of Thg. has also shown that 
there is nothing in the way the dialogue is contructed per se for which Plato 
could not have been responsible, and that, though the dialogue is not 
identical to the general pattern of works often associated with Plato's 
"Socratic" period, it nevertheless does share a number of similarities with 
his early works (see esp. lntr. ch I, b, v). A few other factors, such as the
19See W. Lutoslawski op. cit. 103-104 (after Dittenberger), 123 (after Ritter).
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use of dramatic scenery (see comm. ac/121a4), the establishment of a 
dramatic date, and characterization, would tend to reinforce this con­
clusion. But the situation is not as simple as this, for presumably an imi­
tator would attempt to mode, his composition on the style and techniques of 
Plato.
In fact, the evidence of language and style is one of the greatest 
obstacles against judging Thg. to be an authentic work. The reason for this 
is simple: while the materia, brought forward in the previous section 
indicates that Thg. has much in common with Plato’s early period, an ex­
amination of sources proves that Thg. actually draws upon some later 
works. Of these Tht., which can be dated on interna, evidence to 369 or 
shortly after, is the latest. Even if we leave out of account for the moment a 
more accurate date of composition for Thg., this use of Tht. provides ample 
evidence for a serious inconsistency between the language and style of 
Thg. and the date at which it must have been written (certainly after 369). 
The style and techniques of composition of this work are not those of Plato 
in a later period of activity, the earliest time at which Thg. could possibly 
have been written.20
The evidence of sources may be considered a little further. In other 
chapters (I, b, iii, v, vii', c; II, c) it has been put that Ala I probably supplied 
materia, for the author of Thg., or that the two dialogues, at the very least,
20One further argument that at first glance might seem relevant to the question at hand is 
that the relatively short length of Thg. can be closely paralleled only among early works, i.e., 
Cri., Euthphr., Ion, Menex., Hp. mi. But, although the dialogues generally agreed to be late 
are mostly works of some considerable size, there is no reason why Plato in his mature years 
could not have composed a treatise of the length of Thg., if he had a specific purpose for 
doing so. To assert the contrary begs too many questions, not the least of which concerns 
the present state of research on the chronology of Plato's works. C.W. Muller (Die Kurz­
dialoge 32-44) attempted to show that dialogue length was used in antiquity to decide the 
authenticity of a work; according to him (43-4), an early editor's decision to place the Spuria 
at the end of the nine tetralogies as an appendix was motivated by a desire to show that 
such short works were un-Platonic qua short. For a response to his arguments see the 
review of S.R. Slings, Mnem. 4.31 (1978) 211-14.
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share some important conceptual traits. In view of this, and on the assump­
tion that the date commonly given for Ale. I is correct (345-335), a decision 
about the authenticity of Thg. is apparently at hand, as it is unlikely to have 
been written within Plato’s own lifetime. But as some readers may not be 
satisfied either with inferences about the date of Ale. Z, or, perhaps, with the 
assumptions about the author's use of it in composing this dialogue, I shall 
set it aside for the moment in our attempt to settle the question of the 
authenticity of Thg. A final decision need not rest on this piece of evidence 
(see Intr. ch. V, g).
Still, in another respect the use of sources in Thg. provides impor­
tant material for determining authenticity. Although it is an oversimplifi­
cation to call Thg. a pastiche (see Intr. ch. I, a), nevertheless there is some 
justification in so regarding it: the author has patently drawn upon a wide 
variety of Socratic, and mostly Platonic, works, in the composition of this 
dialogue. Further, allusions to other works are in some cases made using 
almost the ipsissima verba of the original passage. On numerous other 
occasions there is at least the appearance that the author has a Platonic 
passage in mind (see Intr. ch. I, b, i-vir, II,d). This does not represent Plato’s 
regular practice; for while he does occasionally refer implicitly to another of 
his own works,21 or very infrequently even seems consciously to repeat the 
wording of a passage from an earlier dialogue,22 it is not his habit to draw 
so frequently and so transparently upon other works, as he does in Thg.23 
Whether Plato makes extensive and obvious use of the works of his con­
temporaries is impossible for us to determine, since most of this literature is 
no longer extant. But we can safely claim that he is not a composer of
21 See Zeller 11.15 426 n.4, 444-5.
22E.g. Ap. 22C1-3 ~ Men. 99c2-5; Ap. 19e4-20a1 ~ Prt. 316c5-d1.
23See Fritzsche 229-30; Vouveris 116.
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centos, and never among his indisputably genuine works are so many 
patent allusions to his own compositions gathered together in one place. 
Plato does not compose dialogues in this manner elsewhere, and I fail to 
see what special motive would have prompted him to do so here. The 
manner of composition of Thg. in this respect thus constitutes a significant 
aberration.
A word about the dramatic qualities of Thg., especially as this con­
cerns character delineation, may be in order. The earlier chapter on 
characterization (lntr. ch. Ill) has shown, I believe, not only that the author 
made a determined effort to portray his characters in a vivid manner, but 
also that he largely succeeded in this. Moreover, for the most part this 
characterization exhibits nothing on which a critic could readily fasten a 
label of "un-Platonic." But in his portrayal of Socrates in 128d1-130e4 the 
author goes astray. Suffice to say here that Socrates' change of tone in 
this section of the dialogue, though it is motivated by the author’s desire to 
make the theme of his work more pointed, essentially removes from Socra­
tes the traits which in the preceding pages allow us to compare him favour­
ably with the homonymous character in some early Platonic dialogues. 
Indeed, the Socrates of the later part of the dialogue shares some im­
portant characteristics with the Socrates of Aeschines Socraticus (see lntr. 
ch. I, b, vii', c[with nn.72-3]; ch. Ill, a nn.9-10). As well, the qualities which 
had made Thg. dramatically effective up to this point, such as conflict and 
irony, are virtually done away with.24 However, since this evidence is not
24C.W. Muller (135-9) is more fully aware of the dramatic elements in Thg. than most 
scholars are, but I cannot agree with him when he says that the dramatic quality of the dia­
logue breaks down after 127a8-10. This does not happen until the outset of the divine sign 
section.
177
decisive as far as a final evaluation of the divine sign section itself is 
concerned, it must be assigned the status of cumulative evidence.
d. Socrates' divine sign
The representation of Socrates’ divine sign in Thg. has predictably 
aroused the greatest objections against the authenticity of this dialogue. 
As this subject has been dealt with in detail above (Intr. ch. II), I shall be 
relatively brief in summarizing those findings which are directly concerned 
with the question of authenticity.
Socrates dwells on the divine sign at far greater length here than he 
does anywhere else in the Corpus. This in itself might be explained as the 
one exceptional instance where Plato decided to abandon his usual com­
parative reticence on the subject in favour of elaboration. But the manner 
of exposition is suspicious, in as much as Socrates sets forth personal 
information through a series of anecdotes, a form of popular biography not 
completely eschewed by Plato, but one which he uses with moderation 
(see Intr. ch. Ill, a). These anecdotes also appear to be mostly derivative 
as far as literary qualities are concerned, i.e., they emanate from certain 
hints dropped in the actual Platonic references to the divine sign, from 
other features in various dialogues, and possibly from contemporary dis­
cussions about historical figures (see Intr. ch. I, b, vir, comm, ad 128d1-130 
e10, 128d8-129c8, 128d8-129a1). Moreover, Socrates speaks about him­
self with greater assertiveness than is customary for him, and certainly than 
is the case elsewhere when he is on the subject of his divine sign (see Intr. 
ch. Ill, a). This, again, might not be considered decisive, but more dis­
turbing is the nature of the sign as it is described in this dialogue.
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One of the main findings of the earlier examination of Socrates' 
divine sign was that the author of Thg. implicitly took the position that to 
8ocl|jlovlov was not to be distinguished clearly from a 8ct£p.a)v, and 
though he preserved for the most part the language that Plato applies to 
the divine sign, his description, even in some of the smallest details, 
reflects in great measure an essentially popular view. This attitude extends 
also to the ascribing of functions which can be characterized as more 
obviously oracular than any which occurred in the rest of the Corpus. Thus 
in the hands of this author to SocipLoviov emerges as a phenomenon 
which can be located within a traditional religious framework. The survey 
which dealt with Platonic descriptions of the sign (Intr. ch. II, a) also demon­
strated that Plato strove as far as he could to emancipate to 8ocl|j.6viov 
from anything which might lead a reader to identify Socrates' sign as a 
component within a commonplace pattern of belief. In this respect there­
fore the two representations, that of Plato’s indisputably genuine works and 
that of Thg., conflict with one another. This contradiction I take to be an im­
portant piece of evidence against the authenticity of Thg., for the dialogue 
departs from the Platonic account even with regard to the details to which 
Plato was very careful always to limit the divine sign, such as the sign’s 
purely negative aspect. In the face of this evidence we should be forced, in 
order to accomodate Thg. into the Corpus, to manufacture a theory such as 
Friediander’s (328 n.14), to the effect that Plato’s descriptions of the divine 
sign developed from that of Thg. and are, essentially, refined portraits of to 
8ocl(jloviov. Notwithstanding the rather arbitrary nature of such an hypo­
thesis, the discussion in section c above on the compositional techniques 
of this dialogue drew attention to the fact that Thg. must, on account of its 
use of sources, be later than 369. Consequently there can be no question
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of a development of the Platonic divine sign from that which is presented in 
this dialogue. Moreover, in a number of respects the divine sign in Thg. 
has much more in common with later versions of the sign than it does with 
the Platonic account, a fact which must also cast grave suspicion on 
Friedlander's genetic approach. In short, the discussion in ch. II should 
have demonstrated that the divine sign in Thg. is described in a manner 
that is mostly un-Platonic, so far, that is, as we can discern what Plato's 
intentions were in his depiction of to SaijjLoviov. The author of Thg., 
through his depiction of the divine sign, demonstrates that he did not 
understand the full implications and subtleties of the picture which Plato 
drew, and drew quite consistently.
The most unusual departure in the author's representation of to 
Saipovtov in Thg., and one that is no less crucial to a verdict of spurious­
ness than are the considerations mentioned above, is his virtual identific­
ation of epees' with Socrates' divine sign. It would make nonsense of a 
good deal in Plato to argue that Plato himself ever countenanced such an 
identification. And the fact that this "enhancement" of the divine sign can 
only be paralleled, among early (i.e. not middle-Platonic or Neoplatonic) 
treatises, in a work (Ale. I) that is usually athetized for reasons other than 
its portrait of the sign, does not inspire confidence in the Platonic author­
ship of Thg., nor does the possibility that the identification originated in a 
misapprehension of the context in which the divine sign occurs in Phdr. It 
may be granted that some Platonic traits are evident in the report which is 
intended to reveal the effects of the power of to Satpoviov on Aristides, 
but these are superficial, and show little appreciation for the philosophical 
background of the accounts on which the author has drawn (see lntr. ch. I, 
b, vii; ch. II, d). Worse than this, Aristides' report shows an obscurity of
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thought and intention on the author’s part: the reader is doubtless 
bewildered into asking how literally or seriously the story is to be taken.25 
It may rightly be asked if Plato would have lost sight of his reader in this 
way, and indeed, comparison with related passages in Ion and Phdr. does 
not cast a favourable light on the author’s performance in this respect. It 
must also be added that the author's apparent shift from the hint of a 
Platonic view of epcos as a rational impulse in 128b1ff. to what I have 
styled as an Aeschinean concept of epcns which improves not but
OeiQC (jloCpQC (see Intr. ch. I, b, vii) is hardly what we would expect if this 
work were written by Plato.
But the most decisive argument against authenticity, in my opinion, 
is the author's misunderstanding of the paieuTiKrj passage to which he 
was so obviously looking when he composed 129e1ff. Strictly speaking, 
we might disregard the criticism which maintains that Thg. is proved 
spurious merely by the reminiscence in it of this passage of Tht. (although, 
as I argued above [sec.c], a collection in one place of several such remin­
iscences is another matter). But what cannot be similarly disregarded is 
the fact that the author has allowed two concepts, to SaLpovLov and 6 
Beds, which are, in Plato, very different phenomena, to be merged into a 
single entity. What is more, it is just this confusion of terms and concepts 
that seems to have caused the subsequent extension of the divine sign into 
its becoming an accomplice in the progress of Socrates' companions. 
Thus, while the fact that the description of the divine sign in Thg. is different 
from that of any other Platonic work may, even in the face of cumulative evi-
25A review of the modern critical literature demonstrates that one may speak with some 
confidence about the reactions of "the reader," in as much as this part of the dialogue has 
been one of the greatest causes of disagreement about the meaning and authenticity of 
Thg.
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dence, leave some room for doubt as to the spuriousness of the dialogue, 
the serious misunderstanding of Plato which the author shows in the divine 
sign section puts the judgement that Thg. was not written by Plato beyond 
any real doubt.
Finally, although the use of Tht. does not in itself give sufficient 
grounds for condemning Thg. as spurious, it is the particularly curious slant 
which the author of Thg. gives to the profession of ignorance in Tht. that 
marks out the correspondence in the passages as un-Platonic. In Tht. 
Socrates' profession of ignorance is very closely related to p.aie'UTiKrj 
and dialectic. In Thg. Socrates' ignorance (Aristides' claims to have 
learned nothing from Socrates) has nothing to do with pmeuTiKT), in fact it 
has nothing to do with dialectic. Instead, it is the product of his reliance on 
chance, resulting from his inability to control the intervention of to 8ocl~ 
ITovlov. It is difficult to imagine a Socrates in Plato whose ignorance im­
plies nothing about his use of dialectic, about the significance of self­
knowledge, or, at least in middle and later works, about anamnesis and the 
transcendence of forms.
e. Application of the evidence
Modern scholarship has been almost as unanimous in condemning 
Thg. as spurious as ancient critics were in accepting it as the work of Plato. 
This modern verdict, which became firmly rooted in the early years of the 
nineteenth-century, and quickly established itself as a dogma within 
modern scholarship, is partly to blame for the cursory way in which the dia­
logue has, with few exceptions, been examined, and for the frequent un­
critical repetition of the main arguments that began with Boeckh, Schleier-
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macher, and Ast.26 But a great many of these arguments are not valid, and 
they are numerous enough that it has seemed best, for the most part, to 
deal with them separately in the commentary. Most are in the order of ob­
jections to specific items of language and style, but, in this respect, there is 
little or nothing in Thg. that could be reckoned as distinctly un-Platonic. All 
the same, early Platonic style, combined with the use of later Platonic dia­
logues, represents a conflict of evidence which is difficult to account for, 
except by recourse to the argument against Platonic authorship. Neverthe­
less, as Plato was obviously able to move easily from one style to another 
(witness Phdr.), this line of reasoning, though highly suggestive, is not in 
itself final. It is however strengthened by the author's near verbatim refer­
ences to Ap. and Tht., as well as by some less easily discernible, but highly 
likely, uses of other dialogues.
To this point, then, the evidence that the author of Thg. is not Plato 
could not be considered overwhelming, but it is quite strong. The issue 
must be decided by the divine sign section of the dialogue; and the verdict 
imposed by a consideration of this part of the dialogue is that Plato could 
not have written Thg. For while we might well argue that a departure in 
one dialogue from Plato's treatments of a certain topic in other dialogues 
does not imply that a work is the product of a different hand altogether, the 
misunderstandings of Plato that are demonstrated from an examination of 
this part of Thg. can mean nothing other than that the author is not Plato 
himself. Thus, on the basis of both cumulative evidence and a consider­
ation of specific points, the conclusion must be that Plato did not compose 
Thg.
26pOr some useful observations on the way in which scholarly orthodoxy tends to 
perpetuate uncritical bias in dealing with the Dubia and Spuria of the Platonic Corpus, see 
C.W. Muller, Die Kurzdialoge 9-12.
183
But if not Plato, then who? It would be truly rash to put forward any 
names in answer to this question, although the explicit assignment of the 
work to an historical figure has indeed been attempted (see Intr. ch. V, d). It 
seems better to inquire what the dialogue may tell us about the author. In 
the first place, it is hard to believe that he was an original philosopher, nor 
does his understanding of Plato seem to go very deep. Although he is 
writing with knowledge of at least some of Plato’s later works (I argue in the 
next chapter that Thg. was probably composed after Plato’s death), his 
interests and inclinations seem to be with earlier dialogues, and appear to 
be largely at a literary level. We may also infer that he was a member of 
the Academy, for it would otherwise be difficult to account for the dialogue's 
presence in the Corpus Platonicum.-,27 and we might say that, in his 
elaboration of the divine sign, he was following the common Academic 
pursuit of enlarging on concepts about which Plato had said little or had 
only dropped tantalizing hints. Moreover, that he seems to have been 
aware of and used Aeschines Socraticus is not unusual, since Plato him­
self probably did the same, and Aeschines, having been close to Socrates 
in his own right (cf. Phd. 59b8), was at any rate an excellent authority for a 
writer of ZcnKpocTKoi Xoyoi. But it seems inappropriate and possibly 
anachronistic to apply the title of "forger" or "falsarius" to this author, since 
we cannot know if it was ever his intention to pass the work off as Plato’s 
own (as it certainly was the intention of the writers of the Platonic ep­
istles).28 That a person such as the author of Thg. should have been a 
member of the Academy ought not to occasion any wonder. The evidence
27See Souilhe, Platon, Oeuvres Completes 13.2 (Paris, 1930) ix-x; Taylor, ™w6521-2; 
Vouveris 122; G.C. Field 49-50; C.W. Muller, Die Kurzdialoge 19-27; I.M. Crombie, An 
Examination of Plato's Doctrines I (London, 1962) 9.
28See C.W. Muller, Die Kurzdialoge 12-21; Thesleff, Platonic Chronology 91.
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which we now possess suggests that the Old Academy must have been 
very heterogeneous in its membership;29 and that all were not thinkers of 
the first rank is made amply clear by a reading of some of the other dia­
logues among the nine tetralogies which are generally conceded to be in­
authentic (e.g. Ale. II, Amat., Hipparch., Min.). Some interest in prophecy at 
a popular level, such as is evidenced in Thg., may even be inferred from 
the mention of a (j.ocvtls as one of Plato’s pupils.30 Otherwise, nothing 
can safely be said about the identity of the author of T/?p.31 But where the 
dialogue itself may have fit within the interests of the early Academy is 
discussed in the following chapter (sec. b), and some suggestions about its 
intentions have already been made (Intr. ch. I, c).
Appendix: Some Stylistic Tests and Data
Hiatus - average of 40 incidences per Stephanus page, ranging from 
21 to 54 (disregarding instances involving the spiritus asper, and hiatus 
which occurs across any point of punctuation). These statistics prove only 
that the author made no effort whatsoever to avoid hiatus. If the author 
were Plato, this would only mean that the dialogue antedates Sph., since 
that is the first work in which Plato, following the example of Isocrates, 
began to eliminate hiatus.32
29See Field 35-45; Guthrie, HGP IV. 21ff.; Friedlander 1.91; Zeller II.15 982 n.1 for a 
catalogue of individuals known to have belonged to the Academy in Plato’s own lifetime.
30Cf. Plu. Dio 22 (Miltas); but see also Intr. ch. V, b.
°1 Attempts to identify the author of Thg. with an author of other Platonic Spuria seem 
destined to remain highly speculative.
32See Blass, Die Attische Beredsamkeit II2 (Leipzig, 1892) 458ff.; and for the conclusions 
drawn here see Cherniss, op. cit. 230-33.
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Answer formulae and language statistics 33
- ratio of affirmative answers in vat, Trai/u ye, ttccvu ow to
all affirmative answers (Lut. 137, §448): 14/35 = 40%. Von Arnim found
that the ratio for this test in R, Phdr., Tht., Prm., Sph., Pit., Phlb., and Lg., is 
less than one third; in earlier dialogues the ratio is over one-third, and over 
one-half in Men., Euthd., Grg., Crat.
- ratio of interrogatives used as affirmative answers to ail interrog- 
atives (Lut 137, §451): 3/i00 = 3%. The ratio for this test (von Arnim) 
comes to less than 5% only in Chrm., Men., Euthd., Crat.; between 5% and 
10% only in La., Grg., Phd.; 10% to 20% in Euthphr., Cri., R., Tht., Prm.; 
over 20% in Phdr., Sph., Pit., Phlb., Lg.
- ratio of personal pronoun answers (e.g. eycoye, qj.oiye, 8ok€l 
(jioi, ejJLOL yow Sokol vel. sim.) to all answers (Lut. 122, §318): 10/58 = 
17.24%. This test of Ritter's furnished results showing an extremely low 
ratio in Phdr., Prm., Sph., Pit., Phlb., Ti., Crit., Lg. (less than once in sixty 
answers). But the incidence is much higher in earlier dialogues: once in 
five answers in Euthphr. and Men., once in six in La., Euthd., Grg., once in 
seven to ten in Ap., Cri., Chrm., Crat., Tht., once in sixteen to eighteen in 
Prt., Phd., R.
- ratio of interrogatives in Spec to all simple interrogatives (Lut. 128, 
§378): 8/ioo = 8%. Less than 15% in Chrm., La., Lys., Euthphr., Cri., 
Euthd., Grg., Men.; 15%-23% in Prt., Crat., Phd., R., Phdr., Tht.; over 24% 
only in Prm., Sph., Pit., Phlb., Lg. (Siebeck).
33For convenience, reference will be made in the following examples to the relevant pages 
in Lutoslawski’s large collection (74-140) of statistical tests which were made by a number of 
scholars over a period of years.
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- ratio of Trepi + genitive to Trepi + accusative (Lut. 130, §391): 
13/o = 0%. The former combination greatly predominates over the latter in 
all works but Smp., Sph., Pit., Ti., Crit., Lg. bks. 3, 5, 6, 7 (Lina).
Statistical studies of Plato’s language have succeeded for the most 
part only in helping to establish some broad periods of composition (i.e., 
early, middle, and later dialogues). Even at that, a glance at the above 
(admittedly selective) set of tests will show, for instance, that Crat., which is 
usually nowadays regarded as a later work,34 sometimes aligns itself, in 
the statistical evidence it affords, among the earlier compositions. Never­
theless, these tests tend to support the earlier judgements about the style 
of Thg.’. its greatest affinities lie with those works generally accepted as 
being of early date.
Clausulae - 1. i ; b ~~~ “ | ; c | — - | — —
total of (a b c d) = 15.43%
ii ---- = 14.89%
iii -------- --- = 15.96%
total of i, ii, and iii = 46.28%
2. ss 10.11%
3. ----- = 7.45%
4. - = 2.66%
5 ~ - = 2.66%
g -- -- w — = 2.66%
7. ----- = 3.19%
8 a - - - - - = 4.79%
b - - - - - = 6.38% (total of 8 [ab] = 11.17%)
34See most recently M.M. Mackenzie, CQ n.s.36 (1986) 124-50.
187
The above table of clausulae lists the same rhythms as the ones 
Billig applied to his study of the clausulae in Phlb., Pit., and Lg.35 The total 
for rhythms 1.i-iii in Thg. is far below that of the three dialogues named 
above, where the total for the same clausulae ranges from about 70% to 
85%, as opposed to the 46.28% of Thg. On the other hand, Thg. shows a 
more even distribution of the other rhythms than do Phlb., Pit., and Lg. 
Interestingly, the figure of 46.28% for the three predominant clausulae of 
Plato’s latest work is almost identical with the incidence of the same 
clausulae in Ti. (45.6%), concerning which Billig remarks (249-50) that this 
is "indicative only of the equability of rhythm which the Timaeus has in 
common with the Republic and with all the other dialogues of the earlier 
periods." The incidence of rhythm 1.i (a) in Thg. (so common in the dia­
logues Billig analyzed) is 6.38%, a figure which is closest to that found in 
Ap., Chrm., Euthd., and a few other early and middle works.36 Again, the 
frequency of rhythm 9 in Thg. tends to be paralleled in earlier works.37
What conclusions can we draw from the clausulae of Thg.? Unfor­
tunately this is not at all certain. We may confidently affirm, I suppose, that 
the use of clausulae in this dialogue has no close affinity with Plato's final 
period. However, the correspondence with Ti. in this respect suggests that 
an appeal to clausulae will not help us to refine our inferences about date 
much further. In other words Thg., if Platonic, may be seen on the basis of 
clausulae not to be a product of Plato's final few years; but beyond that it 
seems to group itself among a formidable number of dialogues which span
9. — = 5.32%
35See JP 35 (1920) 225-56.
36See A.W. De Groot, DerAntike Prosarythmus I (Groningen, 1921) 55-6.
37lb. 55-6.
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a considerable time period. Moreover, it must be added that the study of 
clausulae has come in for some detailed criticism on more than one 
occasion.38 Yet the safest inference we can draw from the above table of 
figures is that, for Thg., clausulae cannot be used in settling the question of 
authenticity, for as Billig himself notes (250), rhythms 1.i-iii comprise 50% 
of the total possible metrical combinations for clausulae. Thus approxim­
ately one-half of the clausulae produced by any Greek author who did not 
consciously impose certain rhythms at sentence end should be repre­
sented by these rhythms. And this is precisely what we find in the case of 
Thg.; any author might have achieved the same results.
38See H. Cherniss, AJP7Q (1957) 227-30, with nn. 8-9 on 228.
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V. Date of Composition
Given the nature of scholarly attitudes towards the authenticity of 
Thg., it will come as no surprise that a consensus over its date of com­
position has never been reached. Suggestions have ranged from about 
400 B.C.1 to the second century B.C.,2 but as we shall see, neither of these 
extremes is at all likely to be right, and my own feeling is that the true date 
must lie somewhere between these termini, closer in fact to the first limit 
than to the second. In this section an attempt will be made to confine the 
date to as narrow a period as is practicable, but the fact that we have 
earlier determined that Thg. is spurious (see Intr. ch. IV, e) makes it all the 
more difficult to date this work with any precision, since Plato's own lifetime 
cannot now be used to establish the basic chronological limits for com­
position. This difficulty is compounded by consideration of certain peculiar­
ities in the dialogue's content (most notably, the section on Socrates' div­
ine sign), and by the relative lack of testimonia from any period for this 
work. But despite these obstacles, Thg. can, I think, be fixed within a fairly 
precise time frame.
1 Socher 102-3 (before the death of Socrates, and perhaps Plato's first dialogue); Knebel 8­
9 (basically following Socher); Friedlander 154; Fischer 3 n.1. The possibility that this dia­
logue could have been written before the death of Socrates is strictly precluded by the evi­
dence furnished from the study of sources (see Intr. ch. IV, e).
2Stallbaum 226-7; Lamb 345; Souilhd (142) places it at the end of the third century or 
beginning of the second, while Carlini (59f.) supposes that it was written in the third.
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a. The earliest testimonia
Let us begin with the evidence of direct ancient testimony. The 
earliest reference to a passage in Thg. is apparently in the Ars Rhetorica 
(405) traditionally attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus.3 This would 
provide us with a probable terminus ante quern shortly before or after the 
beginning of our era, since it appears that Dionysius died about that time.4 
Unfortunately the Ars Rhetorica is usually considered spurious,5 and infer­
ences concerning its date are highly problematic; some time within the first- 
century A.D. seems generally accepted for the chapter in which the Thg. 
testimonium occurs.6 The most, then, that can be said about Thg. on the 
basis of the Ars Rhetorica is that the dialogue was in circulation by the first 
century A.D. Nor is direct attestation elsewhere in ancient literature a great 
deal of help. There is no other testimonium for a passage in Thg. apart 
from [Dionysius] that can be confidently dated earlier than the beginning of 
the second century A.D.7
Particularly enigmatic (though highly suggestive) is the existing evi­
dence for the ordering of Plato's dialogues into tetralogies. Thrasyllus, we 
are told (D.L. 3.56ff.), divided the dialogues into nine tetralogies, and 
placed Thg. first in the fifth tetralogy; this organization has succeeded in
3C.W. Muller (146 n.48; see also Die Kurzdialoge 107-8, 201-2) believes that the pseudo- 
Platonic Demodocus (dated by him at 350-260 B.C., Die Kurzdialoge 127-8) presupposes 
the existence of Thg., and that Trept dpeTfjs 376b1-c1 (which he dates c. 260 B.C., ib. 
260) reflects Thg. 125c7ff. Neither of these hypotheses can admit of proof, nor do they 
seem to me entirely convincing; see Die Kurzdialoge 108 n.1 for a list of scholars who have 
raised the question of a relationship between Thg. and Dem.
4See L. Radermacher, RE 5.934.
5Dionysius was not a writer of Texvat; see Radermacher op. cit. 969; id., Dionysius Hali- 
carnaseusV\ (Leipzig, 1929) xxiiff.
6Radermacher RE 5.969.
7See the Testimonia cited in the register below text; the earliest passage after [Dionysius] is 
probably [Plutarch] Mor. 568b-574f (De Fato), on which see Appendix 1.
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becoming canonical.8 As we know, Thrasyllus was the court astrologer/ 
philosopher of Tiberius, and died shortly before the emperor's own death 
in 36 A.D.,9 a fact which would furnish an unpromising upper terminus of c. 
35 A.D. for the composition of Thg. But Thrasyllus did not initiate the 
organization of the Corpus into tetralogies: Albinus (Eisag. 4) remarks that 
Dercyllides (whose date is uncertain but is possibly to be put in the first half 
of the first century B.C.)10 arranged the dialogues into tetralogies, and 
Varro too was familiar with a tetralogical ordering of the Corpus (L. 7.37, 
composed c. 45 B.C.). We cannot be certain, however, that the tetralogies 
of Dercyllides, or those known to Varro, possessed the same contents or 
order as Thrasyllus*. Moreover, Diogenes Laertius reports, on the authority 
of Thrasyllus (3.56), that it was Plato himself who published the dialogues 
in tetralogies. Matters are thrown into further confusion when Diogenes (3. 
61-2) reports that some (one of whom was Aristophanes of Byzantium) 
arranged the Corpus into trilogies. He then presents the dialogues belong­
ing to one such organization into five trilogies (none of which includes 
Thg.), and follows this with the statement that "the rest are added individ­
ually and in no particular order" (62 toc 8’ ocXXoc koc0’ ev kocl cctccktcus). 
No mention is made of Thg. at that point either (we are never informed 
what toc ccXXoc consisted of), but it is listed as the first member of a different 
arrangement into trilogies (62; the first dialogues of eight other trilogical
8The tetralogical ordering was however challenged by Albinus, and by some Neoplatonists: 
Albinus Eisag. 4 (149.13-20 Hermann); lamblichus ap. Anonymous Prolegomena to 
Platonic Philosophy 26.12-34 = 47 Westerink; lamblichus ap. Proclus' Commentary on the 
First Alcibiades of Plato 11.11-17 = 5 Westerink; see further M. Dunn, "lamblichus, 
Thrasyllus, and the Reading Order of the Platonic Dialogues" in The Significance of Neo­
platonism (Norfolk, Virginia, 1976) 60 and nn.11-14; A.J. Festugiere, MH2Q (1969) 281-96.
9Cf. Suet. Tib. 62.3; D.C. 58.27.1; for the identification of Thrasyllus cf. sch. adJuv. 7.57Q.
10See Kroll, RE 9. 242.
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orderings are listed as well);11 nevertheless it cannot be taken for granted 
that this arrangement is contemporaneous with that of Aristophanes. 
Finally, it has been held that the organization into trilogies in itself pre­
supposes a tetralogical set-up. On this hypothesis, the trilogical arrange­
ment was a reaction against the tetralogical ordering of the dialogues, 
probably on the grounds that the latter arrangement tended to impose an 
arbitrary dramatic scheme onto the Corpus as a whole (cf. D.L 3.50).12 
But again, what this (notional) earlier tetralogical arrangement might have 
consisted of can only be conjectured.
We know then that arrangements of the Corpus, certainly into 
trilogies, and possibly into tetralogies, existed before Thrasyllus gave his 
stamp to the one which established itself as orthodox. But to assert that 
Thg. belonged to the earliest trilogical arrangements, or to earlier tetra­
logical orderings does, strictly speaking, transcend the evidence;13 in the 
one instance where we can be certain that Thg. belonged to a trilogical 
ordering, it is impossible to determine the date at which that arrangement 
was made. On the other hand, it is at least possible, and might indeed be 
considered probable, that the dialogues in Thrasyllus’ tetralogical arrange­
ment are substantially the same ones as appeared in earlier organizations,
11 No doubt these represent paideutic priority (cf. Alb. Eisag. 4, D.L. 3.62, Olympiodorus 
Proll. 24-6), and not the ordering in actual "editions." Hippolytus (1.19.21) has been held to 
be the first definite witness for a material edition of the tetralogies (see Alline 124; Pasquali 
265), but see also F. Solmsen, ICS 6 A (1981) 102-11.
12See Wilamowitz il.324-5; E. Bickel, Ph Mus92 (1943) 94; M. Pohlenz, Nachrichten Akad. 
Gottingen, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 99 (1952) 7; R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship: From 
the Beginnings to the end of the Hellenistic Age (Oxford, 1968) 196-7; J.A. Philip, Phoenix 
24 (1970) 299 n.6, 300-1. Diogenes' choice of the forceful term eXKOUcn, to describe the 
arranging of dialogues into trilogies (3.61) is taken to argue both for a pre-existing order of 
the dialogues, and for the equal arbitrariness of the trilogical ordering; but see Solmsen, op. 
cit. 110 n.21.
13Although, for example, Taylor (PMV\fi 521) and Rist (20) have not unreasonably made 
this assertion.
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b. Philosophical and literary background
Evidence has been gathered in preceding chapters to indicate those 
works on which Thg. may on reasonable grounds be thought to depend. 
Of these works, the claims of one doubtfully Platonic dialogue, namely Ale. 
I, which to all appearances is later than any of the genuine works from 
which Thg. derives, has been considered (see Intr. ch. I, b, iii, v, vii; c). The 
evidence which this dialogue brings to bear on date of composition will be 
briefly assessed below (sec. g). But for the moment it will be necessary to 
accept Tht. as the latest work on which Thg. demonstrably depends (see 
Intr. ch. II, b). As this dialogue was written after (but probably not long after) 
369,15 this date must suffice, provisionally at least, as our terminus post 
quern for Thg.
Is it possible to be more precise than to assign a date of composition 
for Thg. within the period 369 B.O. to c. 35 A.D., the likely date of Thrasyl­
lus' death? In the first place, and notwithstanding the uncertain evidence 
for the original constitution of the Corpus, there is surely no credible reason 
to place the dialogue in the Christian era, and no more cause to situate it in 
a period at all near to that time; no Platonic scholar has been inclined to do 
this, and we have already seen that there are tentative grounds for dating 
Thg. not later than Aristophanes of Byzantium. Realistically, the question 
confronting us must be how close to the terminus post quern Thg. can be 
pushed back. Inauthenticity in itself cannot be offered as an argument for a 
late date of composition. Even the pseudo-Platonic Sisyphus can hardly 
be much later than 350 B.C., as Aristotle probably refers to it on one
15See, e.g., Guthrie, HGP V. 61-2.
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occasion.16 And although the onus probandi need not necessarily rest 
with those who would wish to condemn a work within the Platonic Corpus 
as spurious,17 it should on the other hand be axiomatic that a compar­
atively late date can only be upheld if there is positive and irrefutable proof 
of this date. Such proof will usually consist of philosophical, historical, liter­
ary, or linguistic anachronism (although naturally these are not mutually 
exclusive categories).
For its own part Thg. affords little evidence on which an argument for 
the influence of Hellenistic philosophical movements could be erected. 
The only point which might prove evidential is the subject of Socrates’ 
divine sign in Thg. But even here the inferences we can draw are meagre. 
Stoicism, we know, recognized the value of (jiavTLKrj, and several Stoics 
wrote books on the subject.18 It might be supposed that the preoccupation 
in Thg. with Socrates' sign could indicate a Stoic interest in jjlocv tl Krj ;19 
and whether or not the sign as presented in Thg. is in fact to be identified 
as a form of [xocvtikt] (see further lntr. ch. II, b), it is noteworthy that Cicero 
(Div. 1.122-4) does devote some space to a consideration of it as a 
legitimate species of divination. Consequently, this could be accepted as 
evidence that Socrates’ sign had become a topos in Stoic discussions of
16S/s. 388e2-389a4 ~ EN 1112a21-23; see MQIIer, Die Kurzdialoge 91 (ib. 94-104 tor his 
dating of Sis.); Thesleff, Platonic Chronology 230.
17Syme's remarks on this point are salutary; see Pseudepigrapha I (Entretiens Hardt 18 
[Gendve, 1972] 9. On the whole, Lesky’s comments about the Corpus are sane (A History 
of Greek Literature, Eng. tr. [New York, 1966] 512): "It is generally wrong to go far beyond 
the end of the 4th century; they [sc. the doubtful works within the nine tetralogies] are 
products of a time when the discussions at the Academy were still closely allied with the 
Master and ventured to imitate his manner of representation."
18Cf. Cic. Div. 1.6: Chrysippus two books, Diogenes of Babylon one, Antipater of Tarsus 
two, Posidonius five.
19So Stallbaum 226-7.
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prophecy,20 and that Thg. was influenced by, and indeed part of, this way 
of thinking.
Such an argument meets with insurmountable difficulties. If it were 
valid, it would be odd that the author never asserts that it is his intention to 
make a statement on i^avTiKrj. At no time is the word, or one approx­
imating to it, used, even though Plato himself sanctioned the belief in 
Socrates’ divine sign as a form of prophecy by applying the term (jlocvtlkti 
to it (Ap. 40a4), as did Xenophon approve the belief no less clearly (Mem. 
1.1.2-9). In fact, through Socrates the author explicitly tells the reader why 
he presents a series of examples that prove Socrates’ ability correctly to 
foretell future events. They are included in order to prove that to Sai— 
p.dviov exercises complete control in Socrates' associations with his 
companions (129e1 -3; though strictly speaking this is not what they prove, 
see Intr. ch. I, b, vii); and in the final anecdote of Thg. (130a4-e4), any 
possible insinuations about (jLOCVTLKfj are actually sloughed off (see 
comm, ad loc.; Intr.ch. II, b). Nor are the implications of Socrates' alleged 
p.avTiKrj ever closely bound up with what could pass for Stoic doctrine: 
we are told that the divine sign helped Socrates to foretell the future, but 
not even the slightest link is allowed to surface between this divination and
20That this is likely the case is suggested not only by Cicero’s remarks on the divine sign in 
connection with prophecy, but also by his report that "permulta conlecta sunt ab Antipatro 
quae mirabiliter a Socrate divinata sunt" (Div. 1.123 = SVF 3.249). For the position of 
Socrates’ divine sign in Stoicism, see Willing 151-7; Maier 453. It may be noted that Stall­
baum (226-7) accepted Cicero’s testimony that Antipater of Tarsus "collected” stories about 
Socratic prophecies as evidence of a late date for Thg., inferring that the author of this 
dialogue drew upon Antipater's "collection.” But, given the earliest date at which Thg. is 
likely to have been assimilated into the Platonic Corpus (see above), and the authority with 
which this will probably have invested the work in the eyes of those interested in Socrates' 
divine sign (for the influence of Thg. on later discussions about the divine sign, see Intr. ch. 
II, d, and Appendix 1), it is infinitely more probable that Antipater "collected" his material from 
Thg., as well as from other sources (see also Taylor, PMVfi 533; Willing 179-80).
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Stoic beliefs concerning fate.21 And yet what is most decisive against the 
possibility of Stoic influence is the fact that p.ccvTiKrj is also a Platonic 
subject of discussion.22 We are, it seems, all but compelled to accept that 
Thg. can hardly be reckoned as a Stoic document in any real sense of the 
term.
There is, then, no good reason to label Thg. as a descendant or 
product of one or more of the Hellenistic philosophical schools 23 But an 
attempt to date the dialogue within the period of the early Academy en­
counters one recalcitrant fact, namely that there is virtually no evidence for 
discussion of Socrates' divine sign in the latter half of the fourth-century 
B.C. anything like that which we encounter in Thg. After Tht. Plato never 
mentions the divine sign, Aristotle is completely reticent about it in his 
surviving works,24 and we search in vain for notice of it in the fragments of 
Plato's early successors.25 But the lack of evidence from Aristotle and the 
other immediate followers of Plato may, of course, be merely symptomatic 
of the fragmentary nature of our evidence, and it may even be slightly mis­
leading to search after affinities for this section only within literary fields 
(see Intr. ch. I, b, vii; II, b, c/[on the possible influence of oral tradition]).
21Cf., e.g., SVF 2.912, 939 (Chrysippus), 943, 944, a connection further articulated by 
Posidonius in the doctrine of sympatheia (E-K 106); see J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy 
(Cambridge, 1969) 176-8. For a further refutation of possible dependence on Stoic doc­
trine, see Taylor, PMW6 533. Later expositors were able to read into this dialogue a con­
nection between the behaviour of to Sctipomov in Thg. (though not its mantic powers) 
and certain dogmas about the workings of fate (cf. [Plu.] Mor. 574b). This is, however, no 
evidence for the original intentions of the author of Thg.
22Cf. Phdr. 244a3ff., Smp. 202e3-203a4, Ti. 71e6ff., Lg. 759bff., 772c6ff., 914a2ff.
23For an attempt to trace the influence of Academic scepticism on Thg., see below n.36.
24See Willing 148-50.
25The tale of Timarchus in Plu. De genio Socratis (Mor. 590a-592e) has been held to 
depend ultimately on an early Academic source (see Willing 150-1, with reff.); but this by no 
means implies that Socrates’ divine sign played any role in the original source which is 
postulated. On the very uncertain evidence for an Antisthenean interest in the divine sign, 
see Intr. ch. II n.92.
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Moreover, if prevailing opinions about the date of Ale. I are substantially 
correct (see below sec. g), that dialogue must be considered a source of 
information on the sign (albeit not a very abundant one) originating from 
the period in question (see lntr. ch. II, c). But at all events the evidence that 
Socrates’ divine sign continued to be a theme of discussion in the early 
Academy is not nearly as full as we might wish.
There are however other important considerations with regard to 
philosophical influences. We can identify a period, still within the early 
Academy, in which it may be inferred that the interest of the Platonic school 
in Socrates’ sign is likely to have been more intense than at other times. 
This is not the place for a full account of Xenocrates' contribution to Platon­
ism, but it is clear that the subject of 8ai|j.oi/es in general exercised the 
Academy during the time in which he was its head (339-314), and to a sig­
nificant degree his philosophical activities are characterized by the anim­
ation of fundamental principles with a deistic element. In fact, Xenocrates 
gave further expression to the orthodox Platonic belief in as
intermediate beings between gods and men (cf. Smp. 202d13-203a8; lntr. 
ch. II, b), and did much to systematize their role.26 His importance to later 
philosophy rests, it would appear, largely on his efforts to produce a stan­
dard and internally coherent and consistent form of Platonism;27 but with 
justification we can speak of an irrational streak permeating his approach 
to the philosophical tradition he inherited from Plato. Within an intellectual 
atmosphere of the kind that must have existed in the early Academy under 
Xenocrates, and undoubtedly even before he was actually its head, a work
26See Heinze, Xenocrates 78-123; J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, 1977) 31-2; 
Guthrie, HGP V. 474-5; Burkert 331-2.
27See Cherniss, Riddle 44; F. Novotny, The Posthumous Life of Plato (The Hague, 1977) 
22-3.
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such as Thg. would have been a natural product.28 It does not matter 
greatly that Socrates’ divine sign is not represented in this work along 
recognizably strong Xenocratean lines;29 it is more important that its 
prominence here reflects a significant interest in the sign, and so possibly 
in SocLjJOves, within literary circles, and very probably within the Academy 
itself (see Intr. ch. IV, cf). Socrates’ divine sign will have been viewed as a 
notable example of a personal guardian spirit,30 the intermediary accor­
ding to Xenocrates' system. As I have already attempted to show (Intr. ch. 
II, b, d), the prominence of the divine sign and the peculiarly unique 
description of it in Thg. are most readily accounted for by regarding the 
portion of Thg. concerned with the sign as representing a link within the 
fairly predictable chain of development which it experienced under various 
influences, and over a period of several centuries. One supposition must 
be that one of these influences on its development from to 8cti|j6viov to 
8(XLjJLcov was the new emphasis given to Saip-ovcs by Xenocrates and 
the Academy.
The preoccupation with the divine sign in Thg. may thus reflect an 
increased fascination with this aspect of Socrates’ character, as compared 
with the previously understated treatment of it in the remainder of the 
Platonic Corpus (see Intr. ch. II, a); a priori we might have expected, 
despite the general lack of evidence concerning the sign itself, that this
28So also a date of composition in the period of Xenocrates’ headship has been suggested 
by Taylor, P/WW6534; Wilamowitz 11.325 n.1; Brunnecke 105ff., 182-3; less decisively F. 
Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles 7: Herakleides PontikosP (Basel, 1969) 104. A similar 
date was considered by Stallbaum (225-6), but was summarily rejected.
29 Pace Stallbaum 225-6; Kruger 37. Kruger's assertion that Thg., if it were written under 
the influence of Xenocrates, ought to betray this influence manifestly, in the way in which 
the works of much later writers on Socrates' divine sign do (i.e. Plutarch, Apuleius, Maximus 
of Tyre), seems to me especially dubious in its assumptions and use of evidence. Compare 
the comment of Gigon quoted in Intr. ch. II n.91.
30Cf. also R. 620d6-e4, Phd. 107dS-7, Ti. 90a2-7.
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would have taken place in the Academy under Xenocrates. One specific 
point of contact between Xenocrates' demonology and references to 
Socrates' divine sign in Thg. may be mentioned. Xenocrates held that ill- 
disposed Socl [jlo veg could be propitiated by certain religious observ­
ances, and this represented an aggressive departure from Plato's own 
beliefs.31 In a similar manner Theages is determined (131a6-7) to pro­
pitiate to Socljjlovlov with prayers, sacrifices, and whatever else the 
[_iccvt€LS32 prescribe, if to Socljulovlov is not favourable to him. Even if 
we exaggerate the level to which Theages is characterized in this dialogue 
by a youthful enthusiasm and naivete (see Intr. ch. Ill, b), it is still reason­
able to wonder if his statement could have been made, or indeed could 
have been uttered without rebuke from Socrates, before beliefs about 
8a.ip.oveg of the kind Xenocrates espoused had been imposed on the 
Academy. In fact this is just one instance among a number in which the 
divine sign in Thg. is treated along broadly demonological (though not 
necessarily always Xenocratean) lines, and in which the distinction (which 
Plato consciously observed) between to Saipoviov of Socrates and 
Saipoveg generally, has been blurred (see Intr. ch. II, b, d).
More than this, we are fortunate in possessing an important com­
plete piece of evidence for the interests of the early Academy in interme­
diate divine beings. The Platonic Epinomis supplies a useful control over 
our estimate of the liberties which members of the Academy felt justified in
31 For Xenocrates cf. Plu. Mor. 361b = fr. 25 Heinze; for Plato cf. Euthph. 14e10ff., Ft. 
364b2ff., Lg. 716e2ff., 905d3-907d1,909a8ff.
32Plato also has little good to say about these people, cf. Phdr. 248d7-e1, Pit. 290c3ff., 
Lg. 908d1ff. But strictly speaking it is in harmony with Plato’s formulations about 
8ai|j.oveg in Smp. 202e7ff. that Theages should appeal to pctPTeig at this point; for the 
relevance of this to the author’s treatment of to Saiptoviop, see Intr. ch. II n. 76.
201
taking with Plato’s own demonology.33 In this work the author diverges 
from Plato's cosmology on a critical point. In Ti. (39e3-41a6) it was 
claimed that there are four kinds of living beings; in Epin. (981 b3ff.) a fifth 
kind is now postulated, consisting of the 8the intermediate 
deities. And these creatures are not only introduced into an essentially 
Platonic cosmology in which no need for them had previously been felt, but 
they are made corporeal as well (984d8-e4); additionally, they can be won 
over with prayers (984e2-3). Since demonological innovations such as 
these were possible in the early Academy, there is no difficulty imagining to 
what lengths an adherent, especially if he was not, or not primarily, a philo­
sopher (as the author of Thg. seems not to have been, see lntr. ch. IV, e), 
might go in developing further the patterns traditionally associated with 
Socrates’ divine sign. In any event, we may regard the extent of the influ­
ence within the Academy of a systematic demonology as pervasive: hence­
forward belief in good and evil Scap.oveg becomes orthodox Platonism 34
We can develop this line of inquiry a little further by noting an 
additional detail in which Thg. would seem to reflect a prominent feature of 
the Academy after Plato's death. In the early Academy the importance 
given to dialectic in intellectual training was gradually reduced; what came 
to be valued more highly was actual experience 35 Now the final anecdote 
in Thg. (130a4-e4) is striking for the way in which Aristides professes to 
"improve" merely in proportion to physical proximity with Socrates. Else-
33Assuming, of course, that Epin. is spurious (whether or not Philip of Opus was its author), 
and that it was composed very late in Plato's lifetime or, what is perhaps more probable, 
some time not long after his death; see most recently (and most fully) L. Taran, Academica: 
Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis (Philadelphia, 1975) 3-47,138-9.
34With one important exception: Plotinus rejected the existence of good and evil 
Saipoves (cf. Enn. 3.4).
35See Zeller, II.15 995f.
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where in Plato Socrates' effect on an interlocutor may be described in 
physical terms, the best known example being the simile of the sting ray in 
Men. (79e7-80b2). But that dialogue leaves us with no doubt as to the 
source of the numbing effect Meno claims to experience, since it is 
ascribed to the dialectical process as it is carried out by Socrates in com­
pany with his associate. Nor does the passage in Tht. (151 a1 ff.) which 
mentions Aristides in a similar context and which speaks of the educative 
influence of the divine sign permit us to claim that the importance of 
dialectic is no longer for Plato what it had been, for most of what follows 
that interlude emerges as an actual display of Socrates' maieutic method 
in action. In the Thg. passage, on the other hand, dialectic is conspicuous 
by its absence; Aristides becomes a vacuous listener, bewitched by Socra­
tes' words as Meno had been, yet contributing nothing himself to the state 
he eventually finds himself in. The characteristic claim is still made that the 
companion learns nothing directly from Socrates (130d4-5), but whereas in 
Tht. this necessarily implied Socrates' role as midwife, here it reflects the 
concept of improvement by a kind of "osmosis." This is a remarkable 
development in the context of Platonic literature (see Intr. ch. IV, d), and it is 
not for nothing that Socrates in Smp. (175d3-e6) is unable to regard with 
any seriousness the notion of education or improvement by physical con­
tact. But Aristides’ words are understandable if by the time Thg. was 
written the importance of dialectic in the Academy had declined. True, 
Socrates does exercise Theages in a dialectical manner through the first 
several pages of the dialogue. But that example of question and answer is 
more notable for its differences from, rather than its similarities with, the
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forms of dialectic in other works (see Intr. ch. I, b, vii), and at any rate the 
story about Aristides remains.36
And yet a likely Xenocratean, or more generally Academic, influence 
clearly does not provide a full explanation for the author’s account of 
Socrates' divine sign; for as I indicated above, while some philosophical 
affinities can be detected between it and what we know about Xenocrates' 
system, and about demonological speculation in the early Academy, these 
are only limited. An investigation of possible contemporary literary influ­
ences will however be more fruitful in helping to substantiate a date within 
the period of the early Academy, as the correspondences in this area 
appear to be substantial.
Several points emerge from a study of the way in which the dialogue 
form developed in the hands of members of the Academy other than Plato, 
both late in his life and after his death. Again we are restricted by the lack 
of surviving evidence; yet it is quite clear that for some prominent writers 
(e.g., Aristotle and Heraclides Ponticus), variety for its own sake increased 
in importance in the composition of dialogues, as demonstrated most 
notably through the uses of anecdote and myth (doubtless following the 
late examples provided by Plato's accounts of Atlantis in Crit. and Ti.).37 It 
is patent for instance that details about Socrates' life were subjects of 
controversy in the early years of Aristotle's school (i.e., some time after 
335-4), and these discussions must have taken the form of gossipy, some-
36Carlini (59-60) uses the above evidence to arrive at a wholly different conclusion, viz., that 
Thg. was composed in the Academy under Arcesilaus (268-41), in whose time dialectic 
again assumed importance. This seems wholly at odds with the evidence, and the dialogue 
form of Thg., which Carlini takes as further proof of composition under Arcesilaus rather than 
in the fourth century, does not indicate what he thinks it does.
37See Hirzel, Der Dialog 1277-8,323.
204
times scurrilous, anecdotes.38 Heraclides, long a member of the Academy 
(until the death of Speusippus in 339), seems to have been especially bold 
in his use of marvellous tales which often detailed supernatural events.39 
We also know that he wrote on the subject of oracles,40 so that his interest 
in prophetic utterances is guaranteed; and he seems, like Xenocrates and 
the author of Epin., to have discussed the role of Sctipio ves.41 As for 
Aristotle, it is demonstrable that he had a penchant for beginning his 
dialogues in medias res, that the mythical element played an important part 
in them, and that they contained lengthy speeches which catalogued 
rhetorical exempla;42 at least one (Eudemus fr. 1 Ross = Cic. Div. 1.25.53) 
spoke of prophetic dream visions. One of the best-attested features of 
Aristotle’s dialogues is that he occasionally took part himself as a leading 
speaker;43 Heraclides on the other hand preferred to introduce characters 
taken from the romantic past44 What all this evidence clearly shows is that 
Heraclides and Aristotle (others as well, no doubt) gave new direction to 
dialogue writing.45 Neither were content simply to develop pale imitations 
of Plato’s compositions; on the contrary, they both were obviously occupied
38E.g., Socrates’ bigamy: cf. D.L. 2.26 (Aristotle, Satyrus, Hieronymus of Rhodes), Athen. 
13.555d-556a (Aristotle, Callisthenes, Demetrius, Satyrus, Aristoxenus), Plu. Arist. 27 
(Aristotle, Demetrius, Aristoxenus, Hieronymus); see L. Woodbury, Phoenix 27 (1973) 7­
21.
39See F. Wehrli, op. cit., e.g. frr. 76-89 (Empedocles' resuscitation of a woman who had 
stopped breathing; his assumption into heaven); also Gottschalk 13-36.
40Frr. 130-141, Trepi xP'QO’Pwv and iTepi xprjcrTripitov; see Gottschalk 94-5,130-1, 
and in general 93ff. for Heraclides' beliefs in divine intervention.
41 Perhaps to be inferred from fr. 111 Wherli; see also Zeller II. 151038; Gottschalk 97-8.
42See Hirzel, Der Dialog 1275-80; Jaeger, Ar/stof/e227-31 (for Heraclides' use of rhetorical 
devices, see Gottschalk 9). Despite the extensive employment of long speeches, there is 
evidence for the retention of question and answer sections in the Platonic mode, cf. 
Eudemus fr. 6 Ross.
43Cf. Cic. Att. 13.19.4, Q.fr. 3.5.1.
44See Gottschalk 9-10.
45On the general character of the post-Platonic dialogue, see Gottschalk 9, with his 
references in n. 31.
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with producing works which could catch a reader's attention through a new 
emphasis on a number of devices.46
But some wider literary preoccupations around the middle of the 
fourth century become still more distinct if we look beyond the dialogue 
genre. For not only were Heraclides and Aristotle instrumental in intro­
ducing novel emphases to dialogue composition, but it is evident that some 
characteristic developments in this field can be paralleled in historiography 
as well. Theopompus (to mention one notable example), writing early in 
the second half of the fourth century, took it upon himself to embellish his 
historical writings with anecdotes and strange tales, created a fairyland 
(Meropis, FGrHist 115 F.75), and even included as part of the eighth and 
ninth books of his Phillipica a segment designated by the title Thaumasia 
(FGrHist 115 F.64-77):47 Within this part he related several stories about 
Pherecydes of Syros, who is said to have had the gift of prescience on a 
number of occasions: he foretold the sinking of a ship, predicted an earth­
quake, and knew in advance that Messene was to be captured (FGrHist 
115 F.71 = DK7A1). Andron of Ephesus on the other hand, also a writer of 
the fourth century, attributed these "miracles" to Pythagoras (FGrHist 70 = 
DK7A6). Nor did Ephorus eschew the use of myth and other-worldly 
subjects in his universal history.48
Certain literary trends become clear. The supernatural and the 
irrational were no longer cast in a supporting role in either dialogue or his-
46On Aristotle’s philosophical position in his dialogues, see Jaeger,Aristotle?24-53.
47A correspondence between Theopompus' Thaumasia and Msloile'sEudemus, inter­
preted as deliberate, has actually been detected by Gigon, "Prolegomena to an edition of 
the Eudemus" in Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth Century, I. During and G.E.L. Owen 
edd. (Gdteburg, 1960) 30-1.
48The historical works of Heraclides Ponticus fall generally in line with the developments 
described above, see Gottschalk 128-39, esp. 137.
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tonography.49 As to where Thg. fits within the activity of the years following 
c. 369, the terminus post quern established above, this can best be deter­
mined with reference to some of the surviving relevant literature discussed 
above. Again, the section on Socrates’ divine sign must come in for 
conspicuous treatment. It is basically anecdotal, not to say (autobio­
graphical; in this it resembles some of the work of Heraclides, Aristotle, and 
some of the Peripatetics, and the accumulation of anecdotes for the 
purpose of emphasizing Socrates’ arguments about his divine sign finds its 
counterpart in Aristotle's use of rhetorical exempla (on the Socratic anec­
dotal tradition in general, see comm, ad 128d1-130e4). Its subject, the 
divine sign, is a supernormal entity; in fact its irrationality is emphasized 
here far more than anywhere else in the Platonic Corpus (see Intr. ch. II, b, 
d). The comments of the preceding few pages furnish ample comparisons. 
The similarities between Socrates' prophecies in Thg. and the predictions 
ascribed by Theopompus to Pherecydes mentioned above are particularly 
striking, and we might also recall Heraclides' interest in oracles and divine 
intervention generally. Dittmar went so far as to attribute Thg. directly to 
Heraclides or one of his "circle."50 This showed not a little temerity, and 
Dittmar has been justifiably criticized for his assertion;51 the evidence 
plainly is not sufficiently extensive or persuasive. Yet he may well have 
simply overstated his case. If certain features about Thg. seem at variance
49See Hirzel, Der Dialog 1333-4.
50Dittmar, Aischines von Sphettos (Berlin, 1912) 64; see also Taylor, PA4W6534 n.1, 
whose apparent view that the effect of Heraclides' literary approach can be detected in Thg. 
was also endorsed by Dodds in The Ancient Concept of Progress (Oxford, 1973) 192-3. 
Dittmar’s hypothesis was resurrected by J.D.P. Bolton, Aristeas of Proconnesus (Oxford, 
1962) 202 n.18. A considerable measure of influence by Heraclides on the Academy 
seems at any rate certain, if we can trust the report of the Suda (= fr. 2 Wehrli) that Heraclides 
was in charge of Plato's school during Plato’s final visit to Sicily c. 361; there is, however, no 
way to substantiate this report. But that he was a prominent member of the Academy need 
not be doubted.
51 See Gottschalk157.
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with the remaining authentic works in the Platonic Corpus, we have good 
reason to feel that the explanation for the anomalies lies in the influences 
of other writers of philosophical dialogues, Heraclides among them, apart 
from Plato. For Thg. does appear to exemplify new approaches to the 
writing of a dialogue, typified by the work of Heraclides and Aristotle; 
approaches still strongly reflecting the habits and predilections of Plato 
(especially in the retention of Socrates as chief interlocutor), but illustrating 
fresh mannerisms, techniques, and emphases. It is difficult to resist the 
temptation to relate Thg. closely to much of the literary activity around the 
middle of the fourth century B.C. It must be significant that, sparse as the 
evidence is for the fields of dialogue and historiography around this time 
(especially, of course, after Plato's death), the little that does survive sug­
gests that Thg. possesses important specific affinities with it.
To summarize then the relevance of philosophical and literary influ­
ences in determining date of composition: No connection with Hellenistic 
philosophical trends is detectable in Thg. On the other hand, the dialogue, 
though written, broadly speaking, after a Platonic manner (see below, and 
lntr. ch. I, b, a, ch. IV, c), shows evidence of an influence emanating from 
the demonology which became after Plato's death a preoccupation in the 
Academy. This influence, however, was exerted on a literary rather than a 
philosophical mind, and is manifested in the author's animadversions on 
Socrates' divine sign. The form that the author’s preoccupations in this 
sphere take is largely consistent with the kinds of literary composition 
being produced among writers of both dialogue and history in the mid­
fourth century.52 On this evidence therefore a date of composition roughly
52There are reasons also to feel that the anecdote about the Sicilian expedition would not 
have been given literary expression until late in Plato's life or after his death; see comm, ad 
129c8-d2.
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within 360-330 B.C. suggests itself; since the dialogue still displays a 
measurably strong influence by Plato, a date earlier in this thirty-year 
stretch rather than later is perhaps more likely.
c. Internal evidence
One further argument for an early Hellenistic date must still be 
examined. Souilhe inferred53 that Thg. 125e8-126a4, in which Theages 
expresses a desire to rule all mankind, or all the more "to become a god," 
reflects the existence of an environment in which this aspiration could have 
been entertained; and the historical context which naturally presents itself 
in this connection, Souilhe added, is that in which the deification of Alex­
ander the Great was debated and enacted. By 324 serious discussion 
began in Athens as to whether Alexander should be worshipped as a 
god;54 already in 327 Alexander had attempted to introduce the act of 
obeisance Trpoo'Kwricns 55 Souilhe assumes that Theages, or rather 
the author himself, has Alexander in mind when the attaining of divine 
status is mentioned. Presumably then, if Thg. is to be dated after the deifi­
cation of Alexander, it must have been written later than 324 (Souilhe 
places it in the third century).
This argument is unconvincing for several reasons. In the first place, 
the notion that Alexander was the first ruler in the Greek world to receive 
divine honours, and was therefore the only paradigm at which Theages 
could be looking, can be dispensed with. Lysander was accorded divine
53Souilhe142; also Robin 1641-2. Souilhd was anticipated by Brunnecke in a brief note 
(182 n.3).
54Cf. Athen. 251b; Din. 1.94; Hyper, in Dem. 31.
55Cf. Arr. An. 4.10.5-12.5; Curt. 8.5.5-21; Plu. Alex. 54.3-6.
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honours by the Samians;56 Dion of Syracuse was deified;57 and (though 
not a ruler) Empedocles was honoured "as a god."58 Early tradition even 
has it that Apollo came to Plato’s father, Ariston, in a dream, and warned 
him not to have intercourse with his wife, Perictione, until she had given 
birth to Plato.59 This story indicates, if not a wholehearted commitment to 
the commonplace occurrence of deification, at any rate a greater receptivity 
among the Greeks to the idea of deification than is ordinarily supposed. 
True, the object of deification may not have been reckoned to have be­
come a god in the strictest sense, but doubtless there was something about 
him which was considered god-//ke, and which therefore demanded vener­
ation. Deification, of one kind or another, thus was not unheard of before 
Alexander's time, and if Theages has any particular individual in mind at 
125e8ff., it need not be Alexander.60
But much more than this, I must confess to strong misgivings as to 
whether we ought even to imagine that the deification of any specific histor­
ical figure lies behind Theages’ proclamation. His thoughts are, after all, 
framed in the most general terms possible, and the passage itself surely re­
flects quite realistically the excitement and exuberance of a young mind 
(see comm, ad loc.). Besides, if it is correct that €Tj£oti|jir|V in 125eS is 
being used of an unrealizable wish (see comm, ad loc.), there can be no 
question of Theages’ being strictly serious about his "prayer" for divine
56Duris ap. Plu. Lys. 18; the date is uncertain, see C. Habicht, Gottmenschentum und 
griechische Stadte? (Munchen, 1970) 243-4.
57Plu. Dion. 46.
58D.L. 8.70.
59Speusippus ap. D.L. 3.2, cf. Olympiodorus, Vit.PL 1, p.191 Hermann; see Wilamowitz, 
Aristoteles undAthen //(Berlin, 1893) 413ff; Jaeger, Aristotle? 108f.
60On the whole matter of deification before Alexander, see Habicht, op. cit. 3-10.
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status: to a large extent his words must represent a manner of speaking.61 
There is no real contradiction here with the comments made just above 
about the individuals who did achieve deification; they are the few ex­
ceptions which prove the rule, and, as I suggested, their deifications should 
probably be treated as hyperbolic instances of reverence. And as far as 
the wish to rule all men is concerned (126a1), here again there is by no 
means any reference to Alexander: the desire for universal rule is a topos 
which goes back as far as Homer.62
That Theages has no thoughts about Alexander will emerge more 
clearly if we consider for a moment the context and meaning of this 
passage. Theages has earlier expressed a desire to become go4>o$; 
Socrates has progressively distorted this desire into a desire to become a 
tyrant; and now, after his most recent distortion through the use of an 
allusion to one of Anacreon’s poems (see Appendix 2), Theages feels he 
must disabuse Socrates of any misconceptions about what he really longs 
for. Thus he says: "I might pray to become a tyrant...as, I think, you and 
everyone else would, and still more perhaps to become a god, but that’s 
not what I said I desired.’’ Two commonplaces are actually at work here: 
First, the belief that eu8ccip.ovia is embodied ideally in the figure of the 
tyrant, the one who commands all he surveys. This was a belief which a 
majority of Greeks probably shared, in one form or another (see comm, ad 
125e8), and so the tyrant’s position was regarded as highly desirable (the 
general acceptability of this belief is stressed by Theages' consecutive use
61Cf. X. Smp. t.15 (the jester Philippos) ovt€ yap eyuyye cnTovSdom av Suvatpriv 
paWov Tyrrep dedvaTos yevecrOai. That the phrase eu^aipriv was a colloquial 
expression seems to me likely; it occurs elsewhere (Ax. 366b7-8), and its survival in the New 
Testament (Acts xxvi.29), despite its optative form, may be due to its formulistic character.
62Cf. Od. 1.389ff. (of Telemachus); see also F. Dirlmeier, Aristoteles, Eudemische Ethik2 
(Berlin, 1969) 288, for some later examples.
211
of oTpuxi [not expressing diffidence] in 125e8 and 126a2). Secondly, in 
the popular imagination the tyrant stood only one step below the gods, and 
writers frequently mention the two in close proximity (see comm, ad 126a2- 
3). Likewise for Theages the first statement naturally, almost formulaically, 
gives rise to the second.
But Theages uses these commonplaces for his own special pur­
pose. Clearly, in his mind it does not matter that he cannot become a tyrant 
or a god, for he has never said that that is what he wants. The desire might 
be latent in the minds of young men like him (see Intr. ch. I, b, iii, v; c, ch. Ill, 
b), but his actual words in the text do not allow us this kind of speculation, 
and such a desire does not represent the point at issue: Theages has no 
aspirations to become a tyrant. Failure to recognize this has largely led 
commentators astray,63 for it has escaped their notice that in these lines 
Theages is not (as seems to be assumed) acquiescing in Socrates’ irony, 
reluctantly affirming that ideally he would wish to be a tyrant, but that his 
present desire is nothing more than a timid second best. On the contrary, 
125e8-126a4 perform a much different function: they serve to communicate 
Theages’ rebuke of Socrates for his behaviour over the previous few 
pages, and Theages’ addition of ctl 8c ye lctgjs p-aXXov 0cos yev~ 
ccOai (126a2-3) merely carries Socrates' distortions one inevitable and 
predictable step further; we are doubtless justified to understand that The­
ages feels he is saving Socrates the trouble of extending his distortion, a
63See, e.g., Pavlu 28; Friedlander 11.149-50; Kruger 9; Pangle 161-3. Pavlu (34) provides 
the best example of a misinterpretation of 125e8-126a4. His understanding is that Theages 
becomes carried away with the excitement evoked by the prospect of ruling all men, 
extends this to cover possible deification, and then catches himself, by expressing the 
words aXX’ ou totjtou eXeyov emOupeiv, before incurring divine wrath over such an 
hubristic wish. Nietszche was seduced into a similar disregard of context by the gnomic 
quality of this passage; cf. The Will to Power, tr. W. Kaufmann (New York, 1967) 503 (Bk. 4, 
aphorism 958): "In Plato’s Theages it is written: 'Each one of us would like to be master over 
all men, if possible, and best of all God.' This attitude must exist again."
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thing which Socrates himself (Theages must imagine) was probably bound 
to do in any event.64 Above all, Theages wishes to convey to Socrates that 
he meant what he said when he originally expressed his principal desire 
(viz., apyciv tcSv ev ttq ttoXci 124a1), and that all the previous talk 
about tyranny has been completely misguided. The phrase .
av (125e8) puts this talk appropriately into a never-never land of idle 
fancy; Theages has had enough of tyranny, or of any other prospects the 
imagination might entertain. The tone of Theages' utterance is that of 
anger and irritation, not of wistful animation.
Consequently, the contrast Theages sets up in these lines is not 
really a contrast between an unrealizable, but nevertheless highly attrac­
tive and desirable, goal on the one hand, and one which can be attained 
on the other, as has been suggested. It is much rather a contrast between 
the time a young man might waste on pointless daydreams, and his much 
more profitable desire for something which can be achieved; and up to this 
point Socrates, in Theages' mind, has been simply wasting time. Hence 
Theages' words, taken as overt criticism and reprobation, effectively follow 
upon the objection against Socrates which he expressed shortly before 
(125e4), and which he amplifies further at 126a7-8. It is important also that 
125e8-126a4 act as a transitional hinge to Socrates' more correct 
appreciation of what Theages is after, in so far as Socrates subsequently 
abandons his earlier ironical premise about Theages' desire to become a 
tyrant; Socrates has recognized Theages' words for what they are.
Thus Theages' prayer to become a tyrant and a god is not really a 
prayer (in the sense of a fervent desire) at all. Rather, it is an expression, in
64C.W. Muller's judgement (137) of the function of etl. . .yevecreai ("Die exzessive 
Steigerung l&sst den ironischen Unterton deutlich werden") is, it seems to me, roughly 
consistent with the above interpretations.
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the form of a commonplace, designed and adapted to show Socrates how 
ridiculous his whole line of questioning and argumentation has been, and 
to demonstrate to him that Theages' true wishes are reasonable, serious, 
and mature.65 There is nothing here which can support a Hellenistic date 
for Thg.
d. The evidence of Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics
C.W. Muller has brought forward an interesting piece of evidence 
which, if he is correct about his assumptions, may help us to narrow the 
date of Thg. still further.66 Although it is not completely inseparable from 
the previous discussion, it deserves full consideration in its own right.
According to Muller (143f.), there is a significant correspondence 
between Thg. 125e8-126a4 and Aristotle EE 1225b32-37. In Thg. The­
ages draws a distinction between prayer (ev£ocipT)v e8) and desire 
(eTTL0Upcl v a3): we pray for what is unattainable (see comm, ad loc.), 
such as to become a tyrant or even a god, but we desire what is within 
human capacity (see sec. c). Aristotle discusses the meaning of the key 
term TrpoocLpcaLS by means of comparison: ocXXoc pr)i/ ouSc (3oljX“ 
tjctls kocl iTpootipeaLS tccvtov (3oijXovtccl pcv yap cvlcc kocl 
t(3v dcSuvdcTW clSotcs, oTov PocctlXcijclv to ttocvtcov ccvepaj- 
TTCJJV KOCL CC0CCVOCTOL cTvOCL, TTpOOCLpCLTOCL 8’ OU0CLS p?) OCyVOcBv 
otl ocSljvoctov, olj8’ oXcos a Suvoctov pcv, pq e<()’ ocuTcp 8’ olctocl 
Trpoc^ocL r) pr| TTpcc^ocL. Muller (144) drew attention to the verbal con­
nection between the contrasting pairs ctj£ccLpr|V~eTrL0tip€LV in Thg. and 
(3oLjXoi/TOCL~TTpoocLpeLTOCL in EE, both sets of words expressing wishes
65For the widespread tendency to attribute excessive naivete to Theages, see lntr. ch. Ill, 
b.
66C.W. Muller 135-47; also Die Kurzdialoge 108 n.1.
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that are and are not attainable. Interestingly, the examples Aristotle used 
of the impossible desire are virtually identical with their counterparts in 
Thg.: in both works it is an impossible desire to wish to rule all men 
(rupavvos ycvecy6ai~(3ao'i\e'ueiv) or to become a god (0eos 
yeveaecci-cxectvotTOL elvctL).
The coincidence here is impressive, and it is tempting to concur with 
Muller that the correspondence is not a matter of chance. But the relation­
ship between these two passages is anything but easy to analyze. 
Derivation of Thg. from EE seems at least unlikely: the one thing which all 
the sources of Thg. considered in previous chapters have in common is 
that they are associated with the genre of Socratic literature, and the inter­
ests of the author of Thg. are clearly more literary and biographical than 
philosophical. The EE would therefore be a slightly curious repository of 
material for this writer. As Muller himself recognized (144), Theages’ 
"prayer" to become a tyrant or god is manifestly coherent and intelligible 
within its own specific context, and it thus appears on the face of it to have 
been fashioned specifically for the role it plays in this work rather than to 
have been imposed externally on its context. In EE on the other hand the 
examples of unrealizable wishes cited above are simply two among a 
number which Aristotle uses both before and after this one to elucidate his 
argument.
If we accept then that the correspondence between Thg. and EE is 
not fortuitous, either the latter derives from the former, or they both recall a 
common source. The lack of any further correspondences between Thg. 
and EE, or for that matter between Thg. and any other Aristotelian work, is 
some evidence that Aristotle did not have Thg. in mind at EE 1225b32-37. 
Further evidence is supplied by the fact that elsewhere (EN 1111 b20-3,
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MM 1189a5-7) the unrealizable wish (pouVriors) is simply for "immor­
tality,” whereas "to rule all men” is excluded. What is important here is that 
Aristotle on other occasions was conscious of a very comparable simile to 
the one presented in EE; it is therefore reasonable to infer that "to rule all 
men" or "to become god/immortal," or both, ranked as topoi of the unfulfill­
able desire (see also sec. c), which Aristotle used as he saw fit. If however 
we supplement this inference with the conjecture that such topoi originated 
within the Academy, and that both the author of Thg. and Aristotle are 
drawing from this common source in their respective passages, we are on 
dangerous grounds. Muller himself considered this possibility (145 n.45), 
but wisely rejected it: under normal circumstances, a Greek could not have 
expressed an unrealizable wish more assertively than by calling to mind 
the notion of transcending his own humanity (see sec. c). It is therefore 
useless, I think, to search for a specific source for this topos, let alone 
expect that we shall discover its origins in a philosophical school. Besides, 
the contrast which seems to be presented in Thg. is not, as we have seen 
(sec.c), pointedly between wishes that can and cannot be fulfilled, i.e., 
between what Theages would really desire and what he feels he must be 
contented with. Yet if the passages from Thg. and EE were closely con­
nected, we should have expected the contrast which Aristotle establishes 
to be drawn in bolder outline in Thg. than is in fact the case.
It was Muller's verdict (145) that the passage in EE derives from 
Thg.®7 For my own part, however, I must conclude, though with some 
measure of diffidence, that the above passages, depending as they do on 
natural commonplace expressions, are most likely connected only by coin­
cidence.
67Muller has found a supporter in Thesleff, Platonic Chronology 218 n.39.
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e. Style and linguistic evidence
A number of linguistic criteria have been cited in the past to prove a 
late date (or inauthenticity) for Thg. As I have already dealt extensively 
with questions of style and linguistic usage in connection with authorship 
(see Intr. ch. IV, b), and have concluded that this evidence, when used to 
prove spuriousness, cannot pass closer investigation, I will not repeat the 
earlier findings here. But I should mention again that, taken by themselves, 
style and linguistic criteria point to a date of composition early in Plato's 
literary career. Moreover, the structure of the dialogue follows, if anything, 
the schemes of some early Platonic compositions (though with significant 
modifications, see Intr. ch. I, b, iii, v, c; ch. IV, c). This category of evidence 
is therefore essentially the only one which can support an early date (i.e., c. 
380 or earlier) iorThg. Still, it must be emphasized that this evidence is 
only useful if it can be proved that Plato is the author of this dialogue. This 
is, however, a conclusion that has already emerged as untenable.
f. The theme and purpose of Thg.
Finally, how can the purpose for which Thg. was written, as argued 
above (Intr. ch. I, c), be used as evidence for its date of composition? We 
have already seen that the section on the divine sign can be brought to 
bear on the question of date. A consideration of the overall theme of the 
dialogue is now required.
A summary of a few of the findings of the earlier chapter on subject 
and purpose is in order. Broadly speaking, Thg. considers, from a Socra- 
tic/Platonic point of view, the claims of alternate forms of education, charac­
teristically described in this dialogue as "association" (cnjvoucria), and the
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author has striven to keep this theme in the foreground from the very start 
of the work. Socratic association is approved, and the consequence of it is 
seen to be the Platonic political ideal of ’'improvement" of individuals. At 
the same time, the dramatic circumstances mark the dialogue out, at least 
partly, as an encouragement towards a way of life distinct from that of the 
sophists or politicians.68 69
That Socrates, the sophists, and oi ttoXltlkol are made the chief 
subjects of this debate over rival educational claims, and that the dialogue 
is virtually confined to the problem of the relative value of these individuals 
as educators, suggest that Thg. was written under circumstances in which it 
was considered necessary to offer a defence of one educational ideal 
against the claims of others. The tone of Thg., which is unmistakably apo­
logetic, supports this inference. Such a scheme is, I believe, most intelli­
gible in the context of the polemics waged between the Academy and 
Isocrates' school, for in this environment there was clearly a need to dis­
tinguish the activities and pretensions of sophist and politician from those 
of philosopher; the passages, for example, from Ft. and Men. cited in Intr. 
ch. I, c(fin.) indicate this, and so, more overtly, does Plato's projected tri­
logy Sophist-Politicus-Philosopher.QQ If this analysis of the situation in 
which the author worked is correct, there will certainly be little difficulty in 
setting Thg. within the last twenty years of Plato's life, and this time frame 
may even be extended to the death of Isocrates in 338. Moreover, the 
criticisms of Plato made after Isocrates' death by Theopompus, a student of
68Forthe details see Intr. ch. I, c.
69See Guthrie, HGP V. 122-3.
Isocrates, argue for an environment in which a defence of the Academy 
would have been apposite even after 338.70
g. Conclusions
Only certain kinds of evidence are of any substantial assistance in 
allowing us to arrive at a date of composition for Thg. Ancient testimonia 
and the evidence for the history of the Platonic Corpus can do no more 
than provoke hypotheses that Thg. is not post-Alexandrian. Some other 
evidence is purely negative: there is no sign that the author of Thg. was in 
any way influenced by discussions about Alexander, or that Thg. and 
Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics are somehow connected. Language and style 
point to an early date, but this evidence would be significant only if Plato 
were unquestionably the author of Thg., and in any event its dependence 
on Tht. necessarily rules out such a date. All this evidence for the dating of 
Thg. can do little or nothing to help us identify a reasonably precise period 
of composition.
We are therefore left with two categories of criteria, i.e., the conclu­
sions which can be drawn about the philosophical and literary environment 
in which Thg. was composed, and the clues furnished by the theme and 
purpose of the dialogue. These are, however, of considerable importance, 
and by far the greatest share of the evidence adduced in these fields 
suggests a date of composition within the middle decades of the fourth- 
century B.C., let us say 365-330. I have already given one or two reasons 
for favouring a terminus ante quern closer to c. 345 (sec.c, d), and even if 
there is no way of being certain about this time frame, I think there is merit
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70Theopompus attacked the Academy in his treatise KctTaSpopr) Tqs nXccTcnvos 
SiocTpip-qs (FGrH/'sf 115 T.48, F. 259).
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in Rist’s notion (19) that the years immediately following Plato’s death pro­
vided excellent opportunities for the assimilation, intentional or otherwise, 
of spurious material under the name of Plato himself.71
I have witheld until now any consideration of the guidance Ala I can 
offer us in specifying an accurate date. The arguments for believing that 
this work was a source for the author of Thg. can be found above (Intr. ch. I, 
b, iii, v, vii} ch. II, c, d). Although the evidence is not absolutely compelling, I 
feel it is very likely that the author of Thg. wrote with a knowledge of Ala /; 
at any rate, both show strong signs of having been composed within the 
same philosophical milieu.72 Presumably, then, such a dependence on 
this work will also furnish a terminus post quern for Thg. which we might 
hope will define the date of composition more precisely than has been 
otherwise possible. Yet difficulties remain. Was Plato the author of Ale. I? 
Most scholars nowadays do not believe so (and I have already given 
further reasons why this position is probably correct, see Intr. ch. II, c), but 
even at that there is no unanimity about its date, although the range 345­
340 B.C. has met with approval.73 But if certainty about the date of Ala / is 
not possible, it is unlikely that it will advance our conclusions about the
71Pavlu's suggestion (PhilWoch 59.22 [1939] 596-7) of composition at the time of Grantor 
or shortly thereafter seems to me slightly late (see also Intr. ch. il n.92). It is not altogether 
surprising that Antisthenes rears his head in the controversy over the date of Thg., given 
the number of supposed reactions to Antisthenes that have been detected in Plato's 
dialogues (see Guthrie, HGP III. 310-11). It is of curiosity value more than anything else that 
Fritzsche (230-1) believed that Thg., in the manner in which it represented Aristides' claim to 
have ''learned nothing" from Socrates (130d4), in effect corrupted the Antisthenic principle 
that virtue does not require teaching.
72This also was the view of Wilamowitz, Hermes 32 (1897) 103; Pavlu (33-4) directly 
opposed Wilamowitz, but the additional evidence I have advanced in Intr. ch. ii, c(see also 
previous n.) further supports the latter.
73See, e.g., Pavlu, WS31 (1909) 37; R.S. Bluck, CQn.s.3 (1953) 52; Taylor, PMW6 522; 
C.A. Bos, Interpretatie vaderschap en datiering van de Alcibiades Maior (Culemborg, 1970) 
107-12. Some upholders of authenticity are Friedlander 11.231-43; C. Vink, Platos eerste 
Alcibiades: Een onderzoek naar zijn authenticiteit (Amsterdam, 1939); A. J. Festugiere, 
Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon (Paris, 1950).
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date of Thg. With some reluctance therefore I should prefer not to base any 
primary assumptions about the date of Thg. on this work, rather than to 
argue ignotum per ignotius.
Weighing all the available evidence, I would offer 345-335 as a 
conjectural period within which Thg. was written.
Appendix: Dramatic Date
Taylor (533) claimed to have discovered a conflict of evidence with 
regard to the dramatic date of Thg.: "There is one glaring anachronism, a 
reference to the mission of Thrasyllus to Ionia in the year 409. Since R. 
[496b6ff.] manifestly speaks of Theages as a grown man, the reference to 
the Sicilian disaster is probably a second.”74 Taylor assumes that the 
mention in Thg. of Theages as a peipocKio'Kos' (cf. 122c8, with n. ad loc.) 
at the putative dramatic date of the dialogue is a biographical mis­
representation. And this would probably be true, if the details of the 
reference to Theages in R. can be pressed, and if the dramatic date of 421 
which he assigns (263-4) to R. is also the correct one. His evidence, 
however, is meagre and open to criticism. For Taylor attaches excessive 
importance to an incidental detail in R, and to the dramatic date of 421 
which he assigns to that dialogue. Not only may this date be disputed (see 
n.89), but we must also ask if Plato still had his mind firmly fixed upon any 
dramatic date when he came to write R. 496b (bk. 6). The biographical
74For the recognition of anachronisms in Plato’s dialogues in antiquity cf. Athen. 216c, 
217c-218e, Ael. Ar. Il.369f., 435 (Dindorf), Macrob. Sat. 1.1.5; for a collection of Platonic 
anachronisms see O. Gigon ad Mem. 1.3.8; and for modern discussions see E. Zeller, 
AKAWB (1873) 79-99; R. Hirzel, Der Dialog I (Leipzig, 1895) 18ff. Aeschines Socraticus’ 
flagrant anacronism in presenting Xenophon, Xenophon's wife, and Aspasia together in the 
dialogue Aspasia (see Dittmar 32 n.118) may indicate that the use of anachronism 
approached the status of a topos in the Socratic dialogue.
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information about Theages reported by Ft. is, I take it, historically accurate 
(see lntr. ch. I, c); but this does not compel us to believe that it is also 
consistent with any specific dramatic date that may be assigned to R. That 
dialogue cannot be relied upon to help us determine the age of Theages at 
the dramatic date of Thg., and it rather looks as though Taylor has been 
forced into his assertion by his belief in the absolute veracity of the 
dramatic details of Plato's portrait of Socrates.
Our most important data for calculating dramatic date are 1) the 
reference to Archelaus, son of Perdiccas (124d2-3), 2) the information that 
the Sicilian expedition has already met with disaster (129c8f.), and 3) the 
statement that Thrasyllus, the Athenian general, has begun a journey to 
Ephesus (129d4ff.). Both 1) and 2) imply a dramatic date some time after 
the year 413 B.C.: Archelaus came to the Macedonian throne in 413, and 
the Sicilian expedition reached its disastrous conclusion in September of 
the same year. 3) is a certain reference to Thrasyllus' Ionian campaign 
and defeat at Ephesus in the summer of 409.75 Since, according to 
Socrates, the fleet is already making its way to Ephesus at the time of the 
dialogue, we must assume the dramatic date to be 409 B.C. The further 
detail that Charmides, who was dead by 403, is still alive (128e8-9) at the 
time of the dramatic date, accords with this calculation 76
75Cf. X. HG 1.2.6-10, Plut. Ala 29.
76The statement in 124d2-3 that Archelaus has just recently attained power in Macedonia 
(top vgcoctl toutov apxovTa cv MctKGSoviQt) appears a little unusual at first glance, 
in so far as vgcjocttl must refer to an interval of three to four years from the dramatic date. 
But VGcncrTL, like some other expressions of time (e.g. Tra\ai, cf. Lat. nuper), can be 
applied colloquially to represent merely a vague temporal relation. For parallels one might 
cite the use of vglocjtl in three Herodotean passages, 2.49, 7.143, and 7.148,where all 
the appearances of vgcdotl cover a period considerably longer than the three to four years 
in Thg. (see A.S. Evans, AJP 108 [1987] 382-4; Dodds, Euripides, Bacchae2 [Oxford, 
1960] xx).
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There are notably few of Plato's dialogues whose dramatic dates 
can be established nearly as precisely as that of Thg. The dialogues which 
focus on Socrates' trial or make reference to it (Euthph., Ap., Cri., Phd., 
Tht.) naturally form a single category in this respect. Dramatic dates which 
can probably be fixed with reasonable precision belong to La. (between 
424 and 418), Chrm. (about 432), Men. (402), and Prt. (433-2, despite an 
anachronism at 327d3-4 concerning Phaerecrates' comedy Savages).77 
Some other dialogues can be located very tenuously at 409 B.C. or there­
abouts. Phdr. seems to occur around 410;78 R. may be set between 411 
and 409, but there is room for doubt;79 and the dramatic date of Euthd. 
cannot be established precisely, but it may fall around 410.80 What this 
data seems to suggest is that Plato's concern to establish internally co­
herent dramatic dates for his dialogues was greatest in the early and early- 
middle compositions, when it was still his purpose to provide realistic and 
historical settings in which his Socrates, not as yet transformed to the 
degree that he would be in later works, might conduct his conversations. In 
these works Plato at least seems to have been aiming for the appearance 
of historical veracity.81 Thus when the author of Thg. came to supply his 
work with a precise dramatic date, it was the pattern furnished by those 
earlier dialogues that he had in mind. This evidence perhaps suggests 
that our author sought to construct his work in such a way as to evoke, as 
far as his theme and purpose allowed, an impression that Thg. was a
77But see J. Walsh, CQn.s.34 (1984) 101-6.
78See R. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus (Cambridge, 1952) 8.
79See Guthrie, HGP IV. 437-8.
80/d. 267.
81 See F.M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London, 1937) 5.
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"Socratic" work in its own right (see further Intr. ch. I, b, iii, v; c; ch. Hi, a; ch. 
IV, b, c).
224
Textual Transmission
Two of the three catalogues of Plato manuscripts compiled this 
century, those of Post and Brumbaugh-Wells, list 34 which contain all or 
part of Thg.A The most complete catalogue, that of Wilson, lists only 31, but 
adds the other three under the category of miscellaneous extracts.1 2 Two 
further items in Wilson's list of extracts prove to contain a small portion of 
Thg. (R.M. 16 C 25.A; Madr.1.36; see below); I have found in addition a part 
of Thg. in another ms. not mentioned in the above catalogues (Vat.113).3 
This brings the number of medieval witnesses of Thg. to 37; and, while 
there is no guarantee that portions or, perhaps, all of the dialogue are not 
to be found in other mss., the possibility that such findings would shed any 
significant light on the text is at least slight.4 The remarks in section a of 
this chapter are based on full collations of all but one of these 37 mss., both 
from examination in situ,5 and from inspection of photographic reproduc­
tions.6 Since conclusions cannot be safely drawn from Bekker's silence, or 
from Stallbaum's very sketchy report of the mss. he collated, rather full in­
1L.A. Post, The Vatican Plato and its Relations (Middletown, 1934) 65-92; R.S. Brumbaugh 
and R. Wells, The Plato Manuscripts: A New Index (New Haven, 1968) 143-4.
2N.G. Wilson, Scriptorium 16 (1962) 386-95, esp. 394, 395.
3I am grateful to the Greek Index Project at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Uni­
versity of Toronto, for drawing this ms. to my attention.
4The following mss. in Wilson’s catalogue might contain fragments of Thg. (I cite by Wilson's
numbers [395]): 55, 82, 103, 115, 141, 175, 178, 221.
6Ven.App.CI.4.1 (T), Ven.184, Ven.186, Ven.189.
6Either microfilm, photograph, or photostat; photographic facsimile (Leiden, 1898) was 
used for the collation of Clarkianus 39 (B).
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formation is given for much of this evidence; the results which are arrived at 
concerning ms. affiliations are summarized (as far as possible) in a stem­
ma codicum (though small extracts of the dialogue generally resist such 
classification, and are not included). Standard sigla will be employed, 
where practicable; but, to avoid confusion, some secondary mss. have 
been given sigla which are intended to be self-explanatory.7
In addition to the manuscript tradition, the indirect tradition of Thg. is 
considered (sec. b), as well as the scholia to this dialogue (sec. c). The 
Latin translation of Ficino and early printed editions (Aldine, Basel, Steph­
anus) have been collated, and are examined in a separate section (sec. d). 
This review of textual evidence concludes with a brief statement about 
modern editions of the dialogue and the method of the present edition (sec. 
e). It should be added that R.A. Pack does not list any papyrus discoveries 
for Thg. up to the middle of the 1960’s,8 and I have been unable to trace 
any finds made since that time.9
a. Medieval Manuscripts™
M Cesena - Malatestianus D 28.4. Date is disputed: Rostagno 
thought s.xii (Jowett-Campbell II.69, 157), Maas s.xiii or xiv (Dodds 49); 
s.xiv (or later) seems most likely since for tetr. 1-7 and Spuria it is a 
descendant of Par.1808, which is dated to s.xiii (see Par.1808). Contents:
7Note also that in the following discussions corrections by the original scribe are repre­
sented by siglum plus superscript c (xc); later correctors are represented by superscript 
numbers, beginning with 2 (x2).
QThe Greek and Latin Literary Texts from Graeco-Roman Egypfi (Ann Arbor, 1965).
9Volume 52 of The Oxyrhynchus Papyri (London, 1984) brings up to date all identified 
Platonic papyri in the holdings of the Egypt Exploration Society (see Preface).
1 °The format generally adhered to in each of the examinations of mss. is as follows: siglum; 
location of ms.; catalogue name; date (I have usually followed accepted datings of mss.); 
Platonic contents and position of Thg.- previous collations for Thg., with important biblio­
graphical data; and discussion of readings and affiliations of the ms. itself.
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tetr.1-7, Spuria, 8.1, Timaeus Locrus, 8.3-9.1, Carm. Aur., Ft. Previously 
uncollated for Thg., but described by Campbell in JP 11 (1882) 195-200, 
who collated it for Ft. That M derives from Par.1808 was first suggested by 
Schanz (Platocodex 104), and subsequently shown to be true for Grg. by 
Dodds (49-51), and for tetr. 4 by Carlini (35). For Thg. the following 
readings are evidential: 124b1 oT|^ai om. Par.1808 M; 125a6 KOCT^yop- 
rjKe Par. 1808 M, KCCT€ipT]K€ BTW; 125d7 oTS’ om. Par.1808 M, s.i. add. 
Mc; 127 d7 auTov postttoXlttiv add. Par.1808 M. Since Par.1808 is 
earlier than M (see below on Par.1808), it, rather than M, must be the 
source of these readings. It is doubtful however that M is, as Dodds 
supposed (49 n.3), a direct copy of Par.1808. Rather, some peculiarities 
shared by M and Par.1809 (apart from the characteristic Par.1808 readings 
that they both display) suggest that these two mss. are related; and E. Berti 
(Hermes 97 [1969] 430-1) has proved by M's omission of a full line of 
Par.1809 in Cri. 49c3-5 (no homoeoteleuton) that for that dialogue at least 
the line of descent is from Par.1809 to M. Though there is no reason to 
doubt this same derivation for M in the case of Thg. as well, the positive 
evidence is not as extensive as might be desired, and some caution must 
be exercised in its evaluation. M and Par.1809 share the following errors: 
122c2 ocicr0d|JLe0oc M Par.1809 (W), aiCT0c6[JLe0a Mc Par.1808 BT; 
123a7-8Trpos ep.e (jiaxeTai T€ Kai om. M Par.1809, add. Mc; 127a2 
ottt] M Par.1809 (W), ottoi Par.1808 BT; 130a4 otoow M Par.1809, 
otouow Mc Par.1808 (BTW). It is only fair to say that all these errors 
could have arisen independently in M and Par.1809 (note homoeoteleuton 
in the omission in 123a7-8). Moreover, the fact that in three of these four 
instances the original hand in M supplies the correct reading would induce 
one to believe that these corrections were made simply by a check of the
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exemplar. But the addition of oT8’ in 125d7 by Mc (interestingly enough, 
the same correction is made in Ang.107 and Flor.b) suggests that this and 
other corrections have taken place against a ms. other than the exemplar. 
With due reservation I would suggest that M is, in Thg. as in Cri., an 
offspring of Par.1809 (for proof that Par.1809 is not a copy of M, see 
Par.1809). If, then, M descends from Par.1809, it will be best to assume, as 
Berti has done with regard to Cri., that it descends via an intermediary. The 
variant aTpccTeiocs in 129d8 (i.m.) shows that this intermediary had been 
contaminated with readings from W or B; Berti postulated from evidence for 
Cri. that the intermediary was a member of the W tradition. This assump­
tion of a stage between Par.1809 and M would explain why M can pre­
serve the true reading where Par.1809 goes astray: 122c7 pevToi M 
recte, pev tl Par.1809; 126d1 ere M recte, ye Par. 1809; and a few other 
readings preserved in M, but not found in Par.1809, possibly point to this 
intermediary: 123e10 poucriK'q M Par.1812 Urb.80 recte, p.O'UOTKfjs Par. 
1809 (BTW); 128c1 e0e\^ M et recc. (recte), eQeXoi Par.1809 (BTW); 
130e2 KOce'Op.Tiv M et recc., Ka0oipr)V Par.1809 (BTW); 130e8 TraiSeu- 
e-qvcxL M (sedi.m. yp. TrotL8eLie<j0ai), Trai8eijecr0ai Par.1809 (BTW). 
The fact that the variant ttcclScuOt] vai (130e8) occurs only in M and 
Urb.80 (both times alongside Trai8eiJecF0ai) suggests that M’s inter­
mediary is in some way related to Urb.80 (which has also been contamin­
ated from W or one of its offspring).
Flor.a Florence - Laurentianus 59.1. Date: s.xiv; the oldest ms. 
containing the complete works of Plato (although Eryx. is not included). 
Collated by Stallbaum (a), whose report is highly selective. Flor.a pre­
serves the readings and omissions that are most characteristic of Par.1808: 
124b1 oTpcci om. Flor.a Par.1808; 125a6 KOCTTiyop^KC Flor.a Par.1808;
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125d7 ol8’ om. Flor.a Par.1808; 127d7 auTOV posttto\ltt(V add. Flor.a 
Par. 1808. In fact, Flor.a rarely deviates from Par. 1808; there are only three 
separative errors: 123a6 8r| om. Flor.a; 123b3 om. Flor.a; 123c6-9 
avuSvn|jios.. .iTOTepov om. Flor.a. On the basis of this evidence, it is 
probable that for Thg. Flor.a is a direct copy of Par.1808; that Flor.a does 
not preserve quite the same order of dialogues as Par.1808 and includes 
matter not found in Par.1808 need not cast any serious doubt on this 
conclusion. Flor.a is in its own turn the parent of the sub-family Flor.c o 
Ven.189 Pal.175 Fic.
Flor.b Florence - Laurentianus 85.6. Date: s.xiii according to Post 
(66) and Wilson (387), but in Dodds' opinion not later than 1355, "and 
probably not very much earlier" (48). Contains tetr.1-6, Ion, Clit, Tim., Hp. 
ma. and mi., Menex., R. 1,2. Collated for Thg. by Stallbaum, who did not 
publish full collations; siglum b Stallbaum, Flor Dodds. Schanz thought 
that Flor.b descended from T through Par.1808 (Platocodex 56), and 
Dodds demonstrated that this is true of Grg. (48-53). The same derivation 
can be proved for Thg. (note also Par.1808 is older): cf. 124b1 oTpai om. 
Flor.b Par.1808; 125a6 KaTqyopqKe Flor.b Par.1808; 125d7 oTS’ om. 
Flor.b Par.1808, add. s.l. Flor.b0; 127d7 auTOV yevecrGai aya0ou 
Flor.b, auTou ayaGov yeveo-Qai Par.1808c (auTov s.Z.), ayaGou 
yeuccrGai BTW. Moreover, Dodds (49) was clearly right when he sug­
gested that Flor.b is an indirect derivative of Par. 1808. As a matter of fact, it 
is probably the case that Flor.b and Neap.337 descend independently from 
a copy of Par.1808; the evidence for a correspondence between the two, 
and for the independence of Neap.337 from Flor.b, is gathered below (see 
on Neap.337). Likewise, there is evidence to show that Flor.b is not a copy 
of Neap.337, for it sometimes preserves a true reading against Neap.337:
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125e8 pcv Flor.b, om. Neap.337; 126a1 pccXiaToc pev ttcxvtcov av“ 
epcoiTcnv Flor.b (recte), tt a vtcov pev avepojTrcnv paXiaTCC Neap.337; 
128c3 eTreiSr] Flor.b (recte), cttci Neap.337; cf. also 123b3 eTTeeupeiS' 
Flor.b Coisl.155 (recte), CTTieupeis cett.; 125d11 eTTiaTacrecci Flor.b 
(recte), CTTicTTpaacrQai Neap.337; 126e4 &Tipd£oi Flor.b (recte), ~ei 
Neap.337; 127a2 croi Flor.b (recte), ere Neap.337; 127a9 poi Flor.b 
(recte), pf) Neap.337; 128b1 ovSev Flor.b (recte), ouSe Neap.337.
Flor.c Florence - Laurentianus 85.9. Date s.xv, one of only three 
extant complete Plato mss. (the others are Flor.a and Ven.184); the con­
tents are arranged in the order tetr.1-7, Spuria, and the remainder in a 
slightly disrupted order. Collated by Stallbaum: siglum c. Flor.c descends 
from Flor.a (see Hiller, Hermes 10 [1876] 173; Schanz, Platocodex 60f., 
95). It contains the characteristic readings of Par.1808 preserved in Flor.a 
(see above on Flor.a), as well as the omissions attributable to Flor.a at 
123a6 8r|, and at 123c6 avcovvpos.. .c9 TTOTepov; at 123b3, where 
Flor.a omits Flor.c prints tJ), but omits ol which follows that word in our 
texts (itacism?). Apart from this, it adds a number of errors, e.g. 122b3 
rpris Flor.c, rpiow Flor.a; 124d3 toijtcov T)yQ Flor.c, toijtcdv 
Flor.a; 127d3 paXiaTa croi Flor.c, paXicrr’ av croi Flor.a; 130d3 €0T] 
epen Flor.c, cpco cc|)T] Flor.a; but it corrects Flor.a at 121d5 in a trivial 
reading (aiJTCJP Flor.a, clutov Flor.c), and its omission of ti at 128b8 re­
presents, I think, the true reading (see comm, ad loc.). It is almost certainly 
a direct copy of Flor.a, and is the source of Ven.189 (see below).
Flor.i Florence - Laurentianus Conv. Sopp. 54. Date s.xiv; contains 
Alb. Eisag., tetr. 1-3, 4.1, 5.2 (138a1-139d2 missing) -4, Thg. up to 122e6 
(Scriv. Collated by Stallbaum (siglum i), who wrongly continues to attri­
bute a couple of readings to it after 122e6 (unless more of the ms. was ex­
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tant when he collated it). The folio leaves which contain Thg. have been 
heavily damaged, and at various places it is impossible to determine (at 
least from microfilm) what the scribe has written. Post (67) suggests a con­
nection with Flor.b, but from the limited evidence which I have this can 
hardly be confirmed. Flor.i agrees with T in two trivial instances, 121c2 tcc 
aXXcc Flor.i T, TaXXoc BW; 122a1 totjtcbv Flor.i T, totjtov BW. Con­
versely, it agrees with W at 121d5 octjtov Flor.i W, octjtcjjv BT; and with 
BW at 122a1 peXei, peXXei T; again these are minor agreements. At 
122c2 Flor.i may read aw^Oetas, which would associate it closely with 
W, but I cannot be certain. However, although there are no other indica­
tions of affiliation for the portion of this ms. containing Thg., J.A. Philip 
(Phoenix 22 [1968] 291) has made it probable that Flor.i descends from W 
for Sph., so the same line may possibly be traced for Thg. as well.
Flor.o Florence - Laurentianus Conv. Sopp. 180. Date: s.xv; con­
tains Ti. Locr., Ti., tetr.4-6, 8.4, 9, Epigr. Collated by Stallbaum: siglum o. 
The general opinion about Flor.o, that it is a copy of Flor.a (see Schanz, 
Piatocodex 60-1; Post 38), is certainly true of Thg. It reproduces the char­
acteristic readings of Par.1808, from which Flor.a descends (see on Flor.a), 
as well as the three omissions of Flor.a: 123a6 8t) om. Flor.a o; 123b3 
om. Flor.a o; 123c6 dvcovLipos.. .c9 TTOTepov om. Flor.a o. Flor.o also 
introduces some of its own omissions and disjunctive readings, e.g., 
121b7-c1 kocl StjqkoXos postyLyveToci transp. Flor.o; 122b4 pouXevfl 
Flor.o (Ven.186 184), anp.pcruXevfl cett.; 125a5 Te om. Flor.o; 127c6 t[8t| 
om. Flor.o; 127c8 Seot Flor.o (M), Sei^ cett.; 130b4 ocKOucn post ZcDKpcc- 
Tes transp. Flor.o (Par.1811). The three errors above which are shared by 
other secondary mss. are likely coincidental.
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Voss. Gr.54 Leiden - Vossianus Graecus 54. Date: s.xv-xvi. Con­
tains excerpts from numerous dialogues, but for Thg. only the proverb in 
122b2-3 is quoted, in the adapted form lepdv o'U|jL(3o'U\'q Xpq|Jia 
ctcxl eTvcti; a very abbreviated version of the scholion to this passage is 
also included. As this abbreviated scholion is found only in T and its 
descendants, and the second title Trepi cro^ias which is given here is 
the reading in T (Trepi o■cn<})poo''UVT]s, BW), Voss.Gr.54 may perhaps go 
back to some offspring of T.
R.M. 16 C 25.A London - Royal Manuscripts 16 C 25.A. Date: s.xvi. 
Contains small excerpts from 25 Platonic works; otThg. only 121 b1 TrdvTcc 
- c1 ccvOpciJTriw was copied. It cites Thg. as Trepi aortas, the subtitle 
preserved in T alone; otherwise there are no indications of its source, and 
no new readings of note (but see following ms.).
Madr.1.36 Madrid - Plut. 1.36. Date: 1480, in the hand of Constan­
tine Lascaris (see Wilson 388). As far as I can tell, the selections from 
Plato in this ms. are identical to those in R.M. 16 C 25.A. The Thg. selec­
tion is the same (121 b1 -c1), and both here and in the London ms. we find 
kocXt) proTroWT) in b7. The two mss. are obviously related (this ms. may 
be the source of the preceding one), and it would appear that we are 
dealing here with a recension of a Renaissance anthology.
Escor. Madrid - EscorialensisYA.13. Date: s.xiii. It has previously 
been collated for tetr.4 (Carlini), 1.2 (see W.S.M. Nicoll, CQ n.s.16 [1966] 
76-7), and 2.2 (see W. Hicken, CQ n.s.17 [1967] 98-102), but not for Thg.’, 
nor have I been able, despite repeated attempts, to obtain reproductions 
for the part of the ms. which contains Thg. It seems likely, however, that 
Escor. is the ultimate source of the gemelli Par.1811 and Par.1812 (q.v.y, 
see Nicoll, Gnomon 37 (1965) 755 n.4.
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Ambros.329 Milan - Ambrosianus 329 (F.19 Sup.). Date: s.xv, with 
the signature and in the hand of Marsilio Ficino. Contains excerpts of 
many Platonic dialogues in a very jumbled order, along with some extran­
eous matter; Thg., of which 128d2-130e7 was copied (the divine sign 
section; not surprisingly, considering Ficino's demonological interests), is 
sandwiched between Smp. and Ion. The ms. has not been collated for any 
dialogue, but Post (71) suggested a possible connection with Flor.c. I can 
find no substantiating evidence for this. In fact, for Thg. Ambros.329 does 
not seem to be specifically related to any extant ms., except for T, with 
which it is clearly affiliated: cf. 129d8 TTpaypaTei as Ambros.329 T, 
crTpaTeias BW (eti.m. Ambros.329); 130c5 aiaOcopai Ambros.329 i.m. 
yp. T, atcredvajpai W, alcredvopaL BT; 130d4 pcv om. Ambros. 329 
T; they also share the reading Trpos pe at 129b4 (Trpos epe BW). The 
marginal variant cr TpaTCt as reveals, however, that Ficino either was 
using a contaminated copy of T (perhaps cf. also TrpO'uXLTrev Ambros.329 
W, Trpou\€LTT€V BT), had access to a copy of B or W, or, in any case, to a 
ms. with B or W readings. Ficino evidently found obtrusive the collocation 
cttl. . .cttl at 129d4 (see also comm, ad loc.), for in Ambros.329 we en­
counter the senseless, but apparently deliberate, cttcl yocp ti cttl 
QTpaTeiav c^opprjcrav vlojvos, and in his Latin translation (see be­
low, Fic.) he offers In expeditionem namque exilt Neonus (cttl yap t*q 
cttl aTpaTeiav c£oppQ ZavvLeovos cett.).
Ambros.409 Milan - Ambrosianus 409 (G.69 Sup.). Date: s.xv, 
written in the hand of John Docianus (see M. Vogel, V. Garthausen, Die 
griechischen Schreiber des Mittelalters und der Rennaisance in Beihefte 
zum Zentralblatt fur Bibliothekswesen 33 [1909] 169f.); Post (71) and 
Wilson (388), who list the contents as tetr. 1, Thg., conflict with Brumbaugh-
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Wells (45), who catalogue only Phd., Thg. Previously uncollated. Ambros. 
409 clearly derives from T, cf. 123a7 eti kcci eTepa Ambros.409 T, 
€T€poc W eti.m. vet.b, ctl B; 124a6 t(Bp TpuyccvTOV Ambros.409 Tc, 
Tp'uycjJVTCov BTW; 129d8 TTpctypctTeias Ambros.409 T, CFTpcrreias 
BW; 130d4 pcev om. Ambros.409 T. It shares a few readings with Par.1812 
(and some other mss.): 124d2 toutov Ambros.409 Par.1812 Urb.80, 
toijtcov cett.; 126d3 ot om. Ambros.409 Par.1812, s.l. add. Par.1812c; 
126d4 eaeaOoci Ambros.409 Par.1812 1811 Lobe. Ven.1029 (oiecreai 
i.m. Par.1812, ai et Q s.l. add. 1811); 128d7 Ambros.409 Par.1812, 
upTv cett.; 129d6 eiT] Ambros.409 Par.1812, ioi cett. et s.l. Ambros.409. 
Any connection, however, must be incidental, since Ambros. 409 does not 
descend from Tvia Par.1808, as Par.1812 does (see below), and while the 
possibility that some horizontal contamination has occurred in these two 
mss. from sources which possessed common readings or variants cannot 
be excluded, I would suggest that Ambros.409 is not closely related to any 
extant ms. of Thg., except for T itself. The evidence for possible contamin­
ation from W or B is extremely meagre: 121d5 auTOV Ambros.409 W recte, 
ocijtov BT; 122a1 peXei Ambros.409 BW recte, peXXei T; 122a1 Tofi- 
tov Ambros.409 BCW recte, toutcov T; 130c2 dcvepojTroj Ambros.409 B, 
avepciJTrcov TW recte-, 130c5 cctaedvajpo'i Ambros.409 W, atcrOdv” 
opal BT. Only 130c2 appears at all suggestive.
Neap.91 Naples - Neapolitanus 91 (li.C.32). Date: s.xv. Contains 
only excerpts of dialogues; for Thg., 121c3-5 (4>o(3d5), 122a2, 122d6-7, 
125e8-126a3, and 126d1-7. Like TW it preserves T) 8e at 121 c4 (tj om. B), 
but, other than the second title Trepi croejnas (T), there are no other signs 
of affiliation. The fact that it omits pev at 125e8 wih Ven.184 186 Vat.1029
(sed i.m. add.) et Vat.2218 merely shows that the mistake was a very easy 
one to make.
Neap.337 Naples - Neapolitanus 337 (III.E.15). Date: s.xiii; con­
tains tetr.1-6. Uncollated for Thg., though Post suspected a connection 
with Flor.b. Like Flor.b it preserves the characteristic readings of Par.1808 
at 124b1, 125a6, 125d7, and 127d7; in the latter instance it inverts the 
word order as Flor.b had done: auTOV yeveoQai ayaGov Neap.337 
Flor.b, octjtov ayaQov yeveaGat Par.1808 (ocyaGov yevecrGai BTW).
But there are many other correspondences apart from this one: e.g., 122b3 
cnjp(3ouXov Neap.337 Flor.b, cxuppouX-q cett.', 122e9 evTauGa Neap.
337 Flor.b, evGa8e cett.', 123b6 ov Neap.337 Flor.b, (Sv BTW; 125d13 
kocl cru post auvoucrias transp. Neap.337 Flor.b; 126d5 ocv om. Neap.
337 Flor.b; 126e1 ayaOos eTriGupeiv Neap.337 Flor.b, eiTLGvpeiv 
ayaGos cett.; 128e5 poi post 8aipoviou transp. Neap.337 Flor.b; 129 
a7 pev Neap.337 Flor.b, pevToi cett.; 130d7 ttoXu paXXov postqjv (d8) 
transp. Neap.337 Flor.b. Taken together, these readings prove that Post’s 
hypothesis was right; but full comparison of the two should allow us to take 
this further. There are two main reasons why Neap.337 cannot be a copy 
of Flor.b. First, Neap.337 preserves the full set of sch. vet., none of which 
are in Flor.b. Second, Neap.337 sometimes preserves the truth against 
Flor.b: 124d6 dp^avTa Neap.337, KaTap^avTa Flor.b; 126b4 aii 
Neap.337, au0LS Flor.b; 127b5 Kai pevTOL Kai Neap.337, Kai pevToi 
Flor.b. In addition, Neap.337 is probably the older of the two. Yet neither is 
Flor.b likely to be a copy of Neap.337 (see above on Flor.b). It appears 
therefore that the two mss. are gemelli, descending from a lost copy of 
Par.1808.
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B Oxford - Clarkianus 39. Date: s.ix (895), written by John the Calli­
grapher for Arethas; contains tetr.1-6 in tetralogical order. Collated by 
Bekker, Burnet, and most fully by Schanz. Being the oldest extant ms. 
containing Thg. (Par.1807 [A] is slightly older, but contains only tetr. 7-8, 
Epigr., Spuria), B is a priori a primary witness. The following is a sample of 
readings which are peculiar to B and its derivatives: 121c4-5 yeyove 
[vev a.c.] Sc Tpo0r) B, YCYOPev, -q Sc Tpo<(yq TW; 123a7 ctl B (ctc~ 
pcc i.m. vetb), CTCpa W, ctl kccl CTCpot T; 127c6 cns om. B (i.m. add. b); 
127e6 otl XP$°> TL (s/c)> 129d7 Y^Xav (i.e. y’ eXav) B, cXav TW; 130 
a4 cpaScv B, OTTCC0CV TW. Once in B, where an uncial error is probably 
to be detected, the restored reading will be seen to agree in truth with an 
indirect witness: 127d6 tc t’ B, tc evqv Priscianus; the variant 
readings at 130e8 (oi T recte, ot’ B, 3 t’ W) may also represent the 
confusion of uncial characters.
Since the main departure of the present edition from earlier editions 
consists in my report of B, it will be well to set forth in some detail where the 
differences lie. Most importantly, past editions have failed to distinguish 
the correcting hands of this ms. Schanz’s collation, which is notable for its 
detail, relegates al, corrections and variants to the siglum "b," regardless of 
the age or source. Burnet explicitly set out to rectify this obvious deficiency 
(see Praef. to OCT III), yet numerous errors persist in his apparatus. 
Souilhe drew upon Burnet for his report of B, but only succeeded in 
obscuring matters further by identifying all corrections and variants with the 
siglum "B2". Yet it is misleading to classify all early editorial activity under 
the same siglum. In B the original hand has been responsible for the 
addition of interlinear and marginal variants, for corrections in textu which 
are made by erasure or over an existing reading, and for changes, add­
236
itions, and deletions of breathings and accents. The work of this hand must 
be carefully distinguished from that of the second, contemporary correcting 
hand (generally believed to be that of Arethas himself; see Dodds 36 and 
n.2), as the above editors have failed to do on a systematic basis. In the 
apparatus therefore I have designated the changes made by the original 
scribe with the siglum Bc, while Burnet’s B2 is reserved exclusively for the 
activity of the second hand (evidence of which is actually rare in this 
dialogue). Detailed collation has also shown that, while Burnet alone has 
made the effort to distinguish early and later hands, he does err 
occasionally; for example, although he recognizes the presence of a hand 
from s.x-xi and designates it as "vet.b" (for this hand [rare in B], see Greene, 
Scholia Platonica xv), nevertheless he fails to attribute the marginal variant 
€Tepa in 123a7 to it, as he clearly should have done; vet.b was also 
responsible for av s.l. in 130c2, and not B2, as Burnet believed; the hand 
which squeezed in 8’ at 128d5 was Bc, I think, rather than b; and the 
alteration of final ai to e (recte) in 129a1 pouXecreai was made by b, not 
B2. Other places where Burnet’s report is misleading have been tacitly 
corrected in the present apparatus. And even though Burnet’s report of B 
was necessarily restricted, it is to be regretted that it is not more complete, 
for Schanz's collations do not supplement it fully. I have therefore sought 
to document the evidence of B in as much detail as possible.
Burnet remarked (CQ 8 [1914] 231-2; cf. Alline 238-41) that the 
correcting hand B2 usually adjusts the text to conform with W; and he con­
cluded that B2 had a congener of W before him. Since B2 is responsible 
for only two readings of any substance in Thg., there can be no confirm­
ation of this theory; but the evidence is suggestive. At the beginning of the 
dialogue B2 has supplied the (obviously false) subtitle Trept crcD<j)po-
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awr|S, which happens also to be the reading of W; and in 130e1 B and T 
have 8f), but B2 has added 8e s.l., the reading of W. Conversely, I see no 
evidence in Bc for a close affiliation with W; where Bc either emends the 
text of Thg., adds a variant, or makes good an omission, the result is 
usually agreement with both T and W; only in 129d5 does Bc alone offer 
the true reading, where to is added s.l. There is no proof, for Thg. at least, 
that Bc is the product of anything but a check of the exemplar of B.
Later hands in B, however, sometimes display a connection with W: 
123a7 eTepoc W eti.m. vet.b; 125e3 ev t-q W, kocl t'Q BT, sedev s.l. add. 
b; and at times (admittedly minor instances) b preserves, along with other 
recentiores, a true reading against BTW: 123d13 oux ocuttq b, ouk octjtt) 
BTW; 125a6 pouXeucijpeQcc b, ~op.€0oc BTW. However, it would be rash 
to ascribe any independent authority to the later correcting hands of B, 
although each case, perhaps, should be decided on its own merits.
Despite the age and importance of this ms., for Thg. it is the ancestor 
of only Vat.226 and Urb.32 (Dodds 37 offers an explanation for this lack of 
influence on the Platonic mss. tradition).
Par.1808 Paris - Parisinus Graecus 1808. Date: s.xiii, containing 
tetr. 1 -7, Spuria, Carm. Aur., Ti. Locr. (as far as 103c7). Post has argued 
(53) that all mss. which arrange their dialogues in the order tetr.1-7 + 
Spuria derive from Par.1808 since that order is first encountered in this ms. 
Collated by Bekker, and by Dodds for Grg.'. sigla B Bekker, Par Dodds. 
Schanz (Platocodex 47-52) demonstrated for a series of dialogues (not 
Thg.) that Par.1808 descends from T. That such a pedigree is true of Thg. 
as well is beyond any reasonable doubt. Par.1808 preserves the most 
characteristic readings and omissions of T: 123a7 ctl kcci eTcpcc Par. 
1808 T; 124a6 tiw TpuycovTCOP Par.1808 Tc; 129d8 TTpocypocTCiocs
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Par.1808 T; 130c5 auj0to|jm Par.1808 exaiaedvopai (BTW), ocicrO- 
copai i.m. yp. Par. 1808 T; 130d4 pev om. Par.1808 T. The discrepan­
cies between the two are moreover few enough to encourage the supposi­
tion that Par.1808 is a direct copy of T (pace Schanz, Piatocodex 52). 
Where Par.1808 diverges, it does so in simple matters, or by apparently 
deliberate effort: e.g., 122a1 peXei fee. Par.1808 (BW) expcWct (T); 
122a1 toutov fee. Par.1808 (BW) exTOUTcnv (T); 124b1 oTpoci om. 
Par.1808; 125 a6 K0CT£ipV)K£ BTW, KCCTT|'ydp'r|K£ Par.1808; 125d7 ol8’ 
om. Par.1808; 130c7 TTpouXciTrev BT, TTpouXiTrev W Par.1808.
The scribe corrected his work in the process of transcription (e.g. 
122a1 above), and, apparently at a somewhat later stage, made a few 
other very minor changes in the original text (Par.1808c; these are 
distinguished by a lighter ink): 123e3 T) Par.1808 (BTW), ijj Par. 1808°; 
124c2 Spocexotpoc Par.1808c; 127d7 ocutov s.l. post ttoXlttiv add. 
Par.1808c; 130c2 t’ fj Par.1808, t’ fjv BW Par.1808c. I have not been 
able to substantiate Bluck’s suspicions (in his edition of Men. [141 n.2]) that 
the particular correcting hand of Par.1808 which is so active in certain dia­
logues (e.g. Grg., see Dodds 50-1) has also been at work in Thg. (nor do I 
see definite evidence of any hand but the first), though the scribe who 
altered ataedvopocL to aio-ecopoci at 130c5 may be this elusive scholar.
For the influence of Par.1808 on the ms. tradition of Thg. (a majority 
of the mss. of this dialogue descends from Par.1808), see the stemma 
codicum below.
Par.1809 Paris - Parisinus Graecus 1809. Date: s.xv, containing 
tetr.1-7, Spuria, Ti. Locr., Carm. Aur., and in a later hand Clit. (to 408d3). 
Collated for Thg. by Bekker: siglum C. Schanz was the first to indicate 
derivation of Par.1809 from Par.1808 (Piatocodex 53-6, 73-7; Hermes 11
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[1876] 109f.); this line of descent is true of Thg., as Par.1809 preserves the 
characteristic readings and omissions of Par.1808 for this dialogue (q.v.). 
Evidence for the proposition that M derives from Par.1809 has already 
been given above on M. But, whatever the explanation for the similarities 
between the two mss., the following render it at least doubtful that Par. 
1809 could be a copy of M: 122e3 octtis crc Par.1809, oaTiae (sic) M; 
126a8 ot ev tQ Par.1809 recte, ev tq M; 126c3 eTrei 8e 8r) Par.1809 
recte, eTreiSr] 8e 8t) M (W); 131a5 ccijto Par.1809 recte, ccutoi M; cf. 
also 123e10 poucriKT^s Par.1809 (BTW), p.ouoTKT) M recte.
Par.1811 Paris - Parisinus Graecus 1811. Date: s.xiv; contains tetr. 
2-5.2, 6.3-4, 7, 1, 5.3-6.2. Collated by Bekker: siglum E. Par.1811, like 
Par.1812, of which it is a gemellus (both preserve the same curious order 
of contents; see further on Par.1812), derives from Par.1808: cf. 121b4 
oTjjlcxi om. Par.1808 1811; 125a6 Kcmryopricre Par.1811, KccTT]y 6prjKe 
Par.1808, KOCTeipT)Ke BTW; 125d7 oT8’ om. Par.1808 1811. That Par. 
1811 is not a copy of Par.1812 is illustrated from the following: 122e3 ere 
Par.1811 recte, om. Par.1812; 122e9 errrep Par.1811 recte, 6) errrep Par. 
1812; 127a9 el Par.1811 recte, om. Par.1812; 127e4 ouSevos Par.1811 
recte, ouSev Par.1812; 128a3 Te Par.1811 recte, om. Par.1812. The 
primary interest of Par.1811 is that it was the main source for the Aldine 
edition of Plato (at least for Thg.y, see below on Aid.
Par.1812 Paris - Parisinus Graecus 1812. Date: s.xiv; contains tetr. 
2-5.2, 6.3-4, 7, 1,5.3-6.2. Collated by Bekker: siglum F. Three readings 
indicate derivation from Par.1808: 124b1 oTpai om. Par.1808 1812; 125 
a6 Komqydprjae Par.1812, KoiTr|y6pr)Ke Par.1808, KCCTeiprjKe BTW; 
125d7 oT8’ om. Par.1808 1812, s.i. add. Par.18122. The ms. exhibits 
numerous other omissions and errors (some corrected by the scribe, others
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by a later hand [Par.18122]), and it is impossible to narrow down its 
parentage any further. It is certainly not a direct copy of Par.1808. In fact, it 
and Par.1811 are closely related: they both preserve the same contents, in 
the same curious order, and share the following conjunctive readings and 
omissions: 122c2 ocia0dpc0oc Par.1812 1811 (W), aiaScopcQa cett.; 
122e9 TrotiSeiJOVTai Par.1812 1811, ttcttqciSc'UI/tccl BTW; 123b6 
ao<[xj0Tepos Par.1812 1811, crowds BTW; 123c2 av Par.1812 1811, aB 
BTW; 123e2 et3 ijj, sedr} s.l. Par.1812 1811; 124a8 ocpyopcOa Par.1812 
1811, apxopci/ BTW; 125d9 au om. Par.1812 1811, s.l. add. Par.1812; 
126b9 fiv om. Par.1812 1811; 126d4 cacaOai Par.1812 1811, oicaOai 
i.m. Par.1812, ai et Q s.l. Par.1811, otLaeeaOoct BTW; 127b7 ac om. 
Par.1812 1811, s.l. add. Par.1812; 128c2 epw om. Par.1812 1811; 129b6 
TVXO Par.1812 1811, Tuyco BTW; 130b2 pc oBv Par.1812 1811, oBv pc 
BTW. The dates of the two mss. cannot be used to lend support to a 
hypothesis of the derivation of one from the other (they are both placed in 
s.xiv), but at all events Par.1812 is unlikely to be a copy of Par.1811. The 
following is a sample of disjunctive readings: 121c5 ScSioti Par.1812 
recte, Slotl Par.1811; 121c8 Sr) Par.1812 recte, om. 1811; 123c6 Sr) 
Par. 1812 recte, om. Par.1811; 124b3 pci/ Par.1812 recte, om. Par.1811; 
126a8 alt. ot Par.1812 recte, om. Par.1811. On the independence of 
Par.1811 from Par.1812, see above on Par.1811. My conclusion must be 
that Par.1812 and 1811 are gemelli (see also Schanz, Philol. 35 [1876] 
664f.); collation of Escor. (see above) could well indicate that it is the 
parent of these two. Par.1812 further shows some affinities with W, but in 
small matters: 121d5 ocuTdv W Par.1812 recte, ocBtcbi/ BT; 122a1 pc\ct 
Par.1812 BW recte, pcXXci T; 122a1 pccKpdi/ Par.1812 W, piKpoi/ BT et 
yp. i.m. Par.18122 recte; 130c5 ataedi/cnpai Par.1812 W, aiaOcxi/-
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ojjlocl BT; 130c7 TTpouXiiTev Par.1812 W, TTpouXciTrcv BT. Without 
exception these correspondences can, I think, be ascribed to coincidence.
Coisl.155 Paris - Coislinianus 155. Date s.xiv; contains tetr.1-8.1. 
Collated by Bekker: siglum T. Schanz established the dependence of 
Coisl.155 on T (RhMus 32 [1877] 483-4; Piatocodex 40-3), and for Thg. this 
can be proved by its sharing the most characteristic readings of T (q.v.). 
Coisl.155 is of interest primarily for the numerous readings, marginal and 
interlinear variants, and corrections (all apparently by the original hand), 
which it introduces into the text. The following have a claim to consider­
ation as good, or at least, in varying degrees, plausible readings: 122d2 
opeoTCpov Coisl.155, opedraTOV cett.; 123b3 cm pc is Coisl.155 
BTW, CTTcOilpcis1 Coisl.155c Flor.b; 123b6 auviaravai Coisl.155 BTW, 
auaTrjaai Coisl.155c; 125a1 cTrcpiJ/cv Coisl.155, CTrepTrev cett.; 125 
a7 cqtiv ol Coisl.155 BTW, eg Tiva Coisl.155c, eg tivos edd.; 125b3 
koci ante SiairuOuipcea add. Coisl.155; 126d6 pr]8cva Coisl.155, pr)“ 
Scv cett.; 127a6 avepcjJTroig om. Coisl.155; 129a2 epcaGai Coisl.155 
BTW, cpcaec Coisi.155c, c s.l. add. W; 130c2 T’ fj Coisl.155 Par.1808 ( et 
recc.); 131a8 ccvtcittois Coisl.155, avTCiTTQS cett. But that Coisl.155 
preserves traces of a second witness independent of T can be excluded 
absolutely: not only are some of the above readings inferior to the general 
testimony of our tradition (esp. 125a1, 125b3, 126d6, 131a8), but the 
others could easily be supplied with a little good sense on the part of the 
scribe or a corrector (esp. 123b3, 129a2). Moreover, Coisl.155 sometimes 
presents readings which are manifestly false, e.g., 122d7 TTpoaayopeij- 
aaipcv; 122d9 fj (sic) ante to add.; 127e3 kccl post tc add.; 128c8 Kai 
om. Quite clearly this is all the work of an active (and occasionally
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ingenious) Byzantine scholar, and nothing more. The descent of Coisl.155 
from T may be indirect, as Schanz supposed (Platocodex 43).
Lobe. Prague - Radnice VI F.a.1 (Lobcovicianus). Date: s.xiv, con­
tents identical to W (for a facsimile page see E. Gollob, SB Wien 146.7 
[1903] 109). Collated by Schneider for R, for which Lobe, is said to be a 
direct copy of W (see Schanz, Platocodex 62, 100f.; Alline 237; Post 32), 
but uncollated for Thg. It is beyond doubt that Lobe, descends from W for 
Thg. as well, for it preserves the significant readings, omissions, and trans­
positions that appear in W, but not in BT: e.g., 122b1 cruirpouXeueoGccL 
posfxP'Q Lobe. W; 122c2 auvrieeias Lobe. W, ouvouctlocs BT 
(recte); 122c8 ti om. Lobe. W; 122e10 ypajajicc Lobe. W, ypappccTcc BT; 
123a4 kccl om. Lobe. W; 123a5-6 ccuTqi eyd) Lobe. W, eyd) ocutc^ BT; 
125e3 ev Lobe. W, Kai BT; 126d5 TTpoSouvccL Lobe. W, TrccpccSowccL 
BT (recte)-, 128a5 toutous om. Lobe. W; 130e8 ol t’ W Lobe., ol T 
(recte), ot’ B; at both the beginning and end of the dialogue the subtitle 
TrepL ao<t)L0C9 has been made i.r. from an original Trepi crcD^poauvris 
(so W and B). Lobe, adds many of its own errors in addition, e.g., 124a1 
epoLye...124a2 ttoXol om.; 126d2 toutcjou om.; 128e7 TpoTrov Lobe., 
Xpovov BTW; 129e9 Kccv..130a3 O'TTlSlSoocO'LV om. Lobe, is closely re­
lated to Vat.1029, and more will be said about the precise relationship of 
Lobe, to W when we come to that ms. But it should be stated that Lobe, can 
hardly be a copy of Vat.1029, as a selection of evidence shows: 121 b7 
XCcXeirq kccl SuokoXos Lobe, (recte), 8wko\os kccl x°c^€Tr0 Vat. 
1029; 121c3 evre <|)UTeiocv eLTe TrocLSoTroLLCcv SeL ocutt]V Lobe. 
(recte), eLTe <j)UTeLccv XP^I TrccLSoTroLLCCU ccutt|V Vat.1029; 124 
e1 outgo iTeLpcj Lobe, (recte), TreLpffi outgo Vat.1029; 128e1 eTuyxocve 
Lobe, (recte), dvccxavev (sic) Vat.1029; 129c2-3 ccutou TjvdyKOcaa
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Lobe, (recte), T)udc7KOcaoc ccutov Vat.1029; 130d4 pev Lobe, (recte), om. 
Vat.1029.
Ang.107 Rome - Angelicanus Graecus 107 (olim Ang. C.1.4). Date: 
s.xiv; contains tetr.1-7, Spuria, Car. Aur., Ti. Locr. Collated by Bekker: sig­
lum u. Post's assertion (55) that Ang.107 derives from Par.1808 is proved 
for Thg. by full collation of the two mss. Ang.107 follows Par.1808 in the 
following places: 124b1 oTpctL om. Ang.107 Par.1808; 125a6 K0CTT|7Op- 
T)K£ Ang.107 Par.1808; 125d7 ol8’ om. Ang. 107 Par.1808, s.l. add. Ang. 
1072 (a later hand). The scribe has corrected Ang.107 to conform with Par. 
1808 at 122a1 toutcjov Ang.107 et Par.1808, toutov (sic) i.r. fee. Ang. 
107, toutou Par.1808c; while Ang.1072 has brought it still further into line 
with corrections and additions in Par.1808: 123e3 T) Ang.107 Par.1808, T) 
Ang.1072 Par.1808c; 124c2 depot Ang.107, otpcc Par.1808, apa Ang.1072 
Par.1808c; 127d7 ocutou post Tro\VTT}V s.l. add. Par.1808° Ang.1072; 
130c2 t* fj Ang.107 Par.1808, t’ Ang.1072 Par.1808c. But the ms. 
against which Ang.107 was corrected was not Par.1808 itself after cor­
rection, as the following indicate: 125a6 (3ou\eudpeect Ang.107 
Par.1808, -oopeOcc Ang.1072; 125d7 oTS’ s.l. add. Ang.1072; 128b8 tl 
eras. Ang.1072 (see comm, ad loc.). The later correcting hand has also 
supplied readings at various points where trivial errors have been made by 
the original scribe. Ang.107 is characterized by several simple omissions, 
e.g., of au 122b7, Kai au 125d13, tgov 125e6, kocl postttoXAols 126 
b10, kccl 130a1; but I can find no compelling evidence to suggest that it is 
not a direct copy of Par.1808 (so also Carlini [39-41] for tetr. 4).
Vat.113 Vatican - Vaticanus Graecus 113. Catalogue gives s.xiii- 
xiv as the date. Only 121a1-122c6 (outgo) is preserved. With TW it has T) 
8c in 121 c4; with BW it has peXeL and toutou (Bc) in 122a1; and with BT
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it has ocijtgjv in 121d5. Clearly this is not sufficient evidence to base any 
conclusion upon, although o“u vouch as in 122c2 strongly suggests that W 
(which reads ouvr^eeias) or one of its offspring was not the source.
Vat.226 Vatican - Vaticanus Graecus 226. The date of this ms. is 
uncertain because of the apparently archaizing hand in which it is written. 
Its catalogue date is s.xii, but Post (56-7) put it possibly in s.xiv, and not 
prior to s.xiii, while Schanz thought s.xv (Philol. 35 [1876] 649). Collated 
by Bekker (siglum 0). Vat.226 and Vat.225 (Bekker A, same hand) to­
gether form a two-volume Plato (complete except for Epp. and tetr.9); Vat. 
226 contains tetr.5-6.2, 8.3, 7, Spuria, tetr.8.1-2. Schanz (ib. 645ff.) derived 
Vat.226 (as well as tetr.6.4 and tetr.2-4 in Vat.225) from B; and that B is the 
immediate ancestor of Vat.226 for Thg. is beyond doubt. Vat.226 omits 
123c9 —crea...c11 ovopa eycoye, a full line in B (no homoeoteleuton). 
Moreover, it follows B in many small details, often in manifest error (follow­
ing also Bc corrections), e.g., 121c4 yeyove 8c B Vat.226, yeyovev, T) 
8e TW; 123a7 ctl B Vat.226, erepa W (i.m. vet.b), ctl Kai €T€pa T; 
125c4rjpcopeOa B Vat.226, —opeGa TW et b; 125d6 ttoloc a B Vat.226, 
ttoloc av TW; 126e6 otl XP^ otl (sic) B, otl XP<5 otl Vat. 226, otl 
Xpcpo TW; 127b1 XeyeLS om. B Vat.226; 127c6 (is om. B Vat.226; 128e2 
vepatav B Vat.226, vepeav TW; 129a5 TavTa B Vat. 226, TavTL TW; 
129d7 yeXav B Vat.226, e\av TW; 130a4 epaGev B Vat.226, crraGev 
TW; 130e6 ot’ B Vat.226, oi T, ol t’ W. It is most likely the original hand 
which is responsible for the minor changes in 121a2 Kav ei Vat.226, Kav 
■§ Vat.226cVat. 1030 Aid.; 121d3 SLaTapaTouo-LV Vat. 226, t s.l. add. 
Vat.226c; 122d7 TTpoaayopeuopev Vat.226, ~copev Vat. 226°; 123b3 
ol om. Vat.226, add. Vat. 226°; 124a7 aXocivTcnv Vat.226, spir. asp. (B) 
fee. Vat.226°; 126b1 tlvos BT Vat.226, TLvas Vat.226c W; 129c8 ano-
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(jTrjVOCL (sic) Vat.226, ccTrocrT'qo’cci Vat.226c. All the above changes 
could easily have been made either independently by the scribe or through 
a comparison with the exemplar, and it is probable that the scribe had only 
B in front of him.
Vat.1029 Vatican - Vaticanus Graecus 1029. Date s.xiv, contains 
tetr. 1-8.3, 9.2-4, Deff., Spuria. Collated by Bekker: siglum Gothic r, Bude V, 
Post R. Vat.1029 descends from W, but the precise relationship between 
the two mss. is uncertain, despite Post's lengthy but inconclusive dis­
cussion (30-5). The problem at issue (as Post himself realized), is the con­
nection of Vat.1029 to Lobe. The former preserves all the characteristic W 
readings found in the latter (see on Lobe.), which settles the question of 
derivation from W for Vat.1029. But Vat.1029 and Lobe, also exhibit iden­
tical readings against W at a number of places, for instance, at 124a1-2, 
126d2, 128e7, and 129e9 mentioned above on Lobe. Since it has already 
been shown in the discussion of Lobe, that Lobe, is unlikely to be a copy of 
Vat.1029, it remains to consider the opposite possibility. In fact, there is 
little to suggest that for this dialogue at least the exemplar of Vat.1029 was 
not Lobe., for there are only three places where the former preserves the 
true reading against the latter: 123b4 kccl eyco is repeated in succession 
by Lobe., but occurs only once in Vat.1029; 129a2 epcaQe Vat.1029 Wc 
(recte), —Qocl Lobe. BTW; 130e6 Vat.1029 (recte), evr) Lobe. W. The first
of these mistakes by Lobe, could have been easily recognized and 
avoided by Vat.1029, and it would have been a small matter for him to 
produce the correct subjunctive in the third case. The second correction 
appears a little more difficult to attribute to the scribe's own good sense, as 
the infinitive is not obviously out of the question (see comm, ad loc.)', but 
the same correction from infinitive to imperative does occur independently
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in Coisl.155 as well. There is, however, one matter which it is hard to ac­
count for. In Lobe, the original hand has subtitled Thg. Trepi ertn^po— 
crwris at the beginning and end of the dialogue, but in both places has 
written Trepi ao4>ias over an erasure. The scribe in Vat.1029 has gone 
through exactly the same process at the beginning of the dialogue, but has 
let Trepi crco<|)pocr'UVTis stand at dialogue end. That both mss. show an 
erasure and change of subtitle in the original hand suggests an exemplar 
in each case which gave Trepi croedicts as a variant; the variant was taken 
up by Lobe, twice, and by Vat.1029 once. I suggest then that Vat.1029 and 
Lobe, derive independently from a copy of W, though confirmatory evi­
dence would have been welcome. Such an hypothesis would at any rate 
explain why Vat.1029 has the correct epecrQe against epeaOai of Lobe., 
since the exemplar would presumably have reproduced from W the 
variants ai and c. As well, it might account for the correct T€ in
Lobe. Vat.1029, against ^©oveTcrGcxi of W. But whereas this is the sole 
reading of Vat.1029, it appears i.r. in Lobe., replacing an original c^eovei- 
cr0ai; perhaps the model for Lobe. Vat.1029 reproduced the W reading, 
but supplied the true reading as a variant s.i. or i.m.
Vat.1030 Vatican - Vaticanus Graecus 1030. Date: s.xv; contains 
tetr.2-5.2, 6.3-7.4, 1, 5.3-6.2. Collated by Bekker: siglum Gothic S. Vat. 
1030 derives ultimately from Par.1808, whose characteristic readings are 
repreated, except for 127d7 (which was introduced s.i. by Par.1808c); at 
125a6 Vat.1030 reads Komqydprio-e pro K0CTT|ydpriK6 of Par.1808. The 
most likely parent of Vat.1030 is Par.1811. The contents of the two mss. 
are identical, and Vat.1030 shares the following peculiarities with Par. 
1811 (a selective list): 121c5 Sion Par.1811 Vat.1030, 8e8iOTi cett.’, 
123b2 eciTiv om. Par.1811 Vat.1030; 123b4 epcoTcBv Par.1811 Vat.1030,
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apcpcoTCOP cett.; 123b6 Trap’ <3 ap aocjxjJTCpos Par.1811 Vat.1030, 
Trap’ t§p ap ai ao<()ds BTW; 123b7 TaiJTT|P ante aiJTpp add. Par. 
1811 Vat.1030; 124b3 |Jiev om. Par.1811 Vat.1030; 124d6 ap£aa0ai 
Par.1811 Vat.1030, ap£at cett.; 125b8 tl om. Par.1811 Vat.1030, s.l. add. 
Par.18112; 126b9 ap om. Par.1811 Vat.1030; 126d4 cacaOaL Par.1811 
Vat.1030 (ai etQ s.l. Par.1811); 127b7 ac om. Par.1811 Vat.1030; 127e3 
apayupouaLOJP Par.1811 Vat.1030, -aaicop cett.; 128b4 ye post apL~ 
KpoiJ transp. Par.1811 Vat.1030; 130b2 pc ow Par.1811 Vat.1030, opp 
pc cett. The relative ages of these two mss., as well as disjunctive errors in 
Vat.1030 (e.g., 125a4 Trcpt|/CLP Vat.1030, TrcpiTCLP Par.1811 recte; 126 
c6 ttoXltlkotjs Vat.1030, ttoXltlkoc Par.1811 recte), indicate derivation 
of Vat.1030 from Par. 1811 (probably direct).
Vat.2218 Vatican - Vaticanus Graecus 2218. Date: s.xv; contains 
tetr.2.4-5.1, ending at Thg. 129a7 tl. Collated for tetr.4 by Carlini 
(35), but not previously collated for any other dialogues. Carlini's conclu­
sion that Vat.2218 derives from M fully concurs with my own comparison of 
the two mss. Vat.2218 omits 122b5 |3oiiXeuaaLTO...b7 cyco tc, which 
comprises a full line in M (no homoeoteleuton). It follows M in close detail, 
e.g., 123d3 rj s.l. add. M Vat.2218; 126a8 alt. ol om. M Vat.2218; and it 
adds some mistakes of its own, e.g., 122c9 au om.; 123b7 pc Vat.2218, 
poL cett.; 124b5 ye Vat. 2218, tc cett.; 125a1 paTpL (sic); 126a3 Va0L 
Vat.2218, tacos cett.; 126 a9 ye om. Vat.2218.
Barb.270 Vatican - Barberinus Graecus 270. Date usually not 
given, but perhaps s.xv (Carlini 33; Wilson 390); contains tetr.1-3.2, 3.4, 
4.3-6.2, 6.4, 7.2-4, Eryx. Collated for Thg. by Bekker: siglum y. Schanz 
(Hermes 11 [1883] 111f.) suggested derivation from Par.1809, and this was 
proved to be true for tetr.4.3-4 (Carlini 33) and for Cri. (Berti, Hermes 97
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[1969] 431), and is very likely for Thg. as well (note that both mss. are 
almost certainly by the same hand; see Wilson 390). Barb.270 preserves, 
apart from all the characteristic readings of Par.1808 that Par.1809 has 
itself faithfully reproduced (see Par.1809), a few novelties first found in 
Par.1809 (Ottob.332, which will be discussed next, is also recorded here): 
123a7 TTpos...a8 kccl om. Par.1809 (and M) Barb.270 Ottob.332; 126d1 
ye Par.1809 Barb.270 Ottob.332, ere cett.; 130a4 otooljv Par.1809 Barb. 
270 Ottob.332, otouotjv cett. Additionally, several scribal errors have 
crept in, which firmly exclude the derivation of Par.1809 from Barb.270, 
e.g., 123e12 yujjLVocCovTCOV Barb.270 Ottob. 332, yupvccCopevenv cett.', 
124d8 kcckls1 Barb.270 Ottob.332, pccKig cett.’, 126d5 oSv om. Barb.270 
Ottob.332; 127e4 ouSev Barb.270 Ottob. 332, ouSevos cett.', 129a2 tl~ 
^ccxou Barb.270 Ottob.332, TLpccpxou cett. It is the source of Ottob.332 
(below).
Ottob.332 Vatican - Ottobonianus Graecus 332. Date: s.xvi, con­
taining tetr.1.2, 1.4, 4.4, Thg., 7.3. Previously uncollated for Thg. Ottob. 
332 reproduces Barb.270 in almost every detail (see the latter for shared 
readings and conjunctive errors). It is undoubtedly a direct copy of Barb. 
270; the opposite derivation is excluded by the age of the two mss., and by 
the following errors which Ottob.332 adds: 123c3 TivecrTiv (sic) Ottob. 
332, tls eaTLV cett.', 127c7 tous Ottob.332, tcc cett.; 130b4 xocXcttccl- 
vets Ottob.332, ~€LV cett.
Pal.175 Vatican - Palatinus Graecus 175. Date: s.xv, in the hand of 
John Scutariotes, who also copied the companion volume Pal.177 (tetr. 
9.1-3); contains tetr.8.3, 4-5.2, 8.4. Collated by Bekker: siglum Gothic e. As 
Post noted (38-9), Pal.175 descends from Flor.o; in addition to containing 
the omissions of Flor.a which Flor.o reproduces, it also preserves readings
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which Flor.o introduces at 122b4, 125a5, 127c6, and 127c8 (see Flor.o). 
There are, moreover, other indications of its derivation: 123c6 Tuyxavei 
Flor.o sedo s.i. (rvyyaveis BTW), TuyxavcL 6 Pal.175; 127b8 
epcov (sic) Flor.o (perhaps because of a change of line after <(>o-) Pal.175; 
129d4 ciTpocTELOC Flor.o Pal.175, CFTpaTCiav BTW. Pal. 175 also adds 
some of its own false readings: e.g., 122b5 ©eiOTepov Pal.175, 0eio— 
Tepou cett.; 125d6Troiav Pal.175, ttoloc av Flor.o; 127e1 fj Pal.175, cT 
cett. However, the fact that Pal.175 reinstates the correct word order Kai 
StjcfkoXos yiyveToci in 121b7-c1 against Flor.o (ytyveTai Kai 8uo— 
koXos), and olkotjo) (3 ZokpaTes ((3 ZajKpaTCS cckoijco Flor.o) encour­
ages the assumption that Pal.175 is not a direct copy of Flor.o, but 
descends via an intermediary ms.
Urb.32 Vatican - Vaticanus Graecus 32. Date: not later than 1444 
A.D., since it is in the hand of Leonardo Bruno Aretinus (1369-1444); con­
tains Spuria (excluding Deff., lust.), tetr.8.1,7.1-2, Thg., 5-6.1 (up to 273a6). 
Collated by Bekker, but not for Thg.-. siglum Gothic I. Urb.32 derives from 
Vat.226 for Thg., which follows Post's conclusions about the source of this 
ms. for Spuria (59). The following conjunctive errors prove a close con­
nection between the two mss.: 123c9 —cr0a...c11 ovopa eycoye om. Vat. 
226 Urb.32; 125c11 vai om. Vat.226 Urb.32; 125e1 Kuavr|S (sic) Vat.226 
Urb.32; 127e2 rjp^as (sic) Vat.226 Urb.32; 127e3 aud Vat.226 Urb.32, 
utto cett.; 127e7 otovTai (sic) Vat.226 Urb.32; 130d7 Kai...d8 olkt]~ 
pan om. Vat.226 Urb.32; 130e1 aXXocye...e2 ottotc om. Vat.226 Urb. 
32. Furthermore, Urb.32 adds a number of its own errors, e.g., 127b7 
Ka\€Trr| (sic); 123c1 els ante TaiJTT]v add. Urb.32; 125c14 tl top Urb. 
32, tcw tl cett.; 125d1 TraXaicov (sic) Urb.32, 'TraXaieiv cett.; 128a4
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(Sv Urb.32, § cett.; 130d6 olk€Lqc Urb.32, olklqc cett.; 130e6 eTriSdcreis 
Urb.32, -(Screis cett. It is, in all likelihood, a direct copy of Vat.226.
Urb.80 Vatican - Urbinas Graecus 80. Date: s. xiv-xv; contains tetr. 
4.4, Thg., 5.4, 3.3 (to 236b2), Ax., 4.2. Collated by Carlini for Ale. II and 
Amat. (46), but uncollated for Thg. Urb.80 has been damaged by damp 
along the upper portion of its folio leaves, obscuring the first few lines of 
several pages, and rendering it difficult, and impossible in some places, to 
read accurately from the photographs which I have used. In any event, for 
Thg. it is demonstrably contaminated. A number of its readings indicate 
derivation from T: 123a7 ctl kccl CTepct Urb.80 T, £tl B, €T€pa W; 
124a6 tcSv anteTpuytSvTcnv add. Urb.80 Tc; 129b4 TTpos pe Urb.80 T, 
TTpos epe BW; 129d8 TrpaypocTeLas Urb.80 T, aTpaTeias BW; 130d4 
pev om. Urb.80 T. But cruvriOeias pro cruvouaias in122c2 must sug­
gest that Urb.80 descends from a ms. which had been contaminated with 
W readings, since cyuvr^eiccs is characteristic of that ms. alone, and 
occurs only in mss. closely affiliated with it (i.e., in Lobe., Vat.1029, and per­
haps Flor.i). While other readings do not prove W contamination, they are 
at least suggestive: 121d5 cctjtov Urb.80 W, -(Sv BT; 126b1 tlvocs Urb. 
80 W, tlvos BT; 127a2 xpfjcreTCCL Urb.80 W, ~r|TCCi BT; 130c5 cclq- 
0ccvcopccL Urb.80 W, -opcti BT; 130b7 TrpovXiTrev Urb.80 W, TrpoiJ- 
XciTrev BT. On a few occasions Urb.80, along with other secondary mss., 
preserves a true reading against BTW: 123e10 pouciKT) Urb.80 Par.1812 
(i.m.) M; 124d2 toljtov Urb.80 Par.1812 Ambros.409; 125a6 povXev- 
(Spe0a Urb.80 b M Par.1811 1812 Vend86 Vat.1029 Ang.1072 Flor.o; 126 
a5 Urb.80 Flor.b Neap.337. All of these are simple corrections, and it 
would be folly to suggest that they point to a source independent of BTW. 
In fact, Urb.80 (or its parent) shows a tendency to normalize (cf. 121a3
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eveKOC Urb.80, eveKev BTW; 122c9 CTTiGup^ Urb.80 Ven.186, ~cl BTW), 
and (apparently deliberately) to offer its own conjectures: e.g., 122a6 
ao<|)cov Urb.80, cro^tQTOJV cett.-, 123d2 ^iXoao^LOCi/ Urb.80, ao^iccv 
cett.-, 124e3 ocutcDv Urb.80, cett., av'Y&v ci. Baiter; 126b9 ockov-
ticftccs' Urb.80, cckovtlo-tlkoijs cett.; 128d7 octjtcov Urb.80, tjjjllv cett.; 
130e8 TraiSeue'qvai Urb.80 M, TraiSeijeo-ecxL BTW eti.m. yp. Urb.80 
M. This last reading would seem to indicate that Urb.80 and the source of 
M are somehow related (see above on M); otherwise, however, I can find 
no secondary witness with which Urb.80 is closely related. Urb.80 is also 
equipped with learned marginal notes which do not appear in other mss., 
e.g., at 124d8-9 (on Bakis, Sibyl, and Amphilytus), where reference is 
made to Aelius Aristides (2.46 Behr, UTrep pT)TopiKfjs) and Flavius 
Josephus (cxpxaioXoyLcx ’IouSaiKrj 1.118).
T Venice - Venetus App. Cl. 4.1. Traditionally dated to s.xi-xii (e.g. 
Schanz, Piatocodex 1; Post 81), but recently identified positively as the 
work of Ephraim povaxos (see B.L. Fonkich, Thesaurismata 16 [1979] 
158; A. Diller, CP 75 [1980] 322-4; R. Barbour, Greek Literary Hands [Ox­
ford, 1981] 14, with a specimen of Ephraim’s hand), thus bringing the date 
of this ms. down to about 950 (Schanz in RhMus 33 [1878] 303, and Burnet 
in CR 19 [1905] 297, already suspected an earlier date for T). Contains Ti. 
Locr. (copied by Johannes Rhosus), tetr. 1-8.2 (to 389d7, then completed 
by a s.xv-xvi hand; Ti. is added by a hand of s.xvi). Collated by Bekker and 
fully by Schanz, on whom both Burnet and Souilhe relied. Schanz how­
ever misreports the contents of T in a number of places: e.g., 121a3 
eveKev re veraT (cvcKa has made its way into the editions of Burnet and 
Souilhe on Schanz's authority); 122b6 pr. ccuToij is a correction for an 
original ocijtou, probably by the scribe himself (Tc); 124a6 tgjv (per comp.
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s.i.) is the work of Tc, I believe, not a later hand (t); 124a6 TpuycovTcov 
was originally TpuyovTcov (so also a number of derivative mss.), but u) ex 
o t; 125c7 Sc re veraT (not 8ai; so also 125e5); 125c10 tcBv p.ayeLpL~ 
kgjv i.m. yp. T ( but attributed only to apographa by Schanz, and to W by 
Burnet); 126b5 kocl ols cIctl tc lkttol kccl xptovTca i.m. yp. T (nott); 
130b1 dircxO^ias re veraT (not aTTex0Las); 130c5 ccLO-ecuiJLCCL i.m. yp. 
T (only in Coisl.155 according to Burnet).
T is commonly supposed to have been copied from A (Par.1807, 
containing tetr.8-9, Spuria) when the latter was complete (see Schanz, 
Platocodex 77\.\ Alline 214f.; A. Jordan, Hermes 13 [1878] 477f.; Dodds 
37f.), though this has in the past been disputed (see Burnet, CQ 8 [1914] 
231; A.C. Clark, The Descent of Manuscripts [Oxford, 1918] 413; Greene, 
Scholia Platonica xxxiv-v). Such a derivation for T would in itself be a 
persuasive argument for treating it as a primary witness, a position which 
Schanz first held, and which has since won general acceptance. More­
over, if T is a copy of the lost volume of A, then there is a strong presump­
tion that T represents a tradition that derives from a sixth-century Alex­
andrian ms. (see Westerink, ICS 6.1 [1981] 112-15). Dodds (38-9) and 
Bluck (130) noted relatively small differences between B and T in Grg. and 
Men.', but much larger discrepancies exist between the two mss. in other 
dialogues (see Krai, IMS 14 [1892] 188). The most reasonable explanation 
for this is the one suggested by Dodds (38-9): B and T descend from 
different hyparchetypes, but each has been contaminated with readings 
characteristic of the other (appearing originally perhaps as marginal or 
interlinear variants), more systematically in some dialogues than in others. 
For one probable instance of this kind, cf. Thg. 123a7: CTCpa W (recte),
ctl B, ctl kocl CTCpa T (where ctl may have been a marginal variant in
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the hyparchetype of T, and was conflated with eTepa). 129d8 also has 
separative value: TTpccypocTeiccs T, CFTpotTeias BW. Other readings in T 
distinguish it from BW, though do not by themselves prove primary author­
ity: 130d4 pev om. T, hab. BW; cf. app. crit. 121c2,122a1, 129b4 (see sec. 
c below on the internal relationship of BTW). T will be treated as a primary 
witness in this edition of Thg.
The influence of T on the mss. tradition of Thg. was pervasive. It is 
the ancestor of most surviving transcriptions of this dialogue.
Ven.184 Venice - Venetus 184. Date: s.xv, tetr. 1-9, Epigr., Spuria 
(minus Deff., Eryx.), one of only three Plato mss. containing all nine tetra­
logies (Flor.a c are the others). This sumptuous ms. was written for Bess- 
arion by Johannes Rhosus (see Alline 209, 307). Collated by Bekker: sig­
lum S, Schanz E. Post asserted (40) that Ven.184 derives from Ven.186 
for tetr.1-8; such an ancestry will perfectly explain certain peculiarities in 
Ven.184: 121d3 SiaTOCpaTTODaLV Ven.186, but t added above pr. t, 
SiaTTapGtTTO'iio’iP (s/c) Ven.184 (the second t in 8ioctt~ has been 
squeezed in); 122a9 aKfjKOuas (sic) Ven.184 186; 122b4 cruppouXeu^ 
Ven.186, but crop,- obliterated, |3ooXeui] Ven.184; 122c9 e Tri ©up] 
Ven.184 186, eTriGupei cett.’, 125c10 payeipcov Ven.186 (BTW), lk s.l., 
payeipiKcnv Ven.184; 125e6 cipxTS Ven.184 186, apxoTs cett.; 129d4 
cTTpocTeia Ven.184 186, aTpotTeiccvcetf.; 129e3 evavTidvTOCi Ven. 
184 186, evavTLolitocl Ven.1842 (cett.). Ven.184 also adds some of its 
own errors: 122c5 XeyeiS“ Ven.184, Xeyeiv cett.; 123d13 TrXeicov Ven. 
184, TrXoicuvcetf.; 127a3 Te Ven.184, ye cett.; 130a6 oXoyco (sic) Ven. 
184, oXiyco cett.; 131a4 pouXeuopeOa Ven. 184, ~oope6oc cett. Ven. 
184 contains numerous additions and corrections by Bessarion, especially 
in matters of punctuation and breathing; Rhosus also supplies corrections
here and there. This ms. was long held to be the primary source of the 
Aldine Plato, although that honour is now usually (but wrongly for Thg.) 
given to Ven.186 (see on Aid.).
Ven.186 Venice - Venetus 186. Date: s.xv; contains tetr.1-3.1, 
followed by the remainder of the Platonic Corpus, except for R, Crit., and 
tetr.9, very much out of the regular tetralogical order; Thg. appears be­
tween Amat. and Lys. Previously uncollated for Thg. Ven.186 is written in 
four hands, of which Thg. is in the fourth. There are copious corrections 
and notes by Bessarion throughout, and several strata of these can be 
detected by the various shades of ink. Post supposed (58-9) that Ven.186 
was the source of the Aldine Plato, but the matter is not that simple (see 
below on Aid). Up to Hp. mi. (the first hand) it is a copy of Ven.189 (see 
Schanz, Platocodex 89f.); Post seems to extend this to embrace Ven.186 in 
general (58), but the derivation of Thg. must be different. For this dialogue, 
Ven.186 goes back to T, but not through Par.1808, as it ultimately should if 
Ven.189 were its source. As a matter of fact it has none of the character­
istic readings of Par.1808 (q.v.). It does, however, preserve the peculiar T 
readings: 123a7 ctl kccl CT€pcc T Ven.186, ctl B, eTepcc W; 129d8 
tt p ocy pccT € l ocs T Ven.186, OTpocTOLQCS BW; 130d4 pev om. T Ven.186, 
hab. BW; there are also trivial agreements between Ven.186 and T, e.g., 
121c2 tcc ocXAcc T Ven.186, tSx\cc BW; 129b4 TTpos pe T Ven.186, 
Trpos cpe BW. A number of fairly simple corrections by the original 
scribe, Bessarion, and possibly one or more other hands, may show 
contamination in the exemplar of Ven.186, or correction of Ven.186 against 
a ms. other than the exemplar, but independent editorial activity is not out 
of the question: 122a1 peXeL BW Ven.186 (recte), peXXcL T; 122a1 
tovtcov T Ven.186, toljtov BW Ven.1862; 122c9 eTTLeup^ Ven.186
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Urb.80, -ei BTW; 123 b6 eGeXoi T W Ven.186 (ut vid.), eQeXi^ B Ven. 
1862; 123e2, 3 T) BTW Ven.186, § Ven.1862 (et recc.); 124c12 auTOV T 
Ven.186 (octjtoli BW), octjtQ Ven.1862; 125a6 pouXcucnpeQa Ven.186 (et 
recc.), -opeOa BTW; 126b1 tlpocs W Ven. 186 (recte), tlvos BT; 127a2 
Xp^oeTai W Ven.186, xP'QO'^tocl BT Ven.1862; 127d6 t’ W Ven. 
186, Te f)P Bessarion i.m. (T); 130c5 aiaQarapai W Ven.186, -op.cn 
BT; 130c7 TTpouXirrev W Ven.186, TTpouXciTrov BT. Other features 
however seem to point more directly to some degree of contamination: 
129c1 SiaXciirav TW Ven.186, sedi s.i. Ven.1862, SiaXvrrav B; 129 
d8 TTpayporreiocs T Ven.186, crTpaTeias BW eti.m. yp. Ven.1862. It 
appears that Ven.186 either descended from a copy of T which was con­
taminated with some B and W readings, or was itself subjected to hori­
zontal transmission.
Ven.189 Venice - Venetus 189. The traditional date of Ven.189 
has been given as s. xiv (e.g. Wilson 387), but since it is a copy of Flor.c, 
which is put at s.xv, one of these dates should be revised. Ven.189 con­
tains tetr.1-3.1, 6.3-7.1, 3.3, 8.3, 4.1-2, Ax., lust., Virt., Dem., Sis., Hale. 
(contents identical to those of Y [Vienna, Phil. Gr. 21]), then follow Hp. mi., 
Mx., Ion, Clit., Phdr., Criti., Phlb., and tetr.4.3-6.2. Collated by Bekker. 
siglum 2, S Schanz and most editors since. In Thg. the connection of 
Ven.189 with Flor.c is indicated by common omissions at 123a6 8r|; 123b3 
ot; 123c6 (xv(jJizupos...c9 TTOTOpov; 128b8 tl; and by shared errors at 
122b3 t]tls Flor.c Ven.189, tjticfovv cett.-, 124d3 tovtwv pyfl Flor.c 
Ven.189, pyr^ Tourav cett.; 127d3 paXioTa croi Flor.c Ven.189, pa\- 
lqt’ av croi cett.; 130d3 o<j)p epffi Flor.c Ven.189, op(3 cett. As a 
descendant of Flor.c, Ven.189 contributes a number of its own errors and 
omissions, e.g., 123a6 aura om.; 124c6 8t) om.; 124c7 Tourav om.;
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125c2yccp pro Sv; 127a4 aoi pro ac; 127c6 clSt] pro t^St); 127e3 Te 
om.', 129b4 e<()T| om. In 127c6 tovto, the reading preserved by Ven.189 
in truth against all other mss., was merely a simple correction by the scribe.
W Vienna - Vindobonensis suppl. gr. 7. The date of the earliest 
part of this ms. (in which part77?p. is contained) has been a subject of some 
dispute, and suggestions have covered a period of about 200 years, e.g., 
s.xii Alline (237); s.xi Post (90) and Diels (Berl. Sitzb. [1906] 749), also the 
catalogue date; 950-1050 Maas (in Dodds 39). W contains tetr.1-3, then 
tetr.4-7, excluding Ale. II, out of the tetralogical order; a later hand has 
added C//Y., R, and Ti. Burnet's very sketchy report of W was based on 
information related to him by Krai (OCT III, praef.). Souilhe alone collated 
W fully for Thg., yet he twice tacitly corrects Burnet where Burnet is actually 
right, i.e., 123a3 cvckcv W, cvckcc Souilhe; 130e8 cc t’ Souilhe, ol t’ 
Burnet; once his report is correct where Burnet's is slightly misleading 
(126c3 Burnet’s app. crit. should read cttclSt) 8e 8f|). Souilhe’s report of 
W is otherwise generally accurate (note however 123e14 ye om. W; 
129d4 kccXov re vera W [Ka\ov Souilhe]); but he ignores the fact that a 
number of readings in W are i.r., and possibly hide a genuine variant. My 
report of W will render as complete an account as possible (see sec. e).
On the various correcting hands in W, see R. Hensel, Vindiciae 
Platonicae (Berlin, 1906) 41-52 (with special reference to Tht. and Pit.)', to 
the seven listed there Bluck (in his ed. of Men. [132-3]) adds an eighth. 
From my photographs I see no evidence for a later corrector in the case of 
Thg., but for (perhaps) 127b3 yapicl W, sed ex cl. It is clearly the first 
hand (the copyist) which has added the marginal variants and scholia in 
122e8, 125c4, c5, 126b5, 127c8, and e3.
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Krai (WS14 [1892] 161-208) demonstrated that W is independent of 
B and T in Thg., as it is for the other dialogues of tetr.1-7. The evidence he 
brought forward for Thg. is small but, I believe, decisive. Independence 
from BT: 123a7 erepa W (recte), en, B (CTCpa vet.b), cti kccl CTCpaT; 
independence from T: 129d8 aTpocTeLecs BW, TTpocypccTciocs T; 130d4 
ejjLCcQov jjlcv BW, pev om. T. To this list may be added 122c2 O"uv- 
odctlccs BT (recte), GwriQeias W, which may well have been originally a 
gloss, either in the exemplar of W, or earlier (see comm, ad loc.). In this 
edition W will be treated as a primary witness.
For Thg. only Vat.1029, Lobe., and (possibly) Flor.i descend directly 
from W.
Appendix: The BTW Relationship
The preceding survey of mss., in so far as B, T, and W have 
emerged as the only witnesses which can rightly be regarded as primary, 
essentially reinforces the opinio communis which has prevailed since Bur­
net's edition. All other mss. are manifestly derivative, and any aid which 
they may provide in constituting a text of Thg. is merely the result of 
independent conjecture as exercised on a given mss. Whether the first 
correcting hand in B (B2) is to be allowed as a primary source cannot be 
decided from this dialogue alone, but, at any rate, in this case its 
contribution is exceedingly meagre.
That the relationship between BTW is close enough to permit us to 
speak of them as comprising a ms. "family," deriving ultimately from a 
single hyparchetype, is supported by shared readings which are demon­
strably false. Such are 123e10 poucrLKfjs BTW, (jlo'UCtlk'Q M Par.1812 
Urb.80 recte', 127c6 toCtov BTW, touto Ven.189 recte', 128a6 ttocvd
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tto\w BTW Za/so;129a3 eueij toO 8ctL|iov£ou BTW falso; and several 
emendations and deletions, if correct, support the same view, cf. 128a6 
TTpoaKcrromeevTas BTW, TrpoKOCTOtTieevTOcs ego; Sokcl tl ctl 
BTW, Sokcl ctl Flor.b c et Ang.gr.107 (sed tl ctl ante ras.); 130b7 to 
dv8paTra8ov BTW, to del. Cobet.
Burnet (CQQ [1914] 231) and Alline (238f.) urged that W represents 
an older tradition of the text than either B or T, and thus stands in an 
intermediate position, from which B and T have diverged. If this is true, we 
could feel some confidence in treating WB and WT agreements with 
greater respect than agreements between BT. There are reasons, how­
ever, why such a dogma cannot be mechanically applied in the case of 
Thg. For one thing, we cannot decide with any degree of certainty the 
relationship in this dialogue between the three primary witnesses; indeed, 
the difference between W on the one hand, and BT on the other, is not 
profound, and there is no firm indication that two mss. consistently side 
against the third. Only two readings show agreement between two mss. in 
a significant reading against a third, i.e., 122c2 where BT agree in truth in 
the reading auvouaLCCS against owqOcLas of W; and 129d8 where T 
preserves TTpocypocTCLCCS, the reading adopted in the present text, against 
(JTpaTCLas of BW. No conclusions can be drawn from this evidence. 
Still less revealing is the agreement of two witnesses against a third in 
places such as 121c4 T) om. B, hab. TW; 123a5 eyd) aiJTq) BT, ccutc^ eyd) 
W; 125e3 kccl BT, ev W; 126d4 oSv ccv TW, av oSv B; 129a4 cftocSlo- 
8popd)P BT, -SpoiTOS W; 129b4 Trpos epe BW, TTpos |Jie T; the depar­
ture of one witness from the other two in instances of these kinds does not 
constitute proof of a separate strand within the BTW tradition. In the case of
Thg. no primary ms. is demonstrably more closely related to a second than 
it is to a third.
There is another reason why it proves to be impossible to determine 
successfully the internal relationship between B, T, and W; namely, the 
evidence that in Thg., as in other dialogues, collusion must have been 
occurring already among the respective ancestors of our three primary 
witnesses. 123a7 is, I think, an indication of this (CTepoc W, cti B, ctl 
kcci €T€pcc T); see above on T. We can possibly detect evidence of the 
relative unity of the BTW family through 130e8: ot T, ot’ B, ot t’ W. One 
of two possibilities presents itself here: either the hyparchetype preserved 
OI with T written as a variant s.l.; B and T then selected among variants, 
while W conflated; or the exemplar of W presented both readings, possibly 
one as a variant. Hence each reading must be examined on its own 
merits, and in any given instance one ms. may be right against the other 
two. We can only guess at the amount of contamination present in the 
tradition when our first mss. make their appearance.11
b. The Indirect Tradition
Since, according to Diogenes Laertius (3.62) and Albinus (Eisag. 4), 
some learners began their study of Plato with Thg., we might expect extant 
quotations of the dialogue by ancient authors to be fairly numerous. They 
are not, however; nor are those that do survive of any great assistance for 
the editor of Thg. The testimonia of several ancient authors have been 
cited in previous editions, notably in those of Stallbaum, Fritzsche, Burnet, 
and Souilhe. All the passages which they collectively cite (Dionysius, 
[Plutarch], Aelian, Clement, Priscian, Stobaeus) will be entered in the
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11 On this question see N. Wilson, CQn.s.10 (1960) 202-4.
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register directly below the text of the present edition, along with all other 
testimonia I have been able to gather. Though no claim to exhaustiveness 
can be made here, the catalogue that has been formed does, I believe, 
take into account most surviving testimonia.
The results are not particularly impressive. Only Priscian supplies 
us with a true reading against the main tradition (127d6), but the correction 
is a simple one, and the reading probably lies behind a transcriptional 
error in B (see comm, ad loc.). On a couple of occasions the indirect trad­
ition supports the text of the main tradition against a modern conjecture 
(128b5, 129e8-9). Several quotations preserve a correct 8e at 128d5 
along with BCT (om. W), but there is little significance in this. The variants 
presented by different quotations are usually inferior to the readings of 
mss. (e.g. 128d2, d5), and the only instance in which an indirect witness 
agrees with the evidence of one primary ms. against the other two (128e3 
omission of an article by W and Aelian) is probably merely a matter of 
coincidence.
Despite such paucity of information, the evidence for the quotation of 
Thg. by later authors is documented fully in the pages of the text, and 
variants are cited in the apparatus where appropriate. Instances in which 
an ancient author paraphrases a passage in Thg. are indicated in the list of 
testimonia by cf.', where an ancient author merely alludes to a specific 
passage in Thg., the abbreviation resp.(icif) is used.
c. Scholia
Like the other dialogues of tetr.1-6, two sets of scholia are preserved 
for Thg. One group, the so-called Arethae scholia, is found only in B, and 
is represented for this dialogue by a single scholion on 126b1 (on the
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phrase irocpa tivos). This scholion attempts to defend a variant reading 
as an Atticism, but is in fact simply an instance of the grammatical and 
syntactical misapprehensions which are to be found not infrequently in this 
set. Despite the title given to these scholia, they were undoubtedly not all 
compiled by Arethas himself (see Greene, Scholia Platonica xxiii; Dodds 
36), though they were transcribed by him into B.
In Thg. the scholia vetera are more abundant than the Arethae 
scholia (though this is not the case with every dialogue, e.g. Grg. and Tht.). 
In B they have been added by a later hand (vet.b), of s.x-xi according to 
Schanz and Allen, which is at work only in Thg. andC/?rm. (see Greene, 
op.cit. xv). In reality, only one of the scholia vetera is preserved in B 
(122e8); the putative scholion on 125c4 registered by Greene (112) is 
merely a varia lectio (yp.) which appears in TW as well as B, and should 
not have been included in his collection (see, however, Greene xxxvi). The 
full set of scholia vetera is contained only in T (the original hand, Greene 
xvi), and the notes are written in small uncial characters. W has the scholia 
vetera on 122e8, 127c8, and 127e3. The scholion on 127c8 is actually 
comprised of two distinct parts in T, and W basically preserves the first, 
briefer version. The scholia vetera in W are in the same hand as that of the 
original scribe.
Neither the scholia vetera nor the Arethae scholia are of any impor­
tance in constituting the text of Thg., nor are they exegetically valuable. 
Burnet collected the source-attributions for the scholia vetera on Thg. that 
were ultimately catalogued in Greene's apparatus (Greene xiii), and I have 
nothing to add to the information gathered there. Such as they are, they do 
not throw any light on the extent to which Thg. was read and studied at the 
time that the various scholia were compiled; indeed, two of the scholia
(121 a1, 127c8) may well have been appropriated from the scholia vetera 
on passages in other dialogues.
d. Early Printed Editions
Aid. Venice - Aldine edition (September, 1513); the editio princeps 
of the complete works of Plato, edited by Marcus Musurus. For Lg. and 
Epin. the source of Aid. may be Ven.187 (Post 3, 41-4), and so also for Ti. 
Locr. (see W. Marg, Timaeus Locrus: De Natura Mundi etAnimae [Leiden, 
1972] 79). Ven.184 was long considered to be the source of Aid. for many 
other dialogues (see Jowett-Campbell II.93; Alline 316); Post (58-9) 
passed the honour to Ven.186, from which Ven.184 was copied. But these 
assertions were never based on complete collations, and whatever may be 
true for other works in the Corpus, in Thg. Ven.186 cannot be the parent (or 
at least the sole parent) of Aid. The ms. which displays greatest affinity with 
Aid. is Par.1811; the following are some conjunctive readings: 121a3 
eveKa Aid. Par.1811 Urb.80, eveKev cett.', 121c6 o3v om. Aid. Par.1811; 
122e9 TTaiSdJOVTCtL Aid. Par.1811 1812, TreTraTSeuvTai cett.', 123b4 
cptOTGOV Aid. Par.1811, avepcoTcov cett.; 123b6 Trap’S Aid. Par.1811, 
Trap’ Sv cett.; 123b7 TauTr|V ante aurqv add. Aid. Par.1811; 124a8 
apxopeea Aid. Par.1811 1812, apxopev cett.; 124b3 pev om. Aid. Par. 
1811; 125d9 qtj om. Aid. Par.1811; 126a8 alt. ol om. Aid. Par.1811; 126 
d4 CQ€Q0ai Aid. Par.1811 1812, ai etQ s.i. Aid. Par.1811, atc0eQ0aT 
cett.; 126d9 Trapexei Aid. Par.1811, Trapcx01 cett-> 127e3 avayupou” 
aicnv Aid. Par.1811, avayupaaicov cett.; 128b4TT\T)v apiKpoO ye 
Aid. Par.1811, TT\rjv ye apiKpov cett.; 130b2 }jlg oSv Aid. Par.1811, 
otjv pe cett.; 130b4 aKouto post S zSxpaTes transp. Aid. Par.1811; 
130c2 pe Aid. Par.1811, pev cett.; 130e10 tvxot Aid. Par.1811 1812.
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But Aldus himself claimed to have relied on more than one ms. (cf. his 
preface: Musurus Cretensis...qui hos Platonis libros accurate recognovit 
cum antiquissimis conferees exemplaribus...), and the positing of Par.1811 
as source of Aid. will not account for all the facts. Aid. sometimes pre­
serves a true reading against Par.1811, e.g. 123b2 ecrTiv om. Par.1811, 
hab. Aid.; 123b6 crowds Aid., ao<J)c6T€pos Par.1811; 127b7 ere om. 
Par.1811, hab. Aid.; 128c2 oXiycp Aid., oXiycov Par.1811; 129a5 vpiv 
om. Par.1811, hab. Aid. Of the four mss. which Alline (316) believed to be 
the source of Aid., one (Monac.237) does not contain Thg., while no traces 
are to be found in Aid. of two others (Flor.b and Par.1809). It is just 
possible that Ven.184 (as Alline thought, see above), or Ven.186 (which 
shows the kind of physical wear to be expected from a printer’s copy), is 
another source. This would account for a number of readings: 122c9 
eiTieupei Aid. (BTW), sed^ s.l. Aid., -f| Ven.186 184 (Urb.80); 125c2 
payeipiKtov Aid. Ven.1862 184, payeiprnv Par.1811 (BTW); 125d7 
oT8’ om. Par.1811, hab. Aid. Ven.186 184 (BTW); 127b3 xapifj Aid. 
Ven.1862 184, xapiei Ven.186, CL s.l. Aid.; 128d3 fj Aid. Ven.186 184, fj 
Ven.1862,s.l. Aid.; 130c5 alcredvcnpai Aid. Ven.186 184 (W). It would 
be difficult to proceed any further than this, but it is salutary to observe that 
Musurus used at least four mss. in producing the Aldine Aristophanes (see 
K. Zacher, Bursian 71 [1892] 30-2), and for Thg. Aldus, or Musurus, or both, 
are likely to have employed other materials besides Par.1811 and Ven.186 
or 184. Musurus may in fact have been capable of some good readings of 
his own; but there is nothing in Aid. which does not otherwise occur in our 
extant mss.
Bas.1 Basel - First Basel edition (March 1534), edited by loannes 
Oporinus (Johann Herbst) apud I. Valderum. The editor has done little
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more than copy the Aldine editio princeps (on the tendency to constitute 
early printed editions on the basis of already-existing editions, see E.J. 
Kenney, The Classical Text [Berkeley, 1974] 10 n.3). Where Bas.1 differs 
from Aid., as it rarely does, it does so in manifest error: e.g., 121a2 kocl 
Bas.1, Se cett.', 123a5 outcds Bas.1, oljtos cett.', 123a6 cru Bas.1, ere 
cett.; 125b4 St) om. Bas.1; 129b3 eTriaT0ccrer|V Bas.1, rjTrLQTCcaeriv 
cett. The sole exception is the simple correction at 123e10 jjeouaLKT) 
Bas.1 recte, pco'ucriK'fjs Aid. (BTW). Further, where Aid. adds a variant s.l., 
Bas.1 in almost every instance ignores this reading where it is to be 
preferred, or follows the variant in Aid. where that variant is false.
Bas.2 Basel - Second Basel edition (March 1556), edited by 
Marcus Hopperus apud Henricum Petrum. The preface advertises the 
method of this edition: Nam vir ille virtutibus et praestanti doctrina clarus, 
Arnoldus Arlenius, ad eruendos, vindicandos, et restaurandos bonos 
auctores, diis ita volentibus, quasi natus, nactus superioribus annis in Italia 
quaedam manuscripta Platonis exemplaria, conferre cum iis Vualderianum 
(cui et Aldinum respondebat) coepit: a quibus cum discrepare id in locis 
aliquot multis animadvertisset, ac desiderari non pauca in excuso vidisset, 
a capite ad ealeem usque corrigere et annotare ea quae occurebant errata, 
quantum fieri potuit, omnia haud destitit. Deprehendit autem quaedam, ut 
dixi, omissa, quaedam contra redundare, quaedam denique in versa et 
transposita. cuius equidem generis errores (ut leviores quasi innumeros 
nunc taceam) plus quam mi He, collatione ea facta, annotavit. Despite 
these words, Bas.2 is decidedly inferior to either Aid. or Bas.1, although it 
does follow the latter quite closely. Where Bas.2 attempts to "correct” a 
reading, it usually makes matters worse, e.g., 121a5 cvckcv ttolt|Gocl 
Bas.2, cveKCC kccl ttccizu cett., evidently looking to 121a3 in the ms. with
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which he was comparing previous editions (Schanz, RhMus 33 [1878] 615, 
suggests this ms. was T); 121c7 ecttl pev oBv aAAa yap Bas.2, where 
the editor has restored ow omitted in 121c6 by Aid. and Bas.1, but in the 
wrong place; 125a3 otl Bas.2, oOl cett.’, 126c1 xpwvTe Bas.2, xp^v- 
tocl cett.’, 128d6 dvocKOLvdovTOCL Bas.2,-(Btocl cett. It does however 
improve on Aid. Bas.1 in 127a4 os ool Bas.2 recte, oool Aid. Bas.1, and 
in 127e3 avayupaaLew Bas 2 recte, avayupovaritw Aid. Bas.1.
Steph. Paris - Edition of Henri Estienne (Stephanus; 1578, the 
’’Vulgate" edition) with accompanying Latin translation by Jean de Serres 
(loannes Serranus). Stephanus in his preface assures his reader that this 
work will be a critical edition: Ac quum varia ex veteribus libris auxilia 
conquisivissem, hanc in eorum usu cautionem adhibui, ut quae lectiones 
praecedentium editionum, Aldinae, Basiliensis, Louvaniensis (quae est 
duntaxat librorum De legibus) ferri posse viderentur, in ista etiam retiner- 
entur, diversis margini adscripts: in earum autem locum quae ovSev 
vyies haberent, (quarum etiam non nulla ne a Ficino quidem agnosc- 
untur) di versa illae ex vetustis petitae libris substituerentur. ut omittam 
quae ex iisdem adiecta fuerunt, ut remedia locis antea mutilis et decurtatis 
afferentur. (He proceeds briefly to discuss his use of conjecture and 
marginal notation.) In fact this edition constitutes a marked advance on its 
three predecessors, and Stephanus shows himself to be a capable editor 
of Plato. Thus in 121c6 he restores ofiv to its correct place; 124a8 apx“ 
opev Steph, recte, apxopeQa Aid. Bas.1 2; 126d4 atcrGecrQaL Steph. 
recte, ecrecrOaL Aid. Bas.1 2; 126d9 it apex01 Steph, recte, —el Aid. Bas.1 
2; and he offers certain plausible or true readings i.m. (some by conjecture, 
others doubtless as variants found in other mss.), e.g., 121 d1 Sokel yap 
[jlol Steph., SokcB yap poL cett.’, 122d7 iTpocrayopeTJcopev Steph, recte
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(BTW), “€ijo|i€V Aid. Bas.1 2; 127a5 avaXtocrcLS ci. Steph, recte (BTW), 
-aai$ Aid. Bas.1 2; 127b8 aTraXXd^CTC Steph, recte (BTW), “(rre Aid. 
Bas.1 2; 129a2 cpecrOc Steph, recte, cpeaOaL Aid. Bas.1 2; 130d3 pcv 
tl vf| totjs ©eovs Steph., p.ev vf) toljs QeoiJS cett. (he is also re­
sponsible for the word separation at 129e9 accepted into most texts). 
Alline’s assertion (317), that Stephanus used Par.1811 as the main source 
for his edition, is not true, since the many traces of that ms. in Steph, are 
simply the result of this edition's dependence on Aid., which does draw on 
Par.1811 (see above).
Fic. Florence - Latin translation by Marsilio Ficino (1485, 28 years 
before the Aldine editio princeps; for the purpose of this collation I have 
used the 1539 Basel edition of the translation). I shall restrict my com­
ments about this translation, since Ficino is frequently loose in his render­
ing of the Greek, and it is not always a simple matter to determine if this is 
an attempt to achieve clarity, or if in fact it is a reflection of the text he had 
before him. In any event, Ficino’s exemplar was clearly Flor.a or one of its 
descendants (cf. M Sicherl, Scriptorium 16 [1962] 51): 123c6ff. Ficino omits 
c6 dvcovijpos...c9 TTOTepov (Quam igitur nunc cupis? Utrum illam 
quidem nosti nomen autem ignoras? vel nomen etiam tenes?), which is 
the pattern in Flor.a and its offspring Flor.c o Ven.189; 123a6 quasi F\c., cos 
Flor.a c o Ven.189, but cos 8t) cett., for which we would have expected 
quasi vero or quasi scilicet. Apart from these features it is difficult to argue 
from specific points of detail. But the possibility that Ficino used a copy of 
Flor.a no longer extant must be seriously considered. For example, in 
123b3 he writes At si cuperes, implying cl cttc0ljijlcls in his exemplar 
(Coisl.155 Flor.b, cttlOdpcls cett.); 125a6 consultemus Fic., |3ouXclj- 
cojJtcea recc., (3ouXcu6|JLC0a Flor.a c o Ven.189; 125d7 nescio Fic., oTS’
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om. Flor.a c o Ven.189; 127b8 obsecro liberetis Fic., aiTaXXdgaTe recc., 
“6Te Flor.a c o Ven.189; 129d4 In expeditionem nanque exiit Neonus Cali 
fihus Fic., ctti yap t*q eiri crTpocTeiav egoppitj Zavvicnvos tov 
kcxXou Flor.a c Ven.189, Zavvanvos Flor.o. But Ficino was constrained, 
unlike an ordinary scribe, to turn Greek into intelligible Latin, and therefore 
could have arrived at correct readings by his own divination. Further, 
Ficino did not feel compelled to translate a passage if he could not under­
stand it; cf. 129a3 t)vlkoc aTroeavoupevos rjei euGij toC Sctipoviou 
codd., cum iam moriturus esset Fic., omitting eueij toC Saipoviou, 
which merely proves that he could derive no more sense from this crux 
than modern editors have been able to do (see Appendix 3). It is difficult to 
know what to make of 122a7-8: (B av cym paXicrTa epouXopriv Trepi 
t(3v toioijtcov peXXcov Trpa^civ avppoiiXevaraaOai codd., quern 
quidem hac in re mi hi consultorem maxime cupiebam Fic. Did Ficino read 
8t) (quidem) for av (ci. Cobet)?
e. Modern Editions
Bekker's edition of 1826 represents the first advancement on Steph­
anus' Vulgate text. Bekker was aware of and utilized far more mss. (13) 
than Stephanus had done, but he followed no scientific principles in 
producing his edition, nor did Stallbaum (1836), who added several mss. 
to the total number of those collated which contained Thg. Baiter's Zurich 
edition (1839) relies exclusively on previous editions, as does the Teubner 
edition of Hermann (1873).
Up to this point the authority of B was recognized, and editors 
followed it as far as possible. However, since the Clarkianus was viewed 
as the codex optimus, little systematic attention was paid to the possibility
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that other mss. might be primary witnesses, until Schanz proved the value 
of T, and founded his edition (Tauschnitz, 1882) on the basis of both B and 
T. Burnet took account of these two mss. for his edition of the dialogue 
(1903), and reported a third witness as well, the Vienna ms. W. But Burnet 
did not collate W for himself, and his account of it is incomplete. Souilhe’s 
edition (1930) basically reproduces the reports of B and T in Burnet, but 
furnishes a much fuller catalogue of the readings in W.
The present edition of Thg. differs from previous editions in a 
number of ways. In the first place, it is based on a consideration of all 
known mss. of the dialogue (except Escor.), and of all but a very small 
number of printed editions; it also takes into account the indirect tradition to 
a fuller extent than has previously been done. It has been possible there­
fore to record the earliest authority or authorities for any reading that is 
accepted into the text. In the second place, this edition departs from the 
most widely used editions in a number of the readings that are adopted in 
the text itself (see the list following the text for a catalogue of the departures 
from Burnet and Souilhe). It is perhaps most important, however, that the 
reports of our primary witnesses, BTW, are intended to be as full as 
possible. The reports of these mss. by Burnet and Souilhe were never 
meant to be exhaustive; and, although I have already spoken about the 
different kinds of inaccuracy in earlier collations of BTW which the present 
reports attempt to remedy (see above on B,T, and W), a brief word about 
the scope of the apparatus criticus of this edition as it differs from those of 
Burnet and Souilhe seems in order. Virtually all variants in BTW are 
recorded: apparent minutiae of an orthographic kind are noticed (e.g., 
aei~ccte£,T)~7*j, 8e~8a£,—13—et in second person singular middle); all 
erasures where a change in reading has been effected are listed (as far as
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this has been possible to judge where photographs alone have been 
used); and all variants added i.m. or s.l. are entered in the apparatus. I 
have been rather more selective on details such as word separation and 
accent; but where a scribe or corrector in B, T, or W has altered a ms. on 
such a point, this fact is stated; so too where a particular accentuation is 
introduced by a modern editor (indicated usually by "edd”). This edition 
also returns to nineteenth-century editorial practice in printing or
where the primary witnesses favour this spelling, and in recording 
variations in this spelling among our primary witnesses.12 Where editorial 
activity of one kind or another has taken place in B, T, or W, I have always 
attempted to distinguish the earliest hand from contemporary or later 
correctors. Moreover, secondary mss. will be mentioned in the apparatus 
only when a reading in one has been accepted into the text, or has 
anticipated a modern correction, and not as a source of variants. While the 
apparatus is for the most part positive, it has not seemed necessary to 
record the readings of all three primary witnesses when confusion is
unlikely to occur.
12For the evidence and justification of this method, see J. Kerschensteiner, Munchener 
Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft i2 (1956) 28-41.
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Stemma Codicum
B
(895)
Vat.
226
Utb.
32
Bas.2
I
Vulg.
271
SIGLA
B Clarkianus 39 (895 A.D.), ff. 277r-282r
Bc idem post correctiones manus primae
B2 eiusdem vetus diorthotes (fortasse Arethas)
vetb manus saeculi x-xi (Rz Schanz)
b eiusdem manus recentiores
T Venetus App. Cl. 4.1 (c. 950), ff. 130r-132r
Tc eiusdem vetus diorthotes (eadem atque manus prima)
t eiusdem manus recentiores
W Vindobonensis Suppl. Gr. 7 (s. xi [?]), ff. 494r-499r
W° eiusdem vetus diorthotes (eadem atque manus prima)
Hie illic codices recentiores citantur
Par.1808
Par.1811
Par.1812
Coisl.155
Vat.1029
Vat.1030
Pal.175
Urb.80
Ang.107
Ven.184
Ven.186
Ven.189
Flor.b
Flor.o
Ambros.329
Ambros.409
M
Neap.337
Lobe.
Parisinus Gr. 1808
Parisinus Gr. 1811
Parisinus Gr. 1812
Coislinianus Gr. 155 
Vaticanus Gr. 1029 
Vaticanus Gr. 1030 
Palatinus Gr. 175 
Urbinas Gr. 80
Angelicanus Gr. 107 (olim C.1.4) 
Venetus 184 
Venetus 186 
Venetus 189 
Laurentianus 85.6 
Laurentianus 85.9 
Ambrosianus 329 (F 19 Sup.) 
Ambrosianus 409 (G 69 Sup.) 
Malatestianus D 28.4 
Neapolitanus 337 
RadniceVl F.a.1 (Lobcovicianus)
Ficino Marsilii Ficini interpretatio in iinguam latinam, Laurenti, 1485 
Stephanus Henrici Stephani (Henri Estienne) editio, Parisiis, 1578
codd. omnium codicum consensus
s.l. lectio supra lineam
i.m. lectio in margine
i.m. yp. varia lectio in margine cum nota ypCa^eToci)
i.r. lectio in rasuram
a.c. lectio ante correctionem
p.c. lectio post correctionem
comp. lectio in compendio
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0EATHZ
AH. TQ ZcoKpaTes, e8eop-qv ccttcx croi tStoXoyqcracreat, 
et cryoXT)- Kav et acrxo^L0C °€ P-'H ttociz-u Tts peyaX-q, optos
X r> <Z Z . zepou eveKev TTOfqcrat axoArji/.
ZQ. ’AXXa Kat aXXins Tuyxdvtu axoXaCtov, Kat Sr) crou
ye eveKa Kat Travu. aXX’ et Tt pouXet Xeyetv, e^ecxTtv.
AH. BouXet oftv 8eupo ets tt)v totj Atos tou eXeuQeptou
OToav eKTToStbv dTroxwpfjotJopev;
ZQ. EtcrotSoKet.
AH. "Itopev 8rj. TQ ZtoKpaTes, TravTa tcc 0uTa Ktv-
f^Z XXX Z XZ X X X o , ZSuveuei top auTov TpoTrov exeiv, Kai Ta ek rqs yrjs cj)uopeua 
Kat Ta Ccoa Ta Te aXXa Kat avepcoTros. Kat yap ev Tots 
<j>UTots pgaTOP Tjptv touto ytyveTat, ocrot tt)V yqv yeiopy-
x Z z> Z XXn.Z Xoupev, to TTapaoKeuaoaCTOat TravTa Ta Trpo tou c|)UTeuetv Kat 
auTO to <J>UTeuom- etretSav 8e to 4>uTeu0ev ptcp, peTa touto 
eeparreta tou <J>uptos Kat ttoXXt) Kat xaXeTrq Kat SuctkoXos
z tZ f>X XZ ,z X V x rA X _ ZytyveTat. outgo 8e exetv eotKe Kat to Trept tcov avOptuTrcov 
aiTo tcov epauTOU eyco TrpaypaTcov TeKpaipopat Kai es TaXXa. 
Kat yap epoi T) tou ueos toutoul, eiTe cpuTeiav eiTe TraiSo- 
Trottav Set auT-qv ovopa£etv, TravTCov ppcrT-q yeyovev, iq 8e 
Tpocjyq SuctkoXos tc Kat aet ev 4>d{3cp Trept auTou 8e8tdrt. 
Ta pev ouv aXXa iroXXa av etr| Xeyetv, -q 8e vuv Trapoucra 
enteupta TouTtp rravu pe cJjopet-ecrTt pev yap ouk ayevvqs,
121b1 TrdvTa - c5 SeStoTt = Stobaeus 11.31.60 (= 11.212.2-13 W-H) 
121c3 Kat - c4 ovopaCetv cf. Dionysium Halicarnaseum Rh. 405 (= II. 
381.5-7 Usener-Radermacher)
St. I 
121a
5
b
5
c
5
Tit. ©edyrjs fj Trept crocbtas T et Diogenes Laertius 3.59 (F): ©eayqs 
fj Trept CTeo^pocruvqs B2W: Trept ^tKocro^tas B2 (i.m.), Diogenes 
Laertius 3.59 (BP) || 121a1 tStoXoyqaacrOat codd.: 8taXoyto— 
acrQat Cobet |j 8e codd.: aXXa Cobet: ye Ast || Tts T: Tts BW || 
a3 eveKev re vera BTW || a7 eKTroSu)v edd.-. eKTroScSv BTW || a8 et 
cot edd.: et aot BTW || b1 post 8rj punct. Cobet: post ZtOKpaTes 
codd. || b3 avepcoTros Schanz: avQpcoTros codd., Stobaeus || b6 
e-rretSav codd.: errav Stobaeus || c2 TaXXa BW: tcc aXXa T, Stob­
aeus || c3 TOUTout codd.: toutou Stobaeus || c4 yeyovev f) 8e 
TW, Stobaeus: yeyovev 8e B (alt. v eras.) || c5 aet BW: atet T: om. 
Stobaeus || c6 TroXXa av codd.: rroXu av epyov Cobet ||
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a<daXepa 8e-€Tri0upei yap St) oStos -qpiv, (5 ZakpaTes, djg 
(jyqai, crowds yeveaQai. SokcS yap poi, tgjv ‘qXiKUUTCov Tives 
auTou Kat 8r|poT(3v, eis to aaTu KaTapaivovTes, Xoyous ti— 
vas aTropvT]poveuovTes SiaTapaTTOuaiv auTov, ous e£fjXco- 
Kev Kai TraXai pot TTpaypaTa Trapexei, oc£lc3u eTripeX-q0'qvai 
pe eauTou Kai xPTPaTa TeXeaai tivi tlov aocjuaTtnv, oaTis 
auTov cro^oi/ Troiricjei. cpoi Sc tcov piev xPrIPLaTt01/ Kai eXctT- 
tov peXei, -qyoupai 8e toutov ouk eis piKpov kivSuvov lei/ai 
oT aneuSei. Tews pev oSv auTov KaTeixov Trapapu0oupevos- 
eTretS-q 8e oukcti oTos Te elpi, -qyoupai KpaTiaTOP eTvai 
Trei0ea0ai auTqJ, iva p-q TroXXaKis aveu epou auyyevdpevos 
Tup Sia^Qapxj. vuv oSv t(kw en’ auTa TauTa, ‘iva Tip toutwv 
tov ao4>iaT(2v 8okouvtwv eTvai auarqaw toutovi. au oSv 
•qpiv eis KaXov Tiapec|)dvqs, (? av eyu) paXiaTa e(3ouXop-qv 
Trepi tov toioutwv peXXwv irpa^eiv aup£ouXeuaaa0ai. aXX’ 
ei ti exeis aup|3ouXeueiv e£ wv epou aKTjKoas, e^eoTi Te 
Kai XPT-
ZQ. ’AXXa pev 8rj, (5 A-qpoSoKe, Kai XeyeTai ye aup- 
pouX-q lepov xPTPa eivai. enrep ouv Kai aXX-q -qTiaouv 
eoTiv lepa, Kai aurq av eir| Trepi -qs au vuv auppouXeurp 
ou yap ecrTi Trepi otou 0eioTepou av aveparrros pouXeuaaiTo
>\ \ C»Z S<r>\r><rfc>ZT) Trepi TraiSeias Kai auTou Kai t(dv auTou oikcicjov. TrpcoTOV 
pev ofiv eyw Te Kai au auvopoXoyqacopev ti TroTe oiopeOa 
touto eTvai irepi oT pouXeuopeea- p-q yap ttoXXockis eyd) 
pev aXXo ti auTo UTroXappavw, au 8e aXXo, KctTreiTa -rroppco 
ttou Tqs auvouaias ata0c6pe0a yeXoioi ovTes, eyw Te 6 aup- 
pouXeucou Kai au 6 auppouXeuopevos, pq8ev tgjv auTdov 
-qyoupevoi.
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122b2aup(3ouXq -3 XP'QPa resp. Proclus in Ale. 183.16 (= 85 Westerink)
c8 ws cjyqai edd.: cos cf/qai T: (jos cjyqai BW || d1 SoKei yap poi ci. 
Stephanus: SoKeiv yap poi Cobet: Sokco yap Beck || Tives B: 
Tives TW || d5 eauTou BW ef(e s.l. fee.) T°: auTou T || d6 auTov 
W: auTcov BT || Kai seel. Cobet (om. Ambros.409) || 122a1 peXei 
BW: peXXei T || toutov Bc (alt. o i.r. ex cd) et W: toutcov BT || 
piKpov BT: paKpov W || tevai <tovTa> ci. Knebel || a2 arreu8ei 
<aTreuSovTa> Schanz || a3 oukcti olos (ouk ctos corr.) T || a7 
av codd.’. Sq Cobet: "quiderrt'vertit Ficino || a8 <ti> Tipa£eiv Cobet || 
b1 posfxPT add auppouXeuaaaOai W || b4 au vuv BT: vuv au 
W || aupfSouXeuq BTW: ~ei (ei exq) Bc || b5 ©eioTepou (po per 
litt.)\N H b6 pr. auTou TCW: auTou BT || alt. auTou B: auTou TW || 
c1 uiToXappavco codd.: -pdvtnv Cobet || c2 ttou BT: ttou W || 
auvouaias BT: auvqOeias W || aiaOtopeGa BT: —opeOa W ||
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AH. ’AXXa poL Sokols opQcos XeyeLv, (3 ZooKpaTes, Kai 5 
Troieiv xpr) OUTGO.
ZQ. Kai Xeyoo ye opQtBs, ou pevTOL TravTaTracrL ye- 
opLKpov yap tl peTaTLGepaL. evvoco yap pr) Kat o peL- 
paKLoxos outos ou toutou ernGupoL ou r)peis auTov oLopeGa 
eiTLGupeLv aXX’ eTepou, eTt’ au ripeis otl aTOTrcoTepoL (3pev d 
TTepi aXXou tou pouXeuopevoL. opGoTaTov o3v poi Sokol 
eTvaL arr’ auTou toutou apyeaOaL, SLaTTuvGavopevous otl Kai 
octtlv ou ottlGupol.
AH. KlvSuvouol youv outgo PoXtlcttov eTvaL cos cru XeyeLs. 5
ZQ. ELTre 8rj poL, tl KaXov ovopa Tip veavLCTKCp; tl auTov 
Trpocrayopeucopev;
AH. 0eayr)S ovopa toutgo, (5 ZcoKpaTes.
ZQ. KaXov ye, co Ar)poSoKe, T(J uol to ovopa eGou Kai 
lepoTTpeTres. elne 8f) r)pTv, (3 Oeayes, eTTLGupeLV <t>X)S crowds e 
yeveoGaL, Kai cx£lols ctou top TTaTepa TovSe e^eupeTv av~
Spos tlvos cruvoucrLav toloutou octtls ere crocpov TroLr)creL;
0E. Nat.
ZQ. Zoc^ous Se KaXeis TroTepov tous eTTLCTTfjpovas, rrepi 5 
otou av ettlctt'qpo ves (Sctlv, fj tous prj;
SE. Tous eTTLCTTrjpovas eycoye.
ZQ. Tl otDv; ouk eScSa^aTO ere 6 TraTT)p Kai erTaLSeucrev 
aTrep evGaSe ol aXXoL iteTraLSeuvTaL, ol tgov KaXcov KayaGcov 
TraTepGov ueis, oTov ypappaTa to Kai KL0apL£eLV Kai TraXai— 10
XX 1Z. . > Z
clv KaL Tr)v aXXr|V aycovLav;
©E. ’Epeye.
ZQ. "ETL OLJV OLOL TLVOS €TTLCrTrjpT)S eXXeLTTeiV, T*)S TTpOCJ— 123 
r)KeL urrep ctou tov TraTepa eTTLpeXrjGrivaL;
0E. ’'Eycoye.
ZQ. Tl$ eaTLV auTT|; eLTTe KaL r)pLV, Lva ool xapLcrcopeGa.
0E. OlSev Kai o3tos, (3 ZcoKpaTes-eTrei TroXXaKLs eyci) 5 
auTw eLpr)Ka-aXXa TauTa e£eiTLTr|8es TTpos ere XeyeL, cos Sr) 
ouk clSgos ou eyco eTTLGupco- TOLauTa yap eTepa KaL TTpos epe 
payeTaf tc Kai ouk eGeXeL pe ouSevi CTUCTTfjoaL.
ZQ. ’AXXa Ta pev eprrpocrGev ctol r^v TTpos toutov piqGev- 
Ta cooTrep aveu papTUpcov Xeyopeva- vuvl Se epe TroLT)CTttL b
c8 tl om. W || d1 eir’B0 (acc. fee.): err’ B || d2 tou T: tou BW || 
opGoTaTov BT: -coTaTOV W || d6 KaXov seel. ci. Baiter, Wagner: Kai 
Richards || d7 TTpocrayopeucopev BT: -euopev W: -euco Richards || 
d8 toutgo (acc. exov fee.) W || e3 ctoc^ov (v per lift., fort. s)W || ©6 fj b 
(acc. fee.): fj B || e8 Kai erraiSeuaev seel. Cobet || e10 ypappaTa 
BT:ypappaW || 123a1 eXXeLTreLV Bc (ol exi fee.) et TW: -Xlitolv 
B || a4 Kai om. W || a5 olSev B (v del. b) || eyco auTqj BT: auT(J 
eyuj W || a7 eTepa W et(i.m.) vet.b: otl B: otl Kai eTepa T || a8 
ouSevi BT: ouSev W ||
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papTUpa, Kai epaPTLOP epou KotTetTre tls eoTLP aurq f) croc^ia 
fjs eiTLOupeLs. <£>epe yap, ei eTreOupeLS TauT-qs fj ol apOpcuTroL 
Ta TrXoia KupepPcooLP, Kai eycn oe eTuyxaPOp apeptnTcop- 
,,TQ Oeayes, tlpos epSe-qs ojp oocjnas pep^r) T(J TraTpi otl 5 
ouk eQeXer oe ouPLOTapaL Trap’ (Sp ap ou crowds yepoLo;" 
tl ap poL aTreKpLPCD; tlpo auTiqp elpaL; Spa ou KupepPT)- 
TLKfjp;
OE. Nai.
ZQ. El Se eTTLeupcup TauT-qp T-qp ooc^Lap elpaL oo<t>ds fj c 
Tct appaTa Ku(3epPu5oLP cTt’ epep^ou tqj TTaTpL, epou au
> z > <z < » z z >\ > z >epcoTLGVTos tls eoTLP auTiq T) oocpLa, TLva ap aireKpLvaj au~ 
rqv elpaL; Sp’ouxi f)PLoxiKfjp;
OE. Nai. 5
ZQ. THs Se S-q pup TuyxdpeLS eTTLGuptBp, TroTepop apco-
pupos tls eoTLP fj e\eL opopa;
0E. oipaL eycoye exeLV.
ZQ. noTepov oftv aurqi/ pep oloea, ou pePTOL to ye 
opopa, fj Kai to opopa; 10
0E. KaL to opopa eyurye.
ZQ. Tl oSp ootlp; eine.
0E. Tl Se aXXo, (3 ZakpaTes, auTrj opopa tls c^atr) ap a 
elpaL ctXX’fj ao^Lap;
ZQ. Oukoup Kai iq f)PLOxeia ooc^ia cotlp; fj apaeia 
SoKei ool elpaL;
0E. Ouk epoLye. 5
ZQ. ’AXXdoo<|)La;
0E. Nai.
ZQ. tHl tl xP^peOa; oux fj lttttcop eTrLOTapeOa Ceuyous 
apxeLP;
©E. Nai. 10
ZQ. Oukoup Kai iq Kupepp'qTLK'q oocjna ootlp;
OE. "EpoLye SoKei.
ZQ. TAp’ oux auTq fj ttXolcop eTTLOTapeOa apx^LP;
OE. AuTqpepofip.
ZQ. THs Se Sp ou eTTLOupeLs iq oocfna tls eaTLp; § tlpos 15 
eiTLOTapeQa apx^L^; e
b2 epaPTLOP Bc (o ex ras. co fee.) efTW: -lcop B || b3 eTreOupeLS 
Coisl.155c Flor.b: eiuGupeLs BTW || b5 gjp Bc (acc. fee.)', dip B || 
pepejn W effq s./.) B2:-eL BT || b6 eOeXeL TW: ~T| B || ou (u i.r.) B || 
c7 tlsBT:tlsW j| fj b (acc. fec.):fj B || c10 fj b (acc. fee.): fj B || c12 
eoTLP edd.: eotlp BTW (et punct. post eine) |J d3 -qPLoxeta T e?fW 
(f|, p ex p fee.): -yta B |J fj b (acc. fee.): fj B || d6 ao4>La BW: ooc|>Lg T || 
d13 oux ccutt| vet.b: ouk auTq BTW |j d15 fj BcTW:t| B || tlpos B: 
tlposTW ||
276
OE. ’EpOt pCV SOKCt, TGOV aV0pGO1TGOV.
ZQ. Mgov •§ tgjv KapvovTtov;
OE. Ov SrjTa.
ZQ. ’IocTpiKT) yap avTT) ecrTtv fj yap;
OE. Nat.
ZQ. ’AXX’ tgov qlSovtgov emcrTapeGa ev tois yopois 
apxetv;
0E. Ov.
ZQ. Movctikt) yap avTT) ye;
0E. naw ye.
ZQ. ’AXX’Tj tgov yvpva£opevtov crrtcrTapeOa apyeiv;
0E. Ov.
ZQ. rvjj.v'ao'TiKT) yap avTT| ye;
0E. Nat.
ZQ. ’AXX’•§ tgov ti ttoiovvtgov; TrpoGvpov etTretv cuorrep 
eym crot Ta epTTpocrOev.
0E. THt tujv kv T'fi TroXet, epotye SoKet.
ZQ. Ovkovv ev t-q TroXet etcrtv Kat ot KapvovTes;
OE. Nat, aXX’ ov tovtgov Xeyrn povov, aXXa Kat tgbv 
aXXoov Tmv ev tt} TroXet.
ZQ. TApa ye pavGavto rjv Xeyets Texv-qv; SoKets yap pot 
Xeyetv ovx "5 tgov ©eptCovTGov enro-Tccpeea apxetv' Kat Tpvy- 
govtgov Kat tgov <|>VTevovT(jov Kat o’TretpovTGov Kat aXocovTGOv
cz \ s z z »z zavTiq pei/ yap yecopytK-q, T) tovtgov apxopev. r| yap;
0E. Nat.
ZQ. OvSe ye oTpat •§ tgjov TrptCovTGov Kat tpvttgovtgov Kat 
^covtcov Kat TopvevovTGOV £vpTravTG0v eiTicjTapeea apxeiv,
» z . z <z \ \ » zov TavTqv Xeyets- avrq pev yap ov tcktovikti;
0E. Nat.
ZQ. ’AXX’ Logos ■§ tovtgov Te TravTcov Kat avT(ov tgov 
yecDpycnv Kat tgov tcktovgov Kat tgov Sriptovpycov aTravToov 
Kat tgov iSigotgov Kat tgov ywatKGOV Kat avSpGov, TavTTjv ter­
ms Xeyets rqv aocjnav.
OE. TavTT)v TraXai, (3 ZooKpaTes, povXopat Xeyetv.
ZQ. "Exets o3v etTretv, AtytoGos 6 ’Ayapepvova airo- 
KTetvas ev ,zApyet Spa tovtgov ^pxev (Sv ov Xeyets, tgov tc
g2 Ven.1862 Par.1811 1812 Flor.a b Vat.1029 Lobe. Coisl.155.: -q 
BTW |] e3 -5 Ven.1862 Par.1808c Coisl.155: T) BTW j| e10 povotKT) M 
Par.1812 Urb.80: povotKf)s BTW || e14 ye om. W ||e15vatom.W || 
©17 eyto crot B: eyco crot TW || 124a5 Spa B: apa TW || a6 
TpvycovTcov BW ef (go ex o fee.) t: -ovtgov T || tgov (comp.) ante 
TpvyovTtov s./. acfc/. Tc || a7 SXogovtgov TW: aX-B |J b1 Trptov- 
tgov Cobet || b2 Topvevovtoov (pr. t p.c.) W || c2 SpaBW:apaT ||
5
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SrjpLoupycov Kai l8lcotcov Kai avSpcov Kai yuvaLKdov £upTrdv~ 
TCOV, T| aXXcov TLVCOV;
0E. Ouk, a\\a toutcov.
ZQ. Tl 8e 8q; n-qAeus 6 Alokou ev 4>0lqc ou tcov auT(2v 
toutcov flpxev;
0E. Nai.
ZQ. HepLavSpov 8e tov Kui|/e\ou apxovTa ev KopLvQcp 
r[8ri aKT)Koas yeveaOaL;
0E. "Eycoye.
ZQ. Ou tcov auTcov toutcov apxovTa ev t-Q auTou TroXet;
0E. Nat.
ZQ. Tl 8e ’ApxeXaov tov FIep8LKKOu, tov vecoaTl toutov 
apxovTa ev MaKe8ovLQt; ou tcov auTcov -qyo toutcov apxetv;
0E. ’"Eycoye.
ZQ. 'iTTiTLav 8e tov neiorarTpaTou ev rq8e Tfj 'rroXei 
ap^avTa tlvcov oiei ap£ac; ou toutcov;
0E. ntos yap ou;
ZQ. Elitols av ouv poL Tiva eTrcovupLav eyet Bokls tc 
i<al ZipuXXa Kai 6 dpeSairos ’ApcjuXuTOS;
OE. Tiva yap aXX-qv, (5 ZcoKpaTes, TrXrjv ye xp^^wSol;
ZQ. ’OpOlds Xeyets. a\Xa Kai TouaSe pot outco Treipco 
aTTOKpivacreai, Ttva eircovupLav exet 'IirTrias Kai nepiavSpos
SX X > x > zta TTjv auT-qv apx'pv’;
0E. olpaL pev TUpavvoL- tl yap aXXo;
ZQ. Oukouv ootls eiTLQupeL tojv dvOpconcov tcov ev tq
Zxk. Z 5Z 9 rx 9 r> Z 9TroXeL ^upnavTcov apxeLv, tt|9 auTT]s apxv)S toutols ein~ 
Qupel, TupavvLK-qs, Kai Tupavvos elvaL;
©E. 0a(veTaL.
ZQ. Oukouv TauTrjs emeupeLV au cjyqs;
OE. "EoLKev ye e£ (Sv eyd) elrrov.
ZQ. TQ pLape, TUpavvelv apa T)pd5v eTTLOupcov TraXai 
epepc|>ou t(£ naTpl otl ae ouk euepTrev ets SLSaaKaXou 
Tupavvo8L8aaKCt\ou tlvos; Kai au, c5 AiqpoSoKe, ouk alaxwo 
124d9 resp. Timaeus Lex. s.v. ripeSaTros (= 74 Ruhnkenius)
5
10
d
5
10
e
5
10
125
c4 rj b (acc. fee.): Ij B || c6 8e BW: Sal Bc (aL i.r. ex e) efT || c12 
auTou B: auTou TW || d2 8e BW: 8al Bc (aL i.r. exe) etT || toutov 
Urb.80 Ambros.409 Par.1812: toutcov BTW: sed. ci. Stephanus || d3 
•qyq W effq s.l.) B2: -el BT jj'd6 tlvcov BT: TLva W || d8 ZLpuWa 
(P p.c.) W jl e3 auT-qv BTW: auTcov Urb.80: auT(2v ci. Baiter || e9 
eiTLOupelv TW ef(v s.l.) Bc:-els B || e10 colkcc Shorey || 125a1 
8L8aaKa\ou sed. Schleiermacher: 8L8aaKaAelov Sydenham || a2 
alaxw'Q (T) s.l.) B2: ~cl BTW ||
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5
rraXat etScbs ou eutGupet oStos, kccl e\cop oGt Trepn|/ocs aiiTOP 
8iqptoupy6p ap erTotiqo-as rqs aortas fjs entGupet, erretTa 
4>0opets Te auT$ Kai ouk eGeXets TrepTretP; aXXa pup-opQts;- 
eTretS-q epaPTtop epou KaTetpr|Ke crou, Kotp-q pouXeucopeGa 
eyco Te Kai cru es Ttpos ap aiiTOP Trep-rrotpep Kai 8ta tt|p 
Ttpos aupoucnap croc|>os ap yepotTo TUpappos;
AH. Nai pa Ata, (5 ZcoKpaTes, pouXeucopeGa 8f)Ta, cos 
SoKei ye pot pouX-qs 8etp Trepi toutou ou c^auXiqs.
ZQ. "Eacrop, coyaGe. StanuGcopeGa auTou npdoTOP tKapos. 
AH. nupGapouS-q.
ZQ. Tt oup ap et EuptntSr) Tt npoaxp-qaratpeGa, co Oeayes; 
EuptntSqs yap nou <|yqey tp—
I \ Z I r> Z□Depot TUpappot tcop crocpcop crupoucrtg’ 
ei ofip epotTO Tts top EuptntSqp- "TQ EuptntSr), tcop Tt 
o’ocfxSp oupouotp cfyqs o‘ocj)ous eTpat tous Tupappous;" ujorrep 
ap et etTropTa—
b
5
c
coc^oi yecopyoi tojp ctocJxjop oupoucrtQC, 
•qpopeGa "Tcop Tt oo<|>(3p;" Tt ap -qptp aneKptPaTo; 5p’ ap
aXXo Tt fj tcop Ta yecopytKa;
0 E. Ouk, aXXa touto .
ZQ. Tt Se et eTne—
oocj)oi payetpot tcop cto(J>(2p crupoucrtg, 
et -qpopeGa- "Tcop Tt a-o^ajp;" Tt ap -qptp aneKptpaTO; 
OTt tcop Ta payetptKa;
OE. Nat 
ZQ. Tt 8’et-
5
oux 10
125b7 aoc^oi... crupouctp rasp- Aulus Gellius 13.19.1 ["Plato in Theae- 
teto" (sic)]
a3 oGt codd.: onot Bekker: ol Cobet j| a5 c|)Qopets Te BT: 0Gop- 
etcrQat W || a6 pouXeucopeGa (co ex o) b et Ven.186 Par.1811 1812 
McAng.1O72 Vat.1029 Urb.80 Flor.o: -opeGa BTW || a7 es Ttpos ex 
es Ttpa (corr. Coisl. 155) fee. Bekker: eaTtP ot B: ecrTtP oT Bc (acc. 
fee.) etT^J || a8 Ttpos Bc (acc. fee.): Ttpos B || b1 pouXeucopeGa 
BT:- opeGa W || b2 ye BW et (y /. r.) Tc: Se a.c. T (ut vid.) || b3 
StanuGcopeGa BT:-opeGa W || b5 Tt edd.: Tt BTW || npocr- 
XP'qo’atpeGa BT: -opeGa W || b6 ttou ^rjcrtp edd.: ttou (Jyqaip B 
(c^rjcrtp Bc) etTW || b7 oupouotQi edd.: -erta BTW (et s/cc1, c13, 
d4) || c3 aupouoipT:-otaBW || c4 -qpopeGa TW et(o ex co fee.) b: 
-qpcopeGa B || Tt ap -qptp aTreKptpaTo BTW : Tt ap otet auTOP 
ccTroKptpaoGat i.m. yp. T ef (ovq) W et vet.b |J c7 Se TW et B (ut vid.): 
8ai (at i.r. ex e) Bc || c8 owouertp T: -crta BW || c10 tqjp Ta 
payetptKa Hirschig: tiLp payetpcop BTW: tqjp payetptKcop /. m. 
yp. TW ||
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oo<|>ol TraXatcrTai tcov oocJxjov ouvouolqc 
elTTev, et qpopeGa- "Tcov tl oo<j>dov;" Spa ouk av tcov 
TTaXaieiv ecj)q; d
OE. Nat.
ZQ. ’ETreLSq Se eTrre—
OOCf>ol TTjpaVVOL TCJV O0(|)C0V OUVOUOLp, 
qpcov epcoTcovTcov "Tcov tl oo<j>cov XeyeLs, (5 EupLTrLSq;" 5 
tl av <j>aLT|; ttol’ au eTvaL TauTa;
OE. ’AXXa pa Al’ouk oTS’eycoye.
ZQ. ’AXXa pouXeL eyco ool evrrco;
OE. EloupouXeL.
ZQ. Tout’ eoTLv cerrep ecf>q ’AvaKpecov Tqv KaXXLKpLTqv 10 
eTTLOTaoOaL' q ouk oloGa to §opa;
OE. ’''Eycoye.
ZQ. Tl ouv; TOLauTqs tlvos kol au ouvouoLas eiTLGupeLs 
avSpos ootls TuyxaveL opoTex^os cov KaXXLKpLTq Tq Kuav- e 
qs kol eiTLOTaTaL TupavvLKa, cooTrep eKeLvqv e<4>r| o TTOLqTqs,
<Z \ \ < Z Z \ o Z .Lva KaL ou qpLV Tupavvos yevq KaL Tq ttoX€l;
OE. naXaL, (5 ZcoKpaTes, okcoittcls Kai TrafCeLS TTpos pe.
ZQ. Tl Se; ou TauTqs <pqs Tqs aocjnas eiTLGupeLV t5 5 
KavTcov av tcov ttoXltcov apxoLS; touto Se ttolcov aXXo tl q 
Tupavvos av evqs;
OE. Eu^afpqv pev av oTpaL eycoye Tupavvos yeveoGaL, 
paXLOTa pev ttccvtcov avGpcoTrcov, et Se pq, cos irXeLOTOOV Kai 126 
ou y’ av oTpaL Kai ol aXXoL TravTes avOpcoKOL—ctl Se ye 
locos paXXov Geos yeveoGaL—aXX’ ou toutou eXeyov eiTL—
Gupelv.
ZQ. ’AXXa tl Sq eoTL noTe 08 eircGupeis; ou tcov 5
ttoXltcDv <|>qs apxeLV ernGupeLV;
OE. Ou Plqc ye ouS’ cnoiTep ol TupavvoL aXX’ €Kovtcov,
cooTrep kol ol aXXoL ol ev Tq TroXeL eXXoyLpoL avSpes.
ZQ. TApa ye XeyeLs doouep ©epLOTOKXqs Kai riepLKXqs
Kai Kcpcov ical oool Ta ttoXltlko. SeLvol yeyovaoLV; 10
OE. Nq Aca toutous Xeyco.
ZQ. Tl ofiv et toc lthtlko. eTuyxaves eTTLGupcov oo<j)ds
d6 cj^acq TW ef(q s.Z.) B2: <}>aLqv B || ttol’ a$ scripsi: ttolo av TW: 
ttolo a B: ttol a Hermann: ''fort. ttolo Sq" Burnet || d7 eycoye TW et 
(yco s.l.) Bc: eye B || d10 KaXXLKpLTqv Ambros.409 Ang.107: 
-KpqTqv BTW || d11 q b (acc. fee.): B j| Sopa B, l add. Bc (i.e.
Scopa) l| d13 ou BT: om.W || e1 KaXXLKpLTq Ambros.409:-KpqTq 
BTW || Kuavqs B: Kuavqs TW || e3 ou (u i.r.) B || KalTqBT:evTq 
W et (ev s.l.) b || e5 SeTW:SalB || 126a5 Sq Flor.b Neap.337 Urb.80:
Se BTW: Sal Bc (ac i.r. exe) || a9 SpaT: SpaB: apa W ||
280
yeveaeat; TTapa Ttvas av a^tKopevos cpr)er)s 8etvds eaeaGat 
tTnrebs; Q Trap’ aXXous Ttvas tj TObs tTrrrtKObs;
OE. Ma Ata otjk eycoye.
ZQ. ’AXXa nap’ abTObs afi TObs Setvobs ovTas TabTa, Kai
T > x tz x < z x > z \ots etatv T£ iTTTrot Kat xptovTat eKaaTOTe Kat otKetots Kat
aXXoTptots TroXXots.
OE. Af)XovoTt.
ZQ. Tt Se et Ta aKovTtaTtKa crowds epobXob yeveaeat; 
oti nap a TObs aKO VTtaTtKObs tyoti av eXGcov cro^os eaeaeat 
TObTObs, oTs eaTt Te ctKOVTta Kat TroXXots Kat aXXoTptots 
Kat otKetots eKao'TOTe xp^vTat {aKOVTtots};
OE. "Epotye SoKet.
ZQ. Aeye Srj pot- eiret Se Sr) tcc TroXtTtKa pobXet ao<|>ds 
yeveaeat, o’tet Trap’ aXXobs Ttvas acjuKopevos ao<$>6s eaea™ 
eat rj tolis TToXtTtKObs TObTObs, TObs abTObs tc Setvobs ov— 
Tas Ta TroXtTtKa Kat xpwpevobs eKaoTOTe tq Te abTcov ttoX- 
et Kat aXXats TroXXats, Kat 'EXXT)Vtat TrpoaoptXobVTas ttoX- 
eat Kat (3ap(3dpots; fj SoKets aXXots Ttatv abyyevopevos 
o'ocjjds eaeaGat TabTa arrep o$Tot, aXX’ otjk abTots TObTots;
OE. ’AK-QKoa yap, (S ZcoKpaTes, obs ae <J>aat Xeyetv toijs
b
5
10
c
5
d
Xoyobs, OTt TObTcnv tcov TroXtTtKdrv avSpcov ot bets obSev 
peXTtobs etatv fj ot tcov aKbTOTopcov Kat pot SoKets dXrp 
OeaTaTa Xeyetv e£ (Sv eycb Sbvapat ataeeaGat. avorjTos o$v 
av etrjv et ototpriv Ttva TObTcov epot pev av napaSobvat 
tqv abTOb aocptav, tov 8e bov tov abTOb pQSev co^eXfjaat, et 
Tt oTos t’fjv ets TabTa co<{>eXetv aXXov ovTtvaoOv avepcbncov.
ZQ. Tt Obv av, (5 (3eXTtoTe avSpcov, xpfjaato aabTtJ, et crot 
eTretSr) yevotTO bos TotabTa TTpaypaTa Trapexot, Kat cf>atr| 
pev av eTrtObpetv ayaOos yeveaeat Ccoypacpos, Kat pepcj>otTO 
crot Tcj) TtaTpt OTt obic eeeXets avaXtaKetv ets abTov TObTcov 
abTcov eveKa apybptov, TObs 8e SQptobpyobs abTOb TObTOb, 
TObs Ccoypdcf)Obs, aTtpaCot Te Kat pf) (3obXotTo Trap’ abTcov 
pavOavetv; fj TObs abXQTas, pobXopevos abXQTQS yevea-
5
e
5
b1 Trapa Ttvas W: rrapa Ttvos Bc (et sic Ar.sch.) etT. Trapa Ttvos 
B || b2 fj B:q TW etb || b5 oTs etatv Te tTTTTot/.m. yp. TW: ot 
etat Te tTrrrtKOt BTW || b8 Se B (ut vid.) et\N: Sat Bc (at i.r. ex e) et 
T || b1G eaTt W: eaTt T: eaTtv B || c1 aKOVTtots seel. Hirschig || 
c3 enet Se Sf) BT: enetSf) Se Sr) W || c5 Setvobs (o per litt.) W || 
c6 aiiTcov B: abTcov TW || c8 rj b (ace. fee.): fj B || Ttatv BT: Ttat W 
et(v del.) b || d1 obs ae <|>aat edd.: obs ae <j>aat TW: otis ae c|>aatv 
B || d4 o$v av TW: av o5v B || d5 Trapa8o0vat BT: TrpoSoOvat 
W |J d6 pr. abTOb B: abTOb TW || <av> co^eXfjaat Hirschig || d8 
XpQaato (at i.r.) B || aabT(J codd.'.avrty Schleiermacher: seel. 
Fritzsche || d9 TotabTa codd.: ToaabTa Richards || e1 av codd.:3r\ 
ci. Richards || e2 aot edd.: aot BTW || eGeXets codd.: ~ots Richards ||
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0aL, r| tous KL0apLOTas; e\ois ay auTq) otl XP^0 KaL ottoi 
ttcpttols aXXooc jjlt) cOcXouTa Trapa toutcou pau©dycLU;
OE. Ma Aia ouk eycoye.
ZQ. Nuu ouu TauToc TauTa auTos TTpos Toy TraTepa ttolcou 
©aupaCecs, Kai pepq>r) cl aTropei otl ctol xp*n°T|Tal KaL ottol 
TrepTrq; cttcl ’A0r|uaL(joy yc tqju KaXfiy KayaOtnu Ta TroXLTLKa 
otlv ay pouX'q ouorqoopey oe, os ool TTpOLica ouyeoTccL- KaL 
apa peu ayupLoy ouk auaXcoocLS, apa 8c ttoXu paXXoy 
euSoKLprjocLS Trapa tols ttoXXols ay©pcoTTOLs fj aXXq) Tq) 
ouyojy.
5
0E. Tl oSy, c5 ZcoKpaTes; ou Kai ou toju KaXtSv Kaya0(2y 
el au8pcSy; cl yap ou poL c©cXols ouyelyaL, e^apKCL Kai 
ouScua aXXou COTco.
ZQ. Tl touto XeyeLs, ©eayes;
AH. TQ ZojKpaTes, ou peuTOL kokcos XeyeL, Kai apa peu 
cpoL xaPlD" eycu ouk co©’ otl toutou pcLCou ay cppaLoy 
pyrioaLpriu, fj cl oStos tc apeoKOLTo tq orj ouuouofp Kai ou 
c0cXols touto) ouuelyaL. Kai pcutol Kai atoyuyopaL XeycLy 
cos oc()68pa pouXopaL. aXX’ eyd) ap^oTepcoy updjy 8eopaL, oe 
t’ e0eXcLy toutq) ouycLuaL Kai oc pr) CqTCLu aXXq) pr|8eyl 
ouyycyeo0aL fj ZcoKpaTCL- Kat pe TroXXcou Kai <j>opep(3y arr- 
aXXa^cTC 4)poyTL8o)y. cos iAju Trauu 4>opoupaL UTrep toutou pfj 
tlul aXXq) eyTux'fl olco toutou 8La<t>0CLpaL.
0E. Mt)kctl uuu, (5 TrotTep, UTTep y epou 4>opou, eurep 
olds t’ el TTCLoaL toutou Tqy ep-qy ouuouoLau TTpoo8c£ao0aL.
AH. nduu KaXcos XeyeLs. (5 ZcoKpaTes, Kpos oe 8’ ay 
T)8t) clt] 6 pcTa touto Xoyos- eyd) yap ool eTOLpos eipL, cos 
8lo ppa\etou clkclu, KaL cpe KaL Ta cpa cos oloy tc olkclo- 
TaTa TrapexeLU, otou au 8cq epppaxu, cay 0eayr| toutoul 
acFTraCQ te Kat EuepyETQS otl av otos te rjs■
ZQ. TQ Ar)po8oKC, to pcy eoTrouSaKcuaL oe ou ©aupaCco, 
ei/TTCp olcl utt’ epou paXLOT’ ay ool TOUTOU co<|)cXr|©TjuaL-ou
127
10
b
5
c
5
d
127d3 ou - d7 co<|>eXfjoaL = Priscianus Inst. XVIII.99 (= 111.253.9-12 Keil)
e6 XPT° TW: XPT I TL B (nov. fol. incip.) || ottol BT: ottt) W || q7 
toutcou BT: toutou W || 127a2 pcpcjyq W:-cl BT || ypTlcrqTaL 
BT:~eTaLW || a3 Trepirr) Vat.2218 (corr. Bekker): rrepTTOL BTW || a4 
pouX-q (rj i.r. ex cl) W: pouXeL BT || os ool TW: os ool B || a6 
au0pd)TTOLS BTW: seel. Hirschig (om. Coisl.155) || b1 XeyeLs TW et 
i.m. b: om. B || b3 XaPt-0 (T ex €t) “d BTW || eppaLoy BT etWc 
(acc. fee.)', eppaiou W || b4TeBT:on?. W || apeoKOLTo Bc (cok i.r. 
ex kco fee.) et W et i.m. yp. T: apKeooLTO BT || c2 SLa<j)©eLpaL BT: 
8Lac])0apf|yaL W || c6 touto Ven.189: toutou BTW J| cos TW et 
i.m. b: om. B || c8 epppaxf seel. Ast ||
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5
yap oT8a urrep otou av tls vouv eyoov paXXov arrouSaCoL fj 
uirep ueos auTou ottgos ids peXTLCTTos ecrTaL-OTroGev 8e e8o£e 
ctol touto, los eyGo av paXXov TOV CTOV uov otos T enqv 
LocjjeX'qocxi irpos to ttoXltt)V ayaQov yevooQai rj ou auTos, Kai 
OTroQev otDtos GpfjQq epe paXXov fj oe auTov co^eX-rjoeLV, tou­
to Travu QaupaCco. ou yap TrpcoTov pev TrpecrpuTepos eT epou, 
eiTCLTa iroXXds fj8r| apyas Kai Tas peyioTas ’AQrjvaiois fjp- 
£as, Kai Tipp utto ’Avayupaoicov Te tcov 8qpoT(2v ttoXu paX~ 
LCTTa Kai utto Tfjs aXXr)s TFoXetos ouSevds f|TTOV epoi 8e 
toutgov ou8ev evopp ou8eTepos upoov. erreiTa ei apa Tfjs pev 
tgov ttoXltlkgov avSpGov ouvouCTtas ©eayris o8e KaTa^povei, 
aXXous 8e Tivas £r|Tei oi TraiSeueiv eTrayyeXXovTat oTol Te 
eTvaL veous avQpGOTrous, eoTiv evTauQa Kai npoSiKos 6 Kei- 
os Kai Topyias 6 AeovTivos Kai ndiXos 6 ’AKpayavTivos Kai 
aXXOL TTOXXOL, OL OUTGO CTO(|)OL CLCTLV GOCTTe OLS TaS TTOXeLS LOV~ 
Tes TreLQouCTL tlov vecov tous yevvaLOTaTous Te Kai ttXouctl- 
LOTCtTOUS-oTs e^eCTTLV TGOV TTOXLT(3v G§ av poUXGOVTaL TTpOLKa 
CTUVeivaL-TOUTOUS TTeL0OUCTLV aTTOXeLTTOVTaS Tas eKeLVGOV
z > ry ZA _ Z > Z
ouvouCTLas auTOLs ouveLvaL, TTpoKaTaTLQeVTas apyupLov 
Travu ttoXu plctQov, Kai yapLV TTpos toutols et8evaL. toutgov 
TLVaS eLKOS T|V TTpOaLpeLCTQaL KaL TOV UOV CTOU KaL aUTOV oe, 
epe 8’ ouk clkos’ ouSev yap toutgov eTTLOTapaL tgov paKap— 
llov Te Kai KaX(2v paQripaTGov-errei epouXop-qv ctv-aXXd Kai 
Xeyoo SfjTrou aeL otl eyoo TuyyavGo gos ottos eLTreLV ou8ev eiTL— 
CTTapevos, TrXfjv ye crpLKpou tlvos paOqpaTos, tgov epGOTL— 
kgdv. touto pevTOL to paQ-qpa Trap’ ovtlvouv TroLoupaL 8ol- 
vos elvaL KaL tgov TTpoyeyovoTGOv avOpLOTroov KaL tgov vuv.
e
5
128
5
b
5
128b2 aXXa -5 epGOTLKdov resp. Proleg. Plat. Phil. 11.4.5 (= 23 West- 
erink)
128b5 touto - 6 eTvaL cf. Aristaenetum 1.4.41-2 (Mazal)
d5 au'rou edd.: auTou BTW || ottgos (go i.r. exo, ut. vid.) B et (gos eras., 
sed comp, s.l.) T || d5 e8o£e ctol codd.: ctol e8o£e Priscianus || d6 
av seel. Cobet: 8f) Richards || t’ eiriv edd. ex Te ej/qv Priscianus (iam 
correxerat Ast): to t’ fjv B: to fjv T: t’ fjv W || d8 GO(f>eXfjCTeLV BT: 
GO^eXfjcreiev W (ult. e punct. del.) || e1 pev (i.r.) B || e3TeBT:Te 
KaiW H e7 Te eTvaL BT: t’eTvaL W || e8 kclos BW: klos T || 
128a5 toutous BT: om. W || aiToXeiTTOVTas codd.: aTToXiTTOVTas 
Cobet || a6 TrpoKaTaTLQevTas scripsi: TrpoCTKaTaTLQevTas codd. || 
apyupLov rravu ttoXu Beck (“multum" pro ttoXu vertit Ficino): ayup- 
lov Travu ttoXuv codd.: Travu ttoXuv Schanz: apyupLov rrapTroXu 
Cobet || b3 aei B: alei TW: aef (acc. fee.) b || b5 TroLoupaL codd. et 
Aristaenetus: o’fopaL ve/TTpooTroLoupaL anon. ap. Stallbaum: dvTL~~ 
TroLoupaL Fritzsche: fjyoupaL Cobet ||
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OE. 'Op$s, (5 TTCCTCp, OTL ScOKpaTTlS OU Travu poL Sokcl 
ctl eOeAeLv epol auvSLaTpLpeLv-eTrel to 7’ epov eTOLpov, 
eav outos eOeAiy-aAAa TauTa KaL^cov TTpos rjpas AeyeL. c 
CTrel eyd) oT8a tcov epdbv f)ALKLC0T(3v Kat oAiycp TrpeapuTepcov 
ot Trplv pev toutcq auvelvac ou8evos cc£lol fjaav, cuclSt) 8e 
auveyevovTO toutcp, ev Travu oALycp xpovtp TravTcov JScAtlous 
4>aLVOVTaL (Sv TTpOTCpOV X^LpOLJS. 5
ZQ. OlaOa otDv oTov touto eaTLV, (5 TrotL AqpoSoKOU;
~ T-. XT S A Z *' <z > \ X » XOE. Nocl pa ALa eycoye, otl, eav ou pouA’q, KaL eyco
*7* Z . )Z o Z *7* Z X > r\olos t eaopaL toloutos yeveaOaL oloLTrep KaL ckclvol.
ZQ. Ouk, coyaOe, aAAa ae AeArjOev oTov tout’ eaTLV, eycb d 
8e aoL 4>pdaco. eaTL yap tl OeLQt poLpp irapeiTopevov epol 
£K TTaLSos ap£apevov 8aLpdvLov. eaTL 8e touto c|)covt), fj 
OTav yevrjTaL aeL poL aripaLveL, o av peAAco TrpaTTeLV, tou- 
tou aTTOTpoTT-qv, iTpoTpeiTeL 8e ouSeTroTe- KaL eav tls poL tcov 5 
qnAcov avaKocvcoTac KaL yevr|TaL rj <pcovq, TauTov touto, 
ctTTOTpeTreL KaL ouk e§ TrpaTTeLV. Kai toutcov uplv papTupas 
Trape^opaL. XappL8r|v yap toutovl yLyvcbaKCTe tov KaAov 
yevopevov, tov TAauKcovos- outos TroTe eTuyyavev epoc e 
avaKOLVoupevos peAAcov aaKqaeLv aTaScov ets Nepeav, Kai
128d2 eaTL - d5 ou8eiTOTe cf. Clementem Alexandrinum Strom. 1.133.3 
(= II. 82.28-83.3 StShlin-Fruchter); resp. Calcidius in Ti. 221 (= 199.1-4 
Waszink)
128d2 eaTL - d7 TrpaTTeLV = Calcidius in Ti. 287-8 (= 263.20-264.2 
Waszink); cf.Fr. Comm, in Arist. Rh. 325.6-9 (Rabe)
128d3 (<j>covfj) sqq. resp. Hermeias Alexandrinus in Phdr. 94 (= 67.27-29 
Couvreur); resp. Olympiodorus in Ale. 21.9 (= 16 Westerink)
128d3 eaTL - 4 aqpacvcL cf. Proclum in Ale. 79.17-19 (- 35 Westerink)
128d3 fj - e4 SlckcoAuov cf. Aelianum VH 8.1 (= 92.18-93.4 Dilts)
b7 otl codd.: 6 Cobet (et post TraTep signum interrogationis posuif) |j 
poL seel. H. Muller, Richards || Sokcl ctl Flor.b etc (unde Ven.189) et 
Ang.107 (tl ante ctl eras.): Sokcl tl ctl BTW: 8okcl tl Bekker (sic 
Pal.175) || c1 eOeAiQ M Vat.1029 Par.1811 Coisl.155° Neap.337 Ambros. 
409: eOeAoL BTW J| aAAa - c5 x^Lpous Demodoco trib. b || C5 
ecj>aLV0VT0 Schleiermacher || d1 aAAa ae TW: aAAa ae B || eaTLV 
W: eaTlv BT || d2 OeLQC (l s.l. add.) T || rraperropevov codd.: rrapa- 
TTepTropevov Fr. Comm, in Arist. Rh.: TrapayLvopevov Clemens || d4 
del Bc (a i.r.): alel B (ut vid.) ef TW et Fr. Comm, in Arist. Rh. || toutou 
airoTpoTT-qv codd.: touto aTroTpeiTeLv Fr. Comm, in Arist. Rh. || d5 
8e T et (8’ i.t.) Bc, Clemens Alexandrinus, Fr. Comm, in Arist. Rh., Calcidius 
(ut vid.): om. BW || tls Bc (acc. fee.): tIs B: tls TW || e1 yevopevov 
codd.: Aeyopevov Cobet || eTuyxctvev TW et (v s.l.) b: eTuyyave 
B J| e2 vepeav TW: vepafav B ||
284
eu0us auTou apxopepou XeyeLP otl peXXoL acrKeLP eyepeTo rj 
<4»ojpfj, Kai eyd) SLEKcdXuop Te outop icai elirop otl "AeyoPTOs 
crou peTa£u yeyope poL f) cpcopf) -q tou 8aLpoPLou- aXXa p-q 5
>z , ,T 11 >z ± II z <z > z > \ <a\ao’KEL. Ictcjs, ecp-q, oripaLPeL cjol otl ou PLK'qa’ur eyco 8e
\ Z s . *A ZZ «a \ z
kop p*q peXXco plkop, yuppacrapepos ye toutop top ypovop 
cd4>eX-q0-qcropaL." touto eliTcdp -qoKeL- a^LOP otjp Tru0eo0aL 
auTou a auTtJ £upe|Tq ano touttis rqs aaK-qcrecos. eL Se pou~ 129 
Xeo©e, top TLpapxou d8eX4>dp KXeLTopaxop epeo0e tl eTirep 
auT(S TLpapxos •qPLKa anosapoupepos fieL {eu0u tou SaLpop- 
lou}, ckclpos Te Kai Eua0Xos 6 OTaSLoSpopcop os Tipapxop 
urreSe^aTo <j>euyoPTa- epeL yap upLP otl etTrep auTcp toutl. 5
0E. Tl;
ZQ. "TQ KXeLTopaxc," e<|yq, "eyco pePTOL epxopaL ano- 
©apoupepos pupl, Slotl ZcoKpctTeL ouk -q0eXop TreL0eo-0aL. "tl 
8q ofip TFOTe touto eTnep 6 Tipapxos; eyco 4>pdoco. OTe 
oplcttoto eK tou oupnocrLou o TLpapxos KaL ^LX-qpcop o b 
^LX'qpopfSou aiTOKTepouPTes Nlklop top 'HpooKapap8pou, 
•qKLO-Tao-0-qp pep auTco popco rqp eTTLpouXfjp, 6 8e Tipapxos 
aPLOTapepos Trpos epe eTnep, "Tl XeyeLs," e<|yq, "(5 Zed- 
KpaTes; upeLS pep TTLPeTe, epe 8e 8eL ttol e^apacrrqpaL- -q£co 5 
Se oXiyov ucFTepov', eav tuxco. Kai p.01 eyeveTo T) cjxnvrj,
Kai eiiTOP Trpos outop, "M-qSapcds," ec^iqp, "apacrTqs* yeyope 
yap jjlol to eicoGos crqjieiov to Sai^oviov. Kai os eiTecrxe.
Kai 8LaXLTTcdp \p6vov a^0LS cdppaTo iepaL, Kai e<t>ry "EipL c 
8rj, ZcoKpaTes." afi0LS eyepeTo iq <j>oop-q- afi0LS o3p outop 
TqpayKaaa eTTLOxeip. to tpltop, pouXopepos pe Xa0eip, 
dpeoTTq oukctl einedp poL ou8ep aXXa Xa0cdp, eTrLTrip-qaas 
aXXooe top poup exoPTa- KaL outcos cqx€T0 ccttlcop KaL 8lc~ 5 
Trpa^aTo e£ c5p -qeL diTO0apoupepos. o0ep 8q touto eTirep 
Trpos top aSeXcpop ouep pup upLP eyco, otl lol aiTO0apou- 
pepos oLa to epoL aTTLOTqcj-aL. ctl tolpup TrepL tcop ep Zlk~ 
eXLQt ttoXXgjp aKouoeCT0op a eyed eXeyop Trepi Tfjs 8La4>0opas 3
e3 iq BT: om. W et Aelianus || e8 cd^eXiqo'opaL Cobet || 129al 
pouXecrOe b (alt. e ex at) etTM: pouXecr0aL B || a2 epeo0e (ult. e s.i.) 
\NC (ci. Stephanus): epecr0aL BTW || a3 irjeL (I.r.) Bc et (i.r.) \NetT. ei/qL 
i.m. B || eu0u tou SaLpoPLOu seclusi: +evQv tou 8aLpopiou+ 
Burnet: eu0u tou 8t|Plou veleu0u tou Sripoo-fou emend. Baiter: 
eu©u {tou 8aLpoPLOu} Souilhd || a4 crTaSLoSpopcSp BT: o-toSlo- 
SpoposW || a5 eTuep BT: eiiTOP W || toutl TW: TauTa B || a? 
KXeLTopaxe TW e/(eL exL) Bc: KXLTopaxe B || b4 aPLcrTapepos 
(ras. interaL etp, fortassepe, eti.m. vitii nota) B || Kpos epe BW: iTpos 
peT || b5 TTLPeTe (alt. e i.r.) B |j ttol TW: ttol B || c1 SLaXLTTcbp B: 
8LaXeLTrcop TW || c7 lol (pr. l /.r.)B || c8 t(2p TW: top B || d1 
8La<j)0opas BT: SLacpopds W ||
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5
tou crTpaTOTre8ou. Kai tol pev TrapeX-qXuedTa tcov eiSoTcov 
ecrTiv aKouaai- Treipav 8’ e£eaTi vuvi Xa(3eiv tou aripeiou el 
apa ti Xeyei. eni yap t-q eiTi o-TpaTeiav e£oppfj Xavvicovos 
tou KaXou eyeveTo poi to aripeiov, oixeTai 8e vuv peTa 
OpaouXXou OTpaTeuoopevos eu0u ’Ec|>eaou Kai ’Icovlas. eyco 
ouv oiopai eKeivov T| aTro0aveio0ai -q opou ti toutc^ y’ eXav, 
Kai Trepi ye Tfjs TrpaypaTeias tqs aXXris Travu <j>opoupai.
TauTa 8t) navTa eipr|Ka ooi, oti r) Suvapis auTT| tou
8aipoviou toutou Kai eis Tas ouvouoias tcov peT’ epou ouv- 
8iaTpip6vTcov to aTrav SuvaTai. ttoXXois pev yap evav- 
TiouTai, Kai ouk eoTi toutois co<j>eXr|0fjvai peT’ epou 8ia~ 
Tpipoucriv, cooTe ouy oTov tc poi toutois ouvSiaTplpeiv 
ttoXXois 8e cruveivai pev ou 8iaK(oXuei, coc|>eXouvTai 8e ou­
Sev ouvdvTes. oTs 8’ av ouXXapriTai Tfjs ouvouoias T) tou 
8aipoviou Suvapis, oStoi eloiv t5v Kai au T)o0r)oai- Ta%u 
yap Trapaxp-qpa eTTi8i8daoiv. Kai toutcov afi tcov cttiSi- 
Sovtcov ol pev Kai pepaiov exouoi Kai Trapapovipov tt^v 
c6cJ)eXiav TroXXoi 8e, ooov av peT’ epou \povov cSoiv, 0au~ 
paoiov eTTi8i8oacriv, eTreiSav 8e pou ccTrooxcovTai, TraXiv ou­
Sev 8ia<j>epouorv otououv. touto TroTe eTraOev ’ApioTeiSris 6 
Auorpaxou uos tou ’ApioTei8ou. 8iaTplpcov yap peT’ epou 
TrapTroXu eTre8e8coKei ev oXiycy xpo^QX eneiTa auTCp OTpaT— 
eia tis eyeveTo Kai cyxeTo eKTrXecov, -qkcov 8e KaTeXappave 
peT’ epou SiaTpipovTa Oouku8i8t)v tov MeXrjolou uov tou 
Oouku8i8ou. 6 8e Oouku8i8t|s ttq TTpoTepaiQC poi 81’ airex“ 
0eias ev Xoyois Tioiv eyeyovei- i8cov oftv pe 6 ’ApiOTei- 
8t|S, eTreiS-q riaTrdaaTd Te Kai TSxXa SieXexOT), ‘'0ouKu8i8r|V
129e7 oTs - e9 eTTi8i8oaoiv = [Plutarchus] Mor. 574b (= 111.458.17-22 
Pohlenz-Sieveking)
130a1 pepaiov - a2 coc^eXiav = Lex.Vind. s.v. Trapapovipov (- 143.1­
2 Nauck)
e
5
130
5
b
d3 eoTiv edd.: eoTiv TW: eanv B || d4 apa BTW: Spa Bc || Ti 
edd.: ti BTW || d5 KaXou re vera W J| to s.l. Bc: om. BTW || d6 
©paouXXou BT: -uXou W || OTpaTeuoopevos BT:~eudpevos W || 
y’ eXav (fee. Hermann) exyeXav B: eXav TW || d8 TrpaypaTeias 
T: cTpaTeias BW: oTpaTias Cobet || e3 aTrav codd.: ttccv Cobet || 
e7 cruXXapr|Tai (ai/.r., i/f v/d.) B || ouvouoias TW: £uv~ B || e8 
Taxu yap Trapaxpf)pa codd. et [Plutarchus]: Taxu yap <Kai> 
Trapaxpfipa Papanikolaou || e9 au tcov Stephanus: auTcov codd. || 
130a2 co<j>eXiav B et Lex. Vind.: ~e 1 av TW J| a4 eTra©ev TW: epa0ev 
B || a5 uds seel. Ast || a7 tisT:tisBW ,| a8 peXrjoiou BW: 
peXioiou T || uov sec/. Ast || b1 a.Trex©eias TW e/(ei ex 1) Bc: 
-©las B ||
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8e," ecj)q, "aKouio, (5 ZcoKpaTes, o-epvuvecr0ai aTTa iTpos ere Kai
XaXeTraiveiv cos tl ovTa........•'Ectti yap," ec}>qv eyco, "outcos."
"Ti 8e, ouk oi8ev," e<|>q, "Trpiv croi cruyyevecrOai olov -r^v 
av8pdTro8ov;" "Ouk eoiKev ye," ecjrqv eyco, "vq tous 
0eous." "’AXXa pqv Kai auTos ye," ecj>q, "KaTayeXacrTios 
eyco, (5 ZcoKpaTes." "Ti paXicrTa;" ec|>qv eyd). "‘"Oti," 
e<j>q, "Trpiv pev eKTrXeiv, oTcpouv avOpco-rrcov olds t’ ij 8iaXe~ 
yecrOai Kai pq8evos xeipcov <}>aivecr0ai ev tois Xoyois, dxTTe 
Kai eSicoKOV Tas ouvoucrias tcov xap^eoTaTcov avOpconrov, 
vuvi Se TouvavTiov cj>euyco av Tiva Kai aicrOavcopai Tre-rrai- 
8eupevov outcos aicrxuvopai end Tq epauTou cJrauXoTqTi." 
"noTepov 8e," 'F|v 8’ eyd), "e£ai4)vqs ere TTpouXiTrev auTq 
q 8uvapis q KaTa crpiKpov;" "KaTa crpiKpov," 8’ os. 
"'HviKa 8e croi TTapeyeveTo," flv 8’ eyd), "KOTepov pa©ovTi 
Trap’ epou ti TrapeyeveTO q tivi aXXcp TpoiTcp;" "’Eyco croi 
epco," ecjyq, "cS ZcoKpaTes, aiTiCTTOV pev vq tous 0eous, aXq0es 
Se. eyco yap epa0ov pev Trapa crou ou8ev TrcoTroTe, cos auTOs 
oTcr0a- eTre8i8ouv 8e orroTe croi cruveiqv, Kav ei ev tq aurq 
povov oikiqc eiqv, p-q ev tcq auTcp 8e OiKqpaTi, paXXov 8e 
oTTOTe ev Tip auTcp oiKqpaTi, Kai epoiye c8okouv ttoXu paXXov 
oiTOTe ev Tip auTip oiKqpaTi cov XeyovTos crou pXeTroipi Trpos 
ere, paXXov q OTTOTe aXXocre dpep-qv, ttoXu 8e paXicrTa Kai 
TTXeicrTov eTre8i8ouv OTTOTe Trap’ auTov ere KaOqpqv exopevos 
crou Kai aiTTopevos- vuv Se, q 8’ os, Tracra eKeivq q e£is 
e^eppuqKev."
"Ecttiv ouv, co Oeayes, ToiauTq q qpeTepa cruvoucria- eav 
pev Ttp 0ecp <J)iXov tJ, Travu ttoXu eiTi8o5oeis Kai Tax'd, ei 8e 
pq, ou. opa odv p-q croi aer^aXecTTepov ij Trap’ eKeivcov Tivi 
Trai8euecr0ai oi eyKpaTeis auToi eicri Tqs co4>eXias qv
5
c
5
d
5
e
5
b4 Trpos ere edd.: Trpos ere BTW |j b5 cos Ti edd:. cos ti BTW || b6 
8e BW: Sai Bc (ai i.r. exe)etT || Trpiv aoi edd.: Trpiv croi BTW || 
b7 to dv8paTro8ov codd.: corr. Cobet |J ye (y oxk) Wc || vq codd.: 
pa Cobet || b8 auTos BT: auTo W || c2 av0pd)TTiov TW: avOpcoTnp 
B: av s.(. vet.b JJ Par.1808 (a.c.) et corr. Coisl. 155: T:?jv BW || c5 
aicrBavcopai W: aicrOavopai BT: a’lcrOcopai i.m. yp. T JJ e7 
TTpouXiTrev W: TTpouXeiTrev BT || c8 q b (acc. foe.): B || d2 q b 
(acc. fee.): B || tivi BTW: Tivi b: tivi Wagner (fort, recte) || d4 
pev BW: om. T || Trapa crou BTW: Trapa crou Burnet || d7 oiKqpaTi 
TW: Se oiicqpaTi B |J e1 dpcpqv BT: optppqv W || 8e W et(s.l.) B2: 
8q BT J| e2 KaOqpqv M Urb.80 Ang.107c Vat.1029 1030 Lobe. Par. 
1811 Ambros.329: Ka0oipqv BTW || eQ •§ BT: eiq W J| e7 •§ BT: eiq 
W JJ e8 oi T: ot’B: oi t’W || coc^eXias BT: ~eias W ||
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(ju<|>eXoDOL tods avepcoiTODS paXXoy Trap epoD otl av
Z r\ <"» V-TDXQS TODTO TTpa^ai.
OE. ’Epol pep toltdv Sok£L, (5 ZcoKpaTes, "opas odtcool 
TToifjcraL, (XTroTreipaQfjv'ai tod EatpovioD todtod odvovtos 
aXX-qXoLS. kocl eav pev TrapeiicQ ripiv, TaDTa peXTLOTa- 
ei 8e prj, totc t)8tq Trapaxp'npa [SoDXeDodpeOa otl 8pctoopey, 
eLTe aXXcp ODyeoopeOa, eLTe KaL aDTO to OeLov to ool yLyvo- 
pevov TreLpaoopeGa TrapapoGeLoGaL eDyaLoi Te Kai ODoiaLS 
kol aXXcp 0T(p av ol pavTeLS e^TyycovTaL.
AH. MrjKeTL Trpos TaDTa dvTeLTrgs, (3 ZcoKpaTes, tcq 
peLpaKLCp- cd yap XeyeL Oeayris.
ZQ. ’AXX’ ei Sokcl xpfjvaL odtco TroLely, odtco TroLCopev.
e9 epoO codd.-. epol Hermann |j e10 tdx*Q codd.: corr. Bekker ||13la3 
TocijTa {BeXTLOTa seel. d. Hirschig || a8 tco B, sedi add. ||
10
131
10
5
288
Departures from the texts of Burnet (OCT) and Souilhe (Bude)
This edition Burnet and Souilhe
(agreement between B. and 
S. is assumed, unless Other-
121a3 ovokov
wise indicated)
ovoKa
125a1 8l8oco-kcc\ou {SLSaaKaXov}
125c10 tqjv tcc payoLpLKa tqjv payoCpojv
125d6 ttol’ aS TTOLa av
126c1 {CCKOVTLOLS} CCKOVTLOLS
126d4-5 ovv av av oSv
127a3 TrepTna TTOpiTOL
128a6 TrpoKaTaTiOevTas TTpOOKaTaTL0£VTaS
128b7 otl (also S.) 6 B.
128b7-8 Sokol otl (Sokol {tl} otl B.) Sokol tl {otl} S.
129a3 {ouei tol) SaLpovLov} toueij tol) SaL-
129d8 TrpaypaTOLas
POVLOLJ+ B.: OTJ0LJ 
{tol) SaLpovLov} S. 
OTpaTLas1
130b7 avSpccTroSov to avSpaTToSov
130c2 dvepQJTTQJV avOpQJTroj
130e10 TTJXXIS
Further disagreements in breathing, accent, punctuation, orthography, and 
v ephelkustikon in: 124a7, 124d2, 126b10, 126d1, 128e1, 130d4, 130e2.
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COMMENTARY
Title. Oeayris: For variations of title in some testimonies to this dia­
logue, see the app. crit. (the mss. of Diogenes Laertius also offer discrep­
ancies in subtitles for Smp., Phdr., and Ale. //); and on the variants TT€pi 
ao<f)iag and Trepi <|>i\oao<t>ias see lntr. ch. I, b, /; vii. Trepi aco<j)pO“ 
cnjVTjs must be an intrusion from the subtitle appended to Chrm., where 
this second title is appropriate. The mistake is understandable as a purely 
mechanical error, since Chrm. follows Thg. in the tetralogical order, but we 
can only guess at the actual process which gave rise to the error.
On the place of Thg. within the tetralogical canon, see lntr. ch. V, a. 
The subtitles attached to the Platonic works of the nine tetralogies (the 
Spuria have no such alternate titles) may be very old: R.G. Hoerber 
(Phronesis 2 [1957] 18-20) assigns their origin to the fourth-century B.C., 
and possibly to Plato himself; J.A. Philip (Phoenix 24 [1970] 302) supposes 
that both the subtitles and the classification of dialogues by philosophical 
character derive ultimately from an early Academic or Peripatetic source of 
the fourth-century, since the division according to philosophical ’'type” sug­
gests a dependence on diairesis, which had fallen out of use after the end 
of the fourth-century; see also Wilamowitz ll.324f.; A.H. Chroust, Hermes 93 
(1965) 42-6. It is true that there are a few relatively early references to 
Platonic dialogues by use of subtitle alone: Aristotle (Rhet. 1415b30) re­
fers to Menex. with the words ev t$ eTriTa<Jnco, and both the author of
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Ep. 13 (363a7) and Callimachus (Epigr. 23.4 Pfeiffer) mention Phd. as 
Trepi x|ruxT)S; and a tradition for subtitles of written works can certainly be 
detected from as early as the fifth century, witness Gorgias’ Trept tou jjlt] 
ovtos fj Trept ^uaecos. But I cannot believe that Plato was responsible 
for the double-titles and philosophical classification of his dialogues; not 
only are the vast majority of subtitles not attested before Thrasyllus, but 
those scholars who wish to trace them to Plato must reckon, as they 
invariably do not, with the fact that their hypothesis necessarily implies that 
Plato considered each treatise to be confined to a single theme, and that 
he intended his readers to approach the dialogues with the preconceptions 
imposed by these subtitles (for an attempted explanation see Ryle, Plato's 
Progress [Cambridge, 1966] 35-6). Later Platonists may have found no 
difficulty in treating Plato's dialogues as thematically unitary (cf. Anonon- 
ymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy 38f. [Westerink]), but it is hard 
to accept that Plato himself tried to achieve this result. Dodds’ conclusion 
that the subtitles are "Alexandrian at earliest" (Gorgias 1 n.1) seems
secure.
121a1-8. Demodocus greets Socrates in the agora of Athens, and 
urgently requests Socrates’ advice on a pressing matter. The two of them, 
along with Demodocus’ son Theages, withdraw to the Stoa of Zeus 
Eleutherios.
In this short introductory portion not only do we learn that Socrates is 
in a familiar haunt, the agora, but more importantly two features of the 
dialogue are established. First, Demodocus is sincerely troubled by what 
he has to discuss with Socrates (see on a1 and a2-3); we must therefore 
not lose sight through the veil of Socrates' playful and often ironic behav­
iour in coming pages that this concern, soon to be elaborated, ought to be
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taken seriously as a central theme. Second, Demodocus feels no hesi­
tation in sharing his anxieties with Socrates, an indication, only vague at 
this point, that Socrates holds an honoured position in Demodocus' eyes 
and is somehow considered to be on a different level from the sophists 
whom he will mention very shortly (122a5-6). See further Intr. ch. I, b, i.
121a1. ZcoKpocTCS: The first sentence of a Platonic dialogue (at 
any rate, those in dramatic form) usually contains a vocative, e.g. La., 
Euthd., Prt., Grg., Men. But in this instance the vocative is notable for its 
initial position, denoting a degree of agitation on the part of the speaker; 
see Gildersleeve 1.1-7 (for the commencement of a dialogue with a 
vocative, cf. Phdr. 227a1, Ale. 1103a1, Ale. I1138a1). Demodocus demon­
strates a proclivity towards placing the vocative in this position, cf. 121 b1 
(see ad loc.), 127b2, 127c5 (first Demodocus' response to his son, then an 
address to Socrates, initiated by the vocative); in 125b1 the vocative is 
preceded only by the emphatic oath Next |jloc Aloc.
a1. eSeop/qv: Translators and commentators have been unable to 
agree on the force of the imperfect, and generally take it in one of two 
ways: 1) as a plain imperfect, e.g. "I was wanting to" (Lamb), "I have been 
needing to" (Pangle; cf. Ficino, Wagner). This interpretation implies that 
Demodocus' intention all along has been to find Socrates and consult with 
him, which would certainly explain the more clearly his great relief at the 
prospect of enlisting Socrates as advisor (cf. 122a7, a9-b1, 127b3-5, with 
nn. ad loc.). And while it is slightly anacolouthic for Demodocus to say "I 
was wanting to have a private talk with you, if you have some leisure time" 
(QX°M)»'t is no more unusual than other features of his language, both in 
the first two sentences of the dialogue, and elsewhere (see Intr. ch. Ill, c; 
some translators circumvent this disjointedness by substituting present for
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imperfect: "I want to speak with you in private" [Burges], or "cupio quaedam 
privatim tecum ioqui" [Ast]). 2) Others (e.g. Knebel, Schleiermacher, 
Cousin) take the verb as a potential imperfect without av, on the analogy of 
e(3ou\dpy|V (on which see Goodwin, MT2 157-Q) and the common poten­
tial c8cl without av (ib. 151ff.). There are, however, no parallels for this 
use of SeojjLai, either in Plato or any other author, and it is doubtful 
whether e8eojJir|V could mean "I would like to" (eSe6jjlt)v av does occur, 
though; cf. Lyc. fr.6.1) The most natural interpretation follows along the 
lines of the first analysis.
a1. L8LO\oyT)cra0'0aL: Only here in the Corpus; the tSioXoy- 
stem is both rare and otherwise late in Greek, cf. Ph. 1.197, Chariton 4.6, 
6.7, Str. 17.1.12, Clem. Rom. Hom. 4.9.1 Cobet proposed SiaXoyiaaa— 
Oai, but tSioXoyrjaaaQai of all mss. must be the true reading: Demo­
docus wishes to speak privately (l8lo-) with Socrates, and for this reason 
asks if he would like to step out of the traffic (ckttoSujv a7, see also n. ad 
loc.). There can hardly be an objection (as, e.g., Ast, Leben 497; Stall­
baum 223; Steinhart 464; against them now Thesleff, Platonic Chronology 
75) to this obviously ad hoc formation, especially as it is employed by 
Demodocus, whose language frequently draws attention to itself (see lntr. 
ch. Ill, c). Taylor remarked (PMW® 534) that the cognate iSioXoyia 
appears as early as Epicurus (Ep. 2.36 Usener), but the word is by no 
means a certain conjecture there for rjST| aXoy ta of all mss.
a2. cl ayoXi]- kSv cl dcrxoXLa: For the introductory appeal to 
cx°Xr]/ao'X0^^oc> cf* Phdr. 227b8-11, Prt. 335c3-6, Phd. 58d2, Ion 530 
d9-10, Hp. ma. 281 a1-3, lust. 374b1f., Sis. 387b6. The phraseology is fair­
ly stereotyped, and natural enough in the present context; we need not
infer (e.g., with Heidel 54 n.7; Robin 1642) a dependence here on any of 
the above works.
a2-3. kSv... oyoMv: I agree with Shorey (WPS 429) that this sen­
tence is, as it stands, stilted and clumsy; but I disagree with his assertion 
that Plato could not be responsible for it. Stilted language is a feature of 
Demodocus' persona in this dialogue, and here it serves a specific function 
in his characterization (see Intr. ch. Ill, c, where I have argued that Socra­
tes' heavy response in a4-5 is uttered in mock-imitation of Demodocus; 
also the following n.). Shorey (ib. 649) makes the same criticism of the first 
sentence of Epin. ("...an indication of spuriousness, unless we assume that 
senility had set in after the Laws"), but see now the comments of Taran ad 
Epin. 973a1-5.
a2-3. kSv ei.. .Troi-qaai,: kSv ei is little different from Kai ei 
(KG I.244; Goodwin, Ml2 65; Riddell §255), although the av component of 
kSv may denote the general conditional nature of its sentence (cf. 130d5; 
see Thompson ad Men. 72c6). Whereas kSv ei is often followed in the 
apodosis by a second av (e.g. La. 184d8f., Prt. 318c4ff., Grg. 514d3f., Lys. 
208b3), here its appearance in the apodosis is precluded because of the 
imperative Troir)om (cf. Prt. 328a8-9; in a similar vein Sph. 267d8f). We 
are perhaps to understand therefore that Demodocus had originally 
intended to frame the apodosis in the form "I should like you to make some 
time for me" (i.e., optative + av), but substituted the aorist command 
instead.
In the combination Kai.. .8e (n.b. kSv. . ,8e a2, see Denniston,
GF2 202), Kai seems usually to be connective, "and" (ib. 199), not adverb­
ial ("even") as here; moreover, I have been unable to trace another in­
stance of kSv el...8e in Plato or elsewhere. This apparently singular
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use of the particle combination may be looked upon as a textual difficulty in 
a sentence which is otherwise suspected because the actual meaning of 
its protasis seems somewhat obscure (Kav 73 found in some recentiores 
[Par.1811 Vat.226 Ambros.409] is no improvement, and is probably merely 
an itacism). Some surgery has consequently been applied to the text: Ast 
suggested ye pro Se, a common enough uncial confusion, but one which 
does nothing to smooth the sentence out as he wished it to do; Cobet pro­
posed aXXa pro Se, which provides for a neater construction, though 
aXXa seems too strong an adversative here. Yet fluidity in this sentence is 
neither necessary nor desirable. Difficulties are removed if we understand 
(jlt). .. fjiey aXr| to be an afterthought added somewhat illogically by an 
anxious and tentative speaker: "But even if you have business - which is 
not all too important - nevertheless...". Most translators take the words 
basically in this way: Ficino’s "Opus habebam, O Socrates, quaedam 
privatim tecum communicare, si quidem otium sit, vel etiam negotium, 
modo non omnino magnum" is adequate, the renderings of Lamb, "even if 
there is some demand, which is not particularly important, on your time...", 
and of Schleiermacher, "Und hattest du auch ein Geschaft, ist es nur nicht 
gar zu wichtig...", rather better; many facilitate the construction by supply­
ing a conjunction, e.g., "mais qui ne soit pas tout a fait important" (Robin 
1284), "a moins qu’elle ne soit trop importante" (Souilhe), but this is not 
strictly necessary.
a2. Travu tis: Cf. Phdr. 228b5 (Travu tls codd., Travu tl POxy.), 
Tht. 150d1 (Travu tls B, Travu tl TW PBerol.y, editors are divided be­
tween respective readings in these two passages, tls may well have 
arisen by dittography in the Tht. passage (tls crowds), but in the Phdr. 
passage it is defensible (as Verdenius saw, Mnem. 4.8 [1955] 266) as
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lectio difficilior, and there is no cause for suspecting our text, although it 
must be noted that the collocation is rare, and another singular feature of 
Demodocus’ language. In fact, instances of ttocvli tis, where the two 
words clearly belong together in sense (i.e., where Travu does not modify 
a verb), are restricted to the three passages given above, until the time of 
Libanius, Lucian, and Athenaeus. tis "gives a light accentuation to the 
quality denoted by the adjective" (DeVries ad Phdr. 228b5); for streng­
thening or weakening (depending on the context), see KG 1.663-4; Schwy- 
zer-Debrunner 11.215; LSJ s.v. A.II.8; Thesleff, Studies on Intensification in 
Early and Classical Greek (Helsingfors, 1954) 194.
a3. cVCK6V (BTW) has been misreported by all editors since Burnet 
(eveKa occurs only in a few apographs, e.g. Par.1811, Urb.80). everev is 
rare, but does occur in the Corpus, e.g. Chrm. 165a5 (text suspect), Grg. 
468a5, 499e9, Smp. 210e6, Pit. 300a4, Phdr. 259d7; and it is supported by 
fourth-century Attic inscriptions, see LSJ s.v. eveKa. Its presence may be 
thought suspicious only two lines before the much more common eveKa 
(a5; so Fritzsche 235 n.6), yet it is rather appropriate to Demodocus’ gener­
ally unusual language that he should employ a little-used form (see also 
on a1 e8ed(aq v, a1 ISioAoyrjcracrQai, a2 Kav el... 8e, a2 it aw tls).
a3. TroiT^am: The aorist imperative is slightly more polite and less 
overbearing than the present.; see W.F. Bakker, The Greek Imperative
(Amsterdam, 1966) 43-6, 54.
a4-5. ’AXXa.. .Travu: Socrates' initial words are nearly as cum­
bersome and stiff as Demodocus'; see the following nn., and lntr. ch. Ill, a.
a4. ’AXXa: Assentient (see Denniston, GF2 17). ax°^^C^v echoes 
cryoA^v on the preceding line (a3); the repetition after assentient aAAa
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(Troupai crx°Mv virtually = o-xoXacrai, cf. Ion 530d9; see KG 1.106, 
322) is especially frequent in Plato (Denniston, loc. cit.).
a4. Kai aXXcns following upon ’AXXa produces a slightly contrived 
jingle; cf. Phdr. 240a9 and DeVries ad loc. But for Kat aXXcos, cf. La. 181 
a5, R. 458a7, 495b2, Phd. 116c4, Prm. 141b7.
a4. Tuyxdvo): The element of coincidence or chance occasionally 
dictates the dramatic circumstances of other dialogues, cf. Lys. 203a3 
(crweTUXOV), Tht. 142a6 (eveTUxov), Smp. 174a3 (evTUX^v), Prm. 
126a2 (evcTUXOjjiei/), Eryx. 392a1 (eTuyx^120^17). a,so x- Mem- 3.2.1 
(evTUXWV), Smp. 1.4 (auvT€TUxr|Ka); Aeschin. Socr. Miltiades (POxy. 
2889.1-2 CTvyxavei?)l and for an apparent imitation in later Greek philo­
sophical writing, cf. Ceb. Tabula 1 (eTuyx^^0^612); see Friedlander 1.158­
9; D. Grene, Man in his Pride (Chicago, 1960) 139. As the meeting in this 
dialogue is not planned (see also on 122a7 eis KaXov), so a similar 
dramatic pretence is often maintained in the earliest dialogues (cf. also X. 
Smp. init.); but the pretence tends to be thrown off in later works that are 
less dramatic and more overtly-philosophical, e.g. Crat., Sph.-Pit.,Ti., Phlb., 
Lg-
a4. Kai 8r|: ’’especially?’ marking ’’the transition from general to par­
ticular" (Denniston, GF2 249, though he wrongly [ib. 250] connects Kai in 
a5 with this Kai [see following nJ).
a5. Kai TTavu is a well-established combination of emphasis (see, 
e.g., H. Thesieff, Studies on Intensification in Early and Classical Greek 
[Helsingfors, 1954] 75); there is no reason somehow to connect it closely 
with Kai 8t) in a4, as Denniston suggests (see above a4 n.). Kai Travu is 
semantically related to Kai (jiaXa, Kai cr<|)d8pa, Kai KapTa, etc. (on 
which see Denniston, ib. 317-8), and like them the usage is probably collo-
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quial (see Thesleff 89, on kocl paXa). For the same emphasis at sentence 
or clause ending, cf. Men. 94e5-95a1, Prt. 361 e2, Phd. 64b4.
a5. aXX’: Denniston confines the iterartion of ctXXcc to clearly-defined 
rhetorical instances (hypophora, GP2 10-11), or to commands and exhort­
ations (GF2 15); but it is common in the context of dialogue, e.g. Phd. 63e6, 
R. 338c2-3; see KG II.283; S. Trenkner, Le Style KA115 n. 4.
a5. egecrTLV: An appropriately stiff and conventional acquiescence 
to Demodocus' oddly-phrased opening request.
a6-7. pOTJ Xei... diTOxmpffcrcnp.ev: Another colloquialism, com­
mon in Plato; see Stevens 60-1.
a6. SeOpo: Apparently Socrates, Demodocus, and Theages are al­
ready very near to the Stoa itself at the inception of the dialogue.
a6-7. tt)v too Aids too eXcoGcptoo cftogcv: As the 
setting of a dialogue cf. Eryx. 392a1-2 (the only other mention of this stoa in 
the Corpus), X. Oec. 7.1, Aeschin. Socr. Miltiades (POxy. 2889.1-7); and for 
a stoa as dramatic scenery in a philosophical discussion, cf. Plu. De Sera 
(Mor. 548b, an unspecified stoa), Luc. JTr. (16, Stoa Poikile); also Zeno’s 
conversations in the Stoa Poikile. On this somewhat stereotyped use of 
dramatic setting, see Hirzel, Der Dialog II 258, 198, /558 n.3, who posited 
the existence, based on works such as the above, of a distinct dialogue 
sub-genre which he called the "Tempel-dialog."
On the location of the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, formerly identified 
with the Stoa Basileios (e.g. H.A. Thompson, Hesperia 6 [1937] 64-76, 
225-6; id.,The Athenian Agora2 [Athens, 1962] 61-4), see Thompson and 
Wycherley, The Athenian Agora 14 [1972] 83-90; Wycherley dates it to 
about 430 B.C. (The Athenian Agora 3 [1957] 30), which would make it a 
late construction in the Periclean building program. It was apparently con­
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structed to commemorate the Greek victory in the Persian Wars (cf. sch. vet. 
ad Eryx. 392a; Piut. Arist. 20.4); but Hypereides offered an alternative 
explanation for the title of the Stoa (see Wycherley, The Athenian Agora 3. 
26, 28, s.vv. Etym. Magnum, Harpokration, Suidas).
a7. CKTroScov: Despite Ap. 17c7f. and 21e3-22e5, Socrates usually 
(as deliberately here) conducts his conversations out of the way of the 
direct confusion of the agora (shelter was one of the main functions of the 
stoai, see Wycherley, How the Greeks Built Cities [London, 1962] 11 Off.), 
which must have been among the noisiest areas of Athens.
a8. El croi Sokcl: The formulaic expression requires an apodosis 
to be supplied, such as outgo xpq ttolclv; cf. Crat. 387a3 (no apodosis); 
apodosis expressed, e.g., at Smp. 175b4, Tht. 145c6, Prt. 362a1. et aoi 
Sokcl + apodosis (whether explicitly included or not) always implies 
acquiescence to a request or action contemplated (see Barrett adE. Hipp. 
507-8).
121b1-122b1. Socrates, Demodocus, and Theages withdraw to the 
stoa. Following a simile between plant-rearing and chi Id-rearing, and the 
difficulties involved in each, Demodocus explains the source of his present 
anxiety: Theages wants to be trained by a sophist. Demodocus asks 
Socrates' advice.
In structural terms, Demodocus' monologue is notable for its length 
(see lntr. ch. Ill, c); on the purposes served and the effects produced by this 
opening speech, see the discussion in lntr. ch. I, b, i.
b1-c5. ’Teo pep.. .8c8lotl: The education-husbandry simile is a 
commonplace; cf. Euthphr. 2d1-4, Prt. 325d5-7, Tht. 167a4-c2, P. 491 d1- 
e3, Phdr. 267b1ff., Ti. 77a3-7, Lg. 765e1-766a1; see Shorey, TAPA 40 
(1909) 189ff.; also P. Louis, Le metaphores de Platon (Paris, 1945) 95-100,
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208-9 (Fritzsche’s objections to the simile as un-Platonic [230] are there­
fore wide of the mark). The origins of the simile are perhaps irretrievable, 
but it can hardly be right to call it (with Guthrie, HGP HI. 168, and Jaeger, 
Paideia I2 309f.) a sophistic topos (see M.C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of 
Goodness [Cambridge, 1986] 1 and 422 n.3 with references). For pre- and 
post-Platonic examples, cf. Antiphon DK 87B60, Hp. Lex 3, Plut. [?] Mor. 
2b; also Plu. Mor. 528c.
b1. ’TajjJLev 8fj. ZcoKpaTes: So Cobet punctuates against 
BTW, which offer a full stop only after ZcnKpaTes. The following argu­
ments are in his favour: 1) it is consonant with Demodocus’ agitated state 
of mind that he should place the vocative in the less common initial 
position of a sentence (see on 121a1); 2) the vocative is somewhat bald if it 
stands alone with the simple hortatory ’Tcop.ev 8rj; 3) Demodocus is 
addressing not only Socrates in the words ’Tcnjjiev 8rj, but his son 
Theages as well (although it may be argued that Socrates is the individual 
with whom Demodocus is most concerned at this point). The fact that 
Stobaeus begins his quotation of 122b1-c5 at ttccv Ta cannot be used as 
proof against this punctuation: he is concerned to de-personalize the 
passage, and, as far as this goes, is little interested that the addressee is 
Socrates. The testimony of our mss. on points of punctuation is, of course, 
arbitrary.
The asyndeton in ’Tcopev 8rj. ZcoKpaTes indicates the move­
ment of the dramatis personae from the place of preliminary discussion to 
the Stoa itself. The device has been labelled ’’awkward" (Steinhart 442, 
Heidel 54 n.6; see also Stallbaum ad loc.), and it does seem somewhat 
abrupt. Fritzsche adduces Phd. 91 c6 as a parallel, but no physical move­
ment is implied in the asyndeton there. Other dialogues do however com­
mence in one location and continue in another: cf. Prt. 310a8-314c2 (intro­
ductory conversation), 314c3ff. (arrival at Callias' house), Smp. 174aff., 
Phdr. 227aff.
bi. Ta <jyuTa: "Living things," "creatures" (LSJ s.v. II.1).
Schleiermacher's objection (349) that this meaning of the word is un­
Platonic is unfounded, cf. Sph. 233e8-9. Socher (94) had already an­
swered Schleiermacher’s criticisms, though somewhat differently.
b2. Kai: Best taken as explanatory; see Verdenius, Mnem. 4.8 (1955) 
14-5, 277-8; Mnem. 4.9 (1956)249.
b3. Ta tc aXXa Kai: "and in particular," laying all the emphasis 
on avOpcoiros following.
b3. avOpaJTros Schanz, av0pcoTros codd., Stobaeus. Schanz’s 
emendation, by the simplest of restorations, must be correct: tgjv av~ 
epCDTRGV c1 suggests that the collective singular is demanded here, and it 
is at any rate required for Demodocus' gnomic statement. Plato shows a 
predilection for the generic use of the singular 6 av0pomos/av0p(DTros 
(the latter a colloquial form according to DeVries, Studia Platonica: Fest­
schrift fur Hermann Gundert [Amsterdam, 1974] 90), cf. Ap. 29a7, Prt. 321 
c5, 322a3, Grg. 495e8, 503c8, 516b6, Crat. 399c3; see also Gildersleeve 
II.256. The generic use of the anarthrous singular seems, on the other 
hand, to be somewhat poetic, cf. Prt. 321 c7, d3, d4, e3, R. 619b1 (though 
this last instance is not necessarily generic, as LSJ claim [s.v. av0pcDTros 
I.2])
b6. CTTCiSav 8c to <j>UTCU0ev |3iq): Stallbaum objected to the 
application of puD to non-human life as un-Platonic. But the root has 
been used four times within the last three lines, and unless it is to be 
repeated once more here (i.e., <f>UTCuei), the author will have to find
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another verb; |3ico presents itself at once. Moreover, this use of (3i($ arises 
largely because the author is giving free rein to the education-husbandry 
simile, and an incidental confusion of terms and blurring of semantic 
distinctions occur easily; one side of the metaphor simply merges with the 
other.
b7. OcpaTrcia tou (jruvTos: For OepocTTeioc in an agricultural 
context, cf. Tht. 149e2; X. Oec. 20.12. It frequently appears in medical 
contexts as well (see LSJ s.v. II), and it seems likely that Plato extended 
OepocTreioc into the educational sphere (as "care of the soul," cf. e.g. Chrm. 
157a3, b3-4, Prt. 312b8-c1, La. 185e4) by analogy with OepaTreia literally 
understood (cf. Chrm. 156e6-157c6).
b7. xotXeTTT| Kai SuokoXos: The collocation also in Phdr. 246b4, 
Lg. 922b5; cf. R. 407b7, c1.
c1. to Trepi tcov dvOpcoTrcnv: The neuter article to (without 
accompanying noun) + Trepi + gen. (acc.), used as subject or predicate, is 
clearly a mannerism of Plato's later periphrastic style ("onkos" style, see 
lntr. ch. IV, b): among early works it occurs only in La. 182c1, but once in 
Phd. and Phlb., twice in Smp., Crat. and Tht., about half a dozen times in 
R., Sph., Pit., Tim., and about twenty times in Lg. (see also P.T. Stevens, 
CQ 30 [1936] 211-12). It has, I think, a particularly stiff and circumstantial 
flavour coming from Demodocus; 6 avepcJTros/oi aveptniTOi or toc 
dvQpGJTriva would have been the most direct way of expressing basically 
the same thing.
c1-2. dv0pQJTra)v aTro Tenv.. .T€Kp.aipojxai: The asynde­
ton is explanatory, but the classification of it as "rhetorical usage" (Dennis­
ton, GPS 114) is not particularly helpful. For T£K|jLaipo|jiai within a sen­
302
tence which is itself introduced by asyndeton, cf. Pi. fr. 152.4-5; [A.] PV 
336; similarly Grg. 487b7-c1.
c2. cctto .. . tSxXoc: A rare construction, the use of which here has 
been said (Taylor, PMW6 533 n.4; Stallbaum 224) to be a direct borrowing 
from Tht. 206b6 (ei Set octto tovtcov TeKpaipeaQai kocl eis tcc 
aXXa); and this is just possible, considering the author’s use of Tht. 
elsewhere (see Intr. ch. II, b). But TeKpaLpeoOai aTTO/eK tlvos is quite 
common, e.g. Smp. 204c2, Phd. 108a5; X. Mem. 3.5.6, 4.1.2. Moreover, 
Stallbaum’s arguments against the grammar of this passage are vitiated 
not only by the Tht. passage, but also by his failure to distinguish tok~ 
paipeo^ai tl ck/cctto tlvos (which he thinks would be the purer form) 
from the present construction TeKpaipeoeai eis tl eK/diro tlvos 
(similarly Carugno). For these can hardly be considered identical: the 
former means ”to infer something on the basis of something else," whereas 
the construction in Thg. signifies "to apply an inference drawn from one 
thing to something else."
c2. tcov. . .upaypctTCOV: Sc. yecopylkoov (Fritzsche).
c2. tcuv epa'UTO'O eyco TrpaypccTcov: The hyperbaton of eyco
serves to emphasize the personal nature of Demodocus' judgement by the 
resultant juxtaposition of the pronoun with epavToij (cf. the emphatic 
position of epoi c3, which goes with ppcTT) c4).
c2. es tSxXcc: I.e. es toc tcDv ocXXcov (so Stallbaum, Carugno ad 
loc.).
c3. epoi: See on c2 tcov. . .TrpccypccTcov.
c3. T| tou ueos toutoui: The pendent article is quite rare, but 
not unparalleled in Plato, cf. Ap. 20e6-7 tt]s yocp epps, ei tls eo-
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tip crocjua kcxl oia, papTUpa Trapcgopai ktX.; also D. 18.20 
(remarkably close phraseology); see KG 1.597.
c3. <JyuTCiav: The extension of the word to the production of children 
is unobjectionable because of the simile in which it is involved (see above 
on b1). The metaphorical sense of (jyuTCUCiv is also common, see LSJ 
s.v. I.2.
c5. 4>o poj.. . 8c8lotl: Often coupled as virtual synonyms, e.g. 
Euthphr. 12b10-c1, Phlb. 12c1, Lg. 648a1, though they are made the sub­
ject of ovopaTCOV opeoTT|S by Prodicus {Prt. 358d5-e1). The two words 
are closely linked as far back as Homer (in the personification of Deimos 
and Phobos, II. 15.119).
c5. cv 4>o|3q): "Plena timoris" (Knebel ad loc.), cf. Ft. 578e5-6; for the 
use of cv see LSJ s.v. II.2.
c6. tol. . . Xeyeiv: The mss. reading is to be preferred over Cobet's 
ttoXij av cpyov ctr) Xeyeiv, cf. Pit. 271e3-4 aXXa O’ ocra T-qs 
ToiauTrjs cqti KaTaKoaprjaecos erropeva, pupia av eirj Xeyeiv. 
c6. pcv oGv: Enough of comparisons; Demodocus must move on
now to tell Socrates precisely what is troubling him.
c6-d1. T| 8c.. .crowds ycvcaOai: Demodocus'present appre­
hension derives from one fact alone: Theages wishes to become crowds. 
The communication of Demodocus' distress is enhanced by sentence 
structure, viz., the climactic postponement, arousing the reader’s curiosity, 
of the crucial phrase crowds yeveaOai, along with the intervening 
personal address (3 SokpaTCS (c8), the dative rjpiv (c8), and the paren­
thetical (ns (fnqai (c8-d1).
c7-8. otjk ayevvfjs, Q<j)aXepd 8c: See below on d1 crowds.
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c7. otjk dycvvT)S: The litotes is fairly common in Plato (ten times in 
the Corpus); the meaning is basically ’’worthwhile," though "not ignoble," as 
an expression of social values and behaviour, is doubtless present as well 
(so Lamb ["not an ill-bred desire"], Schleiermacher ["unedel ist sie freilich 
nicht"], Souilhe ["Car ce n'est pas une envie vulgaire"], Amplo ["nobil- 
issimo"]). The vague ambiguity is consistent with Demodocus’ character­
ization; see below on d1; lntr. ch. ill, c; ch. I, b, i.
c7-8. Yap.. .yap: For the successive yap’s, where the first is par­
enthetical, see Denniston, GF2 65; Trenkner, Le Style KA115.
c8-d1. CTTL0Tjp.CL .. .crowds yeveaQat: Not unnaturally, this 
aspiration is often in Plato applied to youths, e.g. Phd. 96a7 (of Socrates as 
a young man), Men. 91 a3 (a passage similar to our own in context: Anytus 
is scandalized that Meno should wish to be trained by a sophist in his bid 
to become ao<|>6s).
c8. thjl.lv: Ethic dative, an informal idiom (see Thesleff 82).
d1. ao<t>os: This dialogue is ostensibly Trepi acxjnas (see above on
"Title"; but also lntr. ch. I, c), and we are to hear more of ao<|>6s/ao<jna 
throughout the course of Socrates’ conversation with Theages. But the 
initial use here of either of the pair is notable for its obscurity, ao^os itself 
can possess, even simultaneously, several fields of reference, practical, 
theoretical, moral, political (see, e.g., B. Snell, Die Ausdrucke fur den 
Begriffdes Wissen in der vorplatonischen Philosophie [Berlin, 1924] 1-20; 
Guthrie, HGP III. 27ff.; F. Maier, Der Beg riff. Zur Bedeutung, Wert-
ungund Rolle des Begriffes von Homer bis Euripides [Diss. Munich, 1970]; 
Dover, GPM 119-21); the precise meaning on a given occasion is eluci­
dated and determined only by the context in which the word is found. 
Since ao^os can admit of such a wide range of meanings, our inclination
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at d1 is to ask "crowds at what?", which is precisely the question Socrates 
puts to Theages at 123b3ff. and 125b8ff. But Demodocus* obscurity in his 
use of the word is not only intelligible, it is also wholly consistent with his 
character. For Demodocus is thinking here of crowds in terms related to a 
cyo^iaT-qs (cf. d5, 122a6), but since he never gives any indication that he 
actually knows just what a sophist is or what a sophist does (other than the 
fact that this person is a professional, cf. d5-122a1; see on 122a5-6), his 
use of cocos' naturally reflects this confusion. We are probably justified in 
understanding that Demodocus uses the term cro<j)icrTT}s below in a non­
specific sense, i.e. "one who is crowds" (so Robin 1642; see H. Sidgwick, 
JP4 [1872] 66ff.); and if cro Glottis in that case is translated as "intellect­
ual" in the pejorative sense that the English can bear (thus crowds as 
"clever," "smart"), we can well recognize how the conventional Demodocus 
stands with regard to his son’s desire to become crowds (cf. Cleon's 
attitude [Thue. 3.37.4] to the new politicians whom he describes as croc()GJ- 
TCpoi). Demodocus may not know exactly what Theages means when he 
speaks of this desire, but the ambiguity of the word renders the associ­
ations in his mind as anything but favourable. His evaluation of this desire 
therefore is that it is otjk ayowrjs, cr^ocXepd 8e: quite commendable so 
far as it goes, but dangerous because Theages may be corrupted (cf. 122 
a5, 127c2). Demodocus’ frame of mind reflects popular suspicions about 
the sophists and about cro<j>oi generally; see Intr. ch. I, b, /; Guthrie, HGP 
III. 37-9; G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, 1981) 19-22.
d1. 8ok<3 yap poi: The evidence of all mss. has been considered 
uncertain. The parenthetic use of yap is of course well-established (see 
Denniston, GP2 68-9; Schwyzer-Debrunner II.705-6), and there is no 
difficulty with parenthetic 8okcB followed by a finite verb rather than a sub­
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stantive clause (cf./?. 460c1, Prm. 126b4). But parenthetic SokcB poL is 
said to be a different case altogether (Kruger 12-3), and to be impossible in 
Plato; according to Kruger (13), it became common only in middle comedy. 
Emendations have consequently been suggested (Sokel yap poL 
Stephanus as a conjecture i.m., SoKeiv yap poL Oobet, Sokoj yap 
Beck). But in the face of Ap. 36a7 (MeXrjTov pev oBv, gjs epoi 8ok(3,
Kai vw arrc^euya ktX.), Men. 71c4 (Mq pdvov ye, c3 CTaipe, 
aXXa Kai otl ou8’ aXXq) ttco eveTuxov €l8otl, cos epoi Sokqj),
and R. 339d4-5 (Tl XeyeLs* cru; e<Jrr| - <VA otj XeyeLs, epoLye 
8okcjo), these suspicions about the text do not seem well-founded. I can 
trace, however, no precise parallel for parenthetic 8ok(3 yap poL.
d1-2. T(3v qXlklqjtcSv tlvcs auTou Kai SqpoTtSv: Cf. 
Ap. 33e1 KpLTCov oijtocfl, epos tjXlklq)tt)S' Kai SqpoTqs.
d2. 8qpoTd5v: Demodocus’ deme is Anagyrous (127e3), of the phyle 
Erechtheis (cf. Suda s.v. ’AvayupacrLOs; sch. vet. ad127e, giving the 
deme as AiavTLs, cannot be right). Located south of the Piraeus on the 
south-east foot of Mt. Hymettus, between the demes Halai Aixonides and 
Thorai (Str. 9.1.21), Anagyrous appears to have been a coastal deme of 
considerable size and importance (see Gomme, The Population of Athens 
in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. [Oxford, 1933] 56ff.). On Anagyrous, 
see C.W. Eliot, Coastal Demes of Attica [Toronto, 1962] 35-46.
d2. eis to aoTD: Athens, cf. Smp. 172a2, Menex. 243e4. That 
Theages and Demodocus have come to Athens for the purpose of Thea­
ges' education is reminiscent of similar sojourns, directed more deliberate­
ly than here towards acquiring Socrates or Plato as teachers, which are 
mentioned in other sources, e.g. D.L. 6.3.9.10, Arist. Nerinthos, fr. 1 Ross.
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More importantly, this sets up an essential contrast and conflict within the 
dramatic circumstances of the dialogue (see lntr. ch. I, b, i).
d2. KCtTapaivovTes: As a term employed by Plato to indicate geo­
graphical orientation, K0tT0C|3a.lveiv properly refers to movement either 1) 
from an inland region towards the sea (e.g. R. 327a1,328c6, Tht. 142a6) or 
2) from a higher to a lower elevation (e.g. Phdr. 278b8-9, Lg. 678c2). 
Since the deme Anagyrous lies on the coast, and is situated at the foot of 
Mt Hymettus (see on d2 8t))jlot(jj v), it may be assumed that the use of 
KOtTCtpaiveiv here conforms to 2), although the present application of the 
term does not seem wholly consistent (Fritzsche however compares the 
late Alciphr. 2.28.1 els otQTU Ka.Ta(3as).
d2-3. Xoyous.. .ccutov: Since these reports have inspired Thea­
ges to search out a sophist to become his teacher (121d5, 122a6), the 
Xoyoi in question can be plausibly taken to refer to sophistic speeches or 
eiTiSel^eis, or at any rate to a discussion with a sophist or sophists. For 
the intense excitement which the sophists could arouse in a young man (cf. 
d3 SiocTocpocTTODaiv and n.), cf. Phdr. 227d6-228a4 (Lysias’ speech 
contains all the marks of a sophistic epideixis), Prt. 310a8ff. (as in our 
passage, Hippocrates' information about Protagoras is at second-hand).
d3. SiGLTG.pctTTO'ucriv: TotpocTw and related forms can indicate 
supernatural interference (see Dodds, G. and I. 51 n.3), and the word more 
generally (as here) denotes a very high pitch of emotional arousal or con­
fusion (8ia- is intensificatory).
d4. TraXai.. .Trapexci: 123a5-8 represent Theages' confirmation 
and articulation of this statement.
d5. xpn^aTa TeXecrai Tivi tcdv ao<j>ia-T(3v: Plato always 
distinguishes the sophists from Socrates by the fact that the sophists
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charged fees for their services, a point which he frequently stresses (for a 
list of passages, see E.L. Harrison, Phoenix 18 [1964] 191 n.44). In fact, 
the mere mention of sophists is usually enough to prompt a comment on 
fees from Plato, and "sophist" is likewise inextricably linked with profes­
sionalism in Xenophon (Mem. 1.6.13), Isocrates (15.155), and Aristotle (SE 
165a21, EN 1164a30); cf. also Ar. Nu. 98. The debate over the amount 
which the sophists charged for their services seems largely misconceived. 
Figures vary from one authority to another, and indeed from one sophist to 
another (for a collection of the relevant testimonia, see Vlastos, JHS 95 
[1975] 159-60). The difficulty modern scholars have experienced in recon­
ciling the data seems curious; the fees a sophist charged would depend 
primarily on his reputation, and this would allow for a great deal of scope in 
what he demanded (professional services in modern times are no differ­
ent). We need not assume that there was a standard sophistic fee.
d5-6. oqtis auTov <jo<()6v Troiqcret: We are no doubt to 
understand that Demodocus is repeating what Theages has told him, and 
what Theages in turn has heard from his companions. The sophists are 
frequently depicted in Plato as promising to make others cro<j)o£ (e.g. Prt. 
310d6f., Euthd. 273d3f.); the Athenian reaction to this claim must have 
been mixed, contrast Nicias' attitude of acceptance to innovative methods 
of education (La. 181 d8ff.) and Callias’ enormous expenditures on sophis­
tic education for his sons (Ap. 20a4ff., Crat. 391 b11 -c1), with the hostile 
position taken by Laches (La. 183c3ff.) and Anytus (Men. 91 c1 -5). On the 
other hand, Demodocus does not seem to know quite what to make of the 
sophists' claims (see on 121d1). To Plato's Socrates, however, crcxjncx 
must have a rational foundation (Men. 99b4f.; cf. also Ale. 1118c3ff.); but 
the close association here of payment of fees with the promise to impart
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wisdom should leave the reader with no doubt as to the attitude with which 
Socrates will contemplate Demodocus' difficulty (see Intr. ch. I, b, iii-vi\ c).
d6. TTOLTjcrcL: Modal future, "who can make him wise” (see KG 1.175). 
d6-122a1. ejioi.. .Kat cXaTTOV |aeXei: Cobet wished to de­
lete Kat ("importuna copula"; it is absent from the apograph Ambros.409). 
But Kat must be adverbial here (emphatic, see Denniston, GP2316ff., ib. 
319 for emphatic Kai with comparatives). The sense is "I’m actually less 
concerned with the money...," i.e., Demodocus is laying stress upon an 
attitude which he considers worthy of emphasis. Socrates elsewhere 
approves this frame of mind, cf. La. 201 a2f., Euthd. 306d6-e3, Ap. 29d7ff.,
Phd. 78a5f.
a1. T|yo'U|iai.. . klvSuvov: Demodocus states the actual reason 
for his trepidation: he is anxious for the welfare of his son. klvSuvov re­
calls o^aXepa in 121c8. Prt. 313a1-2 is verbally and contextually close 
to our passage: oToQa els olov Tiva kivSwov epXTI wo&fjacov 
t|njxnv; cf. also La. 187b1 for kivSwos applied to the training of the
young. For ou (JLLKpog kivSwos, ct.Crat. 436b2, R. 467b2.
a1-2. ievai oT emeu Set: This phrase, along with the surrounding
words, literally = "I think he is entering into considerable danger where he 
is hastening" (so Lamb, Wagner, Robin, Schleiermacher); it is clear 
enough what this is supposed to mean: Theages is in danger by hastening 
(going) where he is hastening. Yet a number of translators have felt 
uncomfortable with the lack of Greek word(s) to represent the italicized 
items (cf. Ficino, Ast, Cousin, Burges, Muller, Souilhe); and some editors 
would supply a circumstantial participle to make the sense explicit: thus 
Schanz emended to lovai ol o’Tre'uSei OTreuSovTa, while Stallbaum 
and Fritzsche proposed (without printing) levai iovTa oi cxTrcuSei,
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comparing Phd. 58e5-6 (on constructions of the kind oT orTevSei oiTeu- 
Sovtoc, see H.W. Johnstone, Glotta 58 [1980] 49ff.). Emendation, how­
ever, seems a rather drastic measure, as brachylogy involving the ellipse 
of a participle is not at all uncommon, see KG II.565; Schwyzer-Debrunner 
II.709; Riddell §246; see also Knebel ad loc.
a2. crrreuSei: Of a rash eagerness, cf. Cri. 45c6, Prt. 361 b1.
a2. |iev o5v marks the transition to Demodocus’ statement of what
he has actually tried to do under the present difficult circumstances.
a2. Trapa|ju6oup.evos: Of fatherly encouragement also in Menex.
247e5, Sph. 230a2.
a4-5. iva |jrq.. .<TUYyevd{jLev6s Tty Sta^eapfl: Cf. 127c1- 
2. For this statement as an expression of Demodocus’ essentially tradi­
tional patterns of thought, see lntr. ch. I, b, i, and n.16. The vague tcj^ 
would seem to refer to a sophist, as they are mentioned immediately before 
and after (121d5, 122a6), but Demodocus' uncertainty in his use of terms 
in any event reflects his confusion. At the same time we cannot but be re­
minded of one of the charges for which Socrates lost his life, viz., &8iKeTv 
tous to veovs 8ia<t)eeipovTa. ktX. (Ap. 24b9;cf. X. Mem. 1.1.1; see 
lntr. ch. I, c); elsewhere the same charge is imputed to the sophists, e.g. Prt. 
318d7-9, Men. 91 e3; also Ar. Nu. 921-8 (of the ccSikos Xoyos).
a4. ttoXXockis: "Perchance," as often after p.fj, cf. 122b8; see Riddell 
§143.
a5. ctt’ aiba TauTa: Our author is flexible in his use of plural 
pronouns, cf. 122a8, 125d6, 126e2-3, 131a8; see Gildersleeve II.206-7; 
Riddell §41-2. For the singular ctt’ oojto touto cf. Euthd. 274a10.
a5-6. toutcov. . .eivai: "One of those who have the reputation of 
being sophists"; cf. Ap. 21 b9 tcSv Sokouvtcov ao<j)(3v eTvai; E. Med.
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1225-6; also generally Grg. 472a2, Euthd. 303c8. Demodocus’ words con­
tain, I think, a pejorative flavour and reflect his general distrust of the 
sophists (cf. the coinage 8o£ocro4)ot at Phdr. 275b2); see Intr. ch. Ill, c. 
Lucian probably had this passage in mind in Rh.Pr. 1 (epcoTps.. .ott- 
cos...ao<j)io"rqs eTvaL So£eLs; in Rh.Pr. 2 he also uses the proverb 
which occurs in 122b2-3. Lucian tends to quote or allude to authors near 
the beginning of his works, see G. Anderson, BIOS 25 [1978] 97-8).
a6. cru crTT) crco: Vox propria for entrusting one into the care of an 
educator (cf. 123a8, b6, 127a4, La. 200d2; X. Smp. 4.63) or of a specialist 
generally (Chrm. 155b2).
a7. els KaXov: "Opportunely,” "at just the right time" (colloquial, see 
Stevens 38); the dramatic pretence of coincidence is sustained, see on 
121a4 Tnyx^vto. For the phrase cf. Hp. ma. 286c5, Men. 89e9, Euthd. 
275b4, Smp. 174e5; also S. OT 78, E. Heracl. 728-9, Men. Dysc. 773, 
Sam. 280.
a7. Trape^avris: Juxtaposed with els KaXov, the word almost sug­
gests the "epiphany" of a god (see Dodds ad Grg. 527e2); TTapa~ signifies 
that Socrates is at hand to render assistance. Demodocus speaks in 
equally emotive terms in 127b3 (eppaLOV). Euthd. 275b2-4 (though ironic) 
provides a striking verbal and contextual parallel for the relief Demodocus 
experiences in finding someone who can assist in his son's education: 
^opoupeOa 8f) Trepi auTt^ (cf. Thg. 121c5 del ev 4>opq), c7 ^Op­
el). . .pfj tls r^pas (cf. Thg. 122a4 aveu epou).. .Kai SLa^Oel- 
PX) (cf. Thg. 122a5 8ia<t>eapi3). cr<(>d) oSv rpceTOV els KaXXiaTov 
(cf. Thg. 122a7 els KaXov).
a7. (J av eytn.. .epouXdpT]v: For av Cobet would read 8rp 
assuming a classic uncial error; and he may have been anticipated by
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Ficino, who translated quern quidem hac in re mihi consultorem maxime 
cupiebam (where quidem might possibly represent 8f) in Ficino’s exem­
plar; but see "Fic." in Text. Trans.). Cobet was apparently troubled by the 
fact that the indicative epouXopriv, rather than the optative, stands in the 
potential clause; but for e|3ouXdiJir|V av as the virtual equivalent of 
(SouXoipriv av, see Schwyzer-Debrunner 11.347; Goodwin MT2 158; and 
cf. 128b2. ocv here not unnaturally gravitates to the beginning of the rela­
tive clause to emphasize the potentiality of Demodocus' wish, even though 
this causes its juxtaposition with the relative pronoun; cf. Ap. 38d4 tcrcns 
pc olcctGc.. .aTropiQc Xoytov caXcoKevaL tolotjtcov ols av upas 
CTTCLcra. ktX. Riddell observed (§68) numerous similar instances where 
av is juxtaposed with a relative pronoun in optative potential clauses, 
though the particle actually adheres to the verb.
a8. Trpa£eiv: Cobet supplies a formal object for the verb by reading 
tl Trpa^CLV, postulating the common lipography of tl before tt. This 
however yields rather lame sense, and it is better to understand TrepL rav 
toloutcdp as belonging cctto kolvou with both auppouXcucracreaL 
and (jLeXXcDV Trpa^civ (see KG 11.560). The resultant meaning of Trpa£— 
clv ("negotiate," "do business"; for TTpocttelv TrepL tlvos cf. X. HGQ.3. 
3) is a good touch of characterization; see Intr. ch. Ill, c.
a9-b1. e£ecrTi Te Kat XP1!: Cf. Phd 117c1-2. XP'H implies moral 
compulsion, i.e., Socrates is bound by friendship; see G. Redard, Re- 
cherches surXPH, XPHZOAI (Paris, 1953) 47ff.
b2-e1. Socrates now answers Demodocus’ request. Advice is sacred, 
he admits, but first we must ensure that we are talking about the same 
thing. Demodocus agrees, but Socrates adds that they also have to guar-
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antee that Theages himself has the same subject in mind. Socrates asks 
for Theages' name.
On the main purposes served by this brief interplay between 
Socrates and Demodocus, see lntr. ch. I, b, ii. It also conveys the im­
pression that this is a typically "Socratic" Socrates with which we will have 
to deal; cf. (with nn.) b2-3, b5-6 (education a sacred thing), b6-8 (the 
necessity for defining subject of discussion). Whether these first 
impressions are lasting is of course another matter (see lntr. ch. Ill, a).
b2. ’AXXa pev 8fj: Although the precise force of the combination is 
slightly elusive here, I think that "substantiation of condition" is a more 
accurate description than "assentient" (the terms are Denniston's [GP2 
394]; he suggests that either in this case might be right). Demodocus had 
just imposed an element of obligation on Socrates (a9-b1): as a friend 
Socrates must advise him, if he is able. Socrates' response is to exalt the 
nature of advice: "Why yes, Demodocus, they do say advice is a sacred 
thing." This effectively acknowledges the demand Demodocus has just 
made, generalizes its validity (XeyeTai), and justifies its propriety by 
going it one better. Wagner's translation ("Es heisst ja uberhaupt auch, 
lieber Demodokos, dass Rath eine heilige Sache sei") is superior to most.
b2. Kat.. .ye: Kai is adverbial (asseverative); for Kai.. .ye (here 
stressing XeyeTai) see Denniston, GP2158.
b2-3. aruppoiiXri lepov xPWa eTvai: A proverb, as XeyeTai 
indicates, and as the sch. vet. ad loc. tells us (Trapoipia); it occurrs also in 
Ep. 5.321 c5; cf. Epich. fr.228 Kaibel; Ar. Amphiareus fr. 33; X. An. 5.6.4; 
Luc. Ph.Pr. 1.3, Ind. 25.3; lamb. VP 85; see Shorey, WPS 661, for further 
references. The proverb is explained by the sch. vet. in two ways, the first 
of which is rather muddled and contrived (the gist is that advisors [oi crup-
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pouXeuovTcs] have a duty to tell the truth [aij/euSeLV] and to offer the 
best advice they can [toc peXTicToc koctoc Tqv auTtSv y vcd|jt|V aup- 
pouXeueLV]; they are like those who give advice in temples [toc tepee], 
and who must advise KocOocpws kocl ceSoXcos; therefore au|j.pouXfj is a 
sacred trust). The alternative explanation probably comes nearer the true 
intent: the proverb is simply a praise (ottocli/os) of oupipouXfj, on the 
grounds that it is Gcloc kocl wep avSptDTrov (cf. GeLOTepou b5). 
However this may be, Socrates’ use of this kind of language in connection 
with the topic of education is not at all unusual. Elsewhere he speaks of 
instruction or philosophy as initiation into mysteries, humorously in Tht. 
155e3 and Euthd. 277d6-e3, but in a more serious tone at Smp. 209e3- 
210a2; cf. Phdr. 249c6ff., Grg. 497c3; also Ar. Nu. 143, 824.
b3. XPW In a proverbial-type expression, cf. Ion 534b3-4; Hdt. 3.53. 
As a predicate to a masculine or feminine subject, xp^pa appears 
colloquial, see Tarrant, CQ40 (1946) 111; Stevens 20; KG I.60.
b3-4. eLTrep ouv Kat aXXq qTLOouv.. .KaL auTq: The 
meaning is "this above all etc."; the phraseology is formulaic, cf. La. 197c5- 
7; Grg. 451b1-3, Phd. 66a7-8; see KG H.573-4.
b3-4. Kai... Kat: Corresponsive (see Denniston, GP2 324-5). 
b3. aXXq and auTT) (b4) refer most immediately to crup|3ouXq (b2),
but they also anticipate TraL8e£as on b6; the construction is ad sensum 
rather than purely logical.
b4-6. ou yap.. . olkclcdv: The education of the young, and the 
selection of a suitable teacher, were no doubt of primary importance to the 
historical Socrates; cf. La. 185a3ff., 186a3-187b8, Hp. ma. 285b5f., Prt. 
310d5-314c2, 318b1-d4, Grg. 514a5-d1, Euthd. 274d4ff., R. 376-412; X. 
Ap. 21 (where however Socrates sloughs off any irony in claiming to be the
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greatest of teachers). Heidel's contention (54 n.7) that the present passage 
recalls Lg. 765d8-766a4 seems to founded entirely on the occurrence 
there of 0€l6toctov (766a3).
b5. Trepi otou OeiOTCpou: Attraction of an antecedent into the 
relative clause (inverse attraction) is quite common in Plato; see Riddell 
§191; also KG 11.417 (incorporation of nominative antecedent into relative 
clause).
b6-8. irpCDTOV p.e v.. .pouXcuopeOa: The insistence to define 
and determine the subject of inquiry as a preliminary for discussion is 
highly Socratic; cf. La. 185b6-c1, Phdr. 237c1ff., 264a4f., Grg. 457c4f., 
Smp. 199c3f.; see also on c3-4.
b8-c2. p.T|.. .UTToXappdvco... at a0cdp.eea: The use of jjcrj with 
an independent subjunctive in cautious assertions is an almost exclusively 
Platonic idiom before Aristotle; see Riddell §59 ("presumptive use"); 
Goodwin Ml2 92; Thompson ad Men. 89c5. It has been denied, however, 
that (jlt| in this construction can have anything but a prohibitive meaning 
(see C.D. Chambers, CR 10 [1896] 151), but here at least the tentative 
force of a "cautious assertion" (reinforced by ttoXXockis b8, see on 122a4) 
is more consonant with Socrates’ general method of inquiry. If this con­
struction is colloquial, as Burnet surmises (ad Ap. 39a6), it is surprising that 
other examples of its application are not more abundant outside of Plato.
c1. TJTroXap.pdv(n: "Frequently of an ill-grounded opinion" (LSJ s.v. 
111.1); cf. Crat. 410b6, Grg. 458e5, Prt. 341 a6. Cobet's TJTroXocpLpocvcov is 
possible (cf. 123c1-2 and n.), but unnecessary (cf. Phd. 90b4-8, R. 338a8- 
b1, Phlb. 14a1-4; for the construction "finite verb-erreiTa-finite verb" see 
Dover in Classical Contributions: Studies in Honour of Malcolm Francis 
McGregor [New York, 1981] 24).
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c1. KCtTT€iT(X: A colloquialism (see Stevens 47; S. Trenkner, Le Style 
KA112-3); cf. in a similar vein 125a4 eTreiTCt and n.
c1-2. iTOppo) ttou Tfjs auvoucrias: Sc. TTpopepriKOTes (Kne­
bel). For TTOppco ttou + genitive, cf. Phd. 96e6, R 499c9, 598b6, 610e3, 
Euthphr. 4b1.
c2. cru v oner Las (BT) must be right, against GWT)0eioi$ of W. A 
possible explanation for the reading in W is that it was originally a gloss 
i.m. or s.i. entered by an over-scrupulous (Christian) scribe attempting, 
upon the first occurrence in the dialogue of the thematic cruvouara (see 
Intr. ch. I, b, vii', c), to obviate for the reader the possible (and common) 
sexual meaning of the word (for instances of Christian sentiments 
manifested in the Arethae scholia see Greene, Scholia Platonica xxiii n.7, 
with references).
c2. yeXoioi ovtcs: Socrates frequently voices similar warnings 
or apprehensions about appearing ridiculous in discussion; cf. d1 below, 
Euthd. 279c9-d2, R 506d7-8, Smp. 199a7-b2, Tht. 181 b1 -3; see DeVries, 
Mnem. 4.38 (1985) 380. It is fanciful to suppose (with Pangle 152-3) that 
the care taken here not to appear ridiculous is meant by the author to 
represent the obverse of the dramatic situation of Ar. Nu., and that this is 
therefore part of a "rebuttal’’ of Aristophanes’ picture of Socrates.
c3-4. pLT|8ev T(Bv aurav T|youp.evoi: A close parallel is La. 
198a7-b5, esp. b3-4. Socrates here insists on determining the subject of 
discussion in order to prevent his arguing at cross-purposes with Demo­
docus and Theages. Elsewhere (particularly in the early dialogues) this is 
one important reason for his demand for definitions: Socrates endeavours 
to set some order to the obvious confusion caused by different individuals' 
different applications of certain moral terms; what he was after of course
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was an immutable meaning for each term. But it will be noticed that, 
although here Socrates does seek to define certain terms of reference, no 
definition is arrived at; he does not ask "What is ooc|)ia?", but rather "What 
does Theages mean by oo<|)ia?", or "At what does he want to become 
ao<j)ds?" For this modification of the structure of the early Platonic dia­
logue, see Intr. ch. I, b, iii, \r, ch. ill, a.
c5-6. ’AXXa.. .outgo: So also, in a similar context, Melesias ex­
presses ready agreement with Socrates' suggestions (La 185a8, a10, b5).
c5. ’AXXa: Assentient (see Denniston, GF12 18).
c6. ttoiclv xpr| outco: As outgo usually precedes the word it
modifies (see LSJ s.v. outgos B), the order outgo xp'Q ttoiciv (or XPT) 
outgo ttoiciv) would appear to be the natural one, cf. Smp. 175b4, R. 328 
b3, 435a4, Prt. 362a1, 397a4; but the identical order is found once, in R. 
435a4. The formula may be a stylistic marker: it seems that Plato in his 
early dialogues favoured this combination to indicate acceptance of a 
proposal, whereas in later works tocut’ ecrTai (eoTai TauTa, eaTai 
Ta8e) tended to predominate; see DeVries, Mnem. 4.16 (1963) 286-7, 
who calls the formula colloquial.
c7. Kai Xeyoo.. .TravTaTraor yc: La. 195c5 Kai yap Xeyei 
ye ti, ou pevToi aXT|0es ye is strikingly close.
c7. Kai Xeyoo yc 6p0(Bs: The combination Kai.. .ye picks up 
opedos from c5; cf. La. 195c3-5, and Dover ad Nu. 293. The particles 
preserve independent force (see Denniston, GP2159): Kai is emphatic 
(adverbial), ye is limitative ("What I say is correct, as far as it goes; how­
ever...").
c8. crp.iKpov yap ti p.CTaTi0c|JLai: A common vehicle of irony 
for Socrates, cf. Chrm. 173d8, Euthphr. 13a1, Prt. 328e3-4, 329b6, Smp.
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201 c2, Tht. 145d5-e9 (similarly 128b2-4 below); and a natural form of 
understatement, cf. Ar. Lys. 97-8. Socrates’ "one small change" is con­
cerned with nothing less than Theages himself and the object of his 
present desire.
c8-d2. e vvocn . .. ponXeudjjlcvoi: It is faultless, dramatically 
speaking, that Socrates should now draw Theages into the conversation, 
and indeed that he should extend the principle of the need to start from 
agreed premises (cf. 122b6-8 and n.). But there is a further motive, 
important to the theme of the dialogue, for his directing the conversation 
away from Demodocus and turning it exclusively towards Theages (though 
Heindorf [see Hollenberg 354] viewed this as a structural defect); cf. also 
125b3 and n., and lntr. ch. I, b, ii.
c8. evvorij.. .p.r|: Translators generally interpret these words in one 
of two ways: a) as an expression of precaution, "I am worried lest..." (Ast, 
Fritzsche; for evvom as verbum cavendi, cf. X. An. 3.5.3, 4.2.13; ev©ujjl— 
O'OjjLoc’b undergoes a similar extension of meaning in Hp. ma. 300d2-3); b) 
as introducing an indirect question, "I wonder whether...," shading into "It 
occurs to me that..." (so most other commentators and translators, as well 
as Denniston, GP2298; for prj = "whether" see Riddell §61-2). The first 
possibility seems rather strong to me; one expects Socrates to proceed in 
the dialogue’s early stages as the tentative examiner, witholding final 
judgement on the present situation until all facts are made known.
c8. |juf) Kai: The combination has a colloquial flavour, and is appar­
ently more common in Plato and Xenophon than in other authors (see 
Denniston, GP2 298).
c8-9. ptCLpaKLCTKOS: Theages is also called veavio-KOS in d7 and 
imeipocKLOv in 131a9; the three terms are basically interchangeable. A
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good many of Socrates' interlocutors and companions are of such an age 
as to be designated by these words, e.g., Charmides (Chrm. 154b5), 
Theaetetus (Tht. 144c8), Phaedrus (Phdr. 257c8), Hippocrates (Prt. 318 
a6), Simmias and Cebes (Phd. 89a3), Agathon (Smp. 198a2). But the 
flexibility with which the terms are generally used prevents us from drawing 
any conclusions about Theages' precise age. The Greeks commonly 
applied the word jmeLpocKLCTKos to youths between the ages of fourteen 
and twenty-one (see F.A. Beck, Greek Education: 450-350 B.C. [London, 
1964] 95 n.6; M.L. Clarke, Higher Education in the Ancient World [London, 
1971] 3), relying as they did upon the hebdomadic theory which divided 
ages into periods of seven years (cf. Solon fr.27.3ff. W.; [Hipp.] Hebd. 5; 
Arist. Pol. 1336b40ff.; Gel. 3.10). Such age divisions tend however to be 
arbitrary (see T. Hopfner, Das Sexualleben der Griechen und Homer I 
[Prague, 1938] 225-37), and, again, can tell us little about Theages. On the 
other hand, at 122e10 we learn that Theages has finished his "primary" 
education, which implies that he is at least 16, the age at which this 
education was usually completed (see A.D. Booth, Classical Views 4 
[1985] 274-80); and there is circumstantial evidence that he may be closer 
to 18 (see Intr. ch. Ill, b).
c9-d1. €TTL0ii|JL€L .. .(Sp.ev: Editors usually prefer the subjunctive 
eTn0up/Q here (a "normalization" in Urb.80 and [independently] by Bess­
arion in Ven.186), but the indicative (lectio difficilior) is sound. Socrates is 
apprehensive that Theages does in fact (indicative) desire something 
different, and that he and Demodocus may later turn out (subjunctive 
copev) to be ridiculous in consequence of this. For a similar switch from 
indicative to subjunctive, cf. E. Ph. 92ff.; and for jjcrj + indicative cf. Lys.
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216c1, Tht. 145b10-c1; S. El. 581; see Schwyzer-Debrunner H.676; Good­
win MT2 133-4.
d1. clt’ an: For eiTa denoting inconsequentiality, see on 125a4 
erreiTa. aS (reinforced by ctl aTOTrcoTepoL on the same line) refers 
back to 122b6-c4 and the similar provisions and apprehensions there.
d1. aTOTTCBTCpOL: See on 122c2 yc\OLOL ovtcs ; and for cctott- 
os used of misguided dialectical procedure, cf. Chrm. 167c4.
d2. opGoTaTov: As compared with opOdos c5, c7.
d3. 8LaTruv0avo|jL€Vous: Sc. T)pas from the preceding clause; cf.
Crat. 397c4-6.
d3-4. oti Kat ccttlv: "What exactly it is that he desires." Kat 
stresses that the information desired is supplementary to what has already 
been investigated and determined, but this adverbial usage merges with 
the emphatic use of Kai (examples in Denniston, GF2 313).
d5. KlvSuvcucl... XeyeLs: As Demodocus’ original desire was 
merely to take counsel with Socrates (121a1-3, 122a6-b1), Socrates' sug­
gestion now to turn his attention exclusively to Theages elicits a slightly 
more hesitant acceptance (cf. youv) from Demodocus than he offered at 
c5-6.
d6-7. Elttc .. .Trpocrayopeija)p.ev: For Socrates’ not knowing the 
name of a young interlocutor, cf. Lys. 204e1ff., Tht. 144c8.
d6. tl ... veavto’KCQ: The passage has been variously emended 
(see app. crit.), and Heidel (55) considers the phraseology an example of 
"affected style." Fritzsche (ad loc.) was clearly thinking along correct lines 
when he characterized d7-e1 generally as "lusus ex more Platonis," but he 
should have been more precise. We often find Socrates commenting 
upon, or taking a keen interest in the beauty of his young interlocutors (e.g.
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Chrm. 155c7ff., Lys. 206e9ff., Ale. /104a4ff., Smp. 213c6ff.), and, while 
KaXov here modifies ovopa, the adjective must be prompted by Theages' 
appearance (cf. the use of kccXcos in Ale. 1108c6-7). The underlying pro­
cess of thought for Socrates is "Theages is KaXos; his name must there­
fore be KaXov" (for the Greek belief that names reflect the circumstances, 
personality, or particular characteristics of an individual, see R. Hirzel, "Der 
Name", Abhandlungen der Sachsischen Akademie 36.2 [1918-21]). That 
this hypallage carries with it an air of mock-solemnity is suggested by 
Socrates’ imminent play on Theages’ name in et (see n. ad loc.). More­
over, Socrates' response in d10 (KaXov ye) to Demodocus' answer (d9) 
to the present question is a confirmation of the initial use of KaXov ("yes it 
is a fine name you have given your son").
d7. TTpoo‘ayopeiJ(n|iev: Richards, commenting that only Socrates, 
Demodocus, and Theages are present, suggested the singular tt poo- 
ay opeuaj. But Plato sometimes uses the plural of a single person, cf. 
Euthphr. 12e2-4, Men. 75b8, Clit. 408d2, Tht. 161 e5; see KG l.83f.; Schwy­
zer-Debrunner II.243. In 130e5 Socrates says q qpeTepa cruvouoria, 
which cannot include Theages or anyone else, since the statement is not 
prospective (n.b. eo’TLV e5). Socrates' occasional use of the plural to im­
plicate another speaker in his own conclusions (e.g. La. 196c10-d1) is 
rather different (see Jowett-Campbell 195; L. Reinhard Die Anakolouthe 
139 and n.1). The use of the plural pro singular goes back to Homer (see 
P. Chantraine, Grammaire Homerique //[Paris, 1963] 33-4).
Another objection to Trpocrayopeijajpev, first voiced by Schleier­
macher (349), has been directed against its application here to a personal 
name. Strictly speaking, TrpoaayopeijeLV can be used in calling some­
one paoiXeus, taTpos, KupepvqTqs, etc., or KaXos, crowds, etc., but
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never in Plato is it used to identify a person by a proper name, for which 
purpose ovo|jLCx£eiP or kclXciv would normally be expected. But this ob­
jection is only superficially valid, since the appearance of Trpocrayop- 
eueiv actually provides the key to Socrates’ intentions. The point of d6-e1 
is that Theages' name is a sign of the essence of the person, and is con­
sequently more than simply a proper name; it designates an attribute of 
him, much like adjectives such as KaXog, etc. (see on e1 tepOTTpeTres).
d9. KaXov ye: ye is exclamatory (see Denniston, GF2 127), and 
probably slightly frivolous in tone (for KaXov ye used in this way, cf. Hp. 
ma. 282e9, and Denn. GP2 128). The pun at the end of the sentence 
would seem to articulate this tone further.
e1. iepoTTpeTres: The only instance of the word in the Corpus, but 
obviously called into use here solely for a pun on Theages’ name. It is not 
a coinage, however, since it occurs already in X. Smp. 8.40. LepOTTpeTres 
literally = "holy-seeming"; Oeayris = either "god-leading,” from the 
components 8eos and ayeiv/r|yeio-©ai (see E. Fraenkel, RE 32.1620, 
1621; slightly differently Muller [466] "ov 0eds ayei"); or "god-revering," 
from 8eos and ayos/a£o|aai (see Fritzsche ad loc.-, cf. Hsch. s.v. Qea~ 
yfjs, where the word is glossed 0€oae|3r)S).
There are of course abundant instances in Plato of word-play in 
general (e.g. Crat. pass.’, see also D. Tarrant, CQ 40 [1946] 109-17, id. CQ 
52 [1958] 158-60); for some examples of a play on a personal name, cf. 
Crat. 398d2ff., 394c2ff., Smp. 174b4, 185c4, Ap. 25c1-4, Phd. 94a4-5. 
Plato shows an interest in etymology for its own sake (see R.K. Sprague, 
Plato’s Use of Fallacy [London, 1962] 61 n.3).
122e1-123b3. Socrates now draws Theages into the conversation and 
probes him playfully. Theages wishes to become crowds (e1-2); he
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agrees that the cjo^ol are identical with ol eTTiaTfjpoves (e5-7); since 
he has been educated he too is CTTicrTfjpcjov (e8-12; and by implication 
already crowds). But there is still some emaTrjpri which he lacks, and of 
which his father is quite aware, despite the reticence of the latter. Socrates 
asks that Theages tell him what this erricrTripi) is.
The introduction of a new interlocutor is an obvious method of 
formally marking the commencement of a new section (see G. Billings, The 
Art of Transition in Plato [Chicago, 1920] 16). Within the first sentence of 
this section Socrates frames a question which establishes the priority of 
issues for his subsequent interrogation, viz., that Theages wishes to be­
come crowds (which leads naturally to the question of the kind of cro<|>ia 
Theages desires), and that he wants to secure a teacher who will help him 
to achieve his goal. Socrates’ questioning in 122e1-123b3 is of the overtly 
sportive kind that we frequently encounter in the preliminary discussion of 
a dialogue, e.g. Lys. 204b1-205d4, Euthd. 273c1-274a9, Hp. ma. 281 b5ff., 
Menex. 234c1-235c5, Men. 70a5ff., Phdr. 227b9-228c5; but its purpose is 
much more fundamental than this, see Intr. ch. I, b, iii.
e2. a otj is unusual, both because of its position and because the 
dative would be expected. But crou is lectio difficilior, and Fritzsche com­
pares Men. 94d7, Amat. 138e6.
e2-3. egeupeiv.. .7010x5x011: The sentence stumbles somewhat 
at this point; e^cvpeiv ocvSpcc Tiva toiovtov ktX. would certainly 
run more smoothly. But ouvoicria + objective genitive is common (cf. Prt. 
318b6, Ale. 1119a2-3, Smp. 219d8), and owovoia possesses a thematic 
importance for the dialogue (see Intr. ch. I, b, vii; c).
e5-6. Zo^oxjs. . .toxjs px]: For the identification of oo<j>ia/ao<j>6s 
with eTriaTrjp'q/e'n'io'TTjptnv, cf. Ap. 22d2, La. 194d8-195a1, Euthd. 276
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a8-b1,281 b1-6, Tht. 145e3-6, R. 350b3; also X. Mem. 4.6.7; E. Supp. 842­
3; see B. Snell, Die Ausdrucke fur den Begriffdes Wissens in der Vorplat­
onischen Philosophie (Berlin, 1924) 86ff.; J. Lyons, Structural Semantics 
(Oxford, 1963) 96, 227-8.
e5-6. Trepi.. .cucriv: Socrates adds this qualification concerning 
the limits of knowledge of one who is CTriCTTrjiJLtDV because he is about to 
cite the special, limited areas in which Theages himself might be con­
sidered €TTLO'T'q|Jlcov (e8-11). The formula "one is crowds in that at which 
one is eiTicrTfjiJLCOV" (sc. "and d|j.oc0fjs in that at which one is avem— 
cttt^cdv") is recited in similar terms by Nicias in La. 194c8ff. as something 
he has "often heard Socrates say"; cf. also Ale. 1125a1ff.: each person is 
ayaQos in that at which he is 4>povipos (and Trovrjpds in that at which 
he is a<j>pu)v); and this leads (as in our dialogue) to a discussion of the 
special quality that marks out the possessor of the tcxvti of politics.
e8. ouk e8i8d£aTO.. .Kai, euaiSeucrev: Cobet proposed to 
delete Kai CTraiSeucrev, "namque eSiSa^aTo est per alios docuit, 
CTraiSeuaev docuit ipse. Sed neque ypdp.pa.Ta neque Ki0api£eiv 
neque TraXaieiv filius a patre docebatur." But Riddell (§87) and Thomp­
son (ad Men. 93d2) demonstrated long ago that the meaning "to get a thing 
done by another" does not belong to the middle voice qua middle; the 
active can express the meaning just as readily. Hence euaiSeuaev = 
"had you educated."
e9. TTCTrai 8eu v Tai BTW, TTaiSeuovTai Par.1811 (whence Aid. 
Steph.) 1812 Vat.1030. The latter reading looks like a scribal emendation 
rather than a simple misreading, but TreTraiSeuvTai is sound, since it can 
be taken as a gnomic perfect, see Goodwin MT2 53-4; Gildersleeve 1.111; 
Jowett-Campbell 173-4. Cf. Stallbaum ad loc.’. "Semper et instituti sunt et
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instituuntur, i.e. instituti solent." On the other hand, Socrates may be 
referring specifically to Theages' peers (ot •qXiKicoTOi 121 d1) who have 
been educated contemporaneously with him.
e9-10. t(Bv KaXcnv Kayaecnv iTaTCpcnv: On Socrates'employ­
ment of this expression, see Intr. ch. I, b, iii. ot KaXoi, KayaQoi is used 
initially in the fifth-century as an expression denoting not only someone 
whose actions are morally praiseworthy (cf. Grg. 474c9-d2), but who is also 
of a certain social class and behaves in a way that befits his position (for its 
use in connection with wrestling and music, cf. Ar. Ra. 727-9). For dis­
cussions of the phrase, see H. Wankel, KALOS KAi AGATHOS (Diss. War­
burg, 1961) 77-83; KJ. Dover, GPM 41-5; A.W. Gomme, CQ47 (1953) 65­
8; G.E.M. de Ste Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (London, 
1972) 358-9, 371-6; see also n. on 127a3.
e10. ypappaTa tc Kat Kieapi£eiv Kat TraXaiciv: The 
traditional components of an Athenian "primary" education, undertaken up 
until the age of about 16 (see n. on c8-9); cf. Chrm. 159c3-d2, Prt. 312b1-2, 
325d7-326c3, Aic. 1106e6, 118c8-d4, Men. 94b5; X. Mem. 4.2.6; Ar. Ra. 
727-9, Nu. 964, 973. The three subjects were taught in succesive stages, 
not concurrently (see A.D. Booth, Classical Views 4 [1985] 274-80). Pavlu 
(26) claims that our passage derives directly from Ale. 1106e6, but since 
the educational components catalogued here represent standard practice 
(especially as depicted by Plato), this possibility can only be considered if 
we look beyond the mere similarity of wording (see Intr. ch. I, b, iii}.
e11.TT|V aXXr|V aytnviav: Cf. Ale. //145c10 tt]s aXXrjs ayco- 
vias, Grg. 456d1, R. 618a8-b1.
123a1. eXXeiTreiv: eXXiTreiv (B) is possible, but the durative
(BCTW) is clearly superior.
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a2. e'm|JL€Xr|0'nvai echoes Demodocus' words in 121d4; cf. 121b7
0€paiT€La.
a5-8. Of8ev... crucrTT] crai: This passage has caused needless 
difficulty among some commentators, who have addressed themselves to 
two problems: 1) to what does the pronoun TauTa (a6) refer; 2) where in 
the dialogue has Demodocus feigned ignorance (a6-7 gjs 8f) ouk cl8d)s 
oS eyco eTriSupuj). As for 1), Knebel recognized (ad loc.; he was followed 
by Stallbaum ad loc.) that tccutcc must refer back to 122d5, where 
Demodocus assents to Socrates’ condition that they should first investigate 
exactly what Theages desires. Theages now maintains that there is no 
need to do this, since Demodocus knows what he wants. Schleiermacher 
(349) framed 2) as an objection to an apparent structural discontinuity: how 
can Theages imply that Demodocus has anywhere demonstrated anything 
but an understanding of his aspirations ("...dieser sich gar nicht so geauss- 
ert hat, als wisse er nicht was sein Sohn wolle, sondern vielmehr erscheint 
ihm das Weisewerdenwollen als etwas ganz bekanntes und eindeutig- 
es")? This latter criticism results from a failure to appreciate the per­
spective of a5-8, for cos 8t) ouk el8cjjs need not imply that Demodocus 
did in fact feign ignorance, but only that Theages here thinks that his father 
is pretending not to know anything about his intentions. In large measure 
Socrates' ensuing discussion with Theages (123b3ff.) forces him to recog­
nize his father's prudence, and to realize how unclear he himself is about 
what he desires. In effect Theages will be made to recognize the difficul­
ties which Demodocus probably already perceives (see Intr. ch. I, b, iii). 
Hence Theages' remark need hardly be accepted as a true description of 
actual circumstances and of Demodocus' state of mind. Stallbaum's solu­
tion (ad loc.) to the second problem (121 a1 -122d4 were spoken privately
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between only Socrates and Demodocus, which thus accounts for a6-7 
(jjs ... CTThOupiaj) is fanciful and ought to be rejected utterly.
a6. (ns St|: Ironical, cf. Lat. quasi vero (see Jowett-Campbell 205-6; 
Denniston, GF2 230).
a7. TOiauTCt yap CTCpa Kai W, ctl Kai CTCpa Kat T, ctl 
Kat B. W’s text was virtually unknown to nineteenth-century editors, who 
unanimously subscribed to the reading of T. But T here likely represents a 
conflation of the B and W readings. I have little doubt that W preserves the 
true reading (so Burnet, and all editors since); for the independent use of 
tolccutcc CTCpa (internal accusative with ptaxeTai; Knebel [ad loc.] 
however understands Xcycov with the phrase), cf. Prt. 326a4 CTCpa
ToiauTa.
a8. jjidxcTaC tc Kat otjk cOcXcl: It is tempting to take these 
words as a hendiadys ("he obstinately refuses"), but Trpos epic (a7), 
belonging with poxxeTai, mark pax^Tai as a distinct and independent 
component within the sentence. For the figurative application of piaxcTai 
to verbal disagreements, cf. Amat. 134b7; also avTipoXovqs Eryx.39Qe7.
a8. tc Kat: Probably explanatory, cf. tc. . .Kat in 125a5; see Ver­
denius, Mnem. 4.8 (1955) 275; id., Mnem. 4.9 (1956) 252; Gonda, Mnem.
4.7 (1954) 199.
a8. a-uo-T-qaaL: Seeon122a6.
a9-b1. Ta jjlc v.. .T] v.. . pT|0cvTa.. . Xcyopicva: The peri­
phrastic ‘Fjv.. .piqecvTa deliberately balances Xcyopcva (rather than 
cppfj0Ti... Xcydpicva); the aorist aspect establishes the fact of the action 
without specification, while the present describes the circumstances under 
which the repeated action took place (i.e. avcu papTbpcuv); see W.J. 
Aerts, Periphrastica (Amsterdam, 1965) 30-1. The periphrastic construe-
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tion is also used to lay emphasis on a part of the sentence other than the 
verb (see Gonda, Mnem. 4.12 [1958] 97-9); here the simile tncrrrep avev 
papTUpcov is conspicuous: hence (somewhat literally) "It was without 
witnesses, as it were, that what was spoken earlier to him was being 
uttered." Generally speaking, the periphrastic construction (cf. 128d2-3) is 
a feature of Plato’s later style (see Jowett-Campbell 53; Thesleff 84).
b1. (ncmep aveu papTUptnv: The simile seems to suggest legal 
processes; this impression is supported by b2 evavTiov epou KctTeiiTe 
(see n. ad loc.). Such a simile may have been suggested to Socrates by 
Theages' Trpos epe paxoTai a7-8 (see on a8).
b1-2. vuvi... papTupa: Socrates assumes the role of witness also 
in Grg. 472c1, and there is a latent irony in this. For it implies that, ignorant 
as he is, he has nothing to contribute to the proceedings; yet in what 
follows Socrates obviously behaves as anything but simply pctpTUS (see 
lntr, ch. Ill, a). Usually Socrates furnishes someone or something else as a 
witness to what he says, e.g. Ap. 20e6-8, Grg. 472b6, Lys. 215c7, Smp. 
215 b7.
b2. evavTiov epou Karane: The language continues the sim­
ile begun by papTupoc (b1): for evavTiov of papTUpes speaking before 
a jury, cf. Lg. 953e6; D. 27.18, 41,30.19, 24, 27 (etsaep.y Isocr. 17.23; Lys. 
17.2; Ar. Ec. 448. KO/reiTreiv occurs only seven times in the Corpus, and 
only here does it stand simply as a strengthened form of etTreiv ("reveal"), 
the meaning "denounce" being present in every other Platonic instance. 
This meaning of KdTeiTreiv is not exceptional elsewhere (cf. MacDowell 
ac/Ar. Vesp. 54: "...a usual compound for making public some information 
which has previously been confined to a privileged few"). But here our 
author was prompted to use it, I think, because of its frequency in forensic
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oratory: Isocrates has KcrreiTreLV in the sense of "reveal" in ali instances 
but one (17.55), Demosthenes once in three occurrences, Lysias four in 
seven. The suspicions of Heidel (56 n.12) and Ritter (94) as regards this 
form are without foundation.
123b3-e17. Socrates begins to question Theages about the precise 
ao<(na that he desires. If Theages wanted to become crowds at the 
cro<|)ia by which one commands ships, the crcxjna would be helmsman- 
ship; if the ao<jna by which one steers chariots, it would be chariot-driving. 
In response to Socrates’ demand for a specific name from Theages, the 
young man falls back upon the vague "cro^La.” Thereupon Socrates lists 
numerous crafts which can all be called cyo^iai, and which all involve 
apX^LV, but which are too imprecise for determining the cro<|)£ct Theages 
is after.
Socrates' first two examples of ao<|)£oc introduce the notion of 
KU|3epvctv (b4, c2), which quickly leads to the identification of with
apX^iv (of which KU|3epvctv is a species, see c2 n.). For the structure of 
the argument in this section, see Intr. ch. I, b, iii.
b3. <j>€pe yap: Rather rare in the Corpus, occurring only six times 
elsewhere; 4>epc Srj is much commoner.
b3-7. ei. .. diTCKpL ven: Double protases (et €Tr€0v|jieis... 
Kai.. .CTuyxocvov avepcoTaoi/’) are quite frequent in Plato (cf. the triple 
protasis in 123c1-4); often they summarize, as here, a hypothetical conver­
sation, e.g. Hp. ma. 289c9-d2, Prt. 311b5-c1, Grg. 453 c5-8, Tht. 147a1-5; 
see Bluck ad Men. 72a7-b2. For the mixed condition (imperfect/aorist), cf. 
126a12-b2.
b3. CTTcGupicis Coisl.155 Flor.b, the simple correction for eTrieup- 
ei$ of BTW, is guaranteed by the parallel imperfect ervyyavov in b4.
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b4. tol TrXoia KupepvaSa'LV: Socrates' reasoning from analogy 
very early in a dialogue is familiar, e.g. Grg. 448b4ff., La. 185c5ff., R. 
335c2ff. For KU|3€pV(BoTV see on b7 KU(3epvr|TLKrjv; and on the use of 
craft-analogy in this part of the dialogue, see Intr. ch. I, b, iii.
b6. cru VLcrTa vat: See on 122a6.
b6. Trap’ (3v av cri, crowds yevoio: For yiyveaeai Trapa + 
genitive cf. Menex. 236e1-3 (yiyvecrOai virtually the passive of ttol~ 
civ, see K.G. 1.99). For the ellipse of the antecedent (here toijtols), cf. 
129c6; also X. Mem. 1.2.6 8ia to avayKarov auTOis* eTvar 8ra~ 
Xoyoaear Trap’(Sv {av} \df3orcv tov (jlkjOov.
b7. tl av poi aTrcKpLVtn: The aorist does not represent a past 
act, but, preserving fully its aspectual force, signifies a potential instan­
taneous and momentary act. This use of the aorist in apodosi, where the 
verb in the protasis is an imperfect denoting a present unreal condition, is 
mainly a Platonic idiom (see Goodwin /V/T2 151; also Schwyzer-Debrun­
ner 11.348). That the aorist in such cases is employed suppositiously must 
be true, but that its reference is to a future act (so Goodwin and Schwyzer- 
Debrunner), is question-begging, since the verb is purely hypothetical.
b7. Tiva auTT)v eivai: Although the abrupt switch to oratio 
obliqua would perhaps not be out of place in a narrative passage, and may 
capture the colloquial flavour of conversation, it nevertheless strikes an 
unusual note in the context of Socratic dialectic (for a similar anacolouthon 
cf. 125d5); for, although the construction is perfectly understandable and 
natural enough, there seem to be few convincing parallels for this peculi­
arity; cf. Lg. 740b6ff., 753b4ff., 890b3ff.; see Reinhard, Die Anakoluthe 
123f. Conversely, extended oratio obiiqua in Plato is frequently broken by 
brief spots of oratio recta (see D. Tarrant, CQ n.s. 5 [1955] 222-4).
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b7. Kupepvr)TiKT] v: A favourite Texvq for Socrates in his ana­
logies, e.g. Euthd. 279e4-6, Ion 537c6-7, Chrm. 173b1, Grg. 511c9ff., R. 
341c9-10, 346a7-8. But the choice of this craft at this point in the dialogue 
seems to have been carefully made, see c2 n., and lntr. ch. I, b, iii.
c1-3. El...epCQTCO vtos: Virtually a triple protasis, cf. Phd. 67e6ff., 
Clit. 408e3-409a1; Goodwin MT2 193-4; KG II.487-8.
c2. Ta appaTa leupcpvaiaTV: This phrase has been criticized as 
paradoxical, since, strictly speaking, we should expect eXauveiv orr^vi— 
ox^Tv in place of K'upepvav, a verb which normally, one would imagine, 
belongs in a sea-faring context (see Schleiermacher 349; Stallbaum ad 
loc.\ Fritzsche ad loc.’, Heidel 55 n.1). Yet, as Fritzsche himself did not fail 
to remark (citing examples), Kupcpvav often occurs in an extended, poet­
ical sense, and to Fritzsche’s list Heidel added examples of a quasi-meta­
phorical use of Kupepvav. In fact, Kvpepvdv in our passage is un­
assailable, for as Taylor pointed out (PMW® 534 n.4), the phrase tcc ap— 
paTa Kvpepvav is closely paralleled in Lg. 640e5ff.
Stallbaum, however, raised a second and more serious objection to 
what he called "haec eiusdem verbi in re dissimili iteratio," i.e., Socrates 
seems deliberately to use KUpepvav consecutively in b4 and c2 despite 
the fact that this involves him in both regular and extended uses of the 
word within a brief interval. But the author’s motives for doing this are 
closely connected with the theme and structure of this part of the dialogue: 
since Socrates will proceed to equate cro<jna with apx^iv in its political 
sense (e.g. 124a3-4), and since this accords with Theages’ ultimate goal, it 
is probably correct to detect behind the preoccupation here with the use of 
KUpepvav a veiled allusion to the metaphor of the ship of state; that 
Socrates had a predilection for calling politics T) tcov avepcoTrcov Kupep-
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vtitikt) is asserted confidently by the author of Clit. (408b3-4), and Plato 
frequently compares politics to helmsmanship, or the politician to a helms­
man, e.g. Pit. 272e3f., 297e8-12; see P. Louis, Les metaphores de Platon 
[Paris, 1945] 155f.; the metaphor is traditional, see K.M. Kaiser, Das Bild 
des Steuermannes in der antiken Literatur (Erlangen, 1954). On this 
passage see Intr. ch I, b, iii.
c2. cTt’ preceded by a participle (eTTijjlgj v) and followed by a finite 
verb (epie(jl<J>ou) is colloquial; see Stevens 47; KG II.83; Dodds ad Grg. 
457b5.
c3. ccTreKpivo): See on b7 above.
c4. qvioxiKfjv: Another common craft in Socratic analogies, cf. Ion 
538b5, Grg. 516e3f.
c5. Nai: Plato seldom allows a character to answer in successive re­
plies with the same word or phrase, as our author permits Theages here 
(Nai b9); so also d7 and d10 (Nat), 124a9 and b4 (Nocl), 125c11 and d2 
(Nat). See Thesleff 38 ("...somewhat more examples of this in the earliest 
dialogues than later [e.g. ion 537c-e, 538b, Hipp. mi. 373d, 374d, 375c]").
c6. THs 8c 8r|.. .CTrL0ii|jLtDv: Cf. d15 THs 8c 8r| cttj CTrieup- 
cis. 8e 8q is regularly used by Plato when he arrives at the application of 
a line of argument or series of examples, cf. 126c3, Ion 538b7, Prt. 311 d1, 
Grg. 475a8, 485d1, Men. 78d1; see Denniston, GP2 259; Adam ad R. 378 
a1.
c6-7. TroTepov.. .ozvop.a: Elsewhere Plato's Socrates states delib­
erately that he is less concerned with the name of a ao<jna, Tcx^fj, or 
CTriaTrjpq, than he is with its effects or efficacy, cf. R. 533d4-e2; also Lg. 
864a8-b2; see Bluck ad Men. 75e1; Burnet ad Phd. 64c2. But, despite the 
initial emphasis here (see on 8c 8q c6 and C9-10 n.), it will emerge, as
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Socrates moves onto the question of T€xvT» that the name of the crocjua 
only represents a starting point; see Intr. ch. I, b, iii..
c9-10. pL€V...ou pievTOL: As a substitute for ou Se, ou irevTOL 
lays all the stress of the sentence on to ouojjia c9-10 (see Denniston, 
GP2 369-70; Riddell §162); see on c6-7.
c12. tl ofJv ecrTLV; clttc: An imperative form of Xeyco, as a self- 
contained sentence following a direct question, and as a character’s final 
statement, is no doubt colloquial, and probably signifies impatience, cf. Ar. 
Nu. 200, Eq. 131; it also appears now and then in the earlier works of 
Plato, e.g. Grg. 470a4, Men. 74a1, Chrm. 165e2, Prt. 353a6, 357c8-d1.
d1-2. Tl .. .cro<j>Lav: This inept reply to Socrates' question prepares 
us for the extensive process of induction which follows, as Socrates un­
doubtedly feels that his method of argument should be as explicit as possi­
ble for Theages (see Intr. ch. I, b, iii). Though the fullness of this list of 
Tex120^ can be roughly paralleled in other, indisputably genuine, works of 
Plato (e.g. Grg. 449c9ff., R. 332c5-333d8), such lengthy instances of in­
duction are uncommon (see Robinson, PED2 33-4), and Schleiermacher 
(173) objected to the sheer length and tedium of this process as a marker 
of un-Platonic style. In response, Grote (432 n. e), comparing Pit. 285c8- 
286c3, where Plato defends the use of long passages involving collection 
and division in Sph. and Pit. (e.g. Sph. 218eff., 261 bff., Pit. 258dff., 279bff.) 
as being propaedeutic to the investigation of more crucial issues, main­
tained that d3-124e10 (esp. d3-124b9) possess pedagogical value. Need­
less to say, a debate of this kind will never admit of an answer which is 
satisfying to all sides. It is, however, of greater significance that in Ale. I 
125b9-d3 not only are a number of the same T^xvai listed as appear at 
this stage of Thg., but their order of presentation is very similar, and they
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are used (as here) to arrive at a conclusion about the ttoAltikt^ tcx^T- 
Thus in Ale. I we encounter the catalogue lttttcov (b10)...KOcpvoPTcnv 
(b14).. .TrXeovTcov (b16)...0epL£dvTcnv(b18)...xopoSiScxc7KO'A'iK^ (d3); 
while in Thg. there are (in addition to some other items) ittitcov 
(123d8)...K0C(JLvdvTQJv (e3)...Tr\OLcov (d13)...0cpiCovTCOV (124a6, occur­
ring in analogies only here and in the Ale. I passage cited above)... 
pouoTKrj (123e10). Although the evidence that the author of Thg. here 
drew his material from Ale. I is not secure, as has been held (Pavlu 29-31; 
Heidel 55 n.8; Brunnecke 102-3; Souilhe 140 n.1; Kruger 30-1) - Plato, as 
well as other Socratic writers, persistently recur to the same crafts for their 
analogies (but 0cpi£o vtcov above seems an important exception) - 
nevertheless it is hard to resist the conclusion that the two passages are 
related. This seems, in other words, one more place in which a connection 
can be drawn between Thg. and an A/c/6/actes-dialogue; see also lntr. ch. 
I, b, Hi, v, vi, vii', c; ch. II, c. Pangle's attempts (155f.) to detect special 
motives behind Socrates' particular choice of crafts in these examples is 
unconvincing.
d1-2. Ti 8c aXXo.. .aXX’ Tp The idiom is very common in Plato 
(cf. 125e6 aXXo ti fj and n.), but the origin of the combination aXX’ fj 
(i.e., whether aXX’ = aXXo or aAAa) is obscure, see Denniston, GP2 26-7; 
Bluck ad Men. 76b7.
d3. f|Vic>X€ia: Socrates returns to his last example (cf. c4). f)vio~ 
Xia (B) is merely an itacism which occurs independently in a couple of 
recentiores as well (Par.1811 Ambros.409), in Aid., and passes through the 
latter into the Vulgate.
d3. cro<|)ia.. . ct|ia0ia: The regular antonyms in Plato (as cjo4>os““ 
apocefjs), e.g. Hp. ma. 296a5-6, Prt. 337a6, Euthd. 275d4.
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d8. tHl tl XP(J^kLeQa: is internal (adverbial) accusative; cf.
Euthd. 292d1 tl xpr|ao[Jieea, 292d5.
d8-9. ouk ... ctpx^LV: Socrates slides easily into the verb of wider 
application; see Intr. ch. I, b, iii.
d10. Nat: See above on c5.
d11. KUpcpvtjtlkt]: Socrates' first example (cf. b7-8). It is described 
as an ocpCTq in Aic. 1125c11, 135a6, a Tex121) 135d12-3, CTTLO'Trjp'q
in Grg. 511c7-d1; cf. X. Mem. 3.3.9.
d14. pcv o$v: Generally taken as assentient when preceded by a 
word repeated from the previous speaker (as here), the usage is appar­
ently confined to Plato; see Denniston, GP2 476; des Places 106 (see also 
addenda Xo GP2 587: "corrective” pcv ofiv, rather than "affirmative").
d15. 8c 8t) ou CTrLOupcLS T| oo<t>La tls ccttlv: For 
the word-order Stallbaum compares Ap. 20e5. On 8c 8q see c6 n.
e3. Mcnv: Rare in early Plato: no occurrences in Chrm., La., Euthphr., 
Cri., Ap., Menex., Grg., once in Ion, twice in Prt., Hp. ma., three times in 
Euthd., Lys., Men.', only here in Thg. ptnv is often said to expect a negative 
answer (e.g. LSJ s.v.), but see Barrett adE. Hipp. 794.
e4. Ou 8f]Ta: Especially common in the early and middle dialogues 
as a formula of response: eight times in Grg., seven in Chrm., eight in all 
the dialogues acknowledged as late (only here in Thg.).
e5. ’IaTpLKT): Another popular craft in Socrates' analogies, cf. Chrm. 
165c8, La. 198d6, Euthd. 291 e5, Grg. 450a1; X. Mem. 3.3.9. The author is 
flexible in his use of the article with the names of TexvaL: in e10, e14, and 
here it is omitted, but present in d3 and d11 (see KG 1.606f.).
e10. Mouqlkt|: Again, frequent in Socratic analogies, e.g. Grg. 449
d3-4, Ft. 333d8, Hp. ma. 295d4.
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e14. ru|JLVao-TlKTi: Cf. Grg. 450a5, Cri. 47a13f.
e16. TTpoOupou clttclv: The phrase also in Ale. /109a5, 126e1.
Trpo©tjjjloxj here = "do your best" (cf. R. 344e7). 
e17. Ta cpTTpodOcv: I.e. 122e-123e.
124a1-e10. Socrates' equation of ao<J)ia with apx^LV has up to this 
point been too wide, for it is still uncertain what the object of apxeLV is to 
be. Theages now offers a solution, tojv cv TT) ttoXcl (124a1). But this 
also turns out to be too ambiguous, and "to rule those in the city" soon 
comes to be identified with Tupavvos eTvai (124e7).
Again, Theages' failure to specify what he desires (see on 123b3~ 
e17) allows Socrates to draw the conclusions he wants. For the reason 
behind Socrates' obviously ironic tone in this section, see Intr. ch. I, b, iii.
al.cp.017c Sokci: ojs epenye Sokci and cpoi/cpoiyc Sokclv 
are apparently more frequent in parenthesi than epoLyc Sokci; see 
Adam ad R. 332e5 and the passages cited there.
a2. ouko*0v... oi KapvovTCs: Cf. 123e3.
a3-4. Nau. .cv tt) ttoXcl: Although Theages seems here to be
giving Socrates the information required of him, the further distortion of his 
intentions which Socrates subsequently manufactures results from Thea­
ges' failure to specify the manner in which he is determined to rule (this is 
postponed until 126a7-8).
a5-8. *Apd.. . apxopev: Strictly speaking, this analogy, and the 
one that follows in b1-3, seem vitiated by the equation of the craft (ye~ 
cjpyLK'Tj and tcktovlkv)) with the ability to supervise or order those who 
carry its various tasks out, rather than with the ability to do the work oneself. 
But Socrates is induced to form these analogies because he is thinking in 
terms of the tto\ltlkt| Texvq, which is concerned with the mastery over
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others (see lntr. ch. I, b, iii). Moreover, the force of his argument is 
probably, at least in part, ad hominem'. Theages' father, a prominent citizen 
in his deme, and so perhaps a wealthy farmer in his own right (see lntr. ch 
III, c), may well see yeujpyLKrj (and consequently other occupations, such 
as tcktovlkt)) in the light of someone who encounters little of the manual 
side of the operations, but nevertheless still considers himself to be a 
yecopyos. Yet this reasoning is not un-Platonic, for in Pit. 259e1ff. the 
supervisor of manual workers is held to be no less a craftsmen (again, by 
reference to the ttoXltlkt) T€XVT|; the example used is that of the master 
builder, apXLTeKTcov); cf. also Amat. 135b1-7, where it is said to befit the 
freeman, who is experienced in all, or as many as possible, TexV0CL> to
. CZ / >/ \ c/ /
learn oca cruvccrccos ex€T(XL> P3 0(ja X€LpoupyLocg.
a5. '’‘Apa ye is more animated than 5pa simpiiciter (see Denniston,
GP2 50), and likely colloquial (see Stevens 44).
a5. Texvqv: The tacit substitution now of 'reyyx] for cto^lcc con­
solidates Socrates’ application of craft analogy to the notion of ruling men, 
an analogy which is broadened in 125a4, where Socrates remarks that 
Demodocus could have made Theages a Sr^pLOUpyov.. . Tfjs aortas 
fjs eTTLOupeL; on this use of the craft analogy, see lntr. ch. I, b, iii, iv.
a6. 0epi£dvTU)v: For the use in analogy, see above on 123d1-2. 
a6. Tpuytn vtojv: The compendium tcBv (s./.) which Tcsupplies is
no improvement. Plato often varies his use of the article in enumerations 
(see Riddell §237; KG 1.611-12), and the article appears but twice in the 
catalogue tc3v OepLCovrav... aXocovtqjv (a6-7) in order to delimit two 
separate processes, a) tujv QepLCovTtDV.. .Tpuycni/Tcnv, b) w <|>ut— 
cuovtojv Kai orreLpovTCDP KaL aXocni/Tcov (for this use of the article 
see Gildersleeve II.277).
338
a7. aXoojVTCDV: The overwhelming mass of evidence from all per­
iods is in favour of keeping the spiritus levis of TW, and this I have done 
(there are no other examples of the word in Plato). B alone preserves the 
spiritus asper, which most modern editors (except Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, 
Knebel, Carugno) have printed; and although a few arguments for its 
retention may be produced (as a calligraphic ms. B might be expected to 
reproduce correctly just this sort of detail; the cognate noun a\(Ss always 
displays the rough breathing; the tendency from the 3rd century B.C. for­
ward towards psilosis [see LR. Palmer,The Greek Language (London, 
1980) 179] could explain the predominance of the spiritus levis in the 
transmission of this word [see LSJ s.v.]; and the aspirated form of the word 
occurs also in X. Oec. 18.3) are not compelling.
a8. picv (as also pcv in b3) is answered by ocW’ b5; cf. 125e8-126a3, 
with n.
a8. ycojpyiK'q: In Socratic analogies (also yctopyLa), cf. Grg. 490 
e5ff., Ap. 20a7ff., La. 198e1-2, R. 333a2, Phdr. 276c3-5; X. Mem. 3.3.9.
b1-3. oil8c.. .oil: Resumption of ou is not uncommon, e.g. R. 426b8- 
9, Euthphr. 4d5-9; Hom. Od. 3.27-8; Ar. Lys. 61-3; S. Trach. 1014, Ant. 5-6; 
see KG II.205-6; Wackernagel IL302.
b1. Ou8c yc is occasionally used in Plato (and elsewhere) to point a 
climax or, as here, an elaboration of some kind, after a preceding negative 
clause or statement, e.g. R. 499b2, 608b5ff.,Chrm. 163b3, Ion 537c8, Grg. 
456d5; Aeschin. 3.78; X. HG 2.3.42; Dem. 19.184 (only partially treated by 
Denniston, GP2 156).
b1. Trpi£dVT(DV: Kruger (13) quotes EM 688: lcttcov otl ol 
’Ae^VOCLOL OU XcyOUOL TTpLCOTOCL, aXXOC X^pLS TOU Z TTpLCTOCL; 
LSJ s.v. give D.S. 4.76 as the earliest other occurrence (but cf. also 3.27,
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19.58); and Cobet accordingly emended to TrpidvTOJV. In fact, the word 
appears (apart from in Thg.) two and a half centuries or more earlier than 
has been stated, namely in Theophrastus, HP 5.5.6; and, although Trpi£oj 
is never employed with regularity (cf. Clem.AI. Strom. 6.16.148, Phlp. in GC 
14, 2.30, Gal. de Comp. 12.848, Alex.Aphr. Pr. 37), there can hardly be any 
question that it is in place here (there is no other incidence of the simplex 
TTpLCoj/TTpLco in the Corpus; 8iaTreTrpia|jevoi Smp. 196a3 is no proof 
one way or the other). Of course, a non-Attic form could betray the hand of 
a foreign member of the Academy (see Taylor, PMW$ 529); but foreign 
writers are not the only ones to admit non-Attic items.
b3. yap ou: Schanz's deletion of ou is arbitrary, having the sole ad­
vantage of making the resultant sentence conform exactly with a8 
auTT).. .y ecopy ikt). But here auTT).. .tektovikti is a nonne question, 
an effect which f) yap; likewise achieves in a8.
b4. Nat: Seeon123b9.
b5-8. ’AXX’.. . acxjuav: The skill which Socrates here describes, 
and which Theages agrees to be the cro<j>ia he desires, is one to which 
several young men in Plato's dialogues aspire (as did Plato himself, 
according to Ep. 7.324b8ff.), and many sophists of course claimed to teach 
it; cf. Men. 73c9 (apyciv oTov t’ eTvai tqjv avepcoTrojv [cf. 91a2-4]; 
this statement by Meno is accepted by Socrates [c6-8] as a regurgitation of 
Gorgias’ position on ap€Trj, even though Gorgias apparently denied [cf. 
95c1-4] that he could teach virtue), Prt. 319a1-2, Grg. 452d5-8, 466b4-5, R 
344a1, Menex. 234a6-b1, Ale. 1124eff.; for extreme forms of the desire cf. 
Grg. 491a5ff., R. 338c1-2; also X. Mem. 4.2.11 (Euthydemus has been 
trained by sophists, 4.2.1); Isocr. 15.285; Ar. Ach. 595ff. (Dicaeopolis mocks
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the eagerness for office); see further lntr. ch. I, b, iii. For the historical 
evidence about Theages, see lntr. ch. I, c.
b5-7. lctcds. . .Lcrcng: A similar resumption of the adverb in Phd. 
62a2-5, Grg. 455c6-8 (where W.C. Helmbold [Mnem. 4.5 (1952) 226] sug­
gests deletion of either loins). The effect here is slightly rhetorical (the 
anaphora of loins marks a climax), and at the same time ironical: Socra­
tes has uncovered a great secret.
cl-e7. "Exeis.. . eTvai: Socrates' ironical equation of apyeiv 
with TUpayveiv (e5-7) serves the ostensible purpose of humbling Thea­
ges and placing him unequivocally into the position of learner (cf. the 
preliminary conversation in Lys. 21 Oeff.). But this distortion, and the ambi­
guous inadequacy in the use of apx€tv which the distortion points out, 
have definite thematic value in Thg.‘, see lntr. ch. I, b, iii.
c1-e3. ,zExei'S- • .dpx*nv: There can be no real question here of 
"cheap erudition" (Heidel's criticism, 56 n.11), when the topics of dis­
cussion should be common knowledge to any educated Athenian. No 
more an attempt at learned display emerges here than in, e.g., Plato's 
frequent quotations of Homer, Pindar, tragedy, etc. Socrates is perhaps 
adapting the discussion to suit a young man who has just completed his 
formal education (cf. 122e8-11), and who will quite gladly display his 
knowledge about the questions he is here asked. Thus Socrates begins 
from a literary base in the examples that follow, advancing through legend 
(Aegisthus, Peleus), to the more recent romantic past (Periander), to a 
contemporary foreign despot (Archelaus), and finally to one of the more 
famous rulers in Athenian history (Hippias).
c1-2. At/yio-eos 6 ’AyajjLep.vova aTTOKTeivas: The slayer 
of Agamemnon is variously said to be Aegisthus (initially in Hom. Od.
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1.35ff., cf. 4.514-37), Clytemnestra (first, apparently, in Stesichorus' Orest- 
eia, see Jebb's ed. of S. El. [Cambridge, 1894] xiv-xix; she alone performs 
the deed in A. Ag.), and both Aegisthus and Clytemnestra together (as 
early as the epic cycle, see OCT Homer 5.109) The author's choice 
between the different accounts was probably dictated simply by the need to 
present Theages with an example of the actions of a male ruler.
c2. cv vApycL: As Homer consistently places the home of Aga­
memnon in Mycenae (//. 4.376ff., 9.43f., 7.180, 11.46, Od. 3.305), while 
Aeschylus is the first to adopt Argos as the location of his palace (Ag. 24), 
our author may be drawing directly upon the tradition represented in 
Aeschylus' play (but see C.P. Bill, TAPA 61 [1930] 111-29, who contends 
that Argos in the tragedians denotes only the country in which Mycenae 
was located, and never the city itself).
c2. Spa: Postponement of interrogative Spa is common in Plato, but 
rare in all other prose authors (see Denniston, GP2 49-50); emphasis is 
thrown onto the words which precede the particle. On Spa introducing an 
indirect question, see Denniston, ib. 50.
c6. tl 8c 87]; BW, tl Sal Sq; BCT (Bekker is alone in printing the 
latter). The colloquial form 8a£ (see Denniston, GP2 262-4; LSJ s.v.) was 
universally rejected by Burnet, and few modern editors are prepared to 
accept it into their texts (DeVries [ad Phdr. 227b9] is an exception). Since it 
is colloquial, it may be best to consider keeping it (if it is to be retained at 
all) only where a degree of surprise is expressed (see KG 11.134; but 8c 
can perform the same function, see Denniston, ib. 259). Here tl 8c Srj; is 
clearly transitional, and should be printed (for tl Sal 8rj; elsewhere in 
Plato, see Denniston, Ib. 264; Bluck ad Men. 71c4). In Thg., 8a£ never 
occurs as the sole reading of mss., appearing always as a variant of 8c
342
(124d2, 125c7, 125e5, 126a2, 126a5, 126b8, 130b6), and for the most part 
it will be passed over in silence (but see on 126a5). tl 8c 8t); is tolerably 
common as a transitional formula (27 occurrences in the Corpus), but rare 
in earlier works (never in Euthphr., La., Lys., Chrm., once in each of Ap., 
Cri., Prt., Grg.), though gaining somewhat in frequency thereafter (R. five 
times, Prm. four, Sph. three).
c6. rrqAeus 6 AiaKoO: Peleus comes as something of a surprise 
in this catalogue of destructive tyrants: in R. 391 c2 he is called otn^pov— 
ecrTaTOS (cf. Ar. Nu. 1067: Peleus married Thetis 8ia to oro^povciv; 
cf. Hom. II. 9.432-84, 18.570-6 [Peleus' kindness to Phoenix and Epigeus]). 
Both Sophocles and Euripides composed a Peleus, but only fragments 
remain (see Nauck TGF frr. 447-56, 617-24), and in the absence of a 
comprehensive knowledge of the treatment of Peleus in Attic tragedy, there 
is perhaps no way of determining exactly why he is included in this list (in 
any event, Pelus bears no resemblance to a violent despot in E. Andr., e.g. 
789ff.). References to brutality on the part of Peleus are late, and on a 
domestic subject (the slaying of his brother Phocus: Ov. Met. 11.266ff., 
Paus. 2.29.9, Apollod. 3.12.6-7; D.S. 4.72.6).
c9. ncpiav8pov 8c tov Kut|rcXou: Though Peleus appeared 
to be an anomaly within this list of tyrants, the same cannot be said of 
Periander; for Plato's low opinion of Periander cf. R. 336a5; similarly Hdt. 
5.92.3, Arist. Pol. 1313337ff. (cf. 1284^26, 1311 a20), Nic. Dam. FGrHist 
2.A.58-9.
d2. Ti 8c; With all editors except Burnet I prefer to punctuate after 
8c and ctpyciv, thus placing greater emphasis on ’Apx^Xaov tov 
nepSiKKOU, rather than breakup ’Apx^Xaov.. .apx^iv (cf. Tl Sc 8rj; 
c6; Spa c2 and n.; also the emphatic position of ncpiavSpov c9 and
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'Ittttlocv d5); see Adam ad R. 332e3; and for transitional tl 8e; see 
Denniston, GP2-176. But for tl 8e introducing a sentence without a verb, 
see KG 11.518; England ad Lg. 639c1; Dodds ad Grg. 509d7. BTW favour 
Burnet's punctuation, but the mss. are quite unreliable in this respect.
d2. ’ApyeXaov tov riepSiKKOU: Polus (Grg. 470c9-471d2) 
takes Archelaus to be the typical clSlkos ouSaLpcov (a view incidentally 
which most Greeks likely would have shared, cf. Grg. 472a2ff.). What 
Socrates thought of Archelaus, on the other hand, is indicated by his 
discussion with Polus on the subject of eiiSaLpovLa (471d-479e); and 
Socrates declined an invitation to come to Archelaus's court in Macedonia 
(Arist. Rh. 1398a24; D.L. 2.25), though Euripides (Satyr. V7f. Eur. 22ff.; Suda 
s.v. ETJpLTTLSqs), Agathon (Ar. Ra. 83f.; Ael. VH 13.4, cf. 2.21), and Timo- 
theus (Plu. Mor. 177b, 334b) accepted a similar offer. Archelaus died in 
399 at the hands of his own subjects (cf. Ale. II 141d2ff.).
d2. vecJcrTL: I.e. 413 B.C.; for this use of vccjoqtl see lntr. ch. V, 
Appendix.
d2. toljtov is offered independently by three recentiores (Urb.80 
Ambros.409 Par.1812); BTW have toljtcov, which Stephanus preferred to 
delete (his suggestion was followed by Baiter, Hermann, and Schanz). 
toljtov is clearly superior: the redundancy of the pronoun is only 
apparent (Fritzsche compares oStol in Phd. 69c3-4, see also KG I.628), 
since it is used contemptuously here (see KG 1.629-30; Burnet ad Phd. 
69c4; Dodds ad Grg. 470d5 [toljtov again of Archelaus]); and the corrup­
tion into toljtcov was likely facilitated by the presence of tovtcov in d3.
d5. Tirnrav 8e tov neia’LO’TpaTOLJ: Thucydides makes it 
clear that Hippias' tyranny became oppressive only in its last three years, 
after the assassination of Hipparchus (6.54.5f., 59.2; cf. Hipparch. 229b5-
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7). So also Herodotus (5.62.2) and Aristotle (Ath. 19.1), who are however 
less willing to grant that Hippias’ reign had been wholly beneficent in the 
period preceding Hipparchus’ death (see Dover in Commentary on Thucy­
dides /y [Oxford, 1970] 321).
d8. Bcckls: Philetas ap. 2 ad Ar. Pax 1071 offers the highly conten­
tious piece of information that there were three BccKtSes, a Boeotian, 
Athenian, and Arcadian (cf. Ael. VH 12.35), the most famous of which was 
the Boeotian; the earliest references however mention only one Bcckl? 
(Hdt. 8.20.2, 8.77, 8.96.2, 9.43). Rhode defended the tradition for a 
plurality of BocklScs (Psyche, tr. W.B. Hillis [London, 1925] 314 n.58), but 
Dodds' argument against this position seems to me irrefutable (G. and I. 88 
n.45). Bakis was said to be inspired by the nymphs (Paus. 4.27.4, 10.12. 
11; Ar. Pax 1071), and apparently predicted some important events in the 
Persian wars (cf. Hdt. loco. cit.).
d9. ZipuXXa: The multiplication of Sybils seems to be a later elab­
oration: Heraclitus (DK 22B92), Aristophanes (Pax 1095), and Plato (Phdr. 
244b3) mention only one. Heraclides Ponticus adds a second (fr. 130 
Wehrli), while Philetas (ap. 2 ad Ar. Av. 962) mentions a third; ten Sibyls 
are listed in the sch. vet. ad Phdr. 244b; see further Dodds, G. and I. 88 
n.45.
d9. 6 T||Jic8aTr6s ’Ajjk^lXijtos: Much less is known about this 
figure than the previous two. The words 6 T)p.€8aTros (i.e. Athenian; cf. 
Clem. Al. Strom. 1.132.2) are problematical, since Herodotus (1.62.4) 
speaks of Amphilytus as 6 ’AKoepvdv, prophesying evOeccCcov; yet if Her­
odotus had known that Amphilytus was Athenian, we should certainly have 
expected him to mention what would no doubt have been an important 
detail to him. The most sensible proposal seems to be Stein's (ad Hdt.
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1.62): Peisistratus may have given the Acharnanian citizenship, as the 
Spartans had given full citizenship to the seer Tisamenus (Hdt. 9.33ff.). 
Valcknaer proposed to emend 6 ’AKapvav in Herodotus to 6 ’AKap— 
veus (i.e. an Acharnian, a man from the deme Acharnae). But Stein rightly 
observed (loc. cit.; see also How and Wells ac/Hdt. 1.62.4) that Achar­
nanian seers and sages are often mentioned in literature, e.g. Hdt. 7.221; 
Paus. 9.31.5, 3.13.4.
d10. xPrlo’lJL(pSoL: Nominative despite the accusative emowpiav 
(d8); so also TUpavvoi e4; cf. Ap. 23a3, Lg. 956c1-2, Smp. 205d7-8; see 
KG 1.45. Since the xpTjopxySoi were a familiar group in the late fifth- 
century in Athens (see V. Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophanes 2 [Oxford, 
1951] 260f., and the references collected there), Theages ought to have no 
real difficulty, as Schleiermacher (350) supposed he should, in identifying 
Bakis, Sybil, and Amphilytus as members of this class. But the connection 
between soothsayers and the tyrants listed from c1-d5, other than the fact 
that both groups have an eTTCovufjiia, is not immediately apparent, nor is 
Socrates' motive for introducing the three xp^crpcoSoi into an analogy. 
Perhaps the mention of xpT]<T|jiq)8oi is itself a contribution to the general 
ironic tone in this part of the dialogue (cf. Adeimantus' remarks in R. 
364b5ff.); yet the source of the irony has a specific relevance to the 
structure of the present argument, see Intr. ch. I, b, iii.
e1. touctSc anticipates the subject of the dependent clause (e2 
‘Ittttlocs Kai nepiav8pos) by prolepsis; see Riddell §226; KG ll.577ff.
e1. outgo: Not pointing forward to e2-3 Tiva.. . apXT)V, but rather 
"in the same way" (sc. as you did before [i.e. d10]); see Tucker ad R. 338e.
e2. Tirnras Kai nepiavSpos: Only Hippias and Periander are
repeated from the earlier list of five tyrants, probably for the sake of
economy; but presumably Hippias is included because of his connections 
with Athens.
e3. 8ia Trjv ccuttiv apXT]V: Baiter proposed auTcov pro av~ 
TT|v; Urb.80 reads auTcov, which is likely a scribal conjecture. But the 
evidence of all other witnesses is sound: Socrates is forcing Theages to 
reason inductively by having him give the name which the five rulers have 
by virtue of the similarities in their rule.
e4. TUpavvoi: For the nominative see on d10.
e8. The hesitant <j)aiveTai implies a resignation to the implications
of the discussion (cf. eoiKev e10); for a similar reaction among Socrates' 
younger interlocutors, cf. Chrm. 161 a7ff., Men. 86a2-b5, Euthphr. 15b7-c10 
(see also K. Vretska, WS 71 [1958] 33). The same of course occurs with 
older characters, e.g. Laches in La. 193c9-d10. Some are just as likely to 
display their exaspiration through silence, obstinacy, or departure, e.g. 
Callicles (Grg. 505d8-9), Thrasymachus (R. 349a9ff.), and Anytus (Men. 
94e3ff.); so also the younger Euthyphro (Euthphr. 15e3-4).
e10. ’'EoiKev: Shorey (CP 12 [1917] 201) preferred eoiKCt, "which 
expresses the slightly humorous surprised acceptance of the personal 
application of the argument." But for eoiKev cf. Phd. 89b6, Ion 532b2, Prt. 
313c3-4; see Carugno ad loc.
e10. e£ cov eyco eiTrov: Socrates has in fact done most of the 
speaking (though he offered himself as pocpTUS at the outset [123b1 -2]; 
see lntr. ch. Ill, a), Theages rarely offering more than Nai, ’'Eycoye, ndos 
yap ou;, or the like. Theages is of course not admitting to a desire for 
tyranny, only to the possibility that his words could be interpreted to mean 
this.
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124e11-125b4. Socrates is aghast that Theages should wish to 
become a tyrant. He turns to Demodocus and chastises him for not finding 
a teacher to oblige the boy, and then suggests that they decide to what 
teacher of tyrants they might send Theages. Demodocus agrees to this.
Socrates' words (e11-125b4) can scarcely be interpreted as any­
thing but ironic, but the difficulty in this section lies in the interpretation of 
Demodocus' response. Here too I think the basic tone is that of irony (so 
also Knebel, Stallbaum, and Fritzsche ad loc.): Demodocus, by accepting 
Socrates' proposal, indicates that he is actually enjoying the spectacle 
being acted out before him; and since this is his only speaking part be­
tween 122d9 and 127b2, we have no cause to believe that he objects to 
any aspect of Socrates' conduct. In fact his acceptance of Socrates' pro­
posal can be explained on thematic terms (see Intr. ch. I, b, iv', also ch. Ill, 
c). Schleiermacher (350) curiously interprets Socrates' address to Thea­
ges, on the one hand, as irony, but his recommendations to Demodocus, 
on the other, as serious, and then draws attention to "ein dem Platon nicht 
leicht mdglicher Widerspruch." There is, however, no contradiction in 
Socrates' tones of expression. Janell (428) and Pangle (159) contend that 
Demodocus fails to perceive Socrates' irony.
ell. pxapc: The expression seems to be more strongly abusive 
in comedy than it is in Platonic dialogue; cf. Ar. Ra. 446, Pax 183, Eq. 304,
Nu. 1327; see R. Parker, Miasma (Oxford, 1983) 3-5. Here it is ironic and 
playful, setting the tone for the interlude that follows; cf. Phdr. 236e4, Chrm. 
161b8, 174b11.
e11. apa: Denniston's explanation of apa (GP235: it expresses "the 
surprise attendant upon disillusionment") is only partly right; it can also (as 
here) alert the reader to the fact that the words in question reflect another
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speaker's thoughts (referential, as opposed to inferential, use); see Jowett- 
Campbell 208; KG 11.323-4; des Places 268-72; England ad Lg. 693b2.
©11. TraXai, followed by TraXai a3, is ironic, implying "the two of you 
have let matters get this far?"
125a1-2. cp.€|J.<j)O‘U... TLVOS: Cf. 123b5-6.
a1. otjk ETrepiTrev: The tense signifies Demodocus' repeated re­
fusals (see Gildersleeve 1.95: "The negative imperfect commonly denotes 
resistance to pressure or disappointment").
a1-2. eis SiSacrKdXou TUpavvvo8i8acrKdXoii tlvos: 
Schleiermacher, taking offence at the apparent cumbrousness of 8i8ac>“ 
KaXou TUpavvoSiSacKaXou, excised SiSaaKaXov (Ast proposed the 
same measure; the word is bracketed by Schanz, Burnet, Souilhe), while 
F. Sydenham conjectured SiSacrKaXeiov. But T'upavvoSiSao'KaXo'U 
amplifies SiSaoKaXou in a humorously climactic manner, i.e., "...because 
he didn't send you to a teacher's place - a teacher of tyrants." tlvos at 
the same time apologizes for rupavvoSiSaaKaXou ("as it were," cf. 
Men. 72a7); see Riddell §51; Tucker ad R. 328e. Figurae etymologicae of 
this kind are moreover not uncommon in Greek, see Fraenkel ad A. Ag. 
215ff. Fritzsche (ad loc.) compares A. Ch. 315 TraTep aivoTTaTep; Hom. 
Od. 23.97 (jif)TCp.. .SuapriTep; E. Ph. TroSa oov tu^Xottouv. In our 
passage the expression is highly affected and sarcastic.
I can see no force in Pavlu's argument (21 n.1) that the compound 
word in this passage was merely inspired by yepovToSiSaoKaXos 
(equally sarcastic) in Euthd. 272c5. Besides being perfectly suited to its 
context here, the term TUpavvoSiSaoKaXos is employed by Libanius 
(Deci. 1.60 [Apologia Socratis ]) in his defence of Socrates against the 
charge that he taught Critias to be a tyrant; the word may therefore have
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appeared originally in Polycrates' Kcmniyopia as part of the defamation of 
Socrates himself.
a2. Kat cru: For Kai introducing an indignant (here mock-indignant) 
question, see Denniston, GF2 311-12; KG ll.247f.
a3. iraXat: See on e11 above.
a3-5. eiSths.. .Trep/rreiv: Cf. 123a7-8.
a3. 30i: This poetic substitute for oT is rare in prose, and in the 
Platonic Corpus it occurs only here and in Phd. 108b4 (SQiTrep). As far as 
the latter passage is concerned, the word is appropriate in the elevated 
context of the myth of the Afterlife. In our passage Cobet suggested oT 
(adopted by Fritzsche and Schanz; Bekker ottol comparing 126e6), but 
o0i is lectio difficilior, and the poetic diction would seem to deepen the 
irony developed in the whole of this interlude. The effect is that of mock- 
solemnity.
a4. Sripioupyo v.. . Tf]s aortas: As Socrates had earlier com­
pared the oo<J>La that Theages was pursuing to practical skills, so now he 
makes explicit the analogy of crafts to the ruling of men; see on 124a5 
Tcxvriv, and Intr. ch. I, b, iv.
a4. erreiTa: As often, erretTa expresses surprise (in this case ironic 
surprise) at the inconsistency of another's behaviour; cf. 122c1 KcnreiTa.
a5. <j>0oveis is elsewhere used of a father denying his son educa­
tion, cf. Men. 93d1; also La. 200b7, R. 338a3.
a5. Te.. .Kat: Explanatory; see Verdenius, Mnem. 4.32 (1980) 11. 
a5. 6p$s: The interjection is colloquial, see Stevens 36-7; KG II.353-
4; in the Corpus cf. Prt. 336b4, Lys. 211c5, Hipparch. 228a6; in prose also, 
e.g., X. Hier. 1.16; Luc. Peregr. 45; copious examples in comedy, see 
Stevens ad loc.', Starkie ad Nu. 355 (add Alex. 9.8 Kock). It indicates a
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degree of agitation or excitement (not necessarily "a touch of malice" as 
Starkie [ad loc.] maintains).
a6. evavTiov.. .crou: Of. 123b2.
a6. kolvq pouXeucopeOa: A similar context for the phrase in Men. 
91 a1: Anytus and Socrates are to deliberate together over the one to 
whom Meno should go in order to learn how to rule men. For a list of 
passages descriptive of the "common search," see Zeller 11.15 118 n.3. For 
the use of the plural pouXcucopcGa, despite the fact that only Socrates 
takes part in the "search," cf. La. 196c3ff., and see on b3 TrpWTOV.
a7. es tivos: Bekker’s restoration is palmary.
a7-8. 8ia...Tupavvos: Shorey {WPS 429) felt that the quotation
of "Euripides" in b7 below is introduced abruptly, but a7-8 here provide a 
fluid transition to the quotation, the more so since these words constitute a 
loose iambic tetrameter, with catalexis in the concluding metron. This 
metrical effect probably contributes to the overall irony of the section; cf. 
esp. Phdr. 241 d1 (with DeVries ad loc.), and 238c9ff., where Socrates' 
claim to poetic inspiration is explicitly ironic.
b1. Nat |jlol Aia.. .|3ouXeu(n|je0a SfjTa: The latter phrase 
emphatically picks up pouX€Uc6pie0a in a6 (for this use of 8"qtoc see 
Denniston, GP2 276), and the preceding oath combines with it to impart a 
colloquial flavour (see Dover, CQn.s. 35 [1985] 341).
b2. pouX^s.. .ou 4>aiJXt)s: Disjunction and postponement em­
phasize ou <|>auXr)S, and the litotes pehaps serves to increase the irony of 
Demodocus' response.
b2. Trepi toutou: I.e. a7 es tivos. . .b8 TUpavvos.
b3. ’"Eacrov: Sc. to pouXeuecr0ai (Knebel), or still more accur­
ately to koiizq pouXeuecr0ai (see on b3 TrpdjTOV). Knebel adds "Ab-
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rumpit Socrates facetam confabulationem, quae a primario fine colloq­
uium abducere videbatur’'; but the imperative implies only a dismissal of 
the offer of joint deliberation between Socrates and Demodocus, since the 
humour is merely transferred to the questioning of Theages in b5ff. (for 
Socrates’ concentration on Theages see on 122c8-d2).
b3. cnyaGe: A polite remonstrance, cf. 128d1 (though not always this 
nuance of meaning in Plato, see DeVries, Mnem. 4.37 [1984] 441). To 
judge from its numerous occurrences in Aristophanes, the phrase 
possesses a colloquial flavour.
b3. coyaGc. SiaTruGcnpieGa: The asyndeton is explanatory, as 
the sentence SLaTruGcopLcGa.. . IkocvcBs implies the reason for a shift (cf. 
JZEoccrov) in the conversation.
b3. 8iaTruOa)|j.€0a: The aorist, the prefix 8ia— (see on 121d3), and 
iKavcos on the same line, combine to impart perfective force. For the 
meaning of a verbal prefix intensified by an apparently redundant adverb, 
cf. Grg. 461 b1-2, Sph. 217b7-8; see W. Jaeger, RhMus 100 (1957) 378-85.
b3. TTpdiTOV: Socrates’ offer of joint investigation with Demodocus 
(cf. a6), which he here purports to postpone, is in fact never taken up. This 
may be regarded as a symptom of the dialogue genre, one parallel for 
which is R. 328a6-9: Polemarchus invites the present company to dine at 
his home, on the understanding that they will return to the festival of Bendis 
afterwards; but nothing further is said of these plans (von Arnim [Platos 
Jugenddialoge und die Entstenhungszeit des Phaidros (Leipzig-Berlin, 
1914) 73] considered this one indication that Bk. 1 of R. was originally a 
separate work). But Socrates’ turning of the conversation towards The­
ages is thematically important, see Intr. ch. I, b, iv.
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b4. iruvOavou: For the simplex form after the compound SiaiTuS- 
d)(jieQcc, cf. 129e2, e4, e5 (and n. ac/e4); see R. Renehan, Studies in Greek 
Texts (Gottingen, 1976) 11-16; KG II.568. DeVries' opinion (ad Phdr. 
248a2-5) that "This usage is mainly poetical" is not borne out by its 
appearance in, e.g., inscriptions and the Hippocratic Corpus (see Renehan 
loc. cit.)', see also C. Watkins, HSCP71 (1966) 117.
125b5-e7. In an effort to have Theages himself name the teacher best- 
suited to train him, Socrates recites a line which he attributes to Euripides; 
"Tyrants are wise by association with the wise." "Wise at what?" Socrates 
asks. But this expedient is no more successful at eliciting a precise answer 
from Theages than previous attempts had been, and Socrates himself 
offers Theages an answer through reference to a poem of Anacreon. 
Theages complains that Socrates is not taking him seriously.
Theages himself in e4 recognizes Socrates’ irony. But Socrates' 
tone is more than simply ironic, as the quotations of both "Euripides" and 
Anacreon are important elements within the structure of the dialogue; see 
Intr. ch. I, b, v.
b5. Tl o£iv av ei: tl followed by et + optative may be con­
sidered colloquial (see Stevens 30). On av without a verb, cf. below c1 -2; 
see in general KG I.243-4; Goodwin MT2 75; Gildersleeve 1.184-5.
b5. EupLTri8x|: Plato quotes the line cro^OL... auvouaig. b7 in R 
568b1, and there too it is attributed to Euripides. But a number of much 
later authors (e.g. 2 ad hr.Thesm. 21; Lib. Ep. 33; Zen. 2.52; Them. Or. 
6.72c; Gel. 13.19.1; see further Radt, TrGF IV. 120-1) report that the verse is 
in fact taken from Sophocles' Aias AoKpos (fr. 14 Radt), and the Aristo­
phanes scholiast (above) adds that Aristophanes, Plato, and Antisthenes 
all made the same mistake in crediting it to Euripides. Most scholars have
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been inclined to accept at face value the testimony of the later writers, but it 
is impossible to determine the source or the authority of these witnesses, 
nor do we know the context in which the verse originally occurred. The 
attribution of the verse to Euripides by Aristophanes, Plato, and Antisthe­
nes should not be disregarded; they are much closer in time to Euripides 
and Sophocles than are any of the upholders of Sophoclean authorship. 
But without any other evidence to go on, the solution to the authorship of 
this verse must be non liquet. However, it must be noted that the accept­
ance of a mistaken attribution of the verse has led some critics to opposite 
conclusions concerning the authorship of Thg. For example, Schleier­
macher (350; cf. Ast, Leben 496) felt that the same error of ascription in two 
works is evidence that the author of Thg. blindly copied the verse from R, 
while Grote (431) used the same evidence to prove that both dialogues are 
products of the same hand. Yet the only thing that may be established as 
certain is that no objection can be made to Plato's quotation of the same 
verse in more than one dialogue, since he does this on more than one 
occasion; cf. Grg. 451e3-5 ~ Lg. 661a5-6; Smp. 199a5-6 ~ Tht. 154d5; Lg. 
718e2-719a2 ~ Prt. 340d2-5 ~ R. 364c7-d3.
Nevertheless, if a mistake was made in both Thg. and R. (and by 
Antisthenes and Aristophanes) in attributing the verse to Euripides, the 
error is an understandable one. Euripides was notorious for his ao<|>ia, as 
Plato himself notes in R. 568a9 (cf. Ar. Nu. 1369ff., 1377-8, Lys. 368, and 
[probably] Ra. 1413), his plays often stress it (e.g. Ba. 178-214, 395, 877 [et 
pass.], Andr. 379), and they frequently contain glorifications of tyranny (e.g. 
Ph. 524f., Supp. 166, Tr. 1168ff., frr. 250, 332.6, 605 Nauck; also Andr. 
481 ff.). In fact, the mention of Euripides at this point and the ascription of 
the verse to him has special point., since Euripides was perceived as being
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so much more in sympathy with sophistic reasoning than Sophocles was 
(cf. Ra. 77 Iff., 1043ff., 1180-1, and the passages above from Nu.), and 
Socrates, by citing the verse cro<|>oi.. .awoucriQC five successive times, 
is parodying sophistic exegesis of poetry (see Intr. ch. I, b, v). For the im­
plicit irony involved in quoting Euripidean verses within an educational 
context, cf. Ar. Nu. 1361-79 and Pheidippides' scandalous use of Euri­
pides’ Aeolus to justify incest.
b5. Trpoo’XP'n°’a^lJl€®a: The significance of the preverb Trpocr— is 
possibly "use in addition” (sc. to the methods of investigation that we have 
already attempted). But approximate parallels for the meaning "to quote" 
or "recite" are Pit. 268d8-9, Lg. 713a6.
b6. ttou is infrequently employed elsewhere in the Corpus when 
Socrates is introducing a quotation (a natural usage); cf. Crat. 402a8, 
410b3, La. 191a9, Phd. 94d6ff., Prt. 339a6, c2, Ale. II 147b3; see G. Lang- 
bein, De Platonis Ratione Poetas Laudandi (Diss. Jena, 1911) 54-5.
b8. ci.. .EupLTTi8r|V: The main apodosis is postponed until d6 tl 
av <f)CCLTi;. The intervening illustrations (c2-4, c7-9, c12-d1) are ex­
pressed in the aorist indicative not, I think, because the change of mood 
from optative (epoiTO b8) "is a change from a vague future supposition to 
a present unreal supposition" (Thompson ad Men. 74b4, with specific refer­
ence to our passage; see also KG II.480), but rather because the aorist 
aspect denotes distinct, individual questions within the general interroga­
tion of Euripides. For the dialogue with a poet, cf R. 329b8-c4 (Sophocles); 
and for cl oSv cpoLTO tls... tcov tl acxjxBv KTX.,cf. Prt. 312d1 (the 
discussion with the young Hippocrates) aXX’ cl tls cpoLTO qpas, 
"Tcov tl crocfxjov clolv ol Ccoypd^oL CTrLO-Tqpovcs".
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b8. tls: For the imaginary speaker (hypothetical tls), see D. Tarrant, 
CQ 21 (1927) 83-4; and cf. Quintilian 9.2.15 for a brief discussion of this 
common rhetorical device (ficta interrogation
c1-2. cnarrcp Sv cl: See on b5; see also Goodwin MT2 179, 344. 
c3. yccnpyoL: The craft has already occurred in an analogy in
124a5-8.
c4. tl av T||Jllv aiTCKpLvaTO: The marginal variant tl av olcl 
auTOV aiTOKpLvao0aL, preserved by TW and in B by an early corrector, 
must be fairly ancient. There is, in fact, little to choose between the two 
readings (for the variant cf. R 332c7-8 tl av olcl Tjp.LV auTov aTro“ 
KpLvacrOaL), but the marginal reading probably represents an attempt to 
avoid duplication with tl av rjpLV ccTTCKpLvaTO in c9. (No editor ac­
cepts this variant, but Aldus, and following him Stephanus, print tl av 
olcl auTov aTTOKpLvacrSaL in c9 below for tl av rjp.LV aiTCKpLv- 
aTO.)
c7. Tl 8c cl: See on b5; the use with the indicative is equally col­
loquial (see Stevens loc. cit.).
c8„ p.aycLpOL: For p.aycLpOL in Socratic analogies, cf. Grg. 
491a2ff., Euthd. 301c8-d1, R. 332c12.
c10. tcSv Ta p.aycLpLKa is Hirschig's conjecture. If we accept 
tujv paycLpcov (BTW; so Burnet, Souilhe, Carugno, Ample), we must 
assume a difficult anacolouthon, for the response ovy otl tcSv p.ay~ 
CLpcov; simply does not answer the hypothetical question "by association 
with those skilled at what are ol p.aycLpOL skilled." On the contrary, it 
substitutes the name of the group represented by the words "those skilled" 
for the desiderated answer to the question "at what" (tl). Hirschig's 
emendation, based on c5 tcDv toc yccopyLicd, is therefore preferable
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(marginal tcjv p.ay eipiKGJv [yp. TW], read by most editors, might 
preserve a vestige of it), to p.ayeipa)V, like the marginal variant in c4 
(see n.), most likely found its way into the text as an attempt to relieve the 
repetitiousness of this section.
c12. Tl 8’ ei: See on c7 above.
c13. TraXaiaTaL (TraXai eiv) occurs in Socratic analogies in e.g. 
Chrm. 159c8, Hp. ma. 374a2, Prt. 350e1-2.
d2. Nai: See on 123c5.
d3. ’ETrei8f) 8e: We might have expected eTrei 8e 8q, see on 
123c6, 126c3.
d6. ttoi’ a£i eTvai TauTa: For the accusative and infinitive 
construction governed by a verb in the preceding sentence, see on 123b7; 
and for the plural referring back to ti, cf. Tht. 154e4, Phd. 57a5; see on 
122a5. The mss. tradition attests a difficulty here, both by the disagree­
ment in the evidence of our primary witnesses, and in the sense afforded 
by the readings that are preserved. ttoi a a (B) is impossible, and Troia 
av (TW) is dubious, as potentiality belongs rather to the putting of the 
question (ti av <j>air|) than to the content of the answer to be given; as 
such, av has probably intruded here under the influence of av in the 
preceding sentence (note that in the similar accusative and infinitive 
construction in 123b7 av is not repeated from the previous sentence). The 
confusion would have been easy if we assume, as I have done, that the 
original text had tfoT’ aS, which gives the satisfactory sense (literally) "that 
this is what, in turn (or) this time?" For a similar emendation (ttoi’ av to 
ttoi’ a3) cf. R. 468a4 (Burnet); and for the (not uncommon) corruption of 
aS into av, cf. also R. 463e6, Smp. 207c2, Ale. 1107b4. Among other 
suggested changes to the text, Burnet's Troia 8t) is plausible (it is of
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course transcriptionally easy), ttoloc simpliciter, recommended by both 
Hermann and Cobet, originates from a belief in B as codex optimus: av in 
TW began existence as a in B, which itself was caused by dittography in 
that ms. But a could just as easily have resulted from the accidental falling 
out of a letter.
d7. ’AXXa.. .eycoye: Theages’ failure to render any answer at all 
to Socrates’ simple question is taken by Kruger (16) and Pangle (153, 160) 
as evidence that the young man is being depicted as unusually dim. 
However, as C.W. Muller recognized (136 n.3), Theages is in fact refusing 
to offer a response, wishing above all not to equate openly the object of his 
desire with TUpavvLKtj, an identification that must, to his dissatisfaction, 
seem inevitable at this moment. The negative oath ’AXXcc pa Al’ 
emphasizes this disapproval of the path on which Socrates is leading the 
discussion. On this and other signs that Theages is not represented as 
one-dimensionally na'fve in this dialogue, see Intr. ch. Ill, b\ also below on 
d9, e4, 125e8-126a4, 127a8-9.
d9. El cru pouXeL: The disinterested acquiescence is probably a 
sign of annoyance.
d10-e3. TauT’.. .TToXei: Anacreon fr.449 Page (PMG) = 132 
Gentili. For what seems to be the most likely interpretation of this fragment, 
see Appendix 2; and for its importance to the structure of the dialogue, see 
Intr. ch. I, b, v.
d10. KaXXLKpLTTjv (Ang.107 Ambros.409) is shown to be correct, 
against —KpfjTT|V of all other mss., by the spelling of inscriptions (IG 122 
9.636, 637).
d13. Kai emphasizes cru (rather than stressing an addition), "so that 
you might become...?" (see Denniston, GF& 320).
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e1- oiJLdTex^0^: Further play on the analogy with practical skills; 
see lntr. ch. I, b, v.
e1. t*q Kudvris: For the unusual application of the metronymic 
expression, see Appendix 2.
e1. fCudvT|S (B), not Kuavfis (TW), is the correct form: proper names 
usually accent recessively, and those in -vr| are almost without exception 
paroxytone; see H.W. Chandler, Practical Introduction to Greek Accentua­
tion (Oxford, 1862) 38-9 (esp. 39, §139). Diodorus Siculus (5.7.6) and 
Arcadius (110.26) accent the name paroxytone.
e2. cttlcttoctocl TUpavviKa: It seems the safest course not to 
follow Burnet, Souilhe, and Page, in setting these words apart as the 
ipsissima verba of Anacreon; see Appendix 2.
e3. r)piv...TT] ttoXei: For the dativus commodi/incommodi with 
TUpavvos, cf. Lg. 710b4.
e3. Kat TQ ttoXcl has greater mss. authority (BT) than ev t*q 
TroXei (W, ev s.l. b). I take Kat here to mean "and in general" (cf. 129d6 
and n.); see Verdenius, Mnem. 4.7 (1954) 38, 4.9 (1956) 250, 4.27 (1974) 
21.
e4. ndXai.. .pie: Schleiermacher (350) found it difficult that Theages 
only now raises an objection to his treatment at Socrates' hands (cf. ndX­
ai). Knebel responded (ad loc.) that the only place in which he could have 
done so earlier was in 124e10, where however Socrates stole the oppor­
tunity from Theages by turning to address Demodocus directly. But it will 
hardly do to invent a controversy such as this, and although this sentence 
is important for a full understanding of the characterization of Theages, its 
value has, so far as I can tell, been overlooked by everyone except C.W. 
Muller (136 and n.6). Essentially, it confirms our previous interpretations
359
in 125d7 and d9 that Theages is, and has been for some time, fully aware 
of the ironic intent in Socrates’ treatment of him (see on 125d7, with 
references), and Theages’ disquiet over this treatment receives its most 
articulate expression in 125e8-126a4. There is no reason why Theages 
should not postpone his display of irritation; indeed, if my interpretation of 
125d10-e3 (Anacreon fr.449) in Appendix 2 is accurate, Theages’ outburst 
at this precise moment will be seen to be particularly well-motived (see Intr. 
ch. Ill, b.
e4. ctkojittcls Kat 'frai<eis Trpos pe: Oobet (Novae Lectio- 
nes [Lugduni-Batavorum, 1858] 623-4) expunges kccl Troci£eis, under the 
conviction that TrcciCeis originally glossed ctkojittels, and was incorpor­
ated into the text with the requisite aid of kocl (okcjotttels apparently fell 
out of use in later antiquity [see LSJ s.v.]). But the resultant okojtttels 
Trpos pc would be unexampled elsewhere in the Corpus, and LSJ give 
our passage as the only instance in Greek. Trpos pe must go closely with 
ttcclCels in the very common sense "make fun of," "toy with" (cf. 128c1, 
Grg. 500b6, Men. 79a7, Euthd. 27Qc6-7), and pe is to be supplied ad sen- 
sum with OKCOiTTeLS from ITpos pe. This tautology merely lends empha­
sis to Theages’ retort. On the role of ttcclBlcc in this dialogue, see Intr. ch. 
I, b, c.
e5. Tl 8e: Colloquial, expressing surprise; cf. 130b6; see Thesieff 
93; Stevens CO 31 (1937) 184; Denniston, CP2 175.
e5-7. oli. . .€LT]s: Socrates underlines the reality that TroXLTLKfj, 
viewed as apx^LV and nothing more, is inevitably TUpavvLKfj. There 
must, in other words, be further content to TroXLTLKfj if it is to be a worth­
while pursuit. Theages thinks he has the correct solution to the problem 
(126a7-8); see Intr. ch. I, b, iii, v.
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e6. aXXo ti i]: The meaning is basically nonne (see Dodds ad Grg. 
496d6): logically speaking, the acceptance of Socrates' equation of the 
ruler of all citizens with the tyrant demands a positive reply, but aXXo tl rj 
does not imply that such an answer is self-evident, and Theages modifies 
Socrates' equation within the next few lines.
125e8-127d1. Theages affirms that to be a tyrant is indeed a desirable 
thing, but in reality he wishes to become a constitutional ruler, like Them- 
istocles, Pericles, Cimon, and others who have been 8clpol tcc ttoXl~ 
tlkcc. Once again Socrates invokes analogies with practical skills (horse­
manship, javelin-throwing), which illustrate that Theages must find a 
teacher who is crowds tcc ttoXltlkcc if he wants to fulfill his ambition, 
viz., to become aTro\iTiKos. When Theages proclaims that Socrates 
himself has in the past observed that ol ttoXltlkol cannot pass on their 
skill to their sons, Socrates accuses Theages of blocking all possible ave­
nues of instruction, and therefore finds it understandable that Demodocus 
is perplexed by Theages' desire. Thereupon Theages turns to Socrates to 
take the task upon himself. Socrates is surprised, but Demodocus fully 
supports Theages in this suggestion.
Socrates has argued for a short while on the ironic assumption that 
Theages wishes to become a tyrant. Theages at last removes the veil of 
misunderstanding from Socrates by clarifying his desire for cto<|)loc. This 
section elaborates on the true nature of Theages’ pursuit of aocjna, and 
exemplifies the apparent futility in searching for a teacher of "wisdom" in 
traditional places. But it also has a transitional function, in as much as it 
directs the reader's attention first to the educational claims of ol ttoX­
ltlkol, and then to Socrates’ capacity as educator (see Intr. ch. I, b, v).
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125e8-126a4. Eugaiprjv.. .eTriGupeiv. The first and last words 
of the passages contrasfetrongly (see following n.), and superlatives and 
hyperbole fill the intervening phrases (paXicrTa...avepcoTTGJv; cos' 
TrXeicrTcov; TravTes aveparrroi; ©cos yeveaOai); the language helps 
to characterize Theages (see lntr. ch. Ill, b). On the uses made of this 
passage in determining the date of Thg., and on its function within the 
present context, see lntr. ch. V, c, d.
e8-a4. E'ugaiprjv... eTTiOupeiv: The relegation of prayer to the 
status of "wishful thinking," as apparently implied in this contrasting pair, is 
generally consistent with Platonic usage (see J. M. Rist, Plotinus: The Road 
to Reality [Cambridge, 1967] 201-2). But a considerable allowance must 
be made for the possibility that here eu^aiprtv at least partly reflects a 
manner of speaking rather than a solely philosophical conviction of the 
author’s (in 131a6 Theages clearly sees some efficacy in prayer); see lntr. 
ch. V, c.
e8. Eu^aipriv.. .yevecrOai: The envy of the tyrant as eu 8ai~ 
pcov was a commonplace, cf. Grg. 468e6-469c7, R. 344b7ff. (see Adam ad 
loc.), Ale. 1105a4-c7, Ale. II 140e10-141b6 . The desire for absolute power 
has literary antecedents as far back as Homer (e.g. Od. 1.389ff.).
e8. pev is answered by aXX’ a3; see Denniston, GP2 5-6.
a1. paXicrTa pev.. .ei 8e pf): Colloquial (Stevens 23) and
formulaic; cf. Menex. 247a3-4, R. 473b8; see KG 11.485; England ad Lg. 
758d1; A. Bloch, MH1 (1944) 255-6.
a2. Kai cru y’ av oTpai: A gross misjudgement on the part of 
Theages; cf. X. Mem. 1.3.2 tous 8’ euyopevous xpucriov fj apyup- 
iov fj TUpavvi8a fj aXXo ti tcSv toiotjtcov ouSev Siacjjopov
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evdfjLLCev [sc. ZtDKpctTris] euxecreocL rj Kupeicu, fj pctxriv rj aXXo 
tl €ijxoli/to 'tqjv ccSfjXcnv ottojs (xtt opr] ctol to.
a2-3. €TL... vevecrGai: For the (traditional) sequence of preferred 
alternatives 1) ©eos ~ 2) TUpavvos, cf. Lg. 661a4-b4 (similarly Grg. 
481a2-b1); also E. fr. 250 Nauck TtipavviS’ fj ©ecov SeuTepoc vo|j.l£-~ 
€Tai; Archil. 19 W.
a2. 8c ye: Oontinuative, a rare prose usage (Denniston, GP2 155-6). 
a5. S-q (Flor.b Neap.337 Urb.80), 8e (BTW), or Soil (Bc)? 8ccl certain­
ly conveys the liveliness of Socrates' ironically exaspirated question; but 
the appearance of 8aC in Platonic mss. is fraught with difficulties (see on 
124c6). 8e might be defended as a weak form of 8rj (see Verdenius, 
Mnem. 4.9 [1956] 248). Yet emphatic 8rj is preferable: it essentially speci­
fies tl (tl 8q = "what exactly," see on 123c6), and for aXXa.. .8fj after a 
rejected suggestion, see Denniston, GP2 241-2.
a5-6. oo ... cttlG'UIICL v: Socrates' facile restatement of earlier 
conclusions now forces Theages in the next two lines to modify the bald 
assessment of his desire.
a7. Oo.. .ckovtcjdv: A traditional contrast between the constitution­
al and unconstitutional ruler; cf. Pit. 291 e1-6, 308e4-309a2, Lg. 832b10-c7; 
also X. Mem. 1.2.41-6, 4.6.12; Thue. 3.37.2; Anon. Iambi. 7.12-3; Arist. Pol. 
1285a24-9; Plb. 6.4.2 (with Walbank's n. ad loc.). But the currency given to 
the formulation was probably due to Socrates himself (so Xenophon in 
Mem. 4.6.12; see Schmid-Stahlin, Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur 
1.3 [Munchen, 1940] 250 n.9; Guthrie, HGP V. 184); Theages has been 
coaxed into expressing a Socratic ideal.
a8. oi aXXoL oi: "The other sort, the famous etc."
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a8. cXXoyipioi makes explicit what is no doubt a primary impetus 
behind Theages’ seeking after political power; cf. Prt. 316b10-c1 (of the 
young Hippocrates).
a8. avSpes: The addition of the substantive is commendatory, as 
also 126d2, 127a8-9 (not simply a substitute for a demonstrative pronoun, 
as Ast, Lexicon 1.174f.); see Dodds ad Grg. 518a7-b1.
a9-10. TApa.. . yeyovacriv: Socrates attacks these three politi­
cians (and Miltiades) in Grg. 516e9-519b2, yet it appears that here they are 
presented simply as exemplary public figures whom Theages will recog­
nize as such. But they, and others like them, are also now said to be 
Scivoi tcc ttoXitikcx, and this can hardly be complimentary: the adjec­
tive has replaced oo0oi, an exchange which harmonizes with Socrates' 
statements elsewhere about these politicians, e.g. Ale. /118c3ff. (Pericles 
not even crowds, cf. Prt. 319e3-320b1), Grg. 517c3-4 (the four great 
statesmen of Athens SeivoTCpoi at procuring ships, walls, dock-yards, 
and such like, but at nothing else). Socrates' use of 8oivoi may therefore 
be ironic; see on a12-b1.
a9. TApa yc: See on 124a5.
a12-b6. Ti.. .ttoXXois: For this iTTTros-analogy, cf. Ap. 25a13ff. 
a12-b1. ao<()d s ... Scivo s. The apparent interchangeability of
o'o0ds and Seivos in these sentences makes clear the semantic value 
which is to be ascribed to crowds in this context (see Tucker ad R. 337a). 
Additionally, the close interplay of the two adjectives is reminiscent of the 
popular epithet 8eivds Kai o-o0os, a catch-phrase applied to sophists, 
rhetors, and public figures generally, which carried with it a pejorative 
flavour; cf. Hdt. 5.23. Ar. Ec. 245, Ra. 968, S. Ph. 438-40, Dem. 19.126; and 
it is often used ironically by Socrates, cf. Prt. 341 a9, Hp. mi. 373b7, Tht.
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154d8, 173b2-3; see Tucker loc. cit. I would suggest that Socrates' choice 
of adjectives is ironically motivated in a12-b2 as well; see further lntr. ch. I, 
b, v, vi.
b1. €TUYXaveS• ■ -Q}T1 OtQS: For the mixed condition, see on 
123b7.
b1. Trapa TLvas: tlvos (BT) is indefensible (cf. b2, b4, c8), though 
perversely supported in the Arethae scholia as an Atticism (on the fallibility 
of these scholia in questions of grammar and syntax, see Greene xxiv n.4).
b4. Kai: Probably explanatory, see Verdenius, Mnem. 4.8 (1955) 14­
5, 277-8; id., Mnem. 4.9 (1956) 249; Trenkner, Le Style KAI 34-6.
b5. oTs clctlv tc lttttol Kai xP^VTaL: The verb in a co­
ordinate relative clause (here xp^VTai) does without a relative pronoun 
(or the relative is frequently replaced by a demonstrative pronoun) when 
that relative would be in a different case from the initial pronoun; see KG 
II.432. It is perhaps ignorance of this rule (although it is sometimes broken, 
cf. Prt. 313a6-7) that produced the corrupt ot elor Te LTTTTLKOL ktX. 
(BTW; the true reading is preserved i.m. TW).
b5-6. olkclols Kai aXXoTpLOLs ttoXXols: Neither these 
words, nor the parallel ttoXXols. . .cckoi/tlols in b10-c1, are unneces­
sary and clumsy, as Heidel supposed (55 n.11). The choice of adjectives 
is dictated by the analogy with ol ttoXitlkol who’ TXXqvLCTLV Trpoo— 
opLXowTas TroXecjLV Kai pappapoLS (c7-8), and the ability to use 
another’s implements (or similar) as well as one's own is an obvious crit­
erion of genuine technical skill (the issue to which these examples are 
leading, see lntr. ch. I, b, v).
b7. AfjXov 6ztl simpiiciter as a formula of response also in Ion
531 b10, Grg. 459b3, 475c9, Hp. ma. 296c5.
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b8. Tl 8c cl: Most editors print a semi-colon after 8c, but see on 
125b5.
b8. Ta aKOVTLcrTLKa: It is somewhat surprising that analogies 
involving spear-throwing are so rare in Plato. The young men with whom 
Socrates converses elsewhere in the Corpus will likely have been trained 
in the skill (cf. Antiph. Tetr. b), but the closest Socrates comes to employing 
the analogy is the simile of the Sclvos* ccKOVTLCTTrjs in Prt. 342e3.
c1. xP^VTaL: For the absence of a relative pronoun, see on b5. 
c1. [(Xkovtlols]: Hirschig thought this word a gloss, and its awkward
position at the end of the sentence is certainly suspicious; nor was a need 
to include the dative lttttols felt in the parallel oTs.. .ttoXXols b5-6. If 
we retain ockovtlols, it must be assumed that it was included for the sake 
of variety after b4-6. But I do not think this explanation is quite strong 
enough to obviate the other considerations against the retention of the 
word, and I have therefore followed Hirschig.
c3. cttcl 8c 8t) BT; cttclSt] 8c 8q W is awkward and would be 
unparalleled in the Corpus, though cttcl 8c 8q is not infrequently corrup­
ted to cttclSt) 8c, cf. Prt. 357a5, La. 183e5, Euthd. 295d5 (cttcl 8c BW, 
cttclSt} T). For 8c 8q marking the crucial example, see on 123c6. For 
8c in an interrogative sentence after an initial imperatival expression, see 
Denniston, GF2 174; the lively idiom is probably colloquial {ib. 189).
c4-9. olcl ... totjtols: As early a text as Ap. 21c4ff. indicates that 
Socrates does not accept that ot ttoXltlkol will make Theages crowds, 
and this belief proves to be important to the structure of this part of the 
dialogue (see Intr. ch. I, b, v). What is surprising, at first sight (but see Intr. 
ch. Ill, b), is that Theages asserts (d1 ff.) that ol ttoXltlkol have no spe­
cial capacity; see on d1-7.
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c6-7. xpo)|jL€vous.. .TroXXais: As Themistocles, Pericles, and 
Cimon had done.
c7-8.f *EXXt|VLcnv... |3ap|3dpOLS: The possessive adjective 
(here it would be 'EXXriviKais) is not used in Attic with names of cities, cf. 
R 469b9, 470e4, Ale, 1104a7; also Thue. 2.97.3; see Stallbaum ad loc.', 
Burnet ad Cri. 53a1. The desire to manage the affairs of both Greek and 
barbarian states, and the presumption of an ability to do so, is considered 
by Plato to be characteristic of well-born young men (R 494c4-d7; Alci­
biades is frequently mentioned in connection with this passage); see 
further Intr. ch. Ill, b.
c7. irpoo'OiJLLXo'U VTas: Of political interaction, cf. Grg. 463a8, R 
494a8.
d1-7. ’ ’AK'QKoa... av0p(nTrtnv: For the opinion here attributed to 
Socrates, cf. Prt. 319d7ff., Men. 93b2-e2, Ale. I 118d1 Off.; Lysimachus and 
Melesias (La. 179c2ff.) are an embodiment of the statement. The same 
observation is made in the Dissoi Logoi (DK 90.6.4), where however it is 
refuted (90.6.8-9), and by Aristotle in EN 1180b28ff.; the thought goes back 
in essentials to Homer, cf. Od. 2.27Q. But Socrates' conclusions from this 
maxim were significant, namely that apeTq or cro<j>£a is not teachable (cf. 
the Platonic passages cited above), and this issue was of course hotly 
debated both in Socrates' time (cf. Dissoi Logoi DK 90.6, Simon the 
Cobbler ap. Diogenes Laertius 2.122 [Trepi apeTqs oti otj 8i8aKT0V], 
Crito ap. D.L. 2.121 [oti ouk ok tou pa.0eiv ol aya0oi]), and long 
after (cf. Posidonius E-K fr. 2 [Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Posidonius, Hecato]; 
Plu. Mor. 439a-440c [An virtus doceripossif]}; see C.W. Muller, Die Kurz­
dialoge 220-249. Some (Ast, Leben 496; Stallbaum ad loc.’, Fritzsche ad 
loc.', Pavlu 31-2) have tried to argue for a dependence here on another
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Platonic work, but the failure of the sons of famous fathers is a Socratic 
commonplace.
d1-3. ’AK7]Koa...o‘kutot6|jlq)v: Understandably, this is the one 
piece of Socratic doctrine with which Theages is familiar, as it would doubt­
less cause him considerable anxiety. In other places a character may 
claim remote or second-hand knowledge about Socrates and his tenets, cf. 
Chrm. 156a6-8, La. 181a1ff., 194d1ff., Tht. 148e1ff., Phd. 72e3ff., Smp. 
215d3ff. (the effect of Socrates' words at second-hand); Stallbaum's objec­
tions to our passage (222; similarly Steinhart 464) are therefore ground­
less as regards this point. Theages' failure to connect Socrates' reported 
assertions with the whole question of cro<|)£a, or dpeTrj and their teach­
ability illustrates that he does not apprehend the full implications of 
Socrates' observations; see on d3-4. Steinhart’s objection (440) that the 
topos expressed here is a sign of defective composition, because it does 
not lead to some more significant generalization, results from a misappre­
hension of the context (see further lntr. ch. I, b, v).
d1-2. ’AKfjKoa... Xoyous: Reference to Socrates' own set of 
beliefs makes him the focus of attention, and prepares the reader for 
Theages' eventual request (127a8-10) that Socrates become his trainer.
d1. yap expresses a general dissent, sweeping away the whole of 
Socrates' line of questioning (see Denniston, GP2- 73-5).
d1-2. oils.. .tous Xoyous: For the hyperbaton cf. Phd. 88d2 ov 
6 ScoKparqs eXeye Xoyov; and for the juxtaposition ofXeyeiv and 
Xoyous cf. Hp. ma. 285b3-4, 286a8. The article tous probably has spec­
ifying force here, i.e. "those particular” or "well-known Xoyoi" (see KG 
,.598).
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d1. <f>aai: The subject might be understood to be tc3v r)\iKiao- 
t(3v Tives auTou Kai St)|jlot(Lv of 121 d1-2, but see Intr. ch. I n.49.
d2. avSpaiv: See on 126a8.
d3. tgjv aKUTOTopcnv: The conventional depreciation of banausic 
crafts, cf. e.g. R. 495c8ff. But the bias here is Theages’ own, as Socrates 
himself does not employ this particular comparison when speaking else­
where of the sons of successful fathers; although Socrates does of course 
mention cobblers in his analogies and comparisons generally, and some­
times disparagingly, e.g. R. 456d10, 466b1 (cf. also Critias’ remarks in 
Chrm. 163b5ff., Callicles’ in Grg. 491a1-2). I fail to understand Fritzsche’s 
confident assertion (230) that the comparison here is grossly un-Platonic.
d3-4. Kat.. . aicrGeaeai: Theages, attracted by the new intellec­
tuals (cf. 122d4-6), happily rejects old-fashioned notions of natural family 
education and upbringing, and embraces the critical evaluation of Socra­
tes. But a full appreciation of the necessary implications of this evaluation 
would lead Theages to question whether apeTrj orco^ia could be 
taught to him at all, whereas in fact this problem is never addressed, and 
his enthusiasm remains undiminished.
d5. TrapaSoOvai: According to Bluck (ad Men. 93b4) this word is 
"appropriate to the sophistic kind of ’teaching’." It might be better to take it 
as descriptive of the traditional (aristocratic) ideal of education, whereby 
apeTr) orcro^ia is transmitted from one who isayaQos to another 
person in some indefinable way (cf. Men. 92e4ff., Ap. 24e4ff., Prt. 319e3; 
also Arist. EN 1180b33). But TrapaSouvai is used in a sophistic context 
in Euthd. 273d8-9 (ironically applied to the kind of pseudo-ap err) that the 
two charlatans Euthydemus and Dionysodorus profess to impart); cf. Isoc. 
13.5.
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d6. (D<j)eXT]crai: Sc. av from the previous clause (Hirschig's supple­
ment of the particle is unnecessary). Here cu^eXeiv is almost equivalent 
in meaning to TraiSeueiv in the sense "to improve"; cf. 127d3 (with n. ad 
loc.), d7, d8, Ap. 24e10, 25c1; see S.R. Slings, Mnem. 4.29 (1976) 47. For 
the application of co^eXeiv to teachers, cf. 129e6, 130e9, Hp. ma. 281c1, 
283d5, Men. 91 c8, Grg. 520b7-8.
d7. eis Tat)Ta coc|>eXeiv: I.e. to help him become skilled at states­
manship and know how to manage his owniToXis as well as other 
TToXeis (cf. c5-9). For the construction cf. 127d7 (ix^eXfiaai Trpos ktX.
d8-e7. Tl.. . p.av0aveiv: The dialogue returns (by a kind of ring 
form) to an earlier point of departure: Theages is humbled by Socrates, 
who now proceeds to demonstrate that Demodocus, earlier criticized by 
Theages for neglect of his fatherly duties, can be pardoned because he did 
not hand his son over to anyone, since Theages himself has no clear con­
ception of who will make him crowds. For the affinities which this process 
shares with the dialectic of other Socratic dialogues, see Intr. ch. I, b, v.
d8. (3 peXTiCTTe avSptnv: The vocative is colloquial (Thesleff 
87), and here ironic, as often; cf. Euthphr. 4a7, Chrm. 162d7, Hp. mi. 
373b6, Ion 541 c7. But the presence of av8p(2v is telling: Theages else­
where in the dialogue is described as a peipaKicrKOS (122c8), a vea~ 
victkos (122d6), and apeipaiaov (131a9), and to my mind the inclu­
sion of the genitive here produces what Thesleff (70-1; see also Studies on 
the Greek Superlative [Helsingfors, 1955] 73) called a "pathetic" effect. For 
the admonitory use of a similar address, cf. Ap.2967 (cS apiOTe avSpcov).
d8. aaiiTdJ: auTdo Schleiermacher (so also Baiter, Schanz), deleted 
altogether by Fritzsche. Yet auTtn before the expressed referendum of the
pronoun is difficult, and despite the presence of aiJTiQ oti XP^0 soon
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afterwards (eQ), aauTiy can be explained: the close juxtaposition of 
aauTcp with croi (d8) stresses more forcefully the hypothetical application 
of Demodocus' anxious predicament to Theages himself. A similar effect is 
gained in English by italics, e.g., "What would you do, if you..." That the 
collocation of aauTtu and croi is deliberate is suggested by the hyper­
baton of aoi (to be taken with ycvoiTO, not Trapex01) before cttciSt] 
(for postponement of CTrciSfj, see Denniston, GPS 45).
d9. ToiauTa: ToaauTa (Richards) is unnecessary; the meaning is 
"such troubles as you have caused."
e1. av: Richards' is no improvement, as av with the optative in 
a protasis is perfectly admissible; cf. Men. 98b3, Phlb. 58d7-8; see Gilder­
sleeve 1.447 ("... the optative with av [in p rotas i] is often a semi-quotation 
or reference to a known or imagined state of mind"); KG II.482; Goodwin, 
MT^ 92; Bluck ad Men. 79c4.
e1-5. C(nypd<j>os.. . au\r|TCts: In consecutive hypothetical ques­
tions cf. Prt. 318b4-c8.
e1-3. p.cjjl<J)OITO.. .apyupiov: Of. 123a8, 124e11ff.
e2-3. toutcjqv auT(3v: For the plural see on 122a5; but it jars
slightly before the singular auTou toutou (e3), which has the same point 
of reference, viz., to auTov ycvcaOai <(jjypacj)ov.
e4. aTi|ia£oi: "Disregard" (Lamb) is too mild; an ironic "insult" or 
"abuse" is what is required, with reference to Theages’ earlier treatment of 
oi ttoXitikoi and their sons (d2-3).
e6. KiGapiaTas; exois: The asyndeton marks Socrates' impa­
tience.
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e6-7. exoLS.. .xp$o.. .Trcp/rrois: Assimilation of the verbs in 
an indirect question into optative after an introductory optative verb is quite 
regular; see Goodwin, Ml2 62; KG 1.253.
e6-7. ottol. . .aXXocre: ottt| (W) is false, and probably simply an 
itacism: ottt^Zottt^ always have modal force, but a locative expression is 
obviously required here (cf. ottol 127a2); for ottol + aXXooc cf. Men. 
97a10, Ch. 45c1, Phdr. 230e1, Phd. 82a5 (ttol), Ch. 51 d8 (ttol).
127a1. TauTa TauTa ocutos: The accumulation of pronouns is 
perhaps deliberate, as indicated by the mild hyperbaton of auTos (for the 
hyperbaton of pronouns in Plato, see Riddell §290).
a2„ aTropei.. .xpiianriTciL: Cf. 126e6 oxols.. .xp^o; ft 368b3- 
4, Prt. 321c2-3. The future xp^ctctocl (W, and some secondary mss.) is 
also possible; see Magnien, Le Futur Grec II (Paris, 1912) 229; Dodds ad 
Grg. 521 b7; Tucker ad Ft. 368b.
a2-3. diTOpCL...ottol TTcpLTTT]: ttojjlttol (BTW), adopted by 
Burnet and Souilhe, was rightly rejected by Bekker, who opted (as have 
most editors) for the subjunctive TrepiTn^ (it occurs only in Vat.2218, which 
Bekker did not see). The argument that the optative without av is admiss­
ible in an indirect question in primary sequence (allegedly a more remote, 
less possible deliberative question; see Sidgwick in Appendix I of his A. 
Ag. [Oxford, 1881]; Jebb, Appendix to S. OC [Cambridge, 1885]; Verrall ad 
A. Ag. 625) is not supported by any parallels in prose (Sidgwick recanted 
in CR 7.3 [1893] 97ff.), and the only possible analogue to our passage, 
Euthd. 296e1, can be readily explained as an omission of av by haplo- 
graphy before d|j<|ua|3r|T0Lr|V. tt€(jlttol is best accounted for as an 
assimilation to ottol immediately preceding. For a discussion of this 
problem, see W.G. Hale, TAPA 24 (1893) 156-205, esp. 179ff.
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a3-4. €Trcl... 0”Uvecttocl: The same idea is restated in 128a3-4. 
Prt. 320a3-b1 is the best commentary on this sentence: Pericles took 
Clinias away from the latter’s brother, Alcibiades, and handed him over to 
Ariphron (the brother of Pericles), in order to prevent Clinias from being 
corrupted. Greek convention, which sanctioned the relationship between a 
youth and an adult male on educational grounds, would have facilitated 
the sort of arrangement Socrates is here describing; cf. Men. 95a6-b2; see 
K.J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (Cambridge, Mass., 1978) 202-3.
a3. cttcl.. .ye: "And yet," cf. 128b8 and 128b2 (cttcl); see Good­
win, M122QQ\ Burnet ad Euthphr. 4c3; England ad Lg. 669b6.
a3. tcB v... ttoXltlkol: Very much the equivalent ofoi ttoXl­
tlkol whom Socrates has discussed a little earlier (126a9-c9), but the 
emphasis here is different: by confining knowledge of to ttoXltlkol to 
kolXol KocyocOoL, Socrates pays ironic respect to the traditional concept 
that the acquisition of political skill is a matter of heredity, dependent upon 
one's membership in the class kolXol KccyccGoL (on this phrase see on 
122e9; and with acc. of respect cf. Ap. 20b1, Grg. 526a7); see further the 
following n. (Wagner thought tcl ttoXltlkol a gloss, arguing [ad loc.] that 
the phrase tqjv. . .ttoXltlkol conflicts with Socrates' true intentions for 
Theages; i.e., all Socrates envisages for Theages is that he will become a 
good ttoXlt'Qs [cf. 127d7], not an active statesman. But the words are in 
place, for Wagner misses the irony of the passage, and also the dramatic 
situation: there is no reason to feel that Socrates has any specific plans for 
Theages at this stage. Besides, neither Socrates nor Plato believed that 
the political life qua political life was bad, but only as it was practised in 
contemporary circumstances; see Intr. ch. I, b, v.)
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a4. OTcy av PoijXt]: Any KaXos KayaQos will improve Theages; 
it does not matter which he chooses. Socrates is ironic, but Anytus on the 
other hand is in dead earnest when he voices the same conviction in Men. 
92e3-5, and Meletus (Ap. 24e1-25a11) extends this notion by claiming that 
all Athenians (except for Socrates) make the young men of Athens kccXol 
Kayaeoi.
a5. apa pev...apa Se: Cf. Chrm. 158d2, Grg. 452d6-7, Phd. 
108d7, 115d5-6.
a6. euSoKipffcreis.. .aveptoTroLS: Socrates recites one impor­
tant reason why a young man like Theages would wish to become crowds; 
cf. eXXoyLpoL 126a8. The words are a comment on popular standards of 
political success (cf. Ft. 362e4-363a7, the pursuit of the just course for the 
sake of the euSoKLprjcreLS that derive from it), and the invocation of the 
approval of ol itoXXol is ironic in the mouth of Socrates.
a6. avOpcDirois is deleted by Hirschig (also absent from Coisl.155). 
But the addition of ocvepcoTTOLS is derogatory (see Dodds ad Grg. 518a7- 
b1), and for ol itoXXol avOpcoTTOL cf. Euthphr. 5a1, Ap. 29b3-4, 35a1, 
Phd. 9262.
a8-9. oil... avSpdJ v: It is most reasonable to assume, I think, that to 
Theages Socrates is kccXos Kayaeds not guaiToXLTLKds, but that it is 
rather the moral sense of the phrase which Theages has in mind (see on 
122e9). However this may be, Socrates does emerge in this dialogue as a 
special kind of ttoXltlkos; see lntr. ch. I, b, vi, vii; c. For the epithet 
KaXos kayaOos as applied to Socrates, cf. X. Mem. 1.2.17; and for his 
ability to make his companions so, cf. Mem. 1.2.48. Presumably the opin­
ion that Theages here expresses about Socrates is intended by the author
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to represent information gathered from others (cf. 126d1f., 128c2f.), al­
though a level of irony is not out of the question (see Intr. ch. Ill, b).
a9. avSptfjv: See on 126a8.
a9-10. ei...£T)T<3: Theages embraces Socrates as his prospec­
tive teacher; as we learn later (128c2-5), he knows others his age who 
have shown remarkable improvement through regular association with 
him. Cf. La. 200c7-d2 for similar context and phraseology.
a9. yap is slightly elliptical: the sense is ("Let us now forget about the 
others, i.e., other KaXoi KayaOoi) for if you..."; see Denniston, GP2 61-2.
a9. cruveivai: The word, according to Schleiermacher (351), is ob­
jectionable here because Socrates, as teacher, is the subject, whereas in 
similar contexts ow8iaTpi|3eiv is the term more regularly predicated of 
the instructor (e.g. 128b8, La. 180d3); but cf. (with Fritzsche) R. 328d5, Tht. 
151a4.
b1. Tl. . .Oeayes: Socrates’ surprise at Theages' proclamation is 
in character, for in this dialogue he disclaims (as usual) any ability to teach; 
cf. 128a7ff., and see Intr. ch. III. a.
bl.TL.. .XeyeLs: Xeyeis, omitted from B (but i.m. b), is necessary: 
in the phrase tl touto (simpliciter) the verb 8ia<j>epei is normally 
understood, but this sense would be discordant here (see Dodds ad Grg. 
448b1; Stevens 31); and b2 pievTOi. . .Xeyei pick up Xeyeis in this sen­
tence (see Denniston, GF2 401).
b1. Oeayes: Both Thompson (appendix ad Men. 98a4) and Dodds 
(ad Grg. 489a5) doubted that the vocative without (3 is admissible in the 
Platonic Corpus. But no convincing proofs are brought forward, and the 
conventional explanation of the usage, that the simple vocative conveys a 
tone of surprise or astonishment (or better perhaps agitation or excite­
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ment), is credible; see KG 1.48; Gildersleeve 1.7; Chantraine, Grammaire 
homerique 11.37. Socrates' surprise can readily be accounted for, see 
above on b1 Ti. . .Qeayes.
b2-c2. ..8ia<j)0eipai: Demodocus reaffirms his earlier confi­
dence in Socrates (122a6ff.) by approving Theages' choice of him as the 
boy's mentor. For a father’s eagerness to enlist Socrates as his son's 
teacher, cf. La. 200c2-d8; Socrates himself was also aware of parental 
approval, cf. Ap. 33c8ff. Demodocus' ready acceptance of Socrates is one 
reason for detecting an apologetic function in Thg.; see Intr. ch. I, b, i; c.
b2. ‘’'Q ZoJKpctTes: For the initial vocative, see on 121 a1.
b2. ov .. .KOtKois: The litotes deepens the vehemence of Demo­
docus’ statement.
b2. jjlcvtol: The examples Denniston gives (GP2 401) of assentient 
pevToi (asseverative) accompanied by a verb in the third person are al­
most exclusively Platonic.
b2. apa pev: pev is retrospective and contrasts with ov.. .Xeyei; 
i.e., the connection lies between what Theages says and how Demodocus 
reacts to it, a connection reinforced by apa; see Denniston, GP2 377-8.
b3. epoi, xaPLT): As Socrates earlier set out to "oblige" Theages 
(Xapio'cnpeOa 123a4), so also now Demodocus equally desires to be 
obliged; both father and son are presently convinced of Socrates' suitabil­
ity as companion.
b3. ovk ecjQ’ oti. . .pei£ov: Colloquial, cf. Ap. 36d5-6 (see 
Tarrant, CQ n.s. 8 [1958] 159).
b3-4. tov tov pei£ov.. .ip Epexegeticq after a genitive of com­
parison is common in Plato, cf. Phd. 89d2, Cri. 44c2; see Riddell §163; 
England ad Lg. 738e1; L. Reinhard, Die Anakolouthe 164-5.
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b3. epjiaiov: A "stroke of good fortune" or "lucky find"; fairly frequent 
in Plato, e.g. Grg. 468e3, R. 368d6, Chrm. 157c7; it also occurs in comedy 
(Men. Dysc. 226), and is doubtless colloquial. Cf. sch. vet. ad Smp. 217a: 
TO (XITpOaSOKTlTOV K€p8os OCTTO T(BV ev tocls o8ols TLOepcvcov 
aTTCCpXOOL', ocs OL oSOLTTOpOL KaTCCTOLOUCTL V KOCL yOCp ev TOLLS 
oSoLS 60OS LSplJOeOLL TOV 'Ep|Jlf|V, TTOLp’ 0 KOLL €VO8LOS \ey€TOLL. 
For the association of Hermes with luck, see L.R. Farnell, The Cults of the 
Greek States 5 (Oxford, 1909) 23ff.; R.G. Ussher adThphr. Char. 30.17; L. 
Preller-C. Robert, Griechische Mythologie Z5 (Berlin, 1964) 403. The ex­
pression is highly emotive here; cf. similarly 122a7 TTOLpocfxivqs and n.
b4. apccjKOLTO (BCW i.m. yp. T) has greater authority than dcpKe— 
col to (BT), which is also possible. For the metathesis in mss. of k in this 
word, cf. R. 369d6.
b5-6. koll. . .poijXo|jLaL: koll (jlcvtol koll, CLLaxuvopoLL, and (OS 
ac()d8pOL combine to impart almost an affected tone to this sentence (see 
also on 127c6-d1); see lntr. ch. Ill, c.
b5. Kat p.evTOL Kai: Progressive; the combination is more com­
mon in Plato than in other writers, where Kai pevTOL is preferred (see 
Denniston, GP2 413-4). But this cannot be a criterion for authenticity, since 
the full combination occurs also in the spurious Eryx. (397d5).
b5. aLO’x^volJLaL: Not so much "am ashamed" as "shrink from," "feel 
strong scruples about," as e.g. Ap. 22b5.
b6-7. a|i<|>OT€pa)v iipcnv 8eojjiai, ae...ac: SeopaL + geni­
tive governing accusative + infinitive is not recognized by LSJ or Stepha­
nus, but cf. Phlb. 28b7-8, Ep. 3.317c3, 7.338b3-4; see KG II.26; MacDowell 
ad And. de Myst. 9.
b7. CTUVCivai: See on 127a9.
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b8-c1. Kat... <j>povTi8cnv: Cf. the laudatory remarks of Laches 
and Nicias concerning Socrates’ courage and integrity in La. 181a7-b4, 
188a6ff.; also R 328d4-6, Ap. 34a6ff.
cl-2. (jos. ..8La<t>0€Lpai: Cf. 122a4-5 and n. The sentence ex­
plains why Demodocus considers the desire for oo<j>ia to be a^aXcpa 
(121c8). Souilhe (ad loc.) recognizes the apologetic function of these 
words:"... la replique de Demodocos est une protestation contre la calom- 
nie repandue a Athenes par les adversaires de Socrate. Ce dernier, dans 
I'Apologie, ecrite par Platon, en appelle aux nombreux disciples, et a leurs 
parents, qui assistent au proces, entre autres au frere de Theages, Par- 
alos, fils de Demodocos, pour temoigner de la moralite de ses legons (33d, 
e; 34a, b)"; see Intr. ch. I, c.
c1-2. 4>o(3oup.aL. .. e vtu XTI: Unlike Anytus (Men. 92e3f.; see 
above on 127a4), Demodocus prefers not to entrust the matter of education 
to anyone at all.
c2. oiq): Foroios = toloxjtos (BOT€, cf. Grg. 487d5, R. 334d3, 
381e8-9, Euthphr. 11a5; see Goodwin, MT2 305-6. oTos + inf. connotes 
"character," olos Te + inf. "circumstance" (see Gildersleeve, AJP 7 [1886] 
165).
c3-4. MrjKeTL...TTpocrSe$aa0ai: For Theages'receptiveness 
towards Socrates as his prospective companion, see on a8-9, a9-10.
c4. TTpooSe^acGai: Of the acceptance of a pupil by a teacher, cf. 
Euthd. 272c7, 295d7.
c5-6. Trpos.. .Xoyos: Cf. Sph. 218a7-8 Trpos 8e oe qSr| to 
pieTa touto, cos eoiKe, yiyvoiTo av 6 Xoyos.
c5. Trpos ere: "In reference to you"; attention is now cast formally,
and permanently, upon Socrates (see on 126d1-2).
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c5. TTpos crc 8’ av: For the position of Se (contrast Sph. 218a7-8 
quoted above on c5-6), see Denniston, GP2 18. The instances of its post­
ponement in affirmative sentences after an initial vocative are perhaps not 
quite as limited in prose as Denniston suggests (GP2 189); to his six prose 
examples add Euthd. 293b3, Lg. 890e1 (with England’s n. ad loc.). 
Verdenius explains such occurrences of 8c as a weak form of 8rj; see 
Mnem. 4.9 (1956) 248.
c6„ touto (Ven.189) is indispensable.
c6-d1. eyco .. .t]s: The sentence as a whole is awkward and slightly 
contrived: n.b. the dislocation of crot to its strong early position, and the 
repetitious 8ta ppaxccov.. .cpppaxu and oTov tc. . .olds tc fls; see 
on b5-6. The effect is likely intentional, see Intr. ch. Ill, c.
c6. cos has superior mss. authority (TW) and ought not to be omitted 
(as Schanz, Fritzsche, following B;oos i.m. b): forces 8ta ppaxecov 
CLTTCLV, cf. R 424b3, Lg. 791 b1-2.
c7. ppaxccnv in the phrase 8ta ppaxecov is classified by Brand- 
wood (s.v. ppaxus) as neuter, though he suggests that the masculine (sc. 
Xoycov) is also possible. But comparison with the formulaic cos cttos 
clttclv makes the neuter probable.
c7-8. OLKCLOTaTtt is of course the superlative of olkclcos, and 
cos...oLKCLOTaTd = "as personably as I can.” Lamb curiously takes 
OLKCLOTaTa with Ta epa and translates "all that I hold dearest of what is 
mine" (cf. Pangle "whatever I have that is most my own").
c8. epppaxu: The sch. vet. on this passage explains: OTrep av 
CL1TOL TLS CUX^pCOS CLTTCLV 0C\COV T| aTTXcOS, TOUTO CpppaXU 
XcycTaL. epppaxu awTopcos KaL aTrXtfjs. Ast deletes epppaxu, 
for no apparent reason other than a redundancy with the previous Slcc
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ppocxccov. But epfSpocxu is highly idiomatic (Attic; see W. Schmid, Der 
Atticismus I [Stuttgart, 1897] 118) after a relative word such as octtis or 
ottou (see LSJ s.v.), and in such contexts performs much the same func­
tion asd)s cttos eirreiv + ouSeLS/TrocvTes. Ignorance of this usage 
produced the false variant cv |3pocxei in the three other Platonic appear­
ances of epppocx'U (Grg. 457b1, Hp. mi. 365d5, Smp. 217a2); butev 
(3pocxet - "in a short time," "briefly."
c8. Oectyr] toutovi: The article is omitted because its presence in 
conjunction with a personal name + demonstrative pronoun would denote 
a degree of contempt (cf. Lat. iste)-, cf. 127e6,128d8, Euthphr. 5c6; see KG 
I.629.
d1. da'rrct^'Q: Sometimes with an erotic flavour (e.g. Smp. 192b5, 
Phdr. 256a3), but here simply = "gladly accept" (cf. Ch. 47b5-6).
d1. eu epyeTTi s: Virtually synonymous with co<j)€\eTv (see on 
126d6).
127d2-128c8. Socrates commends the solicitude Demodocus feels 
about Theages' future education, but expresses wonder that Demodocus 
ever imagined Socrates himself could assist him in this. Surely Demodo­
cus, Socrates continues, is better equipped, as a ttoXltlkos, to be 
successful at training his own son; or failing that, the sophists specialize in 
just the thing Theages is after. But Socrates himself has nothing to offer, 
except a surpassing knowledge of toc epcuTiKOt. Theages is unsatisfied 
by Socrates' disclaimers, accuses him of imposture, and cites, as proof 
against Socrates' protestations, his knowledge of young men who im­
proved by association with him. Socrates asks Theages if he knows how 
this happens, and Theages announces that it is dictated by Socrates'
consent.
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Socrates maintains an ironic position in 127d2-128b6, and the irony 
is of a characteristic kind: Socrates himseif cannot teach young men (see 
on 127b1). Though the individuals he holds up as better candidates are 
elsewhere in Plato denied any educational ability (see Intr. ch. I, b, iii, v, vi), 
Socrates' behaviour in promoting others as possible educators over 
himself harmonizes well with his position elsewhere (cf. Ap. 19d8-20c3, La. 
186b8-187b7, 200c7-d4, Tht. 151b2-6). On the levels of meaning implicit 
in Socrates' claim to his own possession of a special kind of knowledge 
(128b2-6 toc epcoTiKa), and on the importance of this claim for the 
structure of the dialogue, see Intr. ch. I, b, vi.
Stylistically 127d2-128b6 is fairly elaborate, notable particularly for 
a number of rhetorical traits; n.b. the framing of the initial sentence by 
eocu(jidcCw (d2, e1); anaphora (0ocu|jidcCGJ d2, e1, OTroGev d5, 8, eiKos 
128a7, b1); argument from eiKOS (128a7-b1); TrpdjTOV pcev...erret“ 
toc. . .eTTCLTOC (e1 -5); asyndeton (128a7); perhaps also the opening of an 
initial sentence with an articular infinitive (cf. Lys. 1.1, 4.1); see individual 
nn. ad locc.
d2-e1. . GaujiaCo): Commendation of Demodocus' concern is
coupled with wonder at Demodocus' and Theages' belief that Socrates will 
improve Theages; cf. 122b2-6 (praise of Demodocus' care) and 127b1 
(surprise at Theages' request).
d2. '’'Q Ar)p.o8oKe: For the initial vocative see on 121 a1; perhaps a 
parody of Demodocus (see Intr. ch. Ill, a).
d2. to ... ecmoiiSocke vat: Illustrated first by Demodocus’ open­
ing monologue (see Intr. ch. I, b, i; ch. Ill, c), as well as by his immediately 
preceding words (see on 127b1-c2, c5-d1). Socrates brings the crrrouSfj- 
TratStd contrast into focus (see Intr. ch. I, b, c).
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d3. ei/rrep: No implication of doubt is intended (cf. d5-e1). 
d3„ ctol: Ethic dative; see on 121c8.
d3. (n<|>eXr|0T)V(H: See on 126d7. The verb follows closely again at 
d7 and d8, and later in 130e8-9; Xenophon gave prominence to cn0eX- 
v/aJc^eXLoc as an apologetic theme in Bks. 3 (3.1) and 4 (4.1) of Mem.;
see also Intr. ch. I, b, vi, vir, c.
d3-5. cru ... gcttcxl: For the sentiment cf. 122b2-6 and nn. on b2 and 
b5-6; and for the phraseology cf. Grg. 500c1-3.
d5. ottcds ... eaTai: Elsewhere this is taken for granted as the prin­
cipal concern generally felt towards the young, cf. Ap. 24c9-d1, La. 179a8- 
b2; but Socrates extends it to encompass the highest personal goal for 
each individual (Ap. 39d5-8), and it sometimes implies "care of the soul," cf. 
Ap. 29d7-e3, La. 186a5-6; for the importance of this detail see Intr. ch. I, b, 
vi.
d5-e1. 6'rrd0ev...0a‘U|jLd£(D: Characteristic Socratic self-deprec­
ation (see Intr. ch. Ill, a), explained by the remainder of this speech; cf. also 
127b1 (and n.), 128a7ff.
d5. OTrd0ev: "Judging from what," "on what basis"; Stallbaum (ad 
loc.) found the combination with e8o£e unusual, but cf. Grg. 486c5-6 
ctcrKei dirdOev 8o$eig <()poveTv.
d5-6. e8o£e ctol: ctol e8o£e of Priscian is also possible (cLChrm. 
156c8, La. 180b3).
d6-e1. cns.. .0cru|idC(D: These words strangely contradict the earlier 
remarks (126d1 ff.) about the inability of distinguished fathers to pass on an 
expertise in to: ttoXltlkcx to their sons; and when that passage is set 
beside this one, Socrates’ irony here seems to descend into callousness. 
Yet a few explanations can be offered for an apparent volte-face: 1) It does
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not take long before Socrates shifts the real blame onto Theages, who is 
said possibly to "pour scorn on” (KOCTOC<|)povcL e6, a strong word) the poli­
tical types of the city; 2) although there is a good deal of irony in Socrates’ 
words, he fails to link Demodocus directly with the famous politicians of 
Athens, and so the same opprobrium is not directed specifically against 
Demodocus; 3) it was actually Theages, not Socrates, who earlier raised 
the subject of the failure of the sons of famous fathers; 4) the author has 
simply subordinated strictly consistent behaviour on the part of Socrates to 
the needs of creating an intensely ironic atmosphere. Yet one expects 
Socrates to display behaviour of this kind towards a sophistic interlocutor, 
not towards the rather innocuous Demodocus.
d6. fiv...oTos t’ cvqv: So Priscian (loc. cit.; Ast, unaware of this 
reading, anticipated Burnet's text); tc t’ of B likely preserves a vestige 
of the reading, tc flv T (t’ fjv W), which is retained by a number of nine­
teenth-century editors (Bekker, Stallbaum, Baiter, Hermann, Fritzsche, 
Schanz), is decidedly inferior to the vague potentiality of the optative, 
which represents thoughts Demodocus is likely to have entertained (see 
J.M. Stahl, Kritisch-historische Syntax des griechischen Verbums der 
klassischen Zeit [Heidelberg, 1907] 358). The deletion of av (Cobet) and 
its emendation to 8f) (Richards) were proposed before Priscian's reading 
came to light.
d7. to .. .yevcaGai: I.e., the sort of man Demodocus is presently 
described as (e1-4).
d7. ail ccutos: auTos + personal pronoun (cf. d8) may be the more 
regular order in Plato; see Stallbaum ad Euthd. 273b7; also KG 1.558. But 
auTov ac 128a8, 130e2.
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e1-5. TTpCDTOV jjlcv...cttcltoc. ..€TT€LTCX: The sequence is 
sometimes rhetorical (Thesieff, Arctos 4 [1966] 97), sometimes colloquial 
(Trenkner, Le Style KA112). In view of Crat. 437a2-b2 and Smp. 181b3-4, 
the use here is somewhat confused, since strict logic would demand ’’firstly 
you are Theages’ father...secondly there are ol ttoXltlkol...thirdly there 
are the sophists." But Plato himself does not shun such deviations from 
absolute uniformity in this usage, see Burnet ad Ap. 18c4; Bluck ad Men. 
90a5; Dodds ad Grg. 491a7.
e1. cru.. .€|jloC: Characteristic Socratic deference towards advanced 
years, cf. La. 181d3-5,186d3-5, Prt. 318b1-4, R. 328d7ff.
e2. CTTCLTOt.. .qp^as: For the dative with ocpyeLv, cf. Thue. 2.2.1; 
and for the dative involved in the notion of ruling, cf. 125e3; see KG 1.409.
e2-3. apx&S-. .TLjJLg: TLpq derives from and is consequent upon 
the holding of public office; an expression of conventional Athenian values. 
For the combination cf. Men. 78c7-8, Ti. 20a4.
e3. tl|JU$: Likewise Theages wishes to become eXXdyLpos (126a8; 
cf. euSoKLpqcreLS 127a6).
e3„ ’AvayupacTLcnv: Seeon121d2.
e4-5. €|Jlol ...tj |jlcjd v: For all this modesty Socrates did stand as a 
TTpLJTctL'LS at least once, and perhaps even as eTTLCTTdTqs (cf. Ap. 
32a9ff., Grg. 473e7ff. [with Dodds' n.]), and his courage in battle is cele­
brated highly (Smp. 220d5-221c1, La. 181 b1-4).
e4-5. €|jlol ... cvop$: evop§v + kv everywhere else in the Corpus 
(Grg. 477b2, Amat. 133d5, Ep. 3.318d3); but evop§v + dat. already in 
Thue. 3.30; X. Cyr. 1.4.27.
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e5-6. €Tr€LTOC... KCtTa<|>povei: Only here does it become clear 
that Socrates has been treating Demodocus himself as representative of 
the class ol ttoXltlkol.
e5. cl apa: Denniston's explanation (’’the hypothesis is one of which 
the possibility has only just been realized" [GP2 37]) can be elaborated, 
see on apa 124e11.
e6. avSpcnv: See on 126a8 (but here the application may be partly 
ironic).
e6. Qcayr|S o8c: See on 127c8.
e6. KaTa<j)poveL: A strong word chosen doubtless to characterize 
Theages’ impetuosity; cf. 126e4 aTLp.a£oL and n. For KaTa<j)povcL of 
rejecting a teacher or mode of education, cf. Clit. 407e4.
e7-128a7. ccXXons...ci8cvat: On the source of this passage 
(Ap. 19e2-20a2), see Intr. ch. I n.54.
e7. CTrayycXXovTaL is regularly used of sophistic "professions"; 
cf. Prt. 319a7, Men. 95b10, La. 186c4, Grg. 447c2, Euthd. 273e5; X. Mem. 
1.2.7; Arist £A/1180t>35.
e8. c cttlp ... ttoXXol : The so-called oyTM-a LlLvSapLKOV, em­
ployed when 6ctl oryLyvcTaL mean "there are," or when several 
subjects may be considered to represent a unity. In Plato cf. Euthd. 302c4- 
5, R. 463a1-2, Smp. 188b3-4; see KG l.68f.; Tucker ad R. 363a.
e8. npo8LKOS: So also in Tht. 151b2-6 Prodicus is offered as an 
alternative to Socratic association (cf. X. Smp. 4.62).
128a1. TopyLas: The implication is that Gorgias was considered a 
sophist. This has however been disputed, see Dodds, Gorgias 6-10; but 
compare also Guthrie, HGP III. 36 n.4; l.G. Kidd, PhQ 11 (1961) 81; E.L
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Harrison, Phoenix 18 (1964) 183-92; G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Move­
ment (Cambridge, 1981) 45.
a1. ricSXos 6 ’AKpayai/Tivos: Hippias, not Polus, is the final 
member of the sophistic trio in the parallel passage (Ap. 19e3-4), and the 
change here is curious (see Stallbaum ad loc., Fritzsche ad loc.): Polus 
does not usually seem to be considered a sophist as such, that is to say a 
professional educator, unlike Hippias (though a very brief account of Polus 
is given in Philostratus’ |3loi oo<|ncrT(nv; cf. also Suda s.v. ndjXos 
’AKpocyavTivos). On the other hand Polus was the author of a Texvri 
(cf. Grg. 462b11-12), and this may be evidence for the other side of the 
argument. Notwithstanding this difficulty, it is entirely appropriate that 
Polus’ name should appear at this point, since in Grg. 470c9ff. he is repre­
sentative of the type of young man who would justify and exalt tyrannical 
ambitions (see lntr. ch. I, b, iii); and this is therefore a likely indication also 
for the priority of Grg. over Thg.
a2. ocXXol ttoXXoi: Ironic: the vaunted ability which the sophists 
possess is not so extraordinary as to be confined to a select few of them; 
the cro<|>£a they impart can be bought at a price from any number (see 
also on 127a4).
a2. co^ol: For the implicit connection between crowds and ao<j)— 
LCJTfjs, see on 121 d1.
a3. yevvaLOTCtTous.. .TrXouaiajTctTO'US: Ostensibly, the 
superlatives convey a high praise of the sophists, but the hyperbole is 
ironic: these educators are concerned solely for the profit to be won from 
rich and high-born young men (the emphasis here, an accretion onto the 
original passage from Ap., is no doubt meant for the benefit of Demodocus, 
who is well aware of the sophists’ fees [121 d6]; cf. the definition of cro<|)-
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icttikt) in Sph. 223b1-7, esp. b5-6 vecov ttXouqicov Kat evSo^ojv 
yiyvopevri erjpa).
a4. oTs e£e<JTiv: "Who have the opportunity"; said to be somewhat 
less complimentary than c^ecrTiv + accusative, see Thompson ad Men. 
90e10f.
a4-5. tco v... cruveivai: Cf. 127a3-4;ol KaXoi Kayaeoi Ta 
TroXiTiKa are now identified simply as ol TroXiTai.
a4. T(Dv ttoXitq)p: An explicit contrast with the sophists, who are
all $€voi.
a5. toutous TrciOono'iv: The resumptive repetition (picking up 
TreiQouoTP 128a2) after an interruption in the narrative is quite normal in 
Plato, e.g. Grg. 456c8-d5, Prt. 311e1 -4; see Reinhard, Die Anakolouthe 
151ff.; Jowett-Campbell II.229-30; Denniston, GPS 90. As Hollenberg re­
cognized (358), there are no grounds for the charge (Stallbaum 223, Stein­
hart 464, Heidel 53 n.2) that the author of Thg. has transparently and uncrit­
ically reproduced the anacolouthon of the parallel Ap. passage, for our 
passage is simply not anacolouthic.
a5. (XTroXeiTrovTas: Cobet's aiToXiTrovTas would bring our text 
into line with Ap. 20a1, but cf. Prt. 316c7 aiToXciTroPTas, and the present 
participle here is parallel with the present TrpOKaTaTieevTas a6. The 
present participle can also signify antecedent action, where the aorist is 
expected; see R. Renehan, Studies in Greek Texts (Gottingen, 1976) 157- 
9.
a5-6. tols ... cruV€i vai: cnjvouara and awoivai came to be 
especially associated with the meeting of sophist and pupil; see Taylor ad 
Ti. 17a5. On this thematic word see Intr. ch. I, b, vii.
a5. eKeivcnv: Sc. tc2v ttoXitgov.
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a6-7. TTpOKaTOtTL0€ VTas...P-icrOo v: As so often in the Corpus 
a reference to the sophists is accompanied by a reference to their fees; see 
on 121d5.
a6. TTpOKaTaTLOe VTas: The meaning of the TTpoa— element in 
Trpoo'KaTaTL0evTas of mss. is elusive; we expect it most naturally to 
signify "in addition" or "besides," as Ar. Nu. 1235. The text in 128a5-7 may 
be paraphrased "the sophists persuade the young men to abandon their 
association with those people (i.e. ol ttoXitcii a4), to associate with 
them, to pay a great deal of money/n addition, and to be grateful in addition 
to this." But this is otiose, and the passage would be much more pointed if 
we suppose that the original reading was TTpOK<XTa.Ti0e VTag, subse­
quently corrupted to the mss. reading under the influence of Trpos in a7 
(parablepsis). The sophistic practice of taking money in advance (Trpo—) 
is enunciated by Isocrates (13.5), and may be hinted at in R. 337d9-10; at 
Prt. 328b7 the perfect aTroSeScoKev would seem to imply advance pay­
ment (see Adam ad loc.), although an alternative form of remuneration is 
also mentioned by Protagoras in that passage, a form nevertheless clearly 
peculiar to him (b6-c2). In fact, it appears that advance payment was the 
standard method used by the sophists; see D.L Blank, ClassAnt 4 (1985) 
10ff., where the relevant passages are gathered. As the Isocratean 
passage above indicates, the notion of advance payment was considered 
offensive, and here it would arouse a similar feeling in Demodocus: he is 
already suspicious of the sophists, and will be shocked to hear that they 
want payment before they have even accomplished anything. The only 
difficulty with this proposal is that TTpOK cxtocti Grip.i in the sense "pay in 
advance" seems unexampled. But KaTcmOqpi = "pay" or "deposit" is so 
well established that the preverb Trpo— would have imparted a readily in­
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telligible meaning to the word, and in any event TrpoaKctTOCTi0r|p.i is 
itself barely attested (LSJ s.v. list as classical examples only our passage 
and the line from Ar. Nu. above). Similarly the compound avyKaTa™ 
TiOripi is first attested in Plato (Grg. 501 c5).
a6-7. apyupiov Travu ttoXu puaOdv: itoXuv BTW; Schanz 
deletes apyupiov as a gloss on picredv, while Cobet reads TrapTroXu. 
Some sort of emendation is indeed necessary, since the passage is awk­
ward ifpioQov receives the adjectival qualification, as it must do if 
ttoXuv stands. Beck’s ttoXu (anticipated by Ficino) is therefore the sim­
plest solution, and picredv becomes appositional with apyupiov Travu 
ttoXu (cf. Prt 311 d2).
a6-7. apyupiov.. .yapiv: For the co-ordination ofxPW&Ta 
and X^piS, cf. (with Schanz ad Ap. 19e) La. 187a1-3, Cri. 48c8-d1, Crat. 
391 b10, X. Mem. 3.5.23.
a7. eiSevai. toutcdv: Asyndeton is frequent in rhetorical con­
texts where the speaker introduces, with emphasis, his final point (see 
Denniston, GPS 120).
a8-b1. €Ik6s...€Ik6s: The argument from "probability" or "likeli­
hood" is a rhetorical commonplace; cf. Phdr. 272d7ff., and Thesleff 87; also 
id., Arctos 4 (1966) 97-8; rhetorical also is the anaphora of the word.
a8. cikos r|V: For the absence of av in a potential statement, see 
Goodwin, MT2 151 f.
a8. auTov ere: See on 127d7.
b1-4. ou8ev...epCDTiKCDv: For the importance of this sentence to 
the interpretation of Thg., and for the likely antecedent of the thoughts ex­
pressed here, see lntr. ch. I, b, vi.
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b1-2. ouSev...|JLa0r|p.dT(nv: The standard literary Socratic claim 
to ignorance; cf. (Znf. al.) Ap. 21d2-7, 23a7-b4, C/?rn?. 165b7-c1, Grg. 506a3- 
5, Men. 80c8-d3,77tf. 150c4-d2; see especially M. Hiestand, Das Sokrat- 
ische Nichtwissen in Platons ersten Dialogen (Zurich, 1923); also Vlastos, 
PhQ 35 (1985) 1-31, esp. 1-11 for testimonia. But the present instance is 
significantly different from the stereotyped claim, see on b2-4.
b1. JJiaKapLtnv: For the ironical value of this word, cf. the common cS 
imctKctpie; and for its application to sophists, cf. Hp. ma. 304b7, Euthd. 
303c4. The exact meaning is hard to identify: it can denote something or 
someone elevated above the human norm, or something granted someone 
by divine favour, or something which reveals outstanding success, or simp­
ly someone or something which is unique in a particular way; see C. De 
Heer, MAKAP-EYAAIMQN-OABIOZ-ErTTXHZ (Amsterdam, 1969) 
56-7, 83-7.
b2. gttgl: See on 127a3.
b2. epouXopriv av: The assertion continues the irony in Socra­
tes' tone. For the impf. of pouXopcti + av = vellem, see on 122a7; it is es­
pecially frequent among the orators, cf. Ant. De caed. Her. 1, Lys. 12.22, 
86, Isoc. 15.114, Is. 10.1, Lycurg. §3, Aeschin. Ctes. 2; a parody in Ar. Ec. 
151f.
b2-4. aXXa...€po)TLK(Bv: Socrates often confesses a suscepti­
bility to young male beauty or a desire for particular young men (e.g. Men. 
76c1-2, Phdr. 227c3f., Ale. 1103a1ff.; X. Mem. 2.6.28; Aeschin. Socr. Ale. fr. 
11c Dittmar), yet the positive claim to be skilled in nothing but toc epen- 
tikcc is exceedingly rare, cf. Smp. 177d7f., 198d1 f., 212b6f., Lys. 204b8f.; 
and in our passage this statement appears abrupt and intrusive (so Hein­
dorf [see Hollenberg 354]; Schleiermacher ad loc.-, Stallbaum ad loc.’,
390
Heidel 54 n.7; Lamb 345). But Socrates’ words are thematically motivated; 
they introduce what is to Socrates the difference between cruvovcria with 
himself and with the sophists; see Intr. ch. I, b, vi, vii.
b3. S'qTrou ("of course," "as you know") practically assumes (perhaps 
ironically, see Denniston, GP2 267; KG 11.131) a foreknowledge in Thea­
ges and Demodocus of what Socrates is about to say. What follows, how­
ever, does not appear to have been a well-known profession of Socrates' 
(see on b2-4); but see below on b3.
b3. del: Socrates appears to be saying that his claim to know noth­
ing but toc epcoTiKa is a regular one, yet this is hardly borne out by the 
frequency with which he elsewhere actually professes a knowledge in 
love-matters (see on b2-4). Difficulties are removed, it is true, if we under­
stand del to refer not to the sentence as a whole but simply to Socrates' 
customary assertion of ignorance in b3 alone. Alternatively, del could be 
taken distributively, "from time to time," "on occasion." Nevertheless in Phd. 
72e3-5 Cebes is able to allude to the doctrine of anamnesis with the words 
koct’ eKCivov tov \dyov...ov cru [sc. ZaoKpaTqs] cicoeas edpa 
Xeyeiv. even though only one dialogue containing a reference to ana­
mnesis can certainly be dated earlier than Phd., viz., Men. (cf. 81a5-e2). In 
both places the inconsistency can best be explained, I think, by the 
author's desire to stress the contextual importance of the topic that is being 
referred to (though Burnet [ad Phd. 72e4] not unexpectedly explains the 
language of Phd. by the datum that the historical Socrates himself upheld 
the theory of anamnesis); see further Intr. ch. I, b, vi.
b3. cos erros eiiTeiv: Socrates adds the same qualification to his 
profession of ignorance in Ap. 22c9-d1 epauTco yap cjuvrj8r| ouScv 
€Tri(7Ta|jicva) cos ctfos eiTreiv kt\.
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b4. ttXt]V. . . |ia0T]|^aTOS: Cf. 122c8 and n. for a similar ironic de­
vice; and for the impact of the device as used here, see lntr. ch. I, b, vi.
b4. piaOTiiJiaTOS: That Socrates calls tcc epcoTiKa a |jLoc©rj|jLoc has 
important implications for the interpretation of this passage, and for 
evaluating the author’s intentions; see lntr. ch. I, b, vi, vii.
b5-6. touto. . .vuv: Not only is Socrates skilled in Tot eptoTLKa, 
but there has never been a man as 8 ei vos at the skill as he. These 
words take on a substantial veneer of irony (see following nn.), yet in a very 
important sense they are consistent with some (though not all) of Socrates' 
later statements; see lntr. ch. I, b, vi, vii.
b5-6. touto. . .Trap’ ovtlvouv Troioupm.. .tgov vuv: In­
terlaced word order of this kind (abab structure) is considered to be 
especially characteristic of Plato's late style (see lntr. ch. IV, b). Here it may 
convey a mock-elevated tone in Socrates' words.
b5. jJtevTOL reinforces the demonstrative tou to, as often; see 
Denniston, GP2 399f. The usage, absent outside of dialogue (ib. 401), is a 
conversational, and probably colloquial, idiom.
b5-6. Trap’ ovtlvouv: A slightly contrived form of comparison, see 
Riddell §174 (to whose references add [with Knebel] La. 183c6-8, ion 
539e1-5). The dislocation of Trap’ ovtlvouv from tcov. . .vuv b5-6 also 
increases the (ironic) gravity of the report about Socrates’ unparalleled 
talent.
b5. TTOLOupaL: Numerous substitutes have been suggested for this, 
the consensus reading, which has often been considered devoid of in­
telligible meaning: OLopaL or TTpocnroLou|jiaL Stallbaum, without print­
ing (the first was taken up by Schanz, the second by Hirschig); rjyovpar 
Cobet; avTLTroiou|j.aL Fritzsche, who also draws attention to ttou oTpaL
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Phd. 85b4 (BW). There is in fact no need for emendation, for TrotoupocL 
not infrequently means "I am reputed," cf. R. 498a3, 538c2, 573b2, 574d6 
(see LSJ A.VI s.v.), and it is characteristic of Socrates that he should repre­
sent these laudatory words as the expressions of others: while he claims 
simply to know about toc opaoTiKCC, others say he is the greatest authority 
on it Thus in Smp. 221c2ff. (a passage which our author may have had in 
mind here) it is partly because of Socrates’ disposition towards toc 
epcoTiKcc that the drunken Alcibiades reckons Socrates to be like no man, 
prjTe tcSv ttocXoclcSv (jLt)Te tcDv vvv ovtcov (similarly d3-4). Alterna­
tively, TroioupccL could be translated as "acknowledge" (see J. Rudhart, 
MH 19 [1962] 39-64), in which case Socrates’ statement becomes much 
more assertive. This interpretation however has the advantage of antici­
pating the tone Socrates later assumes (128d1-130e4) in relating stories 
about his influence on others around him. TTOLoOpoci also gains indirect 
support from its presence in the paraphrase of b5-6 by Aristaenetus (I.4).
b5. Seivos: For the ironic content of this word, see on 126a12-b1; 
and for its use here, see Intr. ch. I, b, vi.
b5-6. tcov. ..vfiv: Regular Greek form would involve a superlative 
expression + T(3v vuv alone (see Fraenkel ad A. Ag. 532), but the in­
clusion of tcjov TTpoyeyovorav as well is a slyly hubristic touch which 
must be ironic (the effect is softened somewhat if ttoloupea b5 is inter­
preted in the first of the two ways suggested above [on b5]). It does, 
however, lay the degree of emphasis on toc epcoTiKcc that the author is 
seeking; see Intr. ch. I, b, vi.
b7. ‘Opqcs...otl. . .p.01 Sokol: So BTW; Cobet rejected the 
redundant otl ("insanientis oratio est") and altered to 6, and he was
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followed by Burnet and Lamb. But redundant oti is common in Plato, cf. 
Prt. 356a5-7, Men. 75a1-3, 87a1ff.; see Riddell §279, 280; KG ll.366f.
b7-8. otj Travu.. .Sokci ctl: If we retain tl after Sokci, with all 
mss. except Ven.189 Flor.c Ang.107, then we must assume a dislocation in 
the stereotyped phrase otj iTavu tl. But even if Lys. 204e3 Otj yap 
Travu, c<J)T|, tl is treated as evidence that tl can for no apparent reason 
be separated from Travu (I do not believe it furnishes such evidence), our 
instance is much more exaggerated, and it is better to delete tl from our 
text (Stallbaum, Hirschig, Burnet, Lamb), tl was an easy dittography be­
fore CTL.
b8. ctl: I fail to understand why ctl has been so often excised 
(Bekker, Baiter, Hermann, Fritzsche, Schanz, Souilhe, Carugno, Amplo, 
also suggested by Ast). In terms of sense it is unassailable (Socrates, at 
least in Theages’ mind, has already balked at the thought of becoming 
Theages’ teacher in 127a1-7 and b1, and his speech in 127d2-128b6 
suggests to Theages that he is still ot the same frame of mind), and its ab­
sence from Pal.175 is best explained as haplography after Sokcl tl.
b8. cruvSLaTpLpCLV can take on the specialized meaning of "to 
carry on a philosophical discussion with," cf. La. 188c2, Lys. 204c6, Smp. 
172c5.
b8. CTTCL...y’: See on 127a3.
b8. to ... ctol|Jlov: to y’ epidv is adverbial in Grg. 458d5, Prt. 
338c5, Chrm. 176b2-3 (see also England ad Lg. 688a6; Tucker ad R. 
345a), but the accompanying ctoljjlov in the present instance indicates 
that here to y’ c(tov is, strictly speaking, the subject: "And yet for my own 
part I am ready"; cf. La. 188c4. For to cpov, to aov, etc., as subject (but
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not gratuitous substitutes for eycj, cru), see J. Diggle, Studies on the Text 
of Euripides (Oxford, 1981) 106 (with reff.).
c1-5. aXXa.. .x^ipous: Falsely attributed to Demodocus in B; 
Socrates actually alludes to the words as Theages' own in 129e8.
c1. TFat£o)v TTpos T||ifis: Of. 125e4; for Socrates’ TraiSia see 
lntr. ch. Hi, a; and for Theages' inclusion of his father in his terms of refer­
ence, see lntr. ch. Ill, b.
c2-5. £TT€L.. .xctpous: An anticipation of 129e1-130e4. It is cur­
ious that Theages, despite his acquaintance with contemporaries who 
have improved by association with Socrates, sets out at the beginning of 
the dialogue to find a sophist to enlist as his teacher.
c3-4. tou Tty.. .tou Tty: Resumption of outos can be a rhetorical 
technique, especially in consecutive asyndetic clauses (see Denniston, 
GPS 107-8); but the repetition here is simply a colloquial emphasis (simil­
arly 130e8); see Riddell §49; Thesleff 91; KG l.660f.
c3. ouSevds cc£loi: The idiom is common in Plato, e.g. Ap. 23b3, 
Euthd. 307a5, Phd. 88c6.
c4. cv...xpovty: Cf. 130a6; and for the order "prep.~adv.~adj./ 
noun," cf. Euthd. 303e6 ev Travu oXiyty xpov'cy; see Riddell §299.
c4. peXTious: In what respect? Theages' terminology is as vague 
as ever (also cSx^pous), and we must, I suppose, assume he means 
"better in discussion and argumentation," which is what Aristides claims to 
have become through association with Socrates (130c2-3). Yet Theages' 
choice of vocabulary proves to have importance as a description of the 
effect Socrates generally has over others; see lntr. ch. I, b, vi, vii; c.
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c5. (jxxivovTOti: Ast's ocjxxi vovto is unnecessary: the present de­
notes a lasting effect, "appeared and still do"; see Stallbaum ad loc.; KG 
1.135-7; Schwyzer-Debrunner II.273-4.
c6. (ff TTCtL At)|jio86kou: Although this solemn address may be 
ironic (see Adam ad Prt. 328d8), if that is the tone here it is not obvious. 
Perhaps it was chosen for our passage as suitable to the lofty theme, the 
divine sign, which Socrates is about to introduce, as also Ale. 1103a1 
(where the divine sign is mentioned a5f.); cf. similarly Crat. 384a£ ttocl 
'Itttto vlkolj 'Eppoyeves, anticipating the TraXaia ttocpol)jlloc (Thesieff 
[76] calls the patronymic address "ceremonious"; it is used from its first 
appearance to arrest attention, cf. Semonides fr.1 West). At times the 
address is employed quite naturally where parentage and ancestry are 
emphasized, e.g. Chrm. 158b1, La. 180d7; and for the mock-dignified 
application of (3 ttocl tlvos, cf. Euthd. 278e2, Men. 76e6.
c7. eav cru (3ou\x): For the possible source of this exchange (in­
cluding d1f.), see Intr. ch. I, b, vii.
c7-8. Kat.. .Kat: Corresponsive, see on 122b3-4.
128d1-130e10. The account of Socrates' divine sign forms the culmin­
ation of the dialogue. In terms of structure this section serves to contrast 
Socratic cru vouch ex with everything put forward up to this point about 
other educators, and can be conveniently subdivided further into two parts, 
128d1-129d8 and 129e1-130e10. The first part consists of a general 
statement about the manner in which to SctLpdvLOV manifests itself, 
followed by stories of several acquaintances who suffered by not heeding 
its advice (in one case the story involves Athens itself). The second part 
concentrates more directly upon the influence of the divine sign in the 
educational process, only one sphere within which its influence could be
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felt, but for this dialogue obviously the most thematically important. In this 
instance one example is given to demonstrate the practical effect of to 
SoctjjLdnov on the intellectual progress of an individual. In all the Platonic 
Corpus this is the most extensive repository of information for Socrates' 
divine sign; as various aspects of the representation of the divine sign in 
Thg. have been examined fully throughout earlier chapters (see Intr. ch. I, 
b, vii; ch. II, b-d; ch. Ill, a; ch. IV, d), I shall restrict the present comments to a 
few observations on the author's anecdotal style in this section.
It can be shown that much of the Socratic biographical tradition in 
antiquity was engendered and perpetuated by stories of the kind we meet 
in this part of Thg., i.e., collections of apophthegms or slightly longer re­
ports, also commonly attached to other legendary figures (e.g. Pythagoras, 
the Seven Sages [cf. Hdt. 1.27], and cf. Socrates' anecdotes in Tht. 174a4- 
8, R. 329e7ff.). This type of transmitted information becomes especially 
widespread in the Hellenistic period and onwards, but anecdotes about 
Socrates enjoyed literary circulation even within his own lifetime. The 
earliest extant evidence is Ar. Nu. 143-183: the p.a0T|Trj$ at the door of 
the phrontisterion tells Strepsiades of the marvellous wit and subtlety of his 
master through short accounts of Socrates' experiments and of his clever­
ness in procuring food for the school. Socrates' own report of Chaire- 
phon's questioning of the Delphic Oracle (Ap. 20e8-21a8; cf. X. Ap. 14) 
perhaps belongs within the same genre. It is impossible to ascertain 
whether any of the minor Socratics composed what might be considered 
collections of anecdotes or apophthegms: the titles of works which Dio­
genes Laertius transmits (e.g. 6.15-18 Antisthenes; 2.121 Crito; 2.105 
Phaedo; 2.84 Aristippus; 2.124 Simmias, Glaucon) provide no guidance in 
this matter. Aeschines Socraticus, the one minor Socratic for whom we do
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possess substantial fragments, does not seem to have constructed his 
Socratic discussions in a strictly anecdotal manner, but rather sought 
conversational verisimilitude (cf. also the remarks of Demetrius Eloc. 297). 
Xenophon on the other hand is an exponent of this kind of discussion, 
especially in Mem., which is to a great extent an episodic stitching together 
of Socratic anecdotes not altogether unlike the type we find in Thg., e.g. 
2.8ff., 2.9.1.ft, 3.9.14-15. The fragments of a papyrus from the first half of 
the third-century B.C. (PHibeh 182) contain similar reports of rather brief 
Socratic conversations, and this work may well be a fourth-century 
composition (see Turner’s notes in The Hibeh Papyri II [London, 1955] 27­
8). For the assembled evidence on the anecdotal approach to Socratic bio­
graphy in the Peripatos, see F. Amory, Class, et Med. 35 (1984) 34ff. One 
Herculaneum papyrus has a column with the heading diTocfjOeypctTCC 
ZtOKpccTOUS (see H. Cronert, RhMus 57 [1902] 285-300), and it is all but 
certain that collections of Socratic anecdotes were in existence by the first 
century B.C. (see I. Gallo, QUCC 18 [1974] 182-3). The abundant use of 
anecdotal information in Diogenes Laertius (2.18-47) reflects the same 
biographical tradition and approach (cf. D.L. 2.34); we also find occasional 
traces of this method in other authors, e.g. Cicero (cf. Tusc. 3.77, Div. 1.123 
[anecdote about the divine sign]), Plutarch (cf. Mor. 580dff.), and Athen­
aeus (cf. 14.628, 14. 643). Yet nowhere else in the Socratic anecdotal 
tradition are stories of this kind related by Socrates in the first person, as 
they are in Thg.’, and, though to Saipoviov of Socrates was bound to 
become a prominent anecdotal topic (see lntr. ch. II, b), and the anecdotes 
in this dialogue may themselves stem from oral tradition (see lntr. ch. I, b, 
vii), nevertheless a collection of such stories is something quite unique in
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extant Socratic literature, and may well reflect certain post-Platonic literary 
interests (see Intr. ch. V, b).
128d1-129d8. Socrates' divine sign has attended him since childhood, 
and is distinguished mainly by its apotropaic function: it only occurs when 
he must desist from a course of action, it never urges him forward, and the 
same holds true when Socrates' friends ought not to pursue an enterprise 
which they are contemplating. Charmides did not heed the warnings of 
Socrates' sign, continued to practise for the Nemean games, and suffered 
the consequences. Likewise Timarchus, when he was leaving a sympos- 
ion, disobeyed Socrates' exhortations not to depart, after the divine sign 
had come to Socrates; Timarchus was thereupon caught in an attempted 
assassination of a certain Nicias. The divine sign also came to Socrates at 
the departure of the Sicilian Expedition, and even while Socrates speaks 
Sannio is off on a military venture to Ionia: a shadow was cast over this 
man's departure by the occurrence of Socrates' sign.
These accounts represent an ascending scale of disasters for the 
individuals and groups involved: first, an apparently trivial instance 
(Charmides); next, the personal destruction of Timarchus; the loss of the 
Sicilian Expedition, felt by all Athenians; and finally an incident involving 
an otherwise unknown Sannio and the Athenian fleet in general, which 
carries the discussion to contemporary circumstances. Three of these pre­
monitions occur on typical occasions for divine guidance and assistance, 
i.e., athletic games and battles (a military expedition also figures in the final 
anecdote in 130a6-7, c1 ff.). Note as well that all the warnings that Socra­
tes here brings down through the agency of the divine sign are non-moral 
in character, that is to say, the sign causes Socrates to recommend not the 
juster, but the safer, course of action (see Intr. ch. II, a, b). The Timarchus
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episode is no different in this respect, since it is there said, not that 
Timarchus attempted to take another person’s life, and thereby committed 
an unjust act, because he disobeyed Socrates and the sign, but simply that 
his disobedience cost him his own life (129a7-8, c7-8).
At first sight the four incidents in this section appear to bear little 
relation to the question of Socrates' suitability as a companion. But as 
Socrates himself remarks later (129e1 ff.), they reveal that the divine sign 
"is almighty" (to ccttocv SwctTai e3) in his associations with others, and 
this includes his educational associations. The connection is nevertheless 
not completely coherent; see on 129e1.
d1. cuyaOc: Seeon125b3.
d2-5. ccttl .. .ouSottotc: Ap. 31c7-d4 is the source (see Intr. ch. II 
n.28).
d2~3. ecrTL.. .ccfti: eaTi/'Fjv opening a sentence frequently begins 
a new story, account, or section of a narrative, cf. Prt. 320c8, Menex. 237c5, 
Phdr. 249d4; see J.P. Barron, CQ n.s. 14 (1964) 220 and n.2 (with refer­
ences). The use here is highly emphatic (here underlined by the repeti­
tion) and grandiloquent, cf. 130e5; see Gildersleeve I.32.
d2. e cttl ... Trap otto (jlovov: The periphrastic form (for Trap — 
otto Tai) marks ean out for special emphasis (see on 123a9-b1, and
W.J. Alexander, AJP 4 [1883] 300ff.); in fact emphasis has dictated word 
order generally in this sentence, n.b. the postponement of 8ai|rdviov 
(d3) to climactic final position in apposition with ti (d2).
d2. Gciqt |io£pQC: For the importance of this detail, see Intr. ch. I, b, 
vii] and on the connection of the phrase with to 8aipdviov of Socrates, 
see Intr. ch. II, b.
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d2. Trapeiropcvov: eTropevos and its compounds are "often used 
in connection with daemons" (R.G. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City [Princeton, 
1960] 458 n.200). For the implications of this connection, see lntr. ch. II, b.
d3. ck. . .dpgdpcvov: This piece of information, which occurs also 
in Ap., may well have suggested a specific "demological” line of thought for 
our author, see lntr. ch. II, a. Plutarch was likely thinking of the present 
passage when he called the divine sign (Mor. 580c) a TrpOTTo8T]ydv 
apxf]S (see Appendix 1).
d3. Saipovtov: On the controversy over the substantival vs. adject­
ival use of this word when used to describe Socrates’ divine sign, see lntr. 
ch. II, a, and nn.16-8.
d3-5. ecrTi.. . ovSeiTOTe: A fundamental characteristic of to 8ai~ 
poviov, see lntr. ch. II, a (also for d3 <j>0)vr\, d4 y epr|Tai [and nn.24, 34], 
d4 OTjpaivci [and n.12]).
d5-7. Kai .. .TrpaTTCLV: This extension of the apotropaic function 
of the divine sign to the activity of Socrates’ friends is a feature present in 
Xenophon’s description of the divine sign (cf. Mem. 1.1.4, Ap. 13), but Plato 
never mentions it in works that are definitely genuine (see lntr. ch. II, a, b). 
Heidel argues (53 n.2) that this sentence is "at once seen to be an 
unfortunate attempt to vary the phrase" (sc. from that of Ap. 31d2-4), but it is 
in fact more than that: Socrates will proceed immediately to enumerate 
witnesses (pap tv pots d7) for his statement, ensuring that d5-7 are any­
thing but superfluous.
d6. dvaKOLV(3Tai: "Consult," properly of sharing information con­
cerning oneself with another, cf. Lys. 206c1, La. 180a1, Prt. 314b7; X. An. 
3.1.5. The word implies communication with Socrates for the intentional
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purpose of gaining advice on a contemplated course of action; but the 
following anecdotes do not quite bear this procedure out.
d6. TauTOV touto: Colloquial (cf. 130c5 tou wtiov), see 
Thesleff 91; Stallbaum ad Phlb. 37d; cf. Smp. 178e1, Men. 90d7-e1, Prt. 
318a8.
d7-8. Kai.. .Trape£op.aL: Cf. Ap. 19d1, 20e7, Smp. 215b7-8. 
d7. Tjp.LV: Socrates' previous description of the basic behaviour of his
divine sign was addressed to Theages alone (ae d1, ctol d2); from the 
present point up to 129d8 Socrates’ narrative is directed towards both 
Demodocus and his son (cf. d8 717vodcrKETe, 129a1 pou\ca0e, a5 
up.LP, c7 up.iv, d1 aKOUdecreop); then from 129e1 to 130e10 Socrates 
reverts to addressing his words primarily at Theages (129e1 ctol, 129e8 
cru qcreqaaL). For the significance of this change of pronouns, see Intr. 
ch. I, b, vii.
d8-129c8. Xapp.i8r|V... dTrLaTqcrai: The extent to which story­
telling convention has been imposed upon these anecdotes about Charm­
ides and Timarchus is considerable. Just enough information is offered in 
both accounts to create the kind of aristocratic ambience in which Socrates 
so commonly moves (see following nn. pass.). There are additionally a few 
features common to the "miracle" story (see on 129b1). At the close of the 
Charmides episode the author heightens interest through the use of 
praeteritio (128e8-129a1), and in the Timarchus anecdote strict logic is at 
one point partially sacrificed to dramatic convenience (see on 129c3-5). 
The unheeded warning which leads to disaster is, moreover, a story 
pattern of a popular kind particularly familiar from Herodotus (see H. 
Bischoff, Der Warner bei Herodot [Diss. Marburg, 1932]; R. Lattimore, CP 
34 [1939] 24-35).
402
d8-129a1. Xap,Ai8T)V... daKT] crews: Nothing else is known of 
this incident, but the athletic contest at least is a typical occasion for a 
prophetic utterance. As H. Muller noted (472 n.24), it is worth considering 
the details of this anecdote in the light of the closing portion of Chrm. In 
Chrm. 176a6-d5 Charmides (on his identification see following n.) is repre­
sented as a young man eager for the company of Socrates, and confident 
that he will thereby become crc6(j)pcov; he is portrayed, in other words, as 
conscientious and determined. Yet at the same time both he and Critias 
are unwilling to allow Socrates a say in the matter of this proposed associ­
ation (c5ff.). In Thg. Charmides, conformably with his character in Chrm., 
practises diligently, thinking it will benefit him; but, like the character in 
Chrm., he disregards the prohibitions and counsel of Socrates. It is char­
acteristic of biographical anecdotes in general that they rely heavily on 
prior literary evidence (see M. R. Lefkowitz, The Lives of the Greek Poets 
[Baltimore, 1981] viii-ix; also below on d8).
d8. Xapp.L8r|V: The nephew of Critias and uncle of Plato. He joined 
in the oligarchic revolution of 404 and fell with Critias in 403 (cf. X. HG 
2.4.19), and is familiar as an acquaintance of Socrates from both Platonic 
and Xenophontic works; cf. Chrm., Prt. 315a1; X. Mem. 3.6.1,3.7.1-9.
d8. Xappi 8r|V... touto vi,: For the omission of the article, see 
on 127c8; but the pronoun here is not deictic, signifying rather "the well 
known," cf. Hp. ma. 282b4, 282c2.
d8. tov KaXov yevdp.evov: Plato and the Platonic Socrates are 
elsewhere at pains to emphasize the extraordinary beauty of Charmides; 
cf. Chrm. 154a3-155e3, Smp. 222b1 ff. For the force of this epithet, see on 
129d4-5 (I can see little effect in H. Muller's assertion [472 n.24] that 
kccXos cannot have been used of physical beauty here; the word is
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plurivalent, and may refer simultaneously to beauty of both body and 
character), yevopevov in this passage makes particular sense if the 
author had in mind the early portion of Chrm. (154a4-b7), in which Critias 
tells Socrates how attractive Charmides has become (yeyovev b6) since 
Socrates last saw him (Cobet's emendation to Xeyop.evov is super­
fluous).
e1. tov rXauKtnvos: The addition of a patronymic expression, a 
demotic, or the like, to the name of a character, seems to be an occasional 
anecdotal feature, cf. 129a2, b1 -2, d4-5, 130a4-5, a8~9; see Dover ad Nu. 
156.
e1. rXauKOJVOS* oStos: The asyndeton is quite normal where an 
introductory pronoun refers back to the sentence immediately preceding, or 
to a character within that sentence, cf. 130a5; see Denniston, GPS 109-10.
e1. ttotc: Vague ttotc referring to an indeterminate past and intro­
ducing a report of some kind (cf. 130a4) is a story-telling commonplace: it 
occurs as early as Homer (cf. Od. 8.76), appears frequently, for instance, 
when Pindar breaks into mythical digressions (e.g. Ol. 6.13, 7.34, 72), and 
is used regularly by Xenophon in Mem. (e.g. 1.6.1, 1.6.11, 2.2.1, 2.3.1) 
when he is setting basic dramatic scenery for a Socratic story.
e2„ jjic XXtn v: The divine sign comes when someone other than 
Socrates is on the verge of acting; elsewhere in the Corpus it occurs when 
Socrates himself is about to proceed, cf. Phdr. 242b8, Ap. 40a6, b3, c3; see 
lntr. ch. II, a, b.
e2. p.€XXtnv acricfjcFeLV: Cf. e3 jieXXoi aciKeiv: the future ctCFK— 
rjcreLV denotes intention, the present aoxeTv imminence; see Magnien 
11.104; Goodwin, MT2 20.
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e2. O'TecSiov: The use of the article with this word is rather fluid: 
Plato attaches it in Lg. 833a10, but cf. (with Fritzsche) X. An. 4.8.27. The 
prize for the stadion was the most eagerly sought-after of all the athletic 
events in the various games, and Charmides' zeal for this prize typifies the 
aristocratic circles in which Socrates involved himself.
e2. eis Nepeav: We might expect eis N epe a (the games as 
opposed to the place), but metonymy in the use of place names is quite 
common (see KG 1.12), and Pindar for instance frequently employs a place 
name to denote the athletic games held there (e.g. Ol. 7.82, Nem. 6.19-20).
e3. apyopevov.. .peXXoi: A few secondary mss. have peXXei, 
but the optative is admissible, ocpyopevov being an imperfect participle; 
see KG 1.200; J. Humbert, Syntax grecque3 (Paris, 1960) 172f.; A. Oguse, 
Recherches sur le participe circonstanciel en grec ancien (Wetteren, 1962) 
42f.
e3-4. T| (JxDvrj: The article, absent from W and Aelian, is clearly re­
quired here.
e4. olckcd Xvov .. . ei no v: The imperfect defines broadly the 
sphere within which the action of the aorist falls; cf. Euthd. 288b3-4, R. 
328c5; see KG 1.157f.; Gildersleeve 1.91-2; K. Strunk, Glotta 49 (1971) 201­
3; J.L. Rose, The Durative and Aoristic Tenses in Thucydides (Baltimore, 
1942) 18-20.
e4-5. AeyovTOs... peTa£v: Cf. Ap. 40b3-4 kocitoi ev aXXois 
Xoyois ttoXXocxoij 8fj pe eTreaxe [sc. to tov 6eov aqpeTov] 
XeyovToc peTOC^v.
e5. T| tov Saipoviov: The phrase occurs also as a consensus 
reading in Ap. 40a4 (t) yap eico6vid poi pavTiKq r) tov 8aipov- 
iov), but it is secluded there by Schleiermacher, whose primary objection
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was that the phrase personalizes to Sccipomov excessively (see Burnet 
ad loc.; few editors have followed Schleiermacher). But in Ap. Socrates’ 
language (evai/Tioupevr) a6, ei tl (leXXoipii a6, to tou Qeou orjp.” 
etov b1) makes it clear that his customary (jlocvtlkt) is in fact the direct 
consequence of to SocLpovLOU, and he is in any event persistently vague 
in his description of the divine sign (see further Intr. ch. II, a). By a circular 
form of reasoning Schleiermacher (ad loc., followed by Cousin 425) faulted 
the presence of q tou Sccipoviou in Thg. (cf. also 129e1-2, e7-8) as an 
un-Platonic expression; but I doubt it should ever have been questioned in 
Ap. Still, that the divine sign in Thg. has been personalized can hardly be 
denied (pace Zeller 11.15 73 n.4); see Intr. ch. II, b, d.
e5. aXXa introducing an exhortation is probably a less formal idiom 
(very rare in the orators, see Denniston, GP214), though not necessarily 
colloquial (common in tragedy, ib.).
e6. VLKfjcra): A modal future (since parallel with e7 (jieXXco vlk&v), 
cf. 121 d6; see Magnien 11.188.
e8. oj crop-cxi: Cobet needlessly emended to tn<j)eXfjo‘”
opoci ("Plato et Platonis imitatores dicebant co^eXTjaojj.ccL"): a form of 
oj<})eXfjcro|j.ai (i.e., middle with passive meaning, see LSJ s.v.) occurs 
only once in Plato (R. 343c1, where there is a varia lectio w<j>eXr|0Tjcr— 
ovtocl in M), against two instances of ux^eXriOfjcrovTCCi (Hp. ma. 285a7 
bis). co <j)eXfj copai is indeed common in the passive sense "derive 
advantage" (see Magnien 1.177), but by no means is it used to the exclu­
sion of the future passive in 0^; see Magnien 1.375; KG 1.116.
e8. TauTa: For the asyndeton see on e1. 
e8. TpjKei: Inceptive imperfect.
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e8-129a1. a£iov... do’KTfcrctns: The allusiveness of the state­
ment seems to indicate that the outcome of Charmides’ practising was 
common knowledge to the contemporary reader of Thg., though we know 
nothing about it ourselves. However, it is pointless to argue (Willing 180) 
that Thg. must therefore have been written when the event was still a 
matter of first-hand knowledge. The story may indeed be factually-based; 
yet the author, if he had fabricated the story, might equally have felt that an 
explicit account of the anecdote’s actual conclusion would have been 
superfluous and less dramatically effective (129d2-3 is somewhat similar); 
see Schleiermacher 173 for further suggestions. Robin’s proposed solu­
tion of the meaning of this sentence (1643: "se blessa-t-il de maniere a 
perdre sa beaute native?’’) is merely an attractive guess.
e8-129a1. cx£lov. . . a'UTO'U: Charmides is still alive, a detail con­
sistent with the dramatic date of Thg.; see lntr. ch. V, Appendix, and d8 n.
a1-c8. cl .. .d'mo’T'no'aL: Nothing is known either of the characters 
named in this story or of the incidents related. The anecdote likely de­
pends in a few details on Socrates’ account of an occurrence of to 8ocl~ 
(jlovlop in Euthd. 272d7ff.; see on b1, b8. The story is more highly ani­
mated than the previous one (see on a7-8, a8-9, c1-2); for the supposed 
presence of novellistic traits, see Bruns 346-7; Gigon, Sokrates 172-3 (see 
also S. Trenkner, The Greek Novella [Cambridge, 1958] 46-55, for novell­
istic themes of intrigue).
a1. cl 8c pouXccrQc: A common conversational idiom in Plato 
(Attic; see W. Schmid, Der Atticismus //[Stuttgart, 1897] 64-5), serving as a 
transitional formula, "or if you like," "then again"; see Thompson ad Men. 
71 e2. The incomplete protasis (no complementary infinitive) is sound 
Greek; see Riddell §254, and on a2 cpccrGc.
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a2. tov Tijj.dpxou d8eX<j>dv KXeiTopiaxov: Both names 
are fairly common in inscriptions, but neither of our characters can be 
identified. Plutarch likely named the hero of his myth in the De genio 
Socratis after the Timarchus of this anecdote; see Appendix 1.
a2. epeoOe Wc(also Coisl.155 independently, it would seem); ep— 
ecrOoci (BTW) would complement the formulaic ei 8e pouXeaOe a1, a 
construction not unparalleled in Plato (cf. Smp. 177b1ff.), but much less 
idiomatic than if epecrOe is retained (see on a1). The lack of apodosis to 
ei 8e pouXeaGe...epeaOctL would not be impossible by any means 
(see on 131a3; Stallbaum and Knebel, who accept epeer©cct, compare 
Grg. 454b9ff., but that passage [anacolouthic] is very different); but ep— 
ea©at is probably the result of an ignorance of the Attic idiom cited above 
(a1).
a3. dTroeavoiip.evos igei: eTpt, epxopat, patven, and the like, 
in conjunction with a future participle, can serve one of two possible func­
tions: 1) they can, as in the large majority of instances, retain their primary 
notion of physical movement (as, e.g., 129d5-6); 2) less often, the verb 
loses its sense of motion, lapses into a mere auxiliary, and verb + future 
participle become a periphrastic construction. 2) has been virtually ig­
nored in comprehensive discussions of periphrastic constructions, which 
are usually concerned only with eTvai or exetv + future participle (e.g. W. 
Aerts, Periphrastica [Amsterdam, 1965]; W.J. Alexander, AJP 4 [1883] 291­
308). Even Magnien, who devotes considerable space to the construction 
(II.8-20), lumps 1) and 2) together rather indiscriminately, distinguishing 
them only by the remark that epxo|J.at + eptov (vel. sim.), which according 
to his list occurs in Herodotus, Xenophon, and Plato, is used "indiquant la 
marche du discours" (18). But epyopLat/elpt are occasionally coupled
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with a future participle that denotes something other than speaking; cf. Prt. 
311e5-6, Tht. 198e2-5; Ar. Ec. 574-5 (perhaps also Plut. 844). In the form 
in which I have printed 129a3 (see on a3 [eu0u tou SaijjLOViou]), tqci 
aTroOa.vo'ujj.evos must be considered another example of this latter 
idiom. The v.l. €tT|L (sic) by the original hand of B (i.m.) could possibly 
represent a misunderstanding of this construction, and eirj may originally 
have been written by B and W in c7 (see app.crit. ad loc.)', but the verb in 
a7 and c6 has been left untampered with in all mss.
a3. -qci: Singular despite the plural subject (eKeivos to Kai Eu~ 
aQXos a4), since Euathlos is an afterthought; cf. b1, Ap. 36a9, Phd. 7765­
6, Lys. 207d6; a mark of a loose conversational tone.
a3. [eu0u tou 8aip.ov(ou]: This phrase cannot stand in our texts, 
and should probably be deleted outright; for one explanation of its pre­
sence in all mss., see Appendix 3.
a4-5. Kat.. .<)>euyovTa: In Attic law one who protected a fugitive 
was liable to the same punishment as the fugitive, cf. D. 50.49; also Lys. 
29.11.
a4. EuaOXos 6 aTaSioSpopicnv: Nothing certain is known of this 
person, and Heidel (54 n.6) remarks that EuctGXos "has the appearance 
of a name chosen to suit the fictitious character." But EuaOXos may just 
happen to be a particularly apt name; cf. the statue dedicated at Olympia to 
the wrestling victor ^epeviKOS (Paus. 6.16.1). At any rate the name 
EuaGXos appears on Attic inscriptions from the very early fourth-century 
(IG2 ll.652a, ll.653b), and we know of a Euathlos who was a pupil of 
Protagoras and an orator in his own right (see DK 80A1; Kirchner, Proso- 
pographica Attica [Berlin,1901] s.v. EuaQXos; cf. also Athen. 619e, Quint. 
Inst. 3.1.10). To my mind the only known historical personage who might
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possibly be identified with our Euathlos is the individual who prosecuted 
Thucydides son of Melesias sometime between 433 and 425 (see Mac- 
Dowell ad Ar. Vesp. 592, 947). If the identification is correct, Socrates' 
mention of Euathlos would have provoked a reminiscence of the demise of 
an overly ambitious young man, for in Ar. Ach. 710 Euathlos is cited as an 
example of the indecorous prosecution of a helpless old man (Thucydides) 
by a youthful advocate; on this reading Euathlos would share some 
characteristics with several impetuous characters in these anecdotes. For 
the contextual effect produced by the phrase EtjccGXos 6 qtocSlo™ 
8popuBv, see on 128e2 crTaSiov.
a4. QTa8Lo8popiQ) v: A rare word, cf. D. 59.121 (<TTCi8Lo8papi“ 
of) p.ai at E. HFQ63 is emended to cftccSici SpocpoOpocL by Bond ad 
loc.). o'TCxSioSpopios (W) is also possible, cf. Lg. 833a7.
a5. TJTre8e£aTO: Vox propria for the harbouring of a fugitive, cf. Lg. 
955b5; D. 50.49; Thue. 5.83.3; Hdt 1.41.1.
a7. picvtol emphasizes eyd), see on 128b5.
a7-8. cpxoptav diroOavoBpicvos: See on a3.
a8-9. tl. ..<t>pd<T(tf: Rhetorical interrogation is frequently employed
by the Platonic Socrates; see Riddell §325.
a9. 8t| oBv: The more common order in Plato's earlier works; oBv
8f) becomes the favoured combination in later dialogues (although 8r^ 
ofiv and oBv 8q appear in all periods). Both combinations are said to be 
rare outside of Plato and Herodotus (see Denniston, GP2 468), but this 
cannot be used as evidence for the authenticity of Thg.: the combinations 
occur also in Ale I, Epin., Epp., and Min. (see Brandwood s.v. oBv 8fj, 8t) 
oBp; also des Places 85-7).
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a9. eyd) <J>pcxcrtn: Asyndeton after the rhetorical question heightens 
expectation.
a9-b2. ozT€... 4>iXr|povi8ou: An occurrence of the divine sign in 
Euthd. 272e3 is similar, and was probably a source for our author: koctoc 
Oedv yap Tiva ctuxov Kaefjpcvos evTauea, oSttcp ctj pe elSes, 
ev Tq) aTrooUTTjpiq) povos, Kai qSrj ev vq) eixov avacrTiqvai- 
avigTapevou [cf. b1,4, 5, 7] 8e pou eyeveTo to etco0o<? agpeTov 
to Saipoviov [cf. b8]. TraXiv [cf. aBeis c1 -2] ofiv eKaeiCopqv, Kai 
oXiyqj ucTTepov [cf. c1 SiaXiTTciv xpdvov] eioepxeaOov toutcg - 
o t’ Eu0u8ripos Kai 6 AiovuodScopos ktX.
b1. aviaTaTO: For the singular verb with plural subject, see on a3
tZ€l.
b1. £K tou crupTToaiou: Again, incidental details tend to reinforce 
the impression of an aristocratic environment; cf. Theognis 467-96, and 
see on 128e2 (otocSiov), 129a4. At the same time this is perhaps the 
sort of dramatic scenery which a writer of ZcoKpaTiKOi Xoyoi working 
from a literary base, i.e., recalling the Symposia of Plato and Xenophon, 
might be tempted to adapt to his dialogue. (The symposium seems to have 
quickly become a topos of dialogue after Plato and Xenophon; cf. the 
nepi Tfjs arrvou of Heraclides Ponticus [see Gottschalk 16-17]; see 
Hug, RE 2.8 Halbe 1273ff.; R. Hirzel, Der Dialog / [Leipzig, 1895] 283f., 
359ff.)
The identification of time or circumstances (cf. a3 qviKa aTro0av” 
oupevos $€1, a9-b1 otc aviQTaTo), of place (cf. b1 ck tou aup- 
TTOcriou), and of persons involved (cf. a2 tov Tipapxou a8eX<j)dv 
KXeiTopaxov, b1-2 4>iXfjptDV 6 4>iXr|povi8ou, b2 NiKiav tov 
'HpocrKapdvSpou), is supposedly typical of ’’miracle" stories in general;
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see D.A. Stoike on Plu. De genio Socratis 580d in H.D. Betz (ed.), Plut­
arch’s Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature 3 (Leiden, 1975) 
258.
b1-2. <$>i\iqp(DV 6 4>lXtuj.ovi8ou: Philemon is a common name 
in all periods, but nothing is known about either of these figures. Still, 
behind the name Philemonides may perhaps be detected further colouring 
of the story with a specific atmosphere, since the -£8qs name ending was 
possibly noble; see B. Marzullo, Maia 6 (1953) 108-10; the evidence has 
recently been reviewed by M. Golden, Classical Views 5 (1986) 264-5.
b2-3. dTroKTevou vtcs .. .'q'rriaTda-Oqv: For the juxtaposition 
of dual and plural, cf. Prt. 317e1; see KG I.69-74.
b2. Nlkiccv tov ‘HpooKCtpdvSpO'u: Not the Athenian general 
who died at Syracuse in 413 during the Sicilian Expedition. While Nicias 
is a very common name, it is interesting that the rare ’HpooKapdvSpos 
turns up on two third-century inscriptions (they may refer to the same man), 
and that in both cases the deme is Socrates’ own, Alopeke (IG2 H.859.52, 
11.1811); see Friedlander 153.
b3. 'q'mo'TdcrOriv.. . povcn: The successive duals lay emphasis 
on the clandestine nature of the plot, further underlined by the adjective 
povos (for povco ci.Phdr. 236c8, Menex. 236d2, Clit. 406a10). The stress 
is important here since the credibility of Socrates' clairvoyant powers must 
be guaranteed.
b4. Trpos epe (BW); Trpos pe (T) is also defensible, cf. 125e4, Tht 
145b8, Chrm. 165b6, Men. 91 a2; see J. Vendryes, Traite d'accentuation 
grecque (Paris, 1945) 103.
b4. efTrev.. .ecjyq: For <j)dvai in parenthesi after an introductory 
verb of speaking, cf. b7, Chrm. 164e5-6; see Thompson ad Men. 95e;
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Tucker ad R. 329b. Its effect here is to preserve a natural and spontane­
ous flavour for the telling of the tale.
b4. Tl XeyeLs: Perhaps allied with the colloquial tl ttpocttcls 
(on which see Stevens 41). But these words may imply, like the opening 
words of Hp. mi. (363a1 Zu Se Sq tl QLyps, (3 ZcoKpaTes), and (possi­
bly) those of Hipparch. (225a1 Tl yap to <j)L\OKepSes; [where the use 
of yap is suggestive]), that the characters are supposed to be in the 
middle of a conversation of some kind.
b5. Upets.. .TTLVCTe: The plural is a little odd after the singular 
address (3 ZcoKpaTes (b4), but perfectly understandable in the context of 
informal conversation (cf. Lamb: "Go on drinking, all of you"; Souilhe: 
"Bouvez vous autres"). The same combination of plural imperative and 
singular vocative occurs in Ar. Vesp. 975-6, but there it is part of the comic 
incongruity of the passage (see MacDowell ad loc.). However, compare 
the rather more stereotyped shift in Euthd. 283b4: Eltt€ poL, e<J>rj, (3 
ZcoKpaTes Te KaL upeLS ol aXXoL.
b5. itol: The secrecy of the plot is again underlined.
b5. e^avao-TT) vaL: "Rise up and go out"; cf. Prt. 311a3-4.
b5. rj£co: For "qkco = "come back," "return," cf. La. 201 c4, Crat. 440e3-
4; also esp. Ar. Ha. 1156-7.
b6. eav tuxco: "Perhaps," "maybe," a stereotyped expression, cf. 
Hp. mi. 367a3, Tht. 179c5 (for the assimilation into the person of the lead­
ing verb, see on 130e9-10); but a possible shading over in sense to "if I 
succeed," cf. Thue. 4.63.2.
b6. Ka£: "Thereupon," a common narrative use of conjunctive KaL, cf. 
b8, c1, d2 (similarly the paratactic use at 128e2, e4); see Jowett-Campbell 
11.201; S. Trenkner, Le Style KAI 74-Q (colloquial).
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b7. e^Trov.. See on b4.
b8. to. . . Saipoviov: Cf. Euthd. 272e3 (quoted above on a9-b2); 
also Ap. 40a4 T| yap eicoOuia poi pai/TiKrj. But here the whole phrase 
sounds impossibly clumsy within a dramatic narrative context.
b8. os CTrecrxe: For the relic personal pronoun, cf. (int.al.) Prt. 310 
d4, 312a2, Phd. 118a13, Smp. 172a6, 202b10; see Gildersleeve II.222.
c1. SiaXiTrwv \povov: Cf. P/?d. 117e7 SiaXiTrdjp XP^120^’ 
118a11-12 oXiyov xpo^012 StaXiTrdov.
c1-2. a$0is... . a*ff0is: The anaphora heightens tension
and urgency, and adds emphasis. For the repeated attempts to defy the 
admonitions of to Saipoviov, cf. X. Ap. 4 Kat Sis T)8r| cTrixeip- 
rjaavTos pou ctkottclv Trepi tt^s aTroXoyias evavTiouTai poi 
to Saipoviov.
c2. XoJKpaTes: For the omission of (3 see on 127b1.
c2. afiOis: Asyndeton increases the gravity of the narrative (so also
to TpiTOv). For the combination of asyndeton and anaphora (see on c1-
2), cf. Menex. 284a4-6; see Denniston, GPS 107-8.
c3-5. to .. .exovTa: "In aXXa XaQtov there is an admission fatal 
to the prophetic spirit ascribed to Socrates and hardly in keeping with the 
deification of the 8aipdviov” (Heidel 53 n.3). It is true that dramatic con­
siderations here overtake the author's desire to present a strictly coherent 
picture of a divine force (see further lntr. ch. II, b, and above on 128d8- 
129c8), but the contemporary reader of Thg. would doubtless have been 
less troubled over the lapse of to Saipoviov than the modern reader 
may be. Divine agents in Homer (to take one example) are often described 
as omniscient, but are nevertheless frequently deceived; e.g. Od. 4.468: 
Proteus "knows everything," yet is captured while asleep; II. 5.311, 8.131:
414
the notion is entertained that Aeneas and Troy would have been overtaken 
had the attention of their respective patron deities, Aphrodite and Zeus, 
been diverted at the wrong moment; Od. 1.22ff.: Poseidon, alone among 
the Olympian gods in his hatred for Odysseus, is unknowingly overruled 
while among the Ethiopians; and in [A.] PV Zeus' omniscience does 
nothing to help him discover the secret which Prometheus holds. Despite 
statements such as Adeimantus' in R. 365d6-7 (’AXXct 8tj Oeous outo 
XavOaveiv ouTe pidaotoreai SuvaTov, offered as a standard and 
popular view), and Aristotle's in Po. 1454b5-6 (otTravTct yap aTro- 
8i8opev tols OeoTs opav), both of which must have expressed a 
rather vaguely-conceived opinio communis, omniscience among Greek 
deities is only relative; see R. Pettazzoni,T/?e All-Knowing Godtr. H.J. Rose 
(London, 1956) 145. Yet for all this it is worth observing that Satyrus 
(POxy. 9.1176 [Life of Euripides] fr.39 col.2.8-22) labelled as peculiarly 
Socratic the belief that nothing can be concealed from the gods; and some 
time earlier Xenophon (Mem. 1.1.19) contrasted Socrates' rigid ideas 
about divine omniscience with the attitude of "most people," who claim that 
the gods know some things, but not everything. It therefore appears to 
have been part of the Socratic tradition that Socrates accepted divine 
omniscience in the strictest terms, unlike the vast majority of the Greek 
population (see Gigon's n. ad Mem. 1.1.19; M.L. McPheran, JHPh 23 
[1985] 301 ff.). If we bear in mind the present passage from Thg., it is 
interesting to note that, according to Xenophon (ib.), in Socrates’ view the 
gods know Ta Te Xeyopeva Kai TrpaTTopeva Kai Ta o~iyfj pou- 
Xevopeva.
c3„ to TpiTOV: For adverbial to TpiTOV, cf. Prm. 155e4, Lg. 753 
d3, 920a4, Ep. 7.336c1. An instance of the common "first...second... third"
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of popular story-telling; cf. Hom. II. 6.179-86; Ap. 21b1-22e5 (Socrates 
questions three classes reputed to have knowledge); a fairly high con­
centration of this ingredient in stories of the Aesopic Corpus (e.g. 105, 155, 
173, 271b, 305, 308); see G.S. Kirk,T/?e Nature of Greek Myths (Harmonds­
worth, 1974) 35.
C3-5. pOUXop-CVOS. . .CLTTOJV. . .Xa0(JO V, CTTLTTJpTlCraS ... 
exovTa: The one instance in this dialogue of an accumulation of parti­
ciples is not very elaborate, as compared with, e.g., Grg. 480b7-d6, Menex. 
237b2-c3, R 488b1 ff.
c5. aXXocre.. .exovTa: Cf. Grg. 504d9 iTpos touto act top 
vow excw; Prt. 324a6-7 Trpos TOUTty tov vow ex^v; R 534b5-6
<-> \ Z > I Z >zvow Trepi toutou ou cpqoeis eyeiv.
c5. Kai outcos: A natural method of concluding a story, cf. R 621 b8. 
outcos* here perhaps = "without more ado," "just" (see Stevens 56, who 
classifies the use as colloquial).
c5. cqxcto aTTicbv: An emphatic expression, cf. Ap. 32d7, Menex. 
242b2, Smp. 217b7, 220d4.
c5-6. SieTTpdgeTO (Sv: For the omission of the antecedent, see 
on 123b6.
c6. 8t): For 8-q with the relative (specifying), see T.K. Abbott, Herma- 
thena7 (1890) 44-5.
c7. oti ioi dTro0avoup,cvos: The repetition after a3, a7-8, and 
c6, is probably an attempt to point the moral of his story.
c8. 8id to epoi d'rrio'Tfjaai: For the disregard of Socrates' 
divine sign leading to death, cf. the anecdote in Cic. Div. 1.123, Plu. Mor. 
581 d-e (De genio Socratis), and Socr. Ep. 1.9.
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c8. ctTricrT'qa'ai: cxttlctt6Li> = ctTreiOeiv (the latter, in this instance, 
would have been too elevated to apply to Socrates, according to Burnet ad 
Ap. 29a3, c1) is rather common in Plato, see Ast, Lexicon s.v.; also among 
the tragedians (LSJ II s.v.). Cf. Suda s.v. (bricrov: to aTTCL0CLV. 
Xcyoucn Sc kocl ’Attlcttlocv, tt)V dcTreieeiocv. kocl ’''Attlcttos, 6 
[JIT) TTCL0O|JICVOS'. OVTCOS FIXCCTCOIA
c8-d2. ctl. ..ockol}ctocl: Did Socrates predict the destruction of the 
Sicilian expedition (as Plutarch, drawing in all likelihood upon the account 
in Thg., believed [see Appendix 1]), or is this merely a vaticinatio ex 
eventu? The evidence bearing on this question, meagre though it is, has 
not yet been fully examined, and it will be appropriate to do so here.
1) Our sources are completely silent about the precise circum­
stances of Socrates’ alleged warning, yet, assuming the truth of the story, it 
could hardly have been made in the Ekklesia or Boule: Ap. 32a9-e1 and 
Grg. 473e6-474a1 are unecquivocal on the point that it was Socrates’ deli­
berate decision never to offer formal political advice unless he was left with 
no choice (i.e., as ciTLO’TCCT'qs); had he made an exception in 415, we can 
feel confident that Plato or Xenophon would have mentioned it (in fact 
Plato is conspicuously reticent about the Sicilian expedition; the only other 
possible allusions to it in the Corpus are Menex. 242e4ff., and in the 
spurious Eryx. 392c2-3 [on which see Souilhe ad loc.; D.E. Eichholz, CQ 
29 (1935) 130 n.6]). In any event, Thucydides (6.24.4) makes it clear that, 
once Nicias had made his second speech, no Athenian dared oppose the 
Assembly. Thus, if Socrates forewarned disaster for the expedition, the 
utterance must have been a relatively private one. The implication of the 
statement that many people knew about Socrates' warning (d1 iroMfiv 
ocKoiJerecr0ov) therefore seems to be, at first glance, that the warning
gained wide currency after the event (so Plutarch, see below on d1) 
because it was felt to have been somehow extraordinary.
2) But the warning could hardly have been considered unique if it 
had been nothing more than a prediction of imminent trouble. Nicias held 
serious doubts about the advisability of the Sicilian campaign (cf. Thue. 
6.9-14), and Meton the astronomer (especially famous for the caricature of 
him in Ar. Av. 992ff.) reportedly predicted disaster for the expedition (cf. Plu.
Nic. 532b, Ale. 199f.). Although the fleet itself sailed amidst popular 
approval and high optimism (cf. Thue. 6.24, 31), and had been sanctioned 
by apparently favourable omens and prophecies (cf. Thue. 8.1.1), there 
was a moment at which the Athenian people as a whole felt considerable 
trepidation (toc Seiva Thue. 6.31.1) about their decision to send the 
armada to Sicily. Euripides expressed his protest, and foreboding, in the 
thinly-veiled form of the Troades. The mutilation of the Hermae before the 
expedition may have reflected political opposition to the campaign. Addi­
tionally, Ar. Lys. 387-97 indicate some kind of resistance to the expedition. 
Opponents of the campaign were doubtless in a small minority, but they did 
exist; and without question many private misgivings must have been 
expressed for which no information is now extant.
3) The "prophecy," if it occurred, resisted oblivion for some other 
reason: because of its inspiration, because of the personality of the 
individual who uttered it, or, possibly, because of the suspicion that some 
motive that lay behind it. In Thg. it is clearly for the first reason that the 
warning is considered unique and worthy of mention: the inspiration for 
Socrates’ prescience came from to 8ocl(jlovlov (although here alone 
among the collection of anecdotes the author does not explicitly link the 
prediction with the divine sign). Our question must therefore be, what role
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could to Socljjloviov have played in Socrates’ prediction, allowing that 
the report about it is genuine. Now, to accept that Socrates' prophecy 
about the Sicilian expedition should be closely linked with a divine 
warning requires that we abandon the traditional, Platonic conception of 
the divine sign as personal and apotropaic, as distinct from prophetic. This 
conception, however, while it should not be treated as sacrosanct, is not 
lightly to be cast aside, as the extension of the sign's activities in Thg. is, in 
important respects, popular and derivative (see Intr. ch. II, b, d). Realistic­
ally, Socrates' alleged warning can hardly have had anything to do with his 
divine sign (Nicias, for instance, did not need divine guidance to prompt 
him to adopt the position which he took), though Thg. is evidence that 
rumours to this effect persisted.
This does not constitute proof that Socrates did not make the 
prediction ascribed to him here, only that the central place given to the 
divine sign ought to be discarded. On the other hand, that the Sicilian 
expedition, which, generally speaking, generated such high confidence 
among the Athenians, likely became post eventum an easy peg on which 
to hang anecdotes about an individual's clairvoyant gifts (for omens, 
prophecies, and signs before the expedition, cf. Thue. 8.1.1 with Andrewes' 
n. ad loc.), is suggestive. The possibility that the present passage of Thg. is 
the result of such a process is enhanced if we accept the story as evidence, 
at least in part, for the assimilation of the Socratic biography into patterns of 
popular religious feeling (see Intr. ch. II, b, d).
4) At best, then, we can conjecture that Socrates was, like others, 
against the sailing of the fleet; at worst, that the tradition (if it can be called 
that) is merely a fabrication. Without taking sides on this issue, it may be 
noted that, if Socrates had uttered a warning, even if not unique or extra­
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ordinary in its inspiration, the personality and reputation of the source 
would probably have been sufficient to ensure its preservation. But, in that 
case, why the silence of Plato, Xenophon, and (apparently) other Socratics 
(let alone other sources of a relatively early date besides Thg.) concerning 
the Sicilian expedition and any connection of Socrates with it? This 
question might, I think, be answered as follows: Numerous companions of 
Socrates were implicated in the profanation of the Mysteries and mutilation 
of the Hermae (the evidence is assessed by Dover, Commentary on Thucy­
dides IV. 271 ff.). In the year of Socrates' death feelings about these inci­
dents still ran high (Andocides was brought to trial in 399 for his alleged 
part in the profanation of the Mysteries), and it is possible that the charge of 
irreligion brought against Socrates was partly founded upon a persistent 
notion that, although he could never be proved to have taken part in these 
affairs, he was at the very least guilty by association (see Burnet, Greek 
Philosophy: Thales to Plato [London, 1914] 153-5; Taylor, PMV\fi 159). The 
amnesty of 403 will have guaranteed that the topic could not be raised at 
Socrates' trial, and Plato would have carefully avoided all references to the 
uncomfortable controversy of his master's supposed involvement. In 
Socrates' mouth, the words "I predicted the destruction of the Sicilian 
expedition," combined with a reader's recognition of Socrates' relationship 
with Alcibiades and others, would have done little to promote a Socratic 
writer's apologetic efforts. It seems likely that, in a work purporting to be 
Plato's, this "prophecy" of Socrates’ (even if merely an invention) would 
only have been mentioned either long after any controversial connection 
between Socrates and the Sicilian expedition had faded, or by someone 
who was unaware of the sensitivity of the issues involved (i.e., not Plato).
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c8. ctl tolvuv: Introducing a new example in a series, without 
logical connection; see Denniston, GF2 575-6; des Places 300f.
c8-d1. T(3v...TroXXtDV are not syntactically connected: with toju 
sc. TTpaypaTcov, and with ttoXXcou sc. dvOpcnTrcnv.
d1- ttoWcDv aKOuercaeov: Cf. Plu. Nic. 532b kocl 8vq\0ev cis 
ttoXXous 6 Xoyos (sc. about Socrates’ prophecy of doom).
d2-3. kocl .. .aKO'UO'ccL: The sentence refers not specifically to the 
experiences of the Athenian fleet, but rather more generally to the three 
preceding reports.
d3. TTCLpocv.. . 4>o|3oup.aL: For similar anecdotes which connect 
Socratic advice with expeditions and the individuals who participate, or 
intend to do so, cf. X. An. 3.1.4 and the famous piece of advice which 
Socrates gave to Xenophon; also the anecdote in Ael. VH3.27 to the effect 
that Socrates dissuaded the young Plato from pursuing a career as a mer­
cenary soldier. Aristotle views the sea battle as a typical occasion about 
which future events are frequently apprehended (Div. Somn. 463a2, cf. 
463b1).
d3. Trctpav.. .XapcTv.. .cl: Cf. 131a2 aTroTrcLpaequai tou 
SaLpoviou toutou; and for the prolepsis, cf. Prt. 342a1 ci (3ouXcl 
Xa(3cLU pou Trcipau ottcds eyco ktX. See further below on d4.
d3. vuvl: Not "at this precise moment," but, less specifically, "as 
matters stand," "under the present circumstances."
d3-4. cl apa: Not quite the same as ei apa e5 (referential), but 
rather a more animated ci: "if it should turn out that"; see Denniston, GP2 
37; KG II.324; des Places 273f.
d4. tl XcycL: LikeouSeu Xcyto, the phrase is colloquial (see 
Thesieff 89; Stevens 25; also A.C. Moorhouse, CQn.s. 15 [1965] 31-40). It
421
may be considered remarkable that Socrates should predicate the verb 
Xeyco of his otherwise nebulous oripeTov; but two considerations militate 
against such an impression: 1) the divine sign is occasionally called 13 
4>CDV'rj (cf. 128d3, e3, e5, 129c2; see Intr. ch. II, a, b), and a form of Xeyco is 
therefore a natural term to apply to the processes of the "voice"; 2) ti 
Xeyei conveys essentially "makes sense," "is right" (only imperfectly 
conveyed by Xeyei = "means"); the oral connotation of the verb is secon­
dary. The conditional clause et.. .Xeyei in effect raises the question of 
whether the divine sign, at the present moment, can be verified by observ­
able events. Nevertheless, the clause cannot be explained away so easily, 
as XapeTv Treipav usually in Plato refers to dialectical procedure (cf. 
Euthd. 275b5, Prt. 342a1, 348a2, Grg. 448a5, Tht. 176c6; cf. Arist. Top.
171 b4; and for el apa ti Xeyei cf. Hp. ma. 298c9 [of Socrates]); see Intr. 
ch. il, b.
d4. cttl .. .cttl: The use of the same preposition twice in a sentence, 
and governing different cases, is awkward, but almost identical is E. Ale. 
119-20 (where editors have however suggested a number of emendations, 
see Dale ad loc.). Whatever effect (if any) the author was striving after 
through this collocation is difficult to determine.
d4. e £ o p pjQ: Hapax legomenon.
d4. Zavviaovos: Unknown to us from any other source, although the 
name occurs in inscriptions, e.g. IG2 I.374.9, 205; II.3.3233.
d4-5. tov KaXov: Bekker, Schleiermacher, and Knebel rather naive­
ly followed the "authority" of Ficino and Oornarius in understanding these 
words as a patronymic expression {Cali filius Ficino); Souilhe (though he 
prints tov KaXov) reports KaXov for W (my own collation does not bear 
this out; the proper name in any event ought to be accented paroxytone).
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But tou KaXou must represent a manifestation of Socrates' interest in 
physical beauty, and the addition of the epithet is extremely natural for him 
(cf. 128d8, Prt. 316a4, Hp. ma. 281 a1). It can be added that the personal 
name + 6 kocXos is reminiscent of inscriptions on countless archaic vases 
depicting aristocratic cpcnpevoL, e.g. MlXtlcc8t]s KaXog, MeyaKX'qs' 
KaXos, etc. (see Dover, Greek Homosexuality [London, 1978] 114-22).
d6. OpacruXXou: On Thrasyllus and his expedition to Ionia in 409, 
see lntr. ch. V, Appendix. For the false spelling OpaauXou (W), see 
Andrewes ac/Thuc. 8.73.4.
d6. ’E^ecrou Kai ’Icovias: ’E^eaou is placed first because it was 
Thrasyllus' main goal (see lntr. ch. V, Appendix), and with the advantage of 
hindsight, the author knows that Thrasyllus suffered his major losses there. 
Kai must mean "and in general" (see on 125e3).
d7. T] djjLou tl toutcq y9 eXav: "Or will draw quite near it, at 
any rate." The phrase is perhaps "a metaphor from the chariot race" (so 
Burnet ad Euthphr. 4b1); or possibly from sailing (see R.G. Ussher ad Ar. 
Ec. 109), a derivation that prima facie seems particularly appropriate here. 
Steinhart (465 n.38) objected to this euphemistic expression, but it is 
typically Greek (cf. the common tl Traeeiv = "to die," see LSJ s.v. Traay^ 
III.2).
d7. ojjlou tl: Stallbaum (ad loc.-, also Fritzsche 230, Kruger 13-4) 
calls opou + dative un-Platonic, but cf. perhaps Pit. 303d5-6; it is at any 
rate Attic (see Kruger loc. cit.’, cf. 2 ad Ap. Rhod. 2.121 to opou Kat cttl 
tou depoLcp-aTog tlOcccol Kat cttl tou eyyos, cos ’AeqvaLOL 
CLCDGaaL xpfjaQai; also sch. vet. ad Phd. 72c). On the other hand, opou 
tl + dat. has been considered a late usage (Stallbaum ad loc., Fritzsche 
ad loc., Kruger 14), apparently first found in D.H. 1.78.3. But, as ofiou tl
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in an adverbial sense does occur in Demosthenes (27.11) and Antiphanes 
(fr.217.11 Kock), the value of this criterion for dating seems doubtful (cf. the 
semantically related eyyvs tl in Phd. 65a6, R. 548d8).
d7. 7’ eXav (Hermann, eyeXav B) offers excellent sense, and is 
moreover to be preferred overeXav (TW) as lectio difficilior. For the 
resultant ye.. .ye (d7-8), see Denniston, GP2 144; and for intransitive 
cXauvcn, cf. Grg. 486a7, Euthphr. 4b1.
d8. Tfjs TrpaypaTeias: Tfjs OTpaTias has greater mss. sup­
port (Tfjs CTpaTeias BW; but for the orthography, see England ad Lg. 
942a5; Brandwood s.v. CTpaTeia), and has been the reading preferred 
by most editors this century. But TrpaypaTeias must be accounted for: it 
cannot be simply a scribal error, and the possibility that it is a gloss on 
CFTpotTias can scarcely be countenanced. The opposite hypothesis, that 
TrpaypaTeias was early glossed crTpccTeias, is on the other hand a 
much more plausible explanation of the mss. evidence (see Stallbaum, 
Wagner ad loc.), since TrpaypaTeias is just vague enough to invite am­
plification. The less specific Tfjs TrpaypaTeias is moreover well com­
plemented by the generalizing Tfjs aXXT|S immediately following.
129e1-130e4. The divine sign also exercises complete control in 
Socrates' educational contacts: it prevents some individuals from deriving 
any benefit from the time they spend with Socrates; others it does not stand 
in the way of, but they nonetheless gain no advantage from association 
with Socrates; still others are given positive assistance by to Saipoviov, 
and some of them make rapid and lasting progress. But of the last group, 
many leave Socrates after achieving wonderful improvement, only to lose 
the gains they have made. One such young man was Aristides, son of 
Lysimachus, who, after much time in Socrates’ company, actively pursued
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discussion and argument with the best-educated men of the city. But after 
he departed on a military campaign, he lost all his confidence and ability. 
Aristides asserts that he never learned anything from Socrates, but that he 
made his greatest progress the closer he sat to him; in fact, the results were 
best when he actually physically grasped Socrates.
Whereas in the previous section Socrates cited four examples to 
prove the importance of the divine sign in his associations with others, now 
he reports only one story to convince Theages of the vital role it plays in his 
educational contacts. In Smp. 175c6ff. Plato entertained the idea encoun­
tered here of influence by physical proximity and contact, but there he 
seemed to deride the notion. In our passage the question must be con­
sidered whether the author has drawn upon and distorted those lines in 
Smp/, see Intr. ch. II, b, and nn. on 130d5-e4, d7-e1. At the same time, the 
whole problem of the use of sources for 129e1-130e4 in general is of 
primary importance for the interpretation of this part of the dialogue.
e1. Tgcut(X 8f|: Either demonstrative with ttocvtcc (in which case St) 
is progressive, see Denniston, GP2 238-9), summarizing the previous ex­
cursus, as frequently initial tccljtcc (8tq) immediately after a story or series 
of stories, a myth, an exposition, or the like (cf. Tht. 151 b6, R. 363d4, Grg. 
524a8 [tccCtcx], Cri. 54d2 [tccutoc]); or adverbial, "That’s why...," antici­
pating otl e1 (cf. Euthphr. 4d5 [see Burnet ad loc.], Smp. 174a3; see 
Riddell §18; LSJ s.v. C.VIII; KG l.310f.; England ad Lg. 830d2). The pre­
sence of TravTOC immediately following toclitoc Sq inclines me towards 
the first interpretation (so Ficino, Schleiermacher, Lamb, Souilhe).
e1-2. auTTj.. .totjtou: For the accumulation of pronouns, cf. Cr/. 
54d4 OCUT'Tj T| T)X^ TOUTCOV tcov Xoycnv.
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e1. T| SuvapiLS otUTT): These words involve some confusion. If the 
author is suggesting that the ability of the divine sign to foretell the out­
come of a course of action (as exemplified by the preceding four anec­
dotes) is almighty in Socrates' associations with others and in the improve­
ment these people will make (to my mind the interpretation strictly required 
by the context), this is inconsistent with the sentences that follow immedi­
ately. For as we are clearly shown, the divine sign does not foretell the 
success or failure of a companion, but actively participates in his progress 
and determines who is to succeed and who is to fail. On this problem see 
lntr. ch. I, b, vii\ and for the meaning and use of 8u voqjiLS in this context (cf. 
e7-8), see lntr. ch. II, b (at any rate, T| 8uvoc|jlis ocutt) tou Saipovlou, 
and similarly f| tou Socipovlou Suvapis e7-8, are not merely peri­
phrases for touto to SaipLOULOV [cf. Phdr. 246d6 tto^ukov t) TTTepou 
Suvapxs to epppiOes ayeiv avw], as shown by e3 to octtocv 8uv- 
ctTOti).
e2-3. tcBv. .. auv8iaTpLpovT(nv: Periphrases such as this allow 
Socrates consciously to avoid any overt claim that he actually taught and 
had pupils of his own. Such language is characteristic of the Platonic 
Socrates, but not exclusively so: cf. Aeschin. Socr. Ala fr. 11c (Dittmar); X. 
Mem. 1.2.3; Isoc. 11.5.
e2. jjlct’ cpiou: Elsewhere SiocTpipti) (uncompounded by ow—) + 
jjl€t’ cjjlou e4,130a5, or owSictTplpco + dative 128b8, 129e5 (the regu­
lar construction everywhere else in the Corpus).
e3. to aTrav SuvaTai: A vague description of divinity and omni­
potence, cf. Hom. Od. 4.237, 10.306, 14.445 (see W. Kiefner, Der religiose 
Allbegriff des Aischylos [Hildesheim, 1965] 25-6). It is however modified 
and limited somewhat by e2-3 els... ow8iaTpi|3o vtco v. Omnipotence
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frequently carries with it capricious and arbitrary behaviour (often exempli­
fied in Greek religious experience by Zeus, e.g. in Hom. //., in Hes. Op. 665­
9, and in [A.] PV; cf. also Archil. 130 W, Sem. 1 .Iff. W), and accordingly 
here too some of Socrates' companions are aided by to Soclijlo viov, 
others are hindered by it, while others are unaffected by it (see on 129e1- 
130e4, e3-9); there is no apparent motivation; see further Intr. ch. II, b.
e3. to aTrav: Cobet plausibly suggested Trav pro oav: adverbial 
to aTrav is unexampled in Plato, but to Trav in an adverbial sense does 
occur, cf. Ap. 32d3, Pit. 262b7-c1, Lg. 959a6. I am hesitant, however, to 
depart from the mss. evidence at a place such as this; there is no need to 
force this dialogue to conform with Platonic usage in every detail.
e3-9. ttoXXois. . .CTriSiSoaaiv: On this passage see Intr. ch. II, 
b. Socrates' three kinds of associate are classified according to the effects 
of to SaLjJLovLov: it prevents Socrates from any dealings with many men; 
many others make no progress in Socrates' company, despite the non­
opposition of to Satp-dviov; lastly, to 8ai|jidviov lends active assist­
ance to others, who then make rapid progress. These lines are con­
structed in a form resembling the priamel, which is especially (but not ex­
clusively) familiar from poetry, whereby an enumeration serves as 
background for the crucial element: thus ttoXXois jjlcv (e3)...ttoXXol s 
8e (e6), followed by ols 8’...o3tol (e7-8). This development is contin­
ued by the further subdivision of the final class into two types (ol p.ev 
[130a1].. .ttoXXol Se [a2]), in which the second is expanded upon, and the 
excursus on it is introduced by emphatic asyndeton (130a4). See W.H. 
Race, The Classical Priamel from Homer to Boethius (Leiden, 1982) esp. 
1-17, 111-13.
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In the various kinds of companion enumerated here one may be re­
minded of the different persons considered in Ep. 7.344a2-c1 to be especi­
ally suited to the study of philosophy. Those who are intelligent, but have 
no aptitude for philosophy, and similarly those who have an aptitude but 
are unintelligent, can make no real progress (a2-b1); they are like the in­
dividuals who receive no assistance from the divine sign of Socrates 
(129e3-7), and consequently derive no benefit from association with him. 
Only those who combine a judicious application of themselves with intelli­
gence and a natural affinity for philosophy arrive at a knowledge of the 
truth about virtue and vice (b1-c1); the important addition which is made to 
the conditions of this study, p.eTa Tpipqs Traces Kai xpovou ttoXXoO 
(b2-3), is reminiscent of the fact that in Thg. (130a2-4; and in Tht. 150e1- 
151a5), continued and prolonged association with Socrates is the only 
way to ensure lasting benefit from him.
e3. cvavTiO'UTai: Of the activities of the divine sign, cf. Ap. 40a6, 
b1,c2.
e4. otjk ecrTi: For a similar use of the phrase in the sense of ’’that 
which is fated never to be,” cf. E. Ale. 53,1076.
e4. GJ<J>eXr|efjvaL: See on 126d6 and 127d3.
e4. SiCLTpipouaLV: On the dropping of the prefix (e5), see
on 125b4; also R. Renehan, op. clt. 11, for the iteration of a verb with only 
one instead of both original preverbs.
e5. otjx oTdv Te |Jlol: Because the divine sign has ’’absolute 
power” (e3), there is no question of Socrates’ disobeying it; at all events, 
the consequences for one who disobeys the sign have been well-docu­
mented in the preceding four anecdotes.
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e6. ttoXXols ... 8i<xko)X'U ei: Pavlu (22 n.1) took this clause as 
proof that the author misunderstood the context oiTht. 151a3 (ovlols jjlcv 
to yLyvopievov pioi 8aLp.oviov arroKDXueL auvcLvaL), and that he 
senselessly produced the dative ttoXXols in imitation of ovlols. He 
further suggested that what is demanded here is ttoXXous pro ttoXXols. 
But while the author must indeed have been thinking of the Tht. passage 
(see lntr, ch. II, b), the question of distortion and misapprehension is in this 
case not a valid one, for the present passage is simply the counterpart of 
the second possibility in Tht. (151a4-5), namely eviols Se kq [sc. to 
8(XL|jl6vlov as subject, ZcDKpdTT) as object, and auvcTvai], where eq 
can readily be seen to be the equivalent of ou SlogkcoXuol in Thg. 
Friedlander recognized (328 n.14) that the object to be supplied with Slog— 
KCoXueL is pe.
e7-8. oTs.. .8uvajJiLS: For the construction, cf. Phdr. 237a9; E. Val- 
giglio ad [Plu.] Mor. 574b (De Fato, where the editor quotes our passage) 
compares S. Phil. 281-2; E. Med. 946; Ion 331; Ar. Vesp. 734; X. Hipp. 1. 
22; see also KG 1.347.
e7. auXXa|3r|TCGi: On the active role which to Scgl^ovlov plays in 
this dialogue, and the use of this word in this context, see lntr. ch. II, b. The 
cognate auXXTjiTTUJp can be used of a supernatural accomplice, e.g. A. 
Ag. 1507, E. Or. 1230.
e7-8. r|.. .Suvap-Ls: Seeone1-2. 
e8. oStol. . .‘qcr0'r|CFaL: Cf. 128c2-5.
e8. oStol: The emphatic recapitulating demonstrative (after the rela­
tive ols e7) as in 127d8; see Fritzsche ad loc.; also on 128c3-4.
e8. Kai au: "even you," i.e., despite Theages' youth and general in­
experience.
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e8-9. Taxu .. .CTnSiSoaaiv: So too the sophists themselves lay 
claim to the rapid progress of their pupils, cf. Euthd. 273d8-9, Prt. 318a6-9. 
This surfaces also as a protreptic theme in Arist. Protrepticus B.55 [During] 
(people make swift improvement in philosophy, proving how easy it can 
be), and elsewhere in a generally (non-philosophical) context, cf. I. During, 
Aristotle's Protrepticus: an attempt at reconstruction (Goteborg, 1961) 226.
e8-9. Ta\u . ■ .TrapaxpTlpa: The pleonasm is unparalleled in the 
Corpus, and Papanikolaou (Athena 76 [1976-77] 201) suggests Taxu 
yocp <Kai> TTapaxprjpa. But the text is sound: [Plu.] Mor. 574b quotes 
our passage as it stands in the mss., and the collocation Taxu.. .Trapa~ 
XpT]pa can be accounted for by the widespread Greek habit of combining 
asyndetically two or more temporal adverbs or phrases for the sake of 
(colloquial) emphasis; cf. 131a4 totc t]8t| Kapaxp'Qpa, Euthd. 303e8 
Taxu.. .ck tou TrapaxpTipa, Lg. 867a3 ouk ck tou Trapaxprjpa 
ai<|>vr|S, ib. 867a5-6 ck tou TTapaxpripa cuOus, Grg. 472d1 avTtKa 
TTpujTov; also the very common TraXiv aB/a30is (see Ast, Lexicon s.vv. 
aC, aSeis); see KG II.584. Similar locative pleonasms are well-attested, 
see R. Renehan, Studies in Greek Texts (Gottingen, 1976)121-3.
e9-130a2. Kai.. .(n<()cXLav: This class of individuals is not in­
cluded in any explicit way in the parallel passage of Tht. (150d2ff.), and it is 
not certain, historically speaking, what individuals (if anyone), ol pev (a1) 
might be intended to represent: perhaps Plato himself, or more generally 
perhaps the young men Socrates was keeping in check until after his 
death (Ap. 39c8-d3).
a1. pc|3aiov.. .Trapapovipov: Cf. Smp. 184b3-4 outc (3cp- 
aiov outc povipov.
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a2. cn<t>€Xiav (B) pro cu^cXeuav (TW; but co^eXiocs T in 130e8) is 
supported by the custom of our oldest Platonic witness, Par.1807 (A), as 
well as by B in all dialogues but Phdr. (see Schanz, Platonis...omnia ll.2.xi); 
inscriptions also favour this spelling (see Meisterhans-Schwyzer, Gramma- 
tik der Attischen Inschrifterft [Berlin, 1900] 56).
a2-4. ttoXXol. . . otououv: For this sentence, see Intr. ch. II n.41. 
a3-4. eTreiSav... d'rroo'xwvTai: No specification is given as to
how long an absence from Socrates would result in the degeneration of a 
companion; the ensuing account of Aristides might suggest a fairly lengthy
one.
a4~e4. touto ... e£cppuT)Ke: On the use of Tht. in this anecdote, 
see Intr. ch. II, b. If this section and Tht. 151a1-2 are to be trusted, it would 
seem that Socrates did in fact become a companion of Aristides and 
Thucydides, to whom he is first, and very briefly, introduced in La. 181 a1 ff.
a4. touto: For the demonstrative pronoun in asyndeton, see on 
128e1.
a4. ttotc: Seeon128e1.
a4. crraOev (TW) is commonly confused in mss. with qjtaQev (B); see 
J. Van Leeuwen ad Ar. Nu. 340; Goodwin, Ml2 335. epctOev is intelligible, 
but most likely a scribal error made by contextual association.
a4. ’ApiaTe£8r|S 6 Auorpaxou: See on a4-e4.
a5. uos tou: I can find no difficulty (pace Ast) with uds here or with
tjov in a8; cf. Euthd. 275a9-10 cotl 8e oStos ’Agioyou pcv uds tou 
’A\Ki(3id8ou tou TraXctiou. The employment of patronymic expressions 
in the Corpus is quite fluid; e.g., in Men. 94a1, Lys. 203a4, and La. 181a1 
the genitive simpliciter is used, whereas in Chrm. 154b1-2 and Prt. 310a9 
a form of uds is included. If any tendency can be observed, it is simply
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that where the noun is added, its presence can be explained by a desire 
for clarity, i.e., in instances where not only the father of the principal 
character but also some other relative is mentioned.
a5. ’ApLcrTeiSou: Aristides "the Just." 
a6. Trap.TToX'u.. .xpovcy: Cf. 128c4-5. 
a7. ff Ken v: See on 129b5.
a8. OoukuSiStiv: See on 130a4-e4.
a8-b1. MeXTiCTLOU...OoukuSiSou: On the statesman Thucydides 
and his son Melesias, see Bluck ad Men. 94c2.
a8. tjov toB: See on a5.
b1-2. 6.. .eyeyovei: The preamble about Thucydides (which in­
cludes b2-8) adds colour to the main story (b8ff.), but this sentence may not 
be simply foil. It is perhaps intended to reflect, without elaboration, a famil­
iar circumstance for Socrates and an interlocutor: in the course of dis­
cussion Socrates brings his respondent to a state of dcTropioc, and forces 
him to realize that he does not know what he thought he did, a realization 
which is sometimes attended by a degree of annoyance (e.g. Euthphr.
15b7ff., Men. 79e7-80b7; Nicias [La. 188a4ff.] and Alcibiades [Smp. 216 
b2ff.] are much milder in their reactions); Socrates himself tells his jurors 
(Ap. 22e6ff.) that much of the enmity (mTexOetai) against him arose from 
his cross-examining and demonstrating to others around him that they did 
not possess the wisdom which they presumed they did. We can imagine 
that Aristides is describing the aftermath of a typical Socratic encounter 
with another individual. The ensuing description of Thucydides as civ— 
SpocTfoSov corroborates this interpretation; see also on b4 aejjLV'uvecy- 
Qocl. . .xotXeTraiveiv; lntr. ch. I, b, vii.
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b1-2. |JLOL.. .eyeyovei: "odium in me ceperat” (Ast), "had quareiled 
with me" (Lamb); but these translations downplay the possible meaning "in 
the course of discussions/ investigations/ disputes" for cv Xoyois tioiv 
(see preceding n.). For the turn of phrase, cf. X. Hier. 9.2; see LSJ s.v. 8ia 
A.IV.a and "Supplement" s.v. 8id ("become an object of hatred").
b3. Oouku8i8t)V 8e: The apparently superfluous 8e is probably an 
informal, conversational idiom (Denniston, GP2 172-3). But that 8e looks 
back and marks a contrast (so Denniston, ib.) is doubtful, and Verdenius 
has suggested (see on 127c5) that it can in such instances be explained 
simply as a weak form of 8f).
b4-5. oc|jLvuvcoeai.. .yaXcTraivciv: For the collocation, cf. Ar. 
Ra. 1020 jJL-qS’ cojOdStns aep.vwdp.evos xocXeTraive. The conjoining 
of a more recherche word or phrase (aep.viJ veaOai.. . ae) with an ex­
planatory word is common Platonic practice; see Adam ad R. 451b; R. 
Renehan, Studies in Greek Texts (Gottingen, 1976) 136-7. yaXeiTorveiv 
frequently occurs in Plato to describe an interlocutor's frustration at his 
state of dTropia; see V. Goldschmidt, Les Dialogues de Platon2 (Paris, 
1963) 30 nn.8-9 (add Sph. 230a1, b9). aep.vos and its congeners are 
almost invariably employed by Plato in an ironic sense (see DeVries, 
Mnem. 3.12 [1944] 151-6); but aep.vwea0ai in any event possesses an 
inherently pejorative meaning (ib. 153). If it is correct to detect a dialectical 
context behind these words (see on b1-2), aepvwea0ai possibly hints at 
Thucydides' condition of 8o£oao<|)ia.
b5. (ns ti ovTa: Colloquial (see Stevens 25); cf. Ap. 41 e5, Euthd. 
303d1. For aep.vwea0ai.. .ojs ti ovtoc cf. Phdr. 243a1.
b5. ,zEqti. . . outcds: Pavlu's observation (28) that Plato uses this 
formula of response only in the middle and later dialogues needs some
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qualification. In the first place, the combination, to my reckoning, is never 
very common as a response, even in later works. I have counted one 
occurrence in each of Phd., Tht., Sph., Pit., Prm., and Lg., and five in R. But 
it also occurs in the form of a question in the presumably earlier Hp. ma. 
(303a10); and we might also take note of Grg. 504a6 (’zEqtqj touto 
OUTGO), 513e1 (’ZEO'TCO, cl |3ou\eL, CTOL outcos).
b6. Tl 8e: See on 125e5.
b6-7. ouk ... av8pctTTo8ov: On the significance of this passage for 
the problem of literary and philosophical antecedents, see Intr. ch. I, b, vii.
b7. dvSpctTroSov: Thucydides’ former condition contrasts neatly 
with the position of his companion Socrates, who is frequently described 
as cXcuQcpLOS, or in terms similar to this; cf. Smp. 219d3ff.; X. Ap. 14, 16, 
Mem. 1.6.1-10,4.8.1.
to duSpaiToSou cannot be right, and Cobet correctly secluded 
the article. Omission of a definite article is naturally more common in mss. 
than the false addition of the same, but the latter process does frequently 
occur, e.g. Hp. ma. 293d4, Menex. 241 c2, Ion 532d7. Still, the imposition 
here of such an awkward construction (lit. "does he not know what sort of 
person the slave was?") must be accounted for; yet the explanation is, I 
think, quite simple. A scribe, confronted with dv8paTro8ov, took the neu­
ter noun as an abstract, "slavery," and thought that with to he was appro­
priately adding a generic article (Knebel likewise mistranslated to dv~ 
SpocTToSov as servitium). A similar addition of a false generic article can 
be detected in, e.g., Hp. ma. 290b6, 304b8, Men. 94e2 (see app. crit. ad 
locc.).
b7. vf): Cobet's rejection of uq was based on the "rule” that where an 
oath follows a negative particle in a sentence, pa is to be preferred over
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vfj (see H. Thesleff, Studies on Intensification in Early and Classical Greek 
[Helsingfors, 1954] 166). But the sequence negative particle + vfj is also 
possible, see Blaydes ad Ar. Nu. 217. Similarly pia is not uncommonly 
used in a positive sentence, even though strict conformity would in these 
instances require vai/vrj (see Gomme-Sandbach acf Men. Dysc. 151).
b8. ’AXXa pTjV Kat...7c: Probably progressive (see Denniston, 
GP2 344). aXXa p.r)V.. .ye is very common in the classical period 
(especially in Plato and Xenophon), almost wholly absent in Hellenistic 
prose (see J. Blomqvist, Greek Particles in Hellenistic Prose [Lund, 1969] 
65), a fact which may have value as evidence for dating. aXXa jjlt)v .. .ye 
is more comon than aXXa (jtfjv Kat.. .ye, but figures and percentages for 
Plato are not given by Denniston or Blomqvist (but see Blomqvist 64, fig. 8).
c1. Tl p.dXLC»Ta: "Why exactly" (colloquial, see Thesleff 93). 
c2-6. Trpiv...<j)auX6TT|TL: In Tht. 150e1-151a2 Aristides is given
as an example of those who, either on their own initiative, or by the per­
suasion of others, leave Socrates too early, suffer miscarriage as a result of 
keeping bad company, and thereby come to realize their own ignorance. 
Since the circumstances of Aristides’ departure from Socrates in Thg. are 
different (an expedition, cf. 130a6-7), it is tempting to see in this a sign of 
later elaboration on the part of our author (see Burnyeat, BICS 24 [1977] 
16 n.20).
c2-3. OTcyofjv.. .Xoyois: This is all we are told about the actual 
form of "improvement" which Socrates’ companions made, and by itself it 
sounds very odd. Far from being what we think of as a marker of Socratic 
"education," ovSevos x€^PC01/ <t>aivecr0ai ev tois Xoyois sounds 
more sophistic-eristic (see Stallbaum 222; Steinhart 439). But then, Socra­
tes claimed not to be responsible for his companions' behaviour after they
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left him (cf. Ap. 33b3-6), and both Plato's Socrates (cf. Phlb. 15d8-16a3) 
and Isocrates (12.26) report that young men are in any event exceedingly 
fond of eristic SiaXoyoi, and Aristotle seems to have the same thought in 
mind in Top. 164b8-14. The discussion between Alcibiades and Pericles in
X. Mem. 1.2.40-6 provides an example of this youthful love of eristic. Still, 
some irony may be intended in Aristides’ misconceived boast: as L. 
Woodbury remarked (Phoenix 27 [1973] 14 n.21; see also Pavlu 22 and 
n.1), it is likely that the mediocrity of the descendants of Aristides the Just 
became a commonplace; cf. 130b6-7, c6, e4.
c2. otgjouv dv0p(DTT(nv: avepcniTCD (B) is the choice of most 
editors, but the partitive dvOpCDTTCJV (TW), read by Bekker, Stallbaum, 
Hirschig, and Wagner, is more idiomatic, cf. 128b5-6, Prt. 328e6, Menex. 
248e5-6, Euthd. 303e6-7, Grg. 499b7, 456c5-6, 513a8, R. 335b3, 571 d1-2, 
599c1, Lg. 880d2. The addition av s.l. by vetb (Burnet and Souilhe report 
this wrongly as B2) makes no sense; I suspect it is a corruption of a variant 
cov.
c4. xapteaTarav: Frequently of intellectual capacity, cf. La. 180d2, 
R. 452b7, Lg. 680c2, but also perhaps ironic (n.b. dvepooiTCov c4, and see 
on 127a6).
c5. tou vavTi ov: Colloquial, as also touvavTiov in modern 
Demotic; cf. TauTOV touto 128d6.
c5. Kai ("even") goes closely with aioGavcopai (see Denniston, GP2 
304).
c5. TreiraiSeupevov: Cf. x°cPLCQTCiTC0V c4.
c6. outcos. .. <J>au\OTr|Ti: This, in contrast with c2-3 (see n.), is
much more the result one expects of association with Socrates (for 
aio’xi<vo|jLai of an interlocutor's reaction to refutation by Socrates, see V.
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Goldschmidt, Les Dialogues de Platon2 [Paris, 1963] 30-1, and n.14); poss­
ibly a reminiscence of an Alcibiades-6\a\oQue (see Intr. ch. I, b, vii).
c6. aiaxuvop.ai cttl is not well-attested (LSJ [s.v. B.ll.2.a] list only 
X. Mem. 2.2.8), but it does occur once in Plato, cf. R. 396c8; also in Ale. I 
122c3.
c7-8. noTepov.. .crpiKpov: See Intr. ch. II, b.
d1-2. ‘Hvlkoc. ..TpOTTCQ: These words, along with Aristides' answer
to them (d4-5), essentially confirm Socrates' claim in 128b1-4.
d2. tlvl aXXty TpOTTcy: There is much to be said for Wagner's
suggestion that we read tivi pro tipi, since Socrates is not concerned 
here to discover whether Aristides improved, but rather in what way he did, 
if not by actually learning from Socrates.
d2-4. ’Eyd)... Se: Fritzsche prints a full stop after ZokpaTCS d3, but 
cf. Ap. 32a8 cpffi 8e tjjjllv <J)opTLKct pcv Kai SiKaviKa, dXT)0f] Se. 
Appeals of this kind to the veracity of an imminent statement are very 
common in oratory, and usually anticipate a remark which the speaker 
considers will be seen as outrageous, or even likely to cause embarrass­
ment (see T. Meyer, Platons Apologie [Stuttgart, 1962] 25ff.).
d4-e4. eyd).. . e£eppur|Ke: On the two possible strata of sources 
for this passage (Tht. and Smp.), see Intr. ch. il, b.
d4. yap explains arriGTOV and dXqees in d3.
d4. Trapa crou: Burnet tacitly altered to the enclitic Trapa crou (he
was followed by Souilhe, also without remark), but the emphatic form 
(BTW) is, I think, in place here. In d1-2 Socrates asked Aristides if he 
learned anything Trap’ epou, or if on the contrary his ability to converse 
came to him in some other way. The statement in d4 is a response to the 
first half of this question, and the emphasis in Trapa oou is required.
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d4-5. (ns... oTcjGoc: An obvious allusion to Socrates’ regular pro­
fession of ignorance and general avoidance of the term paOqTqs or the 
like when speaking about his associates; see also on 129e2-3.
d5-e4. CTreSi8oui'.. . c^eppuriKe: The profound influence of 
physical proximity with Socrates is to Aristides airiorov, and it is likely to 
be disturbing for a reader as well (see lntr. ch. II, b; ch. IV, d). Nevertheless, 
Tarrant demonstrated (CQ n.s. 8 [1958] 95-8) that influence by contact is a 
notion which the ancient mind found quite acceptable (although Socrates 
scoffs at the idea in Smp. 175c6ff.). She fails to note, however, 1) that the 
whole concept of influence by contact was not nearly as common in Greek 
experience as it was among other cultures (see Dodds,G. and I. 22 n.52), 
and 2) that in the examples she cites from Greek literature the context of 
this influence usually involves a god or divine element which transfers 
some power (most often directly) to another individual (for touching as an 
aspect of miracle stories see R. Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition 
[New York, 1968] 222). Thus the efficacy of Socrates' touch here in Thg. 
demonstrates that a divine element is to be identified within him, and that 
element is surely the divine sign itself. It is difficult not to view this as part of 
the hagiographical process within the Socratic tradition; see lntr. ch. II, b, d; 
ch. IV, d.
d7-e1. Kai.. .opoj-qv: Aristides makes further progress by fixing his 
gaze on Socrates alone. The experience is remarkable in itself, but per­
haps reflects a fairly common belief that the eyes can possess a special 
capacity when focussed on a certain object Yet the one who fixes his 
gaze is usually also the one who is exerting the influence, and this effect is 
normally malignant (the most familiar example of this is the so-called "evil- 
eye”; cf. Plu. Mor. 680c-683b, and see W. Deonna, Le Symbolisme de I'oeii
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[Paris, 1965] 153-8; J.P. Holoka, CP 80 [1985] 228-9). The passage is 
more coherent if it is seen to be an adaptation of certain philosophical 
antecedents; see Intr. ch. I, b, vii; ch. II, b.
e1-2. ttoXu.. .TrXeicrTOV: The pleonasm is highly emphatic and 
climactic after paXXov 8e d6 ("or rather") and ttoXu paXXov d7. This 
combination of superlatives is unparalleled in the Corpus, and the nearest 
analogues I can find are not very close (cf. Hp. ma. 284a4-6, R. 587a7-8, 
Ti. 53a4-6, 63b2-4); but see Novotny ad Epin. 992b2.
e1. 8e: 8f) (B2 [b Burnet, wrongly] W) is not out of the question; for the 
emphatic use with superlative expressions, see Denniston, GP2 207.
e2. uap’ auTov ae: For this use of auTos ("right beside you"), cf. 
Lys. 203a2 utt’ octjto to Teix°S ("directly below the wall"); E.Hipp. 1187.
e2. KaOtfpriv: Several secondary mss. offer this optative form over 
Kaeoipriv of BTW. We might reasonably suspect that the reading of those 
recentiores originates from nothing more than an itacism, and so it may be 
(Cobet no doubt derived his "conjecture" KaQ^prjv from Bekker's app. 
crit., which lists a number of secondary mss. that display this orthography). 
But KOC0ijp.Tiv deserves attention in its own right, as it was apparently the 
earlier form, KaOoipiqv representing a later (probably Hellenistic) vari­
ation; see Schwyzer-Debrunner 1.680, 794 and n.2; less decisively KB 
11.228. However, one cannot be dogmatic about this, and the Ka0oipqv/ 
KOC©xjjjLT|v confusion occurs in mss. also in Ar. Ra. 919, Lys. 149, X. Cyr.
5.1.8; see J. Wackernagel, Glotta 7 (1916) 231-2.
e3-4. Traer a.. . e^eppuriKe: Aristides describes the phenomenon
in quasi-physical terms: is common in medical contexts, see LSJ s.v.
11.1.a; and foreKpeiv in a material sense, cf. Phd. 112a6, b1, Ti. 85c6,
Criti. 118d5; Ar. Av. 104. The language is unobjectionable (pace Steinhart 
465).
130e5-131a10. Socrates reasserts that god decides if he can offer help 
to anyone, and states that it must yet be determined if someone else ought 
to be entrusted with Theages' education. Theages wishes to make a pro­
visional test of the divine sign, and, if it does not respond favourably, to 
placate it with prayers and sacrifices. Demodocus supports Theages, and 
Socrates agrees to this course of action.
The conclusion of the dialogue; formally its brevity marks it as similar 
to the closing portions of other Platonic works. Socrates is in character to 
the end, recommending others as better alternatives for the instruction of 
Theages. But Theages' suggestion to win over to 8ocip.6viop through 
ritualistic means goes beyond anything said about the divine sign 
elsewhere (see on 131a2).
e5. T|p.CTcpa: For the plural reference see on 122d7 Trpoaayop- 
cucojj.ci/.
e6. Travu.. .Tax*u: Cf. 129e8-9.
e6-7. cl Sc jjtfj following upon a parallel cotv/rfv is formulistic, cf. 
131a3-4; see H. van Herwerden, Mnem. 2.19 (1891) 338-9 ; KG ,,.484-5.
e7-9. dcrcjxxXccrTepov...piaXXov Superfluous piaXXov is 
used resumptive,y after the gist of the initial comparative has been lost 
track of; cf. Pit. 286a7-b1, Phd. 79e4-5; see Riddell §166. In 
ccrTcpov there is perhaps an ironic echo of c^otXcpct at 121c8.
e8. eyKpaTCLS ecu tol: In half-ironic contrast with Socrates, others 
have control in their own right over the help they can render men; Socrates 
on the other hand is at the mercy of a divine agent (further underlined by 
e9-10 jJidWov ...Trpoc^ocL); see Intr. ch. I, b, vii; ch. Ill, a.
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e8-9. tt]s. .. dvOpcoTrous: For oj<|)€\clv + cognate accusative 
axj)e\iav (+ acc.) cf. R. 346c5, 520a1-2, Euthd. 275e2.
e9. Trap’ epou: Hermann's emendation Trap’ epoi possesses the 
sole advantage of harmonizing the prepositional phrase with the combin­
ation Trap’.. .tivi earlier in the sentence (e7). The proposal is, however, 
superfluous: the meanings of the two prepositions must be carefully 
distinguished, "alongside" and "from" respectively; and Trap’ epou... 
touto iTpa^ai is in any case good Greek (see LSJ s.v. Trpao'O’cn 111.1).
e9-10. otl av tuxT)S: tuxX) has near unanimous mss. support (a 
few secondary mss. read tuxol), but the assimilation of ttjxxi into tuxXIS 
(after crot e7) represents the regular Greek idiom; cf. Cri. 44d9-10, 45d2, 
Prt. 353a8, Tht. 179c5, Grg. 522c2-3; also above 129b6 and n.; see Kuhner 
ac/X. Mem. 3.12.1. Bekker's proposal (he printed tuxT)) should therefore 
be adopted, against the verdict of all editors except Schanz. The ease with 
which Tuyx^vco in the above construction (vel sim.) could be corrupted 
from the personal to the much less idiomatic impersonal use is illustrated in 
129b6, where the true reading tuxco has been altered to tux”0 in 
Par.1811 Par.1812.
131a1. pev to i vuv: Plato is fond of this combination, especially in 
dialogue (see Denniston, GP2579; des Places 309). For pev solitarium 
see on 123e2.
a1. outgo ctl points to what follows; see DeVries, Mnem. 4.16 (1963) 
287 (with references).
a2. aTroTreipaOfjvaL: Cf. 129d3-4; but whereas Treipav \a|3eiv 
earlier referred to the testing of the sign's prophetic veracity, here the 
testing concerns its willingness to participate in Theages' improvement - a
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shift in meaning which reflects the dislocation in the divine sign section 
(see ad 129e1). octto— is perfective, see Schwyzer-Debrunner II.268-9.
a3. TToepELKTQ: Cf. Tht. 150d3-5, where however permission for a com­
panion's progress is granted not by to SatjjLOVtov, but by 6 Gods (see 
Intr. ch. II, b).
a3. TtriJTCi pdXTicrTOC: Hirschig tentatively suggested the seclu­
sion of these words, thus producing an idiomatic omission of the apodosis 
after an odev-protasis and before the antithetical ot So pif) (a4); see 
Goodwin, MT2179; KG II.484-5. But the emendation is unnecessary; see 
H. van Herwerden, Mnem. 2.19 (1891) 338-9 (who cites, int.al., Hp. ma. 
295b3-4).
a4. ol 8o piT): Forot following doev, see on 130e6-7.
a4-6. poiiXo'UO'd|JLO0a.. .TTOLpao’dp.oOa: Fritzsche explains the
successive plurals in this sentence by reference to Men. 71c1-2 (see also 
Bluck ad Men. 75b8, and above on 12267). But at this stage Theages 
probably does not yet exclude his father from his plans; elsewhere he 
speaks in similar terms, cf. 128c1 ttoci£cuv TTpos r^cts; see Intr. ch. Ill, b.
a4. 8pctcro|jiov: Modal future ("ought to," "must”).
a5-6. to .. .yLyvo^evov: Cf. Tht. 151a4 to ytyvo^ovov 8ocv-
irdvtov; see Intr. ch. II, b.
a6. e-uxaiOTL to Kai Guarcas: Cf. Menex. 244a5 ovxats kocl 
Guatats, Lg. 885b8-9 Guorats to kocl odxats, Euthphr. 14b3-4 eu- 
xdp.ovos to Kat Gijcov. The Ionic dative is generally (since Campbell, 
Sophistes and Politicus [Oxford, 1867] xxxiv) accepted as a chronological 
marker, because it is said to occur only in post-Republic dialogues; and 
Plato, moreover, largely avoids lonicisms (see Wilamowitz, Platon II3 
[Berlin, 1962] 413). Ritter therefore accepted ouxator as a decisive mark
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of inauthenticity, since he felt that Thg. otherwise conforms perfectly to 
Plato’s earliest style (Untersuchungen uber Platon [Stuttgart, 1888] 94; see 
also Intr. ch. IV, b). This judgement, however, must come in for two serious 
objections. 1) It is not quite true that the Ionic dative only occurs in post­
Republic works: Burnet's edition of Ion restored xpucroTcn (F) at 535d3 
where xpuoots (TW) had previously been read (on the probable date 
and authenticity of Ion, see Guthrie, HGP IV. 199; Ritter [Neue Untersuch­
ungen uber Platon (Munich, 1910) 217] considered it spurious). This is 
clearly the superior reading: in a dialogue with a Homeric rhapsode, the 
archaic dative is particularly suitable (it is also lectio difficilior). 2) As 
Friedlander remarked (329 n.17), a’jxcucn Te Kai Quotais form a dac­
tylic rhythm (a quotation?), and it seems generally consistent with the char­
acterization of Theages that he should express himself in a manner re­
flecting the education he has only recently completed (see Intr. ch. Ill, b); 
Ionic datives are admitted freely in Attic poetry (especially in tragic lyrics), 
and in Theages' proposal to placate to SaLpoviov there is an epic fla­
vour which makes the form appropriate here. In this instance it is important 
to exercise some flexibility in evaluating style, especially since general 
conclusions about chronology are at stake.
Critics who object that only here is it ever suggested that one can 
appease to Saipoviov (so Stallbaum ac/131a7; Rist, Phoenix 17 [1963] 
20) tend to overlook the fact that Theages, not Socrates, is speaking. 
Nevertheless, it may be evidence for the date of Thg.; see Intr. ch. V, b.
a7. e£riytf) VTai: Vox propria for a seer’s interpretation or explana­
tion of signs or omens; cf. Ft. 427c4, Thue. 7.50.4, E. Ph. 1011, And. de 
Myst. 115.
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a8-9. Mr|K€Ti.. .©eayris: As elsewhere, the concerned adult has 
the last word but one; cf. La. 201b6-c3 (Lysimachus), Euthd. 307b5 (Crito); 
cf. also the intrusion of the TrociSocycoyol and their dispersal of the gather­
ing before Socrates' final words in Lys. 223a2ff.
a10. ’AXX’...Trend)Cf. Socrates' second last sentence in Prt. 
(362a1)’ ’AXX’, 8’ eyco, outgo XP*Q Troieiv, el aoi 8okci. There is 
a vague reference to a future course of action here, cf. Chrm. 176d1 ff., La. 
201 b6ff., Menex. 249e3ff., Men. 100b7ff., Phlb. 67b11 ff.; see lntr. ch. I, c.
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APPENDIX 1
Plutarch and the ‘Yucp tou nXctTcnvos Oeayous 
(Lamprias Catalogue §70)
We know of only one work in the ancient world which might possibly 
have been a commentary or separate study on Thg., namely the entry in 
the Lamprias Catalogue (§70) entitled 'YTrep totj nxdcTtnvos ©ed— 
yous. But this work is no longer extant, and, since Plutarch apparently 
does not refer to it directly or indirectly in any of his surviving compositions, 
and since the Lamprias Catalogue is probably a library inventory rather 
than simply a list of Plutarch's works,1 it can hardly be assumed without 
question that §70 was the product of Plutarch's own hand. Indeed, the 
claim for inauthenticity has been made, for reasons that are closely con­
nected with the argument that Plutarch, and others, did not even accept the 
Platonic authorship of Thg. Since I have earlier asserted that the auth­
enticity of Thg. was not questioned until the nineteenth century (see Intr. ch. 
IV, a), the very limited evidence concerning the 'YTrep totj nxdTcouos 
©edyous* must be examined in detail.
If the 'YTrep tou nxdTcnvos Oedyous was Plutarch's own com­
position, he obviously believed that Thg. was written by Plato. But Plutarch 
never mentions Thg. or quotes from it under Plato's name, and this has 
been taken to prove that he did not accept the dialogue as genuine.2 And
1As indicated most sharply by the inclusion in it (§56) of eight books of Aristotle’s Topica-, 
see K. Ziegler, RE41.696-7; D.A. Russell, Plutarch (London, 1973) 18-9.
2See Stallbaum 225; Wagner 10 n.2; H. Patzig, Quaestiones Plutarcheae (Diss. Berlin, 
1876) 3; Fritzsche 227; Wilamowitz II.325.
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since the title of §70 in the Lamprias Catalogue unambiguously ascribes 
Thg. to Plato, it follows, we are told, that that work cannot have been written 
by Plutarch.3 Quite recently Sandbach, who has edited the Lamprias 
Catalogue, has asserted that "The authenticity of the Theages was dis­
puted," and, to judge by his translation of §70 in the Catalogue as "In 
Defence of (or About) Plato’s Theages," it would appear that he is prepared 
at least to entertain the possibility that the ‘YTrep tou nXccTtnuos 
Oeccyous addressed the question of the authenticity of Thg.4 Thus the 
prevailing opinions about §70 in the Lamprias Catalogue promote three in­
ferences: 1) Plutarch refused to accept Thg. as authentic; 2) there existed a 
school of thought in antiquity which held Thg. to be spurious, and against 
which the author of the ’Yrrep tou nXctTcovos ©ectyous was reacting; 
3) the latter-named work was a pamphlet whose sole or primary aim was to 
defend Thg. against charges of inauthenticity.
It will be best to consider Plutarch’s attitude to the dialogue first. It is 
true that he never quotes Thg. as Plato's; the one testimonium for Thg. 
which occurs in the Plutarchan Corpus is from the (probably) spurious De 
Fato (Mor. 574b).5 This fact, however, is of little significance. For Thg. is 
not the only Platonic dialogue which Plutarch fails to quote: he provides no 
testimonia, for example, for Lys. or /on; and he never explicitly ascribes to 
Plato references to Cri. or La.6 These four works, it will be noted, never
3So Patzig, op. cit. 3.
4F.H. Sandbach, Plutarch's Moralia 15 (London, 1969) 15. Patzig (op. cit.) did not raise this 
further possibility.
5For a brief discussion of the un-PIutarchan character of this work, see Ziegler, op. cit. 725­
6. J. Hani (Plutarque: Oeuvres Morales 8 [Paris, 1980] 3-4 n.2) has collected a convenient 
list of those who defend or reject its authenticity.
QCri. ~ Mor. 581c, 1126b, Demetr. 889c; La. ~ Mor. 1033b, 1117e, 987f. Additionally, 
Plutarch never makes any form of reference to Hp. ma., which has of late won a great deal of 
support in favour of authenticity (see Guthrie, HGP IV. 175-6).
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had their authenticity called into question in antiquity, nor are they doubted 
nowadays. On the other hand, Plutarch attributes material extracted from 
Ale. I, Clit., and Min. to Plato, although the authorship of these three works is 
much disputed in modern scholarship.7 It seems that the safest tentative 
conclusion one can draw about Plutarch's position as regards the Platonic 
Corpus in general is that he accepted as genuinely Platonic those works 
which were received into the canon of Thrasyllus,8 and that, like the vast 
majority of ancient authorities (see further below), he made no real critical 
attempt to identify spurious works embedded within the nine tetralogies.9 
That he never quotes from Thg. is no more an indication that he considered 
it spurious than the absence of testimonia is for Lys. and Ion.
A more telling argument against the possibility that Plutarch be­
lieved Thg. to be Plato’s own work is the one that holds that Thg. is not 
quoted by Plutarch where one would most expect him to do so, i.e., in the 
De genio Socratis.10 Now, this would be significant, but for certain consid­
erations. First, the De genio is not an overtly philosophical treatise. It
7Ale. I ~ Plu. Ale. 192a, Lyc. 49f; Clit. ~ Mor. 439c, 534e; Min. ~ Mor. 550a-b, 776e. On the 
question of the authenticity of Ale. I, see lntr. ch. V, g; on Clit. see Taylor, PMW0 536-8; 
Shorey, WPS 422, 657-8; Guthrie, HGP V. 387-9; and on Min. see Taylor, ib. 538-40; 
Shorey, ib. 425-7, 659; Guthrie, ib. 389-90.
8See Field’s comments (225) on Plutarch's use of the Corpus Platonicum. For a list of the 
dialogues from which Plutarch quotes, see Ziegler, op. cit. 750; it is noteworthy that 
Plutarch passes over the Spuria in complete silence, selecting only from the dialogues of 
Thrasyllus’ tetralogies. For the tetralogical and trilogical organizations of the Corpus in 
antiquity, see lntr. ch. V, a.
9One exception to Plutarch's unwavering acceptance of the authenticity of the Platonic 
Corpus has been suggested, namely Ep. 7. Edelstein speaks with great confidence about 
Plutarch's rejection of the authenticity of Ep. 7 (see Plato's Seventh Letter [Leiden, 1966] 
57 n.133), but the phrases in Plu. Dio which allude to Ep. 7, such as cos (xtjtos yeypa<|>€ 
nXctTcov (4.5), and the reverential ufe <j>Ttcn,v auTos (11.3), make this rejection ex­
tremely doubtful. Plutarch's failure to use the philosophical digression in Ep. 7 has recently 
been accounted for by a new hypothesis about the composition of the letter (see H. Tarrant, 
Phronesis 28 [1983] 81 ff.).
10See the scholars cited in n.2 above. Concerning the absence in Plutarch of quotation 
from Thg. Ziegler (op. cit. 751), drawing attention to the presence of the 'YTrep toO 
nXctTLOVOS ©eccyous in the Lamprias Catalogue, says merely "sehr merkwurdig."
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displays lively dramatic elements, and in it we do not find quotation from 
Thg., or from any other work of Plato's for that matter, with attribution to 
Plato, because this would have jarred sharply with these dramatic ele­
ments.11 We might contrast, for instance, the De sera, which begins from 
philosophical premises; here Plato is mentioned as the authority for certain 
statements (e.g. 550a, d), but such mention is much more in harmony with 
the academic tone of the work. The second consideration is, simply, that 
Plutarch probably does make use of Thg. in the De genio. For one thing, 
the prophecy about the destruction of the Sicilian expedition which Plu­
tarch reports Socrates as having made (De genio 581 d, cf. Nic. 532b, Ale. 
199f) is most likely to have been taken from Thg. 129c8-d2, which is the 
only surviving source of information for the prophecy before Plutarch's 
time.12 More difficult to evaluate is the evidence provided by a few struc­
tural details in the De genio. The hero of its myth (590a-592e), who enters 
the cave of Trophonius to learn the nature of Socrates' divine sign (590a), 
is given the name Timarchus, and the story about him is told among a 
group of conspirators on the night in 379 B.C. that Thebes was freed from 
Spartan occupation. Several scholars, some independently it would seem, 
have suggested that Plutarch named the hero of his myth after the 
character Timarchus in the third anecdote of Thg. (129a1-c8), and draw 
this inference from the prominence of Socrates' divine sign in both Thg. 
and De genio, and from the fact that a secret plot bulks large in the Thg.
11 See R.M. Jones, The Platonism of Plutarch (Diss. Chicago, 1916) 107: "The formal 
quotation of extended Platonic passages, with indication of the dialogue from which they 
are taken, is relatively infrequent; it occurs almost altogether in exegetical works, such as de 
animae procreatione in Timaeo, and the quaestiones Platonicae...."
12l might add that other sources for the story have been suggested, namely Antisthenes 
and the historian Timaeus (see Dittmar 79-80).
448
anecdote as well.13 Certainty will never be reached on this theory, but it 
should be noted that Plutarch frequently indicates literary or philosophical 
indebtedness through the simple naming of a character. Thus Simmias, 
one of the main interlocutors in Phd., is included as a character in the De 
genio, which itself has been strongly influenced by Phd. in its dramatic 
setting.14 Similarly, Aridaeus/Thespesius in the myth of the De Sera (cf. 
Mor. 564c) is clearly modelled after the Ardiaeus of the myth of Er in R. (cf. 
615c6ff.); Epicurus, mentioned at the outset of the De Sera (548b), is not 
physically present in it but is merely a symbol for the philosophical position 
from which the dialogue takes its start; and so also the name of the 
character Aristotle in the De Facie (920f et pass.) signifies the Peripatetic 
viewpoint in that work.15 The application of the name Timarchus in the De 
genio may likewise be Plutarch's implicit acknowledgement of his use of 
Thg.
Hence the argumentum ex silentio for Plutarch's rejection of Thg. is 
supported by exceedingly weak foundations, and as such it is hardly 
tenable. Concomitantly the proposition that the 'YTrep tou nxdcTtovos 
Oectyous is un-Plutarchan falls to the ground. But there are further 
reasons, more positive in nature, for believing that Plutarch was its author.
We know from the De genio Socratis (Mor. 575b-598f) that the pre­
cise nature of Socrates' sign was a controversial matter for Plutarch (580c- 
582c, 588c-589f). Thg. provides the most extensive collection of informa­
13See Schleiermacher 351; W. Christ, S8AlV(1901) 95, 103; Gigon, Sokrates 173-4; A. 
Corlu, Le Demon de Socrate (Paris, 1970) 60-1. On this connection some scholars are non- 
commital (e.g. Knebel ad 129a; Hermann, Geschichte und System 597 n.240), others reject 
the connection outright (e.g., von Arnim, Verhandelingen Kon. Akad. van Wetenschappen 
te Amsterdam 22 [1921] 17; G.M. Lattanzi, // "De Genio Socratis" di Plutarco [Roma, 1933] 
49 n.3), while others are perhaps unaware of the possibility (e.g., De Lacy and Einarson, 
Plutarch's Moralia 7 [London, 1959] 365 and n. a; Hani, op. cit. [n.5] 47).
14See DeLacy and Einarson, op. cit. 362 n. a.
15See Cherniss, Plutarch's Moralia 12 (London, 1957) 6.
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tion about Socrates’ sign to be found anywhere in the Platonic Corpus, and 
it is reasonable to assume, given Plutarch's interest in Socrates' sign and 
the interest in it current around Plutarch's lifetime (cf. Max. Tyr. 15; Apul. 
Socr.), that the Tirep toli nxdTtnvos Oeayous was largely concerned 
with to Socljjlo vlov of Socrates. Another Plutarchan work is of special 
interest in this connection. In Quaestiones Platonicae 1 (Mor. 999c-1000e) 
a discussion is offered on the meaning of the famous passage in Tht. 
(150c7-8) where Socrates disavows any ability to "beget" ideas of his own, 
asserting instead that he merely assists others to give birth to their own 
intellectual "offspring." Plutarch goes so far as to suggest that it was a 
spiritual guide (to SctLpovLOV 1000d; cf. 999e Qeiov tl kccl Socl(ji6v- 
lov) that prevented Socrates from producing any of his own positive doc­
trines. In this passage he is extending the role of to Sccljjlovlov as he 
found it in Tht., much as the author of Thg. also elaborated on the Platonic 
account in 129e3ff., a passage which is certainly dependent on part of the 
same lengthy discourse in Tht. as that from which Plutarch derived the 
theme for Platonic Questions 1 (see lntr. ch. II, b). In both works to 8ocl- 
po vlov is said to participate actively in Socrates' educational contacts 
(avXXccprjTOCL Thg. 129e7; L^TjyTiacxTO Mor. 999e, so also Mor. 581b), 
although this assertion is in direct contradistinction to the purely apotropaic 
function assigned to the divine sign everywhere else in Plato's indisputably 
genuine works (see lntr. ch. II, a).
Plutarch, in other words, is at one with the author of Thg. on the be­
haviour of the divine sign, and we may therefore suppose that he would 
have felt a particular attraction to write about this work. It is certain, at any 
rate, that he would have defended the adaptation made in Thg., as he 
himself clearly subscribed to a similar representation of the divine sign in
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his own writings. But the 'YTrep tou nXctTtovos Oedyous would in 
addition have provided ample scope for Plutarch generally to indulge his 
interest in both Saipoves16 and prophecy.17 Moreover, I would venture 
to suggest that the position of the 'YTrep tou nXcrrcovos Oedyous in 
the Lamprias Catalogue also offers a clue as to its content: it occurs be­
tween §69 riepl ZcoKpctTOUS SctipoiXou (De genio Socratis) and §71 
nepi pccvTLKTis otl otoCotccl KOCTCC tous ’Akoc8thjlcxlkous (lost; cf. 
§131 nepi tou pr] pdxecyeaL tq (tccvtik-q tov ’AKaSripaiKov 
\dyov); these three works would seem to comprise, as the product of 
deliberate editorial activity, a small cluster of thematically-related treatises, 
dealing generally with Socrates’ divine sign and (tccvtikt).18 As a parallel 
it may be observed that shortly after this section there appear similar sets of 
anti-Stoic works (§§76-9) and anti-Epicurean compositions (§§80-2).
This is, I believe, as far as we can go concerning both Plutarch's 
attitude to the authenticity of Thg., and his own authorship of Lamprias 
Catalogue §70; until solid evidence to the contrary is brought to light, we 
may assume that the work was from the hand of Plutarch. What, then, can 
be said for Sandbach’s proposal that the authenticity of Thg. was a subject 
of dispute in antiquity, and for the corollary that the 'YTrep tou n\ocT- 
covos 0edyous defended the authenticity of the dialogue?
There are no external data to support Sandbach’s first assertion. 
That Thg. was not considered spurious in antiquity is strongly suggested by
18See in general G. Soury, La Demonologie de Plutarque (Paris, 1942); J. Dillon, The 
Middle Platonists (Ithaca, 1977) 216-24; F.E. Brenk, In Mist Apparelled: Religious Themes 
in Plutarch’s Moralia and Lives (Leiden, 1977); K. Doring, Mnem. 4.37 (1984) 376-92.
17For Plutarch's interest in the prophetic side of to Baipomov, cf. Mor. 580df., 581df., 
588c; his concern with p.ai/TiKrj hardly requires documentation, but cf. the treatises DeE 
apud Delphos, De Pythiae oraculis, De defectu oraculorum.
18ZiegIer (op. cit. 704-5) classifies §§70 and 71 as "wissenschaftlich-philosophischen 
Schriften," while §69 is placed in the category of "theologische Schriften."
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the complete absence of explicit statements about its inauthenticity; for 
while this dialogue is cited relatively infrequently by ancient authors (see 
the Testimonia between the text and apparatus), on those occasions when 
it is ascribed to a particular source, that source is always Plato (see Intr. ch. 
IV, a). Once again, the conclusion imposes itself that no one in antiquity 
doubted the authenticity of Thg., largely for the simple reason that it be­
longed to the canon of Thrasyllus. Only very rarely is any work within the 
canon called into doubt: such was the case with Epin.;1Q Athenaeus (11. 
506c) informs us that Ale. //was attributed by some to Xenophon; Aelian 
(V77 8.2) was aware of an uncertainty about the authenticity of Hipparch.', 
and there is an indication that the authorship of Amat. may have been 
questioned in antiquity (Thrasyllus ap. D.L 9.37).* 20 But only in the case of 
Epin. does this scepticism seem to have been at all widespread. Thus if 
Thg. was considered spurious, this belief has left no traces, except for the 
possibility that "In Defence of Plato's Theages" refers to a defence of its 
authenticity. Could this be what the title implies?
This is a heavy, but not, perhaps, impossible burden for the preposi­
tion wep to shoulder. And while it is a well-established feature of Plu­
tarch's diction that wep is frequently used as a virtual synonym of Trepi +
**9For the details see L. Taran, Academics: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic 
Epinomis (Philadelphia, 1975) 3-13. Plutarch himself never expresses any doubt about the 
authenticity of Epin., but neither does he ever mention it by name. On the other hand Mor. 
477c may contain a direct reference, with ascription to Plato, to Epin. 984a (see W. 
Helmbold, Plutarch's Moralia 6 [London, 1939] 239).
20Aelian says of Hipparch. et 8-q 6 ''IiTTrapxos nXccTcovos ecrTi t<5 optl, a state­
ment which need not be taken to imply his doubt as to the authenticity of the dialogue (see 
comm, ad 127d3 for this use of et), but which must nevertheless indicate scepticism in 
some circles. Similarly Thrasyllus' words concerning Amat., evrrep ot ’A VTe peter toll 
nXaTOJVos etcri, could well show that he assumed the genuineness of that dialogue.
But, despite the explanations of Taylor (PMV\ft 531 n.2), I fail to see the reason for a strong 
assertion of Platonic authenticity unless, again, some doubt had been cast on it from 
elsewhere. On Theopompus' attitude towards the Platonic writings, see Intr. ch. IV n.1.
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gen., meaning sinply ’’about,"21 yet among the titles of Plutarch's extant 
works and those of the Lamprias Catalogue the preposition wcp is used 
only twice, in §70 and in the extant treatise npoc KojXaJTqv irrrep tcov 
aXXtov <|)iXo0'o<t>(3v (Mor. 1107dff. [adv.Colotem], §81 in the Catalogue; 
but in some mss. Trepi is found pro unep). When Plutarch in his titles 
wishes to say "about," he invariably uses Trepi; so it seems doubtful that 
TJTrep is here merely a synonym for Trepi. We are left then to speculate on 
the force of irnep in the title.
While it is impossible to discount the notion that the preposition 
means "in defence of the authenticity of," the lack of any other evidence for 
such a controversy concerning Thg. should induce us to look for another 
explanation of the title. The explanation may lie behind the inferences al­
ready drawn above concerning the content of §70. Under circumstances in 
which various theories about the divine sign were circulating, a polemical 
position was bound to be taken against certain accounts of it; and since 
Thg. goes beyond all other Platonic works in the influence it ascribes to the 
divine sign, especially through its attribution to the sign of positive activ­
ities, through the assimilation of the sign to conventional 8a.ip.oves, and 
through the prophetic powers which the sign is able to impart to Socrates 
(see lntr. ch.ll, b), it is probable that the 'Tnep tou nXctTcovos Oeccyous 
was, at least in part, an attempt to reconcile the extension of the powers of 
to 8aip.oviov as depicted in Thg. with the information about it which 
Plato provides in every other instance. And if Plutarch upheld the presen­
tation of the divine sign in Thg. as the "true" sign of Socrates, it does not 
follow necessarily that the authenticity of Thg. was ultimately at stake.
21 See H.A. Holden, Life of Demosthenes (London, 1893) 181 s.v. TJTrep A; and on the 
gradual shift in meaning of the preposition from "in defence of" to "about,” see P.T. 
Stevens, CO 30 (1936) 211-12.
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Plutarch frequently takes it upon himself to reconcile apparent contradic­
tions within Plato (e.g. Mor. 1006c-1007e, 1015M017b; cf. 1013 e), as we 
should expect him, as a devoted Platonist, to do.22 Nor should we ignore 
the fact that Plutarch possessed what we do not, namely descriptions of 
Socrates' divine sign, some presumably from the fourth century, which no 
longer survive. We cannot know what non-Platonic (and non-Xenophontic) 
accounts other authors contemporary with Plutarch may have favoured 
over the one, influenced by Thg., that Plutarch espoused. The possibility 
must not be dismissed that some writers rejected tout court the various 
descriptions of to SaiirovLov in the Platonic Corpus. In a situation such 
as this, a "defence" of Thg. would be fitting.
Although this investigation cannot admit of any absolute conclu­
sions, there is no compelling reason to believe that Plutarch, or anybody 
else in antiquity, considered Thg. to be spurious. That assessment, to all 
appearances, belongs to a much more critical period of scholarship.
22See Field 225; Russell, op. cit. 65-6.
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APPENDIX 2 
ANACREON FR.449 {PMG)
ZaoKpaTqs. TauT’ ccttlv aTrep e<f>q ’AvaKpecov Tqv
KaXXLKpLTqv eTTLaTacjOcti • rj ouk oTcrOa to §apa;
Oeayqs. "Eycoye. Zen. Ti o6v; TOLauTqs tlvos
KOCL <JU O”U VOWL OCS eTTL0Up.£L S OCVSpOS OQTLS
TuyydveL op-OTeyvos cov KaXXLKpLTq Tq Kuavqs KaL 
oiTLCTaTaL TupavvLKa, coorep eKeLvqv ecjrq o TTOLq—
Tqs, Lva Kai ou qplv Tupavvos yevq Kai Tq ttoXcl;
(= Theages 125d10-e3)
There is predictable disagreement about the extent of poetic quota­
tion which can be extracted from this passage. Burnet set off OTTLOTaTaL 
TupavvLKa as though lifted verbatim from the Anacreon poem in ques­
tion, and Page followed suit. Gentili accepted only KaXXLKpLTq Tq Ku~ 
avqs (i.e. KaXXLKpLTq q Kuavqs), and explicitly cast doubt over cttl— 
ototol TupavvLKa.1 Edmonds manufactured the iambic line KaXXL— 
KpLTq q Kuavqs eiTLOTaTaL TupavvLKa as a possible restoration of 
the particular passage to which Socrates alludes in Thg.2 Although on this 
question a verdict of non liquet seems inevitable, and there is little hope 
that fr.449 can be connected up as a part of any other surviving fragment or 
poem of Anacreon, nevertheless there is a fairly strong presumption that 
Gentili, at least, was correct. Metronymic formations of the kind KaXXL— 
KpLTq Tq Kuavqs are very rare in Greek generally, and no less in lyric
^Anacreonte (Roma, 1958) 81-2.
2Lyra Graeca //(London, 1924) 183.
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poetry (the Cologne Archilochus papyrus preserves the only other example 
of a metronymic expression in Greek lyric [Pap.Col. 7511.10-12]). This 
strongly suggests that Socrates is quoting, rather than introducing the form­
ation himself.3 Moreover, it is reasonably clear that, besides the likelihood 
that Kallikrite and her mother Kyane were named in the poem, eTTiaTct— 
tocl TupavvLKa, if not the ipsissima verba of Anacreon, must neverthe­
less embody the main thrust of a particular statement made by Anacreon 
about Kallikrite, for Socrates' pretext in citing this poem is its mention of 
TUpocvviKdc, which has emerged as an ironical theme of discussion in the 
dialogue within the last page or so (124e1 ff.).
As to the meaning of fr.449 within the original poem, there has been 
considerably greater unanimity. According to commentators, CTriCTOtTCti 
TUpocvviKdt described Kallikrite’s political sagacity, or ability, or both, an 
inference usually supported by citing the alleged parallels of Aspasia or 
Diotima (Kallikrite thereby becomes a "teacher” of the political craft in Ana­
creon's poem),4 or by identifying Kallikrite’s mother Kyane with the little- 
known mythical Kyane, who was wife of Aeolus.5 To my mind, however, it 
is much more probable that from Anacreon, who is patently a poet of
3The use of a metronymic with the name of a deity is, however, not uncommon in lyric (see 
Anne Pippin Burnett, Three Archaic Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho [Cambridge, 
Mass., 1983] 90 n.31), and this might lead us to believe that Kallikrite and Kyane were 
divinities of some kind. But, while not excluding this possibility, it is not what we would 
expect of Anacreon, who largely avoids mythical themes and references, except for 
stereotyped invocations to Aphrodite, Eros, and the like.
4I.S. Muller, Sechs auserlesene Gesprache Platons (Hamburg, 1736) 432; Cousin 249; 
Burges 408.
^Initially Souilhe 151; following him Robin 1643; Carugno 31; Amplo 18; most recently 
Pangle 139 n.12. Souilhd's assertion is at best suspect: the evidence he adduces (Dio­
dorus Siculus 5.7.6) confirms that a Kyane was wife of Aeolus, but Kallikrite is mentioned 
neither there nor elsewhere as her daughter, nor is there any reference in Diodorus to the 
joint administration of Lipara which Souilhd ascribes to Kyane and Kallikrite. Moreover, the 
scholiast ad Hom. Od. 10.6 does not mention Kallikrite in the list of Aeolus' twelve children 
(although he does cite the existence of a different list), and Telepatra is given as his wife 
(but Amphithea in [Plut.] Mor. 312c-d and in Sostratus ap. Stob. 44.35 = 4.472 W-H). 
Kyane and Kallikrite simply cannot be identified with any degree of certainty.
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erotikafi the reference was rather to a prowess in love matters. The meta­
phor of erotic tyranny (love or the lover as tyrant) already occurs in extant 
Greek literature once before this fragment (Archilochus 23.20 West), and 
the conceit increases somewhat in frequency thereafter.* 7 On this reading, 
fr.449 represents one more instance in Anacreon of love or desire 
described in terms of oppression, of dominance and subservience;8 and 
Kallikrite, accordingly, was depicted as the erotic tyrant.9
That Socrates should introduce a reference to erotic tyranny at this 
point in Thg. is not only coherent within the structure of the dialogue, but 
also represents an important stage in its argument (see Intr. ch. I, b, v). It 
should be mentioned as well that this metaphor of the erotic tyrant can be 
paralleled from elsewhere in Plato. In Men. 76b4-5 Socrates comments 
that Meno's behaviour would prove, even if Socrates were blindfolded, that 
he is handsome and still possesses epoccrTal; Meno asks how this can 
be, and Socrates responds (b7-c1) that it is because he acts so imperious­
ly in his discussions, ouep ttolovctip ol Tpu^covTCs, cctc Tvpocv-
8So, consistently, the ancient tradition on Anacreon’s poetry, cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.71, Suda s.v. 
’AvaKpeiov, Athen. 13.600d, 2 ad Pi. Z. 2.1, Paus. 1.25.1, Him. Or. 19; see further J.M. 
Bell, QUCC 28 (1978) 31 n.7.
7Cf. E. Hipp. 538, id. fr. 136.1 Nauck; S. fr. 855.15 Nauck; Ar. Vesp. 500-502; Bion ap. Plu. 
Mor. 770b-c (and see below n.14); also the occasional use of 8eo"rr6Ceiv in amatory con­
texts in later Greek literature (see J.C. Yardley, CQ n.s.30 [1980] 240 and n.8). For the ex­
tension of the same idea into Roman literature, see R. Pichon, Index Verborum Amatorium 
(Paris, 1902) s.vv. domina, regnum, regno.
8E.g., frr. 357.1 (8apa\r|s ’"Epics), 360 (the lover as charioteer drives the poet's \|/DX’n), 
413 (the hammer as instrument of Eros), 460 (4>6pTov ’"EpicTos); cf. also 368 and (pro­
bably) 346.4.3-6.
9Our evidence suggests that when a man attaches the metronymic to another man's name, 
or to the name of a woman (as Anacreon apparently does here), he does so for some 
special, often abusive, effect, since this practice represents a direct reversal of convention 
(see M.B. Skinner, Ancient History Bulletin 1 [1987] 39-40). Hence one possibility open for 
fr.449 is that Kyane was notorious for her erotic behaviour, and Kallikrite has followed in her 
mother's footsteps; reproof is not necessarily implied, but is likely enough.
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veuovTes* ecus av ev cupQt (Sctlv.10 In Thg. Socrates displays the same 
preoccupation with epcos that he does in Men., and describes it along simi­
lar lines.
It is worth adding here that the interpretation presented above of fr. 
449 as an instance of the erotic tyrant may shed some light on a passage 
in Anacreontea 15.7-10 which has recently been subjected to emendation 
by M.L. West.11 The textus receptus of the poem in these lines is as 
follows:
’AvaKpecov jjl’ €TTe|jLi|/e
TTpos TraiSa, TTpos BaOuWov 
tov apTi t(3v ccrravTcov 
KpaTOUVTa kccl Tiipavvov.
West objects to the text on two fronts: "Eros himself is Tupavvos 0ed5v 
Kai avOpcoTrcov (Eur. fr. 136.1), but I do not know a parallel for TUpav— 
vos used of someone to whose charms everyone is enslaved. It is, to be 
sure, not much of an advance on KpaTouvTa." Accordingly, in his critical 
edition of the Anacreontea,^2 West reads TUpavvcov for TUpavvov. Of 
his two arguments in favour of emendation, his second is not particularly 
compelling; by itself there is little that is remarkable, or indeed suspicious, 
about the kind of particularizing climax which TUpavvov, if retained, pro­
vides.13 As for the first objection, West, it is true, has collected an im­
pressive amount of evidence, mostly from poetry, and covering a wide 
chronological period, to demonstrate that it is epcos who is frequently cast 
as a tyrant.14 And yet, from the preceding discussion it should now be
10Cf. R. 573b6-7 (Tupavvos 6 ’"Epcos), 573d4, 574e2.
11COn.s.34 (1984) 210.
^Carmina Anacreontea, ed. M.L. West (Leipzig, 1984) 11.
13Cf., e.g., Archilochus 23.20 West (mentioned above).
14ln his apparatus criticus to Anacreontea tr. 1.4-5 (p.48).
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evident that a lover, male or female, could without any special constraints 
on the poet be labelled as a tyrant, or as exercising a tyranny, and there is 
correspondingly no reason why Bathyllus in this poem should not be 
depicted as such a character. Indeed, I would go farther than this and 
suggest that, since it can be assumed that the author of Anacreontea 15 
aimed to imitate Anacreon successfully, a respectable Anacreontic exam­
ple of the lover-tyrant for him to draw inspiration from was ready to hand, 
and presently survives in fr.449. Tvpavvov in Anacreontea 15.10 is 
therefore unobjectionable and should be retained. It may be, as well, in­
direct confirmation of the interpretation of fr.449 presented here.15
15My thanks are due to Professor David Campbell, who brought this passage in the Anacre­
ontea to my attention.
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APPENDIX 3
Theages A29a3
el 8e pouXeaOe, top TLpapxou a8e\<j)dp KXclto” 
jjlocxop epecrQe tl elTTep ccutcq Tip.apxos qPLKoc 
aiToeocpoupepog -qei + eu6u tolj 8ocl|jioplou+5 ckci- 
pos Te kocl EuctQXos 6 OTOcSLoSpo^cDp os Tlpocp- 
XOP we8e£ccT0 ^euyoPTOc.
Burnet is responsible for the formal identification of the crux, but it 
appears that the obscurity of the passage was attested several centuries 
earlier. In his 1485 Latin translation of the dialogue, Ficino renders a3 
t^plkoc. . .a5 <j)eijyopTOC with the words cum iam moriturus asset. Is enim 
et Euathlus quidem cursor qui ilium fugientem suscepit.... Ficino's neglect 
of a Latin equivalent for eu0u totj 8ocl[jloplou might be interpreted in a 
couple of ways: 1) his exemplar did not contain the words,1 or 2) he did 
not understand how they should be construed and translated. A third 
possibility, that Ficino considered eu0u tou Sccl^oplou trivial enough 
to omit, has little to recommend it, since Socrates' sign is the focus of 
attention for this part of the dialogue. 1) is highly unlikely: all mss. 
containing Thg., one of which is in the hand of Ficino himself (Ambros. 
329), preserve the problematic eu0u tou 8ocl)jloplou. On balance, 2) 
remains the likeliest possibility.2 In spite of this, Johannes Serranus, who 
supplied Stephanus with the Latin translation to his 1578 edition of Plato,
1This exemplar was Flor.a or a descendent of the same; see "Fic." in Text. Trans.
2Cf. the comments on Ficino’s treatment of the text of Men. in Block's commentary (145) on 
that dialogue.
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felt confident enough of the meaning to turn the phrase by the words 
contra daemonis mandatum. This explanation satisfied most scholars, 
with hardly a murmur from a dissenting voice,3 until Baiter suggested (he 
did not print) St](jilou or Srjpoaiou pro 8cxl(jioplou: "(straight) to the 
executioner/prison."4 Subsequently, C.F. Hermann, Schanz, and Lamb, 
incorporated SripioaLOU into their editions of the dialogue.
One thing, however, is certain: eu0u tou Sotipoviou cannot 
stand in our texts. euQu as a preposition normally (and always in Plato)5 
means "straight to" or "to"6 (cf. Thg. 129d6 eu0u ’Ec^eo'ou kocl ’Icdulocs); 
"(straight) to the daemonic/TO 8ocl(JLOVLOV" is nonsense in the present 
context, and no parallels have been discovered to prove the meaning 
contra daemonis mandatum correct.7 Knebel (ad loc.) thought he had 
found a parallel for the latter in Max. Tyr. 15.7 ’AyiWcus vqo’ov olkcl 
cu0u ’TcTpou KCCTCt TT)V nouTLKqv edcXocTTOCU, but the alleged 
similarities are illusory, for eu0u in that passage is locative in sense, as 
contra daemonis mandatum is patently not. Nevertheless, this approach 
has recently been resurrected by A. Papanikolaou,8 who further adduces 
Hom. II. 5.849 and Hdt. 1.107.4 in defence of the mss. reading of Thg.', but 
those instances too are essentially locative, and in any event we are still 
without adequate Attic parallels. Baiter's suggested emendations are the
3Cf. Ruhnken's comment on the interpretation (Tim. Lex. s.v. ctjOtj [ed. nova cur. G.A. 
Koch, Lipsiae, 1828]): qui formulae usus ob raritatem notandus.
4For Srjpios = "executioner,” cf. Ft. 439e8; for SqpocTiov = "prison," cf. Thue. 5.18.7 (no 
Platonic instances of this usage). LSJ list no examples of Sripoaros = "executioner" 
earlier than D.S. 13.102.
5Cf. Grg. 525a6, Lys. 203a1, b2, b3; as an adverb at Ax. 364b1.
6H. Richards however questions the nuance of immediacy implied by the translation 
"straight to" (C015 [1901] 442-5).
7The interpretation is accepted by LSJ s.v. eueu B.I.I.a; see also Ast, Lexicon s.v. euQv, 
who translates by contra, adversum.
8Athena 76 (1976-77) 196-8.
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most attractive solutions which have been offered, yet to my mind neither 
Sriptocriou nor 8T)pXou are wholly satisfying conjectures, as they supply 
a circumstantial detail which the story about Timarchus can do without. 
Souilhe is also sceptical about the text, but refuses to offer a replacement 
for tou SaijJLOVLOu; he prints eu0u + tou Sai(jiovLOU+, reckoning the 
obelized words as some form of gloss.
I suggest that another explanation for the appearance of cu0u tou 
8ocl(jloplod at Thg. 129a3 can be offered. At a relatively early stage in 
the transmission of this dialogue, a note may have been entered along­
side, or in the immediate vicinity of, the line or lines containing r|ViKa 
cctto 0avoup.e vos xjei (perhaps supra lineam). If this note read cc30is 
to Sotipidviov (the point of reference is, after all, Socrates’ second 
anecdote about the divine sign), we may imagine that oc30is was cor­
rupted into eu0u, and that the genitive required to complement eu0u was 
fashioned from to 8ccip.oviov.9 This may have occurred through 
multiple stage corruption: 1) a30is — eu0us: cl30is is glossed cu0us 
by Hesychius, and palaeographically the alteration is easy enough;10 2) 
eu0us — 6U0u.11 From this point it would have been a simple matter for 
a scribe to insert the aberrant gloss cu0u tou Sctipioviov into the text, 
without thinking a great deal about precise meaning; the most natural
9We may compare the behaviour of epfSpaxu in Platonic mss.: when ev— or epppaxu 
appeared in an exemplar, scribes were naturally disposed to alter (3paxu to ppaxet, for the 
simple reason that ev takes the dative, and that epppocxv was an unfamiliar form; cf. Grg. 
457b1 ep|3paxu BTP, ev ppaxeT F; Hp. mi. 365d5 epppaxv TW, ev ppaxet F; Smp. 
217a2 epppaxu Cobet, ev ppaxei BTW.
1°Cf. Plu. Per. 164f for the restoration of auGis pro euGus of all mss. (accepted by 
Flacelidre-Chambry [Bude] and Perrin [Loeb]; Ziegler [Teubner] retains euGus).
11 For the confusion of euGus and euQij, cf. Lys. 203b3.
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place for it would be after a verb of motion, in this instance 'qci.12 The 
divine sign is moreover a topic which was bound to invite even cursory 
acknowledgement from a copyist: for marginal notes on the divine sign, 
cf. sch. vet. ad Ala I 103a5-6, Arethae sch. ad Ap. 31c8-d1; <f>co vfj at Ap. 
31 d1 is generally accepted as a gloss on the sign which was wrongly 
entered into the text as it now stands. An example of an intrusive gloss 
which, like the one postulated above, simply alluded in its original form to 
the general subject of discussion in a particular portion of the text, is Hp. 
ma. 283a2-3 Trepi ’Avcc^ccyopou XeyeTCti (bracketed by Burnet, 
following Stallbaum; deleted by Croiset). Since these words occur in the 
two mss. families represented by TW and F, which are known to have 
diverged at an early stage in the history of the Platonic text,13 we can 
safely assume that the interpolation of the phrase is quite ancient.14
If this analysis is correct, eu6u tot) Socipoviou has no place in 
our texts, and should be excised completely, rather than emended. Such 
a measure may gain support from 129a7-8 opxo|jloci ccTroectvou|j.evos, 
129c6 dnoOccuoupevos, and 129c7 ioi cctto eocvou|T6v os, in all 
of which instances the phrase euOu tou Sccijjiouiou is absent.15
12lt may be noted that Hackforth's emendation of Epin. 976a7-8 (see POPS 178 [1946] 9) 
assumes a similar set of circumstances.
13See Dodds, Plato: Gorgias (Oxford, 1959) 41-2.
14l am grateful to Professor C.W. Muller, who drew the relevance of this parallel to my 
attention.
15On the future participle + eTpi, epxopai, or the like, where the verb has lost its primary 
notion of movement and has assumed the function of a virtual auxiliary, see comm, ad 
129a3.
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APPENDIX 4
A Collection of Conjectures on the Theages
The following lists are intended to give the user of the text and commentary 
information concerning all places in Thg. which have been subjected to 
modern conjecture. These lists are, I believe, tolerably complete, although 
I cannot vouch for possible emendations offered in works unrelated to Thg. 
which I may not have seen. Section A below catalogues all readings 
accepted into the present text of Thg. that are the result of modern 
conjecture, including minutiae such as breathing, accentuation, and word 
separation. Detailed information on these passages is provided in the 
apparatus criticus to the text. Section B is a list of all other conjectures that 
have not been accepted into the text itself.
A. Readings in the present text of Thg. which depend on modern con­
jecture: 121a7, a8, 121b1, 121b3, 125a7, 125b7, 125c1, 125c10, 
125C13, 125d4, 125d6, 126c1, 127d5, 128a6, 128a7, 129a3,
129d7, 129e9, 130b6, 130b7, 130e10.
B.
121a1 iSioXoyrjo'ao’eai] SiaXoyicraaeai Cobet
121 a2 Se] ye Ast: aXXa Cobet
121c6 TroXXa av] ttoXu av epyov Cobet
121 d1 Sokco yap poi] SoKei yap poi Stephanus: SoKeiv yap 
poi Cobet: Sok(L yap Beck (ap. Bekker)
121d6 Kai] seel. Cobet
121d6 Kai eXaTTOV] eXXaTov fj pqSev Burges
122a1 ievai] ievai idVTa Knebel
122a2 crTreuSei] aiTeuSei o-TreuSovTa Schanz
122a7 av] Sf) Cobet ("quidem" vertit Ficino)
122a8 iTpa^eiv] ti Trpageiv Cobet
122c1 uTToXapfBavco] UTroXap(3avcov Cobet
122d7 KaXov] seel. Baiter: KaXco Taylor (ap. Burges): Kai 
Richards
122d8 TTpoo-ayopevcopev] Trpoaayopeuco Richards
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122d9 TOUTcy] TOUTcyL Hirschig
122e8 Kai CTTaiSeucrev] seel. Cobet
124b1 TTpL^OVTCJOV] TTpLOVTCOV Cobet
124b3 ou t<ektovlkt|] otj seel. Schanz
124d2 toutov (toutcov BTW)] seel. Stephanus
124e3 auTT)V] auTcev Baiter (auTcSv Urb.80)
124e10 ’Toikcv] ,zEolkcc Shorey, CP 12 (1917) 201
125a1 8L8aaKaXou] seel. Schleiermacher: SLSaaKaXoLOV F.
Sydenham (ap. J.H. Lupton, CR2 [1888] 228)
125a3 o0l] ottol Bekker: oT Cobet, Novae Lectiones (Lugduni- 
Batavorum, 1858) 624
125a6 opgs] apa Cornarius
125d6 ttol’ au (Troia av TW, Troia a B)] Troia Hermann: Troia 
8r| Burnet
125d10 KaWiKpLTTjv] Xa\iKpT)TT|V Burges
125e4 Kai TraiCoLS] seel. Cobet, Novae Lectiones 623-4
126a5 tl Srj] tl ye Stephanus
126a5 Srj co'tl ttoto] 8t| ttot’ octtlv Hirschig
126b4 Trap’ auTous au tous] Trapa tous auTous Hirschig
126c8 pappapOLS] pappapLKOLS Knebel: pappapLKaLS
Fritzsche
126d6 cn<t)cXT]craL] av (jo^eXfjcraL Hirschig
126d8 aauTGp] auTcy Schleiermacher: cru auTcy Wagner: seel.
Fritzsche
126d9 TOLauTa] to crau Ta Richards
126e1 av] 8f) Richards
126e2 eOcXcLS] cOcXols Richards
127a3 tcov KaXcSv KccyaOaov] tcjjv ayaOcuv Burges
127a3 to. ttoXltlkcc] seel. Wagner
127a6 avQpcoTTOLs] seel. Hirschig
127a8 tcov KaXcSv KCcyaOcSv] tojv ayaOcuv Burges
127b8 aTTaXXa^cTc] aTTaXXa£aL Stephanus
127c6 ctol] tol Hermann (fortasse e typographo)
127c8 epppayu] seel. Ast
127d6 av] seel. Cobet: 8f) Richards
127e8-128a8 octtlv ... elSevaL] sec/. H. Muller
128a5 ccTroXeLTrovTas] aTroXLiTOVTas Cobet
128a7 apyupLov ttccvu ttoXu (apyupLov ttccvu ttoXuv BTW)]
ttccvu ttoXuv Schanz: apyupLov TrapTroXu Cobet 
128b4-7 ttXtiv... vuv] seel. H. Muller
128b6 TTOLOU|jiaL] OLopaL aut TTpoorroLoupaL anonymus ap.
465
Stallbaum: aPTLTTOLOupaL (efTrou olpaL) Fritzsche: 
T^youpaL Cobet
128b8 otl] 6 Cobet (et post ttccTep signum interrogationis posuif)
128b8 poL] sec/. H. Muller, Richards
128b8 8okcl ctl] Sokcl tl Bekker
128c1 oStos] auTos Ficino ("modo ipse voluisset" vertit)
128c5 <|>aLvovT0CL] cc|)aLPOPTO Schleiermacher
128d4 ycvriTCXL] yLyprjTaL Richards
128d7-130e4 KaL toutcop. . .cgeppUT)KC] seel. H. Muller 
128e1 ycpopcpop] Xcyopcpop Cobet
128e8 (jj^e\T)0TjaoiJLaL] cjj^cXpoopaL Cobet
129a1 cl 8c] ctl 8’ cl Wagner
129a3 xJcl] t[clp Schanz
129a3 {CTJ0TJ TOU SaLpOPLOU}] CU0U TOTJ STlpOQ-LOU VOl 8T|(JLLO1J
Baiter: + eu0u tou SaLpoPLOu^ Burnet: cu6u {tolj
SaLpoPLOu} Souilhe
129b8 to SaLpoPLOP] sec/. Wagner
129c6 t{cl] tfcLU Schanz
129d5 tou KaXou] tou KaXou Ficino ("filius Cali” vertit)
129d7 opou tl] aXXo tl Papanikolaou
129d7 y’cXap] tcXclp Burges
129d8 TrpaypaTCLas] CTpaTLas Cobet (OTpaTCias BW)
129e3 aTrap] Trap Cobet
129e8 Ta\u yap TTapaxpfipa] Ta%u yap Kai Trapaxp'npa 
Papanikolaou
130a5 uds] ulou Cornarius, Stephanus: sec/. Ast
130a6 cttcScScjjkcl] cttcScScokclv Schanz
130a8 uop] ulou Cornarius, Stephanus: sec/. Ast
130b2 cycyopcL] cycydpcLP Schanz
130b7 pf)] pa Cobet
130d2 tlpl] tlpl Wagner
130d3 pep vt)] pep tl pt) Stephanus
130d4 Trapa aou] Trapa aou Burnet
130e3 c$ls] Xc^ls Vat.1029
130e9 epou] epoi Hermann
131a3 TauTa pcXTLOTa] sec/. Hirschig
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